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This thesis analyses the writings of Lionel Curtis 
(1872-1955), in particular his federation projects, 
from an International Relations perspective. It argues 
that the textbook versions of the so-called 'First 
Debate' between naive idealists and hard-boiled 
realists is inadequate for a meaningful 
conceptualization of Curtis's thought.
Instead, a neo-Gramscian perspective is adopted 
here, in which the relations between state and civil 
society is the crucial variable distinguishing between 
different state/society complexes. In this 
interpretation, Curtis's federation plans had two aims: 
First, integrating the Lockean heartland against 
Hobbesian contenders and colonial independence 
movements. Second, stemming Britain's relative decline 
vis-a-vis the USA within the heartland.
Chapter One summarizes the textbook 
characteristics of idealism and realism and discusses 
some criticisms of and alternative versions to this 
dichotomy.
Chapter Two follows the revisionist 
interpretations of E.H. Carr's writings and argues that 
his position cannot be reduced to putting down idealism 
in favour of realism.
Chapter Three provides an overview of Curtis's 
life and major activities.
Chapter Four traces out textbook elements of 
idealism and realism within Curtis's writings and shows 
that he could be placed into both camps.
?
Chapter Five introduces the neo-Gramscian 
framework used in the thesis, particularly the work of 
Kees van der Pijl.
Chapter Six gives an overview of three political 
movements which are of relevance for understanding 
Curtis's thought: empire federalism, new liberalism and 
social imperialism.
Chapter Seven shows how elements of these 
movements as well as of liberal internationalism and of 
the state monopoly tendency appear in Curtis's 
writings.
Chapter Eight discusses what Curtis had to say 
about other state/society complexes of the Lockean 
heartland, the Hobbesian contenders and the colonial 
Prize area.
The Conclusion summarizes the argument.
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Introduction
Why Lionel Curtis?
In 1951, towards the end of his long life, Lionel 
Curtis reflected over the disasters that mankind had 
encountered during the first half of the 20th century. 
The maintenance of national sovereignties had twice 
pushed the world into a gruesome war. And at the time 
of his speech, people were already living in dread of a 
third one.
However, there was hope. Curtis referred back to 
the proposal of a South African union, drafted by him 
and others half a century ago and eagerly taken up by 
wise politicians, that had ended all threat of war 
between the English and the Boers at once. And now, the 
Canadian Senate had just passed a resolution calling 
for a convention to form a federal union encompassing 
the countries of Western Europe and Northern America. 
The idea of Atlantic federal union was supported in the 
U.S. by 27 Senators. In the United Kingdom, both Prime 
Minister Attlee and opposition leader Churchill were 
thought to be sympathetic to the project.
But, ultimately, it was the intellectuals who bore 
the heaviest responsibility. If they would tell the 
ordinary people the truth about international 
relations, i.e. that the abolition of national 
sovereignties was necessary, they could unlock the gate 
to peace. By their failure to have done so in the past, 
they had proved themselves guilty of the cataclysms 
that had, so far, befallen this century.
Looking to the future, Curtis was guardedly 
optimistic. If the right decisions were made now,
historians of the year 2000 A.D., living in a world of 
peace, order, prosperity and happiness, would be 
looking in astonishment at the chaotic first half of 
the 20th century and wonder why statesmen had been so 
slow to draw the lessons of World War I and to do away 
with national sovereignties.1
Today, the magical year 2000 has passed. An 
Atlantic federal union does not exist and is not soon 
to be expected. And neither can we claim to be living 
in a particularly peaceful and orderly world. With 
hindsight, it is easy to smile at the apparent naivety 
of Curtis's vision. Single-issue blueprints for a 
golden future, in this case federal union and the 
abolition of sovereignty, have gone out of fashion. 
Pre-Mandela South Africa hardly recommends itself as a 
model the rest of the world should emulate. It is 
difficult to comprehend how a North Atlantic super­
state, whose combined power would have raised concern 
by other states, particularly the Soviet Union, could 
have contributed to world peace. Furthermore, Curtis's 
lecturing about the heavy responsibilities for world 
peace that intellectuals like himself have to bear 
appears as inflated self-importance.
No wonder, then, that even Curtis's main 
biographer does not take his pet projects very 
seriously. After narrating how Curtis, in his function 
as Acting Town Clerk of Johannesburg in 1902, had 
carried through a decision to extend the city borders
1. Lionel Curtis, 'The 'Fifties as Seen Fifty Years 
Hence', in International Affairs 27 (1951), pp.273-84, 
here pp.273-77, 284.
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to include the mining areas surrounding it,2 Deborah 
Lavin commentss
In the process he had recognized a principle he 
believed to be of fundamental significances that the 
common interest of any community ... could not be 
served by the mere co-operation of separate authorities 
but only realized organically, in a common organ of 
administration ... Seldom can an idea have been so 
relentlessly applied. The argument originally 
formulated for the mines was elaborated and extended 
with no apparent sense of incongruity to ... the Union 
of South Africa, the federation of the British Empire, 
even ... a single world government.3
Lavin considers it particularly odd that Curtis managed 
to convince himself that the ideal of a federal 
unification of the Empire-Commonwealth, which according 
to her was already outdated by the end of World War I , 
could serve as model for a world state and as a panacea 
for all international problems.4 From all this, we can 
get the impression that Curtis was something like a 
trader in intellectual patent medicine. Why should one 
bother to deal with him and his work, except as a 
historical curiosity?
But things are not as easy as that. There are 
four reasons why he deserves to be treated better than 
that. First of all, alongside his utopian federal 
projects for which, among those few who know of his 
existence at all he is most famous (and notorious), 
Curtis had a more practical side as well. Although he 
held official posts only for comparatively short 
periods, he was well-placed within the networks (old 
boys' and others) of the British ruling and governing
2. Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International 
Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995, pp.40-45.
3. Ibid., pp.45-46.
4. Ibid., pp.ix-x, 323.
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classes to leave his mark at important political 
turning-points.
When he referred to his role in the 
transformation of the four British colonies into the 
Union of South Africa in 1910, this was not mere 
boasting. While Curtis was not the only midwife of the 
new white Dominion, his own contribution as member of 
the High Commissioner's staff was nevertheless 
extremely important. Later on, Curtis in typical 
fashion acted as unofficial adviser to the Government 
of India and the India Office. His proposals on the 
extension of self-government in India were to a large 
extent taken over by the authorities and materialized 
as the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919. Although 
this was hardly the intention of either Curtis or the 
India Office, these reforms clearly set India on a 
track leading ultimately to independence. And, shortly 
after, as official Adviser to the Colonial Office, 
Curtis also tried his hand at the Irish cauldron. 
Selling de facto independence for Ireland as nominal 
Dominion status to both London and Dublin, he helped to 
bring about the Irish Free State in 1921. Finally, 
turning from politics to academia, it was Curtis who 
founded the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
South African Union, Indian 'dyarchy', the Irish 
Free State, the RIIA - this is a heritage that is 
hardly to be neglected. Curtis's plans for federal 
unions (encompassing either the British Empire, or 
Europe, or the North Atlantic area, or the whole 
planet) might be ignored. Nevertheless, his 
achievements as political adviser and institutional 
founder are big enough to secure him a respectable
1?
place in history, even if his federation projects were 
just naive pipedreams.
But were they? This brings us to the second reason 
of taking him and his ideas seriously. True, all that 
has come out of the ambitions for imperial federation 
is the Commonwealth of Nations - a solid detached house 
rather than the magnificent palace Curtis dreamt of.
The Atlantic union project had its heyday in the 1940s 
but has by now sunk without a trace - unless we 
consider NATO as a scaled-down version of it. On the 
other hand, the project of European unification remains 
alive and well, and we might still live to see the 
emergence of a European federal state. Ironically, if 
such a development will happen. Great Britain is more 
likely to stay outside or to be dragged along rather 
than leading the process, as Curtis had hoped.
As far as world federation is concerned, its 
realization is a much more remote possibility. 
Nevertheless, the idea of replacing the system of 
nation-states by a world government has not completely 
dropped off the agenda but is still propagated by some.5 
A more modest proposal that does not aim to eliminate 
nation-states but to limit their power has recently 
been made by Anthony Giddens. He envisages a kind of 
global EU, with a parliament, administrative body, 
inter-governmental association and federal court of 
law.6 Clearly, such ideas are not to be dismissed 
lightly. Given the global problems, it may be argued
5. Maja Brauer, Weltfoderation: Modell globaler 
Gesellschaftsordnung. Frankfurt am Main etc.: Peter 
Lang, 1995.
6. Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: A Renewal of Social 
Democracy. Cambridge: Polity, 1998, p.144.
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that the construction of a world-wide governmental body 
is even more urgent today than it was in Curtis's time. 
Seen from this aspect, his proposals still remain of 
interest.
This does not mean, however, that they do not 
deserve severe criticism. But this criticism should not 
be based on their alleged 'impracticality' but rather 
the configuration of interests that was behind these 
projects. This is the third reason why Curtis is of 
more than marginal interest. If we only look at the 
specific means he propagated, i.e. the different 
federal unions, we can say that all his ambitions have 
failed miserably. But if we rather turn our attention 
to the ultimate agenda underlying these projects, the 
record is much more impressive.
It is one of the core arguments of this thesis 
that Curtis was not a starry-eyed lover of mankind but 
that he had a quite down-to-earth (but, nevertheless, 
problematic) vision: A close cooperation between the 
United Kingdom and the United States against outside 
challengers and the establishment of an Anglo-Saxon 
global hegemony. This ultimate agenda was not only his 
own pet project but was consistently pursued by 
influential groups on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Curtis's specific proposals fell on deaf ears. 
Nevertheless, his implicit and sometimes not-too- 
implict assertion of the moral superiority of the 
Anglo-Saxons and their God-given right to manage world 
affairs found a much more favourable audience. In this 
respect, the many books, articles and speeches that 
Curtis and other pan-Anglo-Saxonists produced were far 
from wasted.
Yes, there is no North Atlantic federal union 
today. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the alienation between the present US 
government and the 'Old Europe", the special 
relationship between Washington and London has reached 
an unforeseen importance. Were Curtis alive today, he 
would probably have applauded the American-British 
campaign in Iraq as a moral crusade. He would only have 
added that, had the US and Britain federated, Saddam 
Husayn would never have dared to misbehave in the first 
place.
From the perspective of the history of IR as a 
discipline, there is a fourth reason why Curtis 
deserves to be rediscovered. This is the light his 
approach, and the context of this approach, throw on 
the discussion about whether there really was a 'First 
Debate" and, if so, how this debate should be 
conceptualized•
The First Debate Revisited
It is a widely accepted wisdom in International 
Relations scholarship that the inter-war period 
witnessed the 'First Great Debate" of the discipline.
It is often asserted or taken for granted that in this 
period classical realism clashed with naive idealism, a 
dispute reaching its culmination with the publication 
of E.H. Carr"s The Twenty Years' Crisis in 1939, and 
the consequent defeat of idealism by realism. The 
Twenty Years" Crisis is seen as a realist manifesto 
which issued in a 'paradigm shift" in International 
Relations thought and paved the intellectual ground for 
the postwar hegemony of realism.
Behind this common wisdom there are several 
interconnected assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
realism and idealism are, at their very basic forms at 
least, by and large uncontestable terms. For realism, 
the major actors in the world are nation-states. These 
nation-states struggle with each other for political, 
economic and ideological power, i.e. their relationship 
is characterised by an ineluctable conflict of 
interests. Therefore, power and use of force in 
interstate relations represent the prime dynamics of 
the international system. They are, together with state 
interests, the main elements which students of 
international studies should focus upon.7 Realists do 
not expect any essential change in this situation. The 
best one can hope for is the balancing of power.
Idealists, on the other hand, are those who in one 
way or another envisage progress in overcoming the 
conflictual aspects of international relations. In the 
discipline, idealism is normally used to denote liberal 
internationalism. It is conceded that idealist 
approaches to international relations have been very 
variable: Examples of such idealists range from those 
of the inter-war era, who came up with an array of 
proposals aimed at the circumvention of the war-prone 
conditions in international relations which had caused 
the havoc of the World War, to the "neo-idealists' of
7. Whether this assertion is based upon an emphasis on 
human nature as guided primarily by competitive 
instincts, as in classical realism, or upon a 
conception of the "international system' having its own 
logic which constrains state "actors', as in the 
structural realism of Kenneth Waltz, the result in 
terms of how the general picture of world politics 
looks is, according to more generalised accounts of 
realism, the same.
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the 1990s who focused on international regimes. 
Idealists put their bets on the pacific aspects of 
capitalism in combination with the essentially 
consensus-oriented human nature and the resultant 
potential for a harmony of interests, with some 
measures derived from the application of liberal 
democratic political theory to domestic and 
international politics, these factors lead in the long 
run into a benign direction. According to the 
idealists, and contrary to the pessimistic and 
defeatist paraboles of realism, progress in 
international relations is possible.
The second assumption is that idealism and realism 
constitute a dichotomy. One is either a realist, or an 
idealist. Connected to this assumption is the 
supposition that the inter-war era witnessed a 'Great 
Debate" between liberal internationalists (like Norman 
Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Arnold Toynbee) and Carr as 
the representative of realism. Allegedly, realism 
emerged as the victor of this contest in the postwar 
period, as illustrated by the increasing dominance in 
the 1940s International Relations of such classical 
realists like Frederick Schuman, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau.
Finally, following on from the previous 
assumptions, it is assumed that Carr was a 'typical 
realist". In most textbooks, he is counted among the 
early realists. Connected to this, we are told that 
Carr claimed in The Twenty Years' Crisis that there was 
a dichotomy between realism and idealism.
To sum up, mainstream conceptions of realism and 
idealism in International Relations stand on a posited,
17
transhistorical dichotomy between these two traditions, 
which is often conceived of as a crude juxtaposition of 
realpolitik to liberal moralism. The legitimacy for 
this distinction is traced to Carr's work and an 
alleged "First Debate' between these two opponent 
views. The alleged dichotomy between realism and 
idealism has been so strongly determining for the 
conceptualisation of these two wide-ranging traditions 
that one can call it one of the founding myths of the 
discipline.
However, this founding myth, or cluster of 
founding myths, need to be critically reevaluated. In 
the first place, contrary to some facile 
interpretations, the thesis agrees with revisionist 
accounts which question the uncontestability of the 
meaning of the terms realism and idealism. Both of 
these approaches to IR are a composite of different 
strands of thinking. There is not one realism and one 
idealism, but two broad traditions which have evolved 
over time in response to varying ideational and 
material circumstances. This seems to be a commonplace 
assertion. Furthermore, systematising the features of 
schools of thought inevitably brings about a certain 
amount of simplification and distortion. Despite this, 
it could be claimed that the canvassing of realism and 
idealism in IR textbooks is often done with too broad a 
brush. And there is a very specific reason for this:
The above-mentioned process of dichotomization based 
upon an alleged "First Debate' allegedly instigated by 
Carr.
The thesis further follows the revisionists by 
rejecting the dichotomy of realism and idealism, both
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in the sense these terms are understood in IR, and in 
the specific sense in which Carr (according to the IR 
textbooks!) allegedly employed them. This dichotomy 
is apparently possible in the context of the above­
sketched caricatures of realism and idealism. However 
the thesis aims to show that even on these terms, such 
a dichotomy is not sustainable.
Connected to this, the thesis rejects the view 
that the inter-war period provided the stage for a 
'Great Debate" seen in terms of a constellation of IR 
realists against IR idealists. There were numerous 
debates in international relations thought in this 
period. The relatively limited controversy between Carr 
and the liberal internationalists was one of these.
None of the inter-war debates on international issues, 
however, matched the oft-alleged 'paradigm debate" 
between the IR sense of realism and idealism.
What has all this to do with Curtis? Because his 
major works were published during the two world wars 
and the inter-war period, he clearly belongs to the 
generation of the alleged 'First Debate" in IR. If we 
look at his work from the the perspective of the 
idealism vs. realism dichotomy, a (for that 
perspective) very surprising fact emerges: Curtis could 
be equally well placed within either camp. This does 
not mean that he was an eclectic syntheziser who 
somehow found a compromise solution between idealism 
and realism. On the contrary, he was, in some ways, a 
consequent realist who, however, drew idealist 
conclusions from this very realism. The example of even 
one writer whose work transcends the dichotomy in this 
way is important, because it can help to illustrate how
IQ
weak what I have called the founding myth is. Much more 
important for the perspective of this thesis is, 
however, the social and intellectual context 
surrounding Curtis, and the light this context throws 
upon the connections between inter-war idealism and 
realism.
While this thesis owes a lot to the revisionist 
accounts challenging the traditional image of inter-war 
IR, most of these accounts are not completely 
satisfactory. Despite having done a good job of closely 
re-reading the key texts of that period, most of them 
neglect the specific historical background within which 
these texts need to be placed. The case for seeing a 
continuum rather than a dichotomy between inter-war 
realism and idealism, which this thesis asserts, cannot 
simply be raised at the textual level but has to 
address the material circumstances, particularly the 
forms of capital accumulation which prevailed while 
these texts were written. For this, the thesis resorts 
to the neo-Gramscian perspectives in IR, especially the 
writings of Kees van der Pijl.
Although they have not directly addressed the 
alleged "First Debate", the neo-Gramscians see academic 
treatises as serving concrete interests: either 
interest in reproducing existing conditions, or 
interest in changing things. Such interests can, in 
turn, be identified as those of certain classes, or 
factions of classes. However, parochial interests need 
not be advanced directly. Here, Antonio Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony comes in. A stable hegemonic order, 
whether domestically or internationally, is one in 
which the dominant group or state expresses its own
?n
demands or legitimates its own position in a way that 
also claims to meet the agendas of the other groups or 
states•
It is this line of thinking that is also behind 
Carr's charge that the inter-war idealists were 
hypocritically concerned with the 'have"-states" 
interest in the status quo. Indeed, we will see that 
Carr has been an inspiration to Robert Cox, In any 
case, this charge of hiding concrete interests behind 
seemingly value-free scholarship can also be levelled 
against the realists. In the case of Curtis, both 
idealist and realist elements were invoked to provide 
intellectual defence both of Britain's specific 
position vis-a-vis other capitalist powers and of the 
liberal Anglo-Saxon world against authoritarian 
Continental states.
For an analysis along these lines I draw upon two 
kinds of distinction developed by van der Pijl. First, 
there are different concepts of capitalist control tied 
to different capital factions: Liberal internationalism 
(tied to money capital and light industries), the state 
monopoly tendency (tied to productive capital, 
particularly heavy industries), and corporate 
liberalism (tied to finance capital as the synthesis of 
money and productive capital and geared especially to 
consumer industries). These 'comprehensive concepts of 
control"
are political formulas that lend cohesion and cogency 
to the rule of particular classes and fractions of 
classes by translating idealized class and fractional 
viewpoints into a strategic orientation for society as 
a whole.
They derive the authority for such a formulation from 
their key role in the economy,
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which at particular junctures in the process of capital 
accumulation and social development acquire a relevance 
beyond8
the strict functions of such classes and fractions of 
classes.
Second, there is the distinction between the 
Lockean heartland (consisting of state/society 
complexes with an autonomous, largely self-regulating 
civil society) and the Hobbesian contenders (consisting 
of state/society complexes in which the state apparatus 
is dominant over society)•
The ideas of Curtis represent the transition from 
British to American hegemony with the accompanying 
transition from liberal internationalism to corporate 
liberalism via the state monopolistic tendency. The 
ideas of Curtis, which reflect many of the major 
intellectual discussions that took place in Britain at 
that time, illustrate all of these transitions 
extremely well. Through his ideas, therefore, we can 
trace the evolution within the Lockean heartland in the 
early twentieth century, reflected in the transition 
from British to American hegemony. In this way they 
also provide a suitable basis for criticising the 
mainstream conceptualisations of realism, idealism and 
of the 'First Debate".
There are two kinds of fusion, two ways of seeing 
interwar realism and idealism as a continuum rather 
than a dichotomy here. On the one hand, a number of the 
classical realists, as immigrants from Germany, 
combined the power-political elements related to the
8. Kees van der Pijl, 'Ruling Classes, Hegemony and the 
State System: Theoretical and Historical
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Hobbesian state-society complex with idealist elements 
related to the Lockean state/society complex. On the 
other hand, Curtis and those close to him like Alfred 
Milner were with their social background related to the 
Lockean state/society complex. They therefore had 
internalised concepts like the liberal philosophy of 
the Pax Britannica as reflected in ideas of 'England"s 
mission". Nevertheless, they borrowed from discourses 
related to the Hobbesian state/society complex like 
efficiency, social imperialism, and the critique of 
British parliamentarianism. Their ideas are thus a 
different example of the integration of thought 
patterns related to, respectively, the Lockean and the 
Hobbesian state/society complex.
The Outline of the Chapters
As has been indicated, the major aim of the thesis 
is to level a critique of the mainstream IR 
conceptualisations of realism, idealism and of the 
'First Debate" through the example of Lionel Curtis and 
the intellectual and social millieu surrounding him. 
Based mainly upon IR textbooks, the first chapter 
summarizes these mainstream understandings. This thesis 
starts with the claim that there is a wide-spread but 
wrong textbook account of the 'First Debate". To 
substantiate this claim, it is necessary to refer to 
the mainstream books and articles themselves. Sources 
used include British, American and German publications. 
The use of German textbooks can also demonstrate that
Considerations", in International Journal of Political 
Economy 13 (1989), 3, pp.7-35, here pp.7-8.
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what I have called the textbook account is by no means 
restricted to Anglo-Saxon IR.
In recent years, there have been numerous 
reappraisals of these mainstream accounts. On the one 
hand, there are those accounts which reconceptualise 
International Relations as a whole, and in this context 
opt for different understandings of realism and 
idealism. On the other hand, there are those writers 
who have started a critique of the mainstream accounts 
from a liberal perspective. Many of these reappraisals, 
despite having rectified some misunderstandings about 
the 'First Debate', remain ideological, since they are 
reappraisals only at the level of ideas. They therefore 
reproduce many of the misunderstandings in a reverse 
way.
Since many of the postwar assumptions about 
realism, idealism, the 'First Debate' and the genesis 
of IR are premised on a specific interpretation of The 
Twenty Fears' Crisis, the way one sees the 'First 
Debate' is very closely related to the way one 
interprets that book and its author, E.H. Carr. Because 
of this, the second chapter is devoted to Carr. After 
referring to some liberal-oriented accounts criticizing 
Carr's incoherent use of his bogeyman-term utopianism 
(or idealism) I will point to further inconsistencies 
in the book with respect to the dichotomous 
relationship between realism and utopianism. 
Furthermore, for all his insistence on the importance 
of power and his despising of the concept of a 
naturally existing harmony of interests, Carr betrays 
his own version of a malleable world.
Expanding upon recent insights on Carr's 
dialectical use of his terms, I will argue that these 
apparent contradictions disappear if we distinguish 
between the polemical and the substantial parts of the 
book. In substantial terms, Carr enlisted both the 
''sociology of knowledge' and his sense of the 
historical process to uncover the interest- and time- 
bound background of allegedly universalist and 
benevolent projects.
The chapter continues with a short discussion of 
recent reappraisals of Carr from post-positivist 
quarters. The common denominator of these reappraisals 
is a challenging of the postwar reading of Carr as a 
positivist thinker, and his main contribution to IR as 
consisting of his power-political attack on idealism. 
They include a reading of Carr which locates him close 
to Gramscian historical materialism, which is the 
approach preferred in this thesis. It has to be 
underlined, however, that the thesis does not claim 
that this new reading of Carr provides us with all the 
answers. Rather, it sees this different reading as 
rendering clues which should be further developed in 
the context of critical theory in IR.
In the third chapter, the thesis looks more 
closely at the case of Lionel Curtis. The chapter 
provides a biographical overview of his life and lists 
his major activities and ideas. In particular, his role 
in the imperial politics concerning South Africa, India 
and Ireland is mentioned - without, however, going into 
details about the elaborate constitutional devices he 
developed for these countries. The content of his 
publications is only briefly summarized, since a more
detailed discussion of them will be found in the 
following chapters. Finally, there are also short 
discussions of the groups he was involved with, 
foremost among them the Round Table, but also the 
Federal Union and the United Europe movements.
Chapter Four deals with the textbook version of 
the "First Debate' as applied to Curtis. Curtis could 
be seen as both an IR idealist and an IR realist. For 
example, he shared the normative concerns and the 
optimistic faith in human reason and the possibility of 
global cooperation usually accorded to the idealists.
On the other hand, according to the shallow and generic 
interpretation of realism which still prevails in the 
discipline, Curtis could also be seen as the 
archetypical realist.
If realism consists of the deep awareness of the 
unavoidable conflict of interests in the context of an 
anarchical international system, an emphasis on power, 
and a head-on defense of the national interests of 
one's country, then Curtis would have easily fulfilled 
the requirements of such a realist. The dichotomous, 
"paradigmatic' conceptualisation of the relationship 
between realism and idealism seems singularly ill- 
placed for the interpretation of his worldview. An 
alternative approach is necessary.
In Chapter Five, an overview of the alternative 
line proposed here is given by a discussion of Gramsci, 
Cox and van der Pijl. I do not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive summary of their thought. Particularly 
given the richness of Gramsci's works, this would have 
been too vast an undertaking. This chapter thus 
restricts itself to a short treatment of Gramsci's
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distinction between political and civil society, his 
concept of hegemony and its implications for 
revolutionary action, and the role of the 
intellectuals. In the case of Cox, I dwell upon his 
criticism of IR realism as "problem-solving theory" and 
his particular understanding of hegemony. Finally, van 
der Pijl's distinction between different forms of 
accumulation and the accompanying concepts of control 
and the characterization of the Lockean heartland and 
the Hobbesian contenders are summarized.
In Chapter Six, the major currents of thought in 
early 20th century Britain which aimed to supersede 
old-style liberalism will be discussed. There was, in 
Gramscian terms, a hegemonic crisis within Britain's 
historic bloc at the turn of the century, during which 
a number of political movements came to the fore. These 
were the - somewhat dated - imperial federation schemes 
resurrected by Curtis and his companions, the so-called 
new liberalism representing the productive-capital 
perspective, and social imperialism, which largely 
followed state-monopolist currents of thought.
In the ideas of Curtis conceptions of a "world- 
state" based upon an initial "Empire Federation" 
between Britain and her Dominions, and clear 
articulations of Britain's national interests in a 
context of declining hegemony were firmly welded 
together. This will be demonstrated in two steps.
In Chapter Seven, it will be shown that Curtis's 
works, including his later publications, were 
decisively shaped by the discussions of the turn of the 
century. The connections with Empire federalism are 
obvious. Furthermore, a close reading of his
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publications shows that Curtis adhered to the new 
liberal and especially to the social imperialist agenda 
of the early 20th century for the following 50-odd 
years. This will be demonstrated by summarizing his 
criticism of traditional liberal internationalism, his 
stress on the individual's need to realize himself 
through society, Curtis's ambivalent attitude to 
democracy, his emphasis on the typical social 
imperialist pet issues of social reform and 
'efficiency' and his stance towards coloured 
immigration. It will also be seen that his rejection of 
Tariff Reform is not to be misinterpreted as a 
distancing of himself from the social imperialist 
agenda.
Chapter Eight proceeds to look at Curtis from 
another angle. It develops the idea that the common 
denominator bringing together the realist and idealist 
strands in the thought of Curtis was the search for a 
new hegemonic stabilisation for Britain and the world 
order underpinned by the Pax Britannica. Dwelling upon 
his approach to the Dominions, the United States, the 
Hobbesian contenders and the 'coloured races', the 
thesis argues that all his federal union projects need 
to be seen as attempts to simultaneously strengthen the 
Lockean heartland and to bolster as much as possible 
Britain's ultimately handing over the torch to the USA. 
It will be shown how he cunningly developed schemes for 
British leadership vis-a-vis the Dominions and Western 
Europe, for a comfortable place for Britain once the 
ultimate American hegemony would be in place, and for a 
continued subordination of the Asian and African
peoples. All these schemes were expressed within the 
principles of equality, altruism and self-government.
The conclusion briefly summarizes the thesis's 
argument•
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Chapter One
Mainstream Understandings of the First Debate
Introduction
This chapter has two aims. First, it tries to 
dissect what I call the mainstream version of the 
'First Debate". It summarizes what idealism and realism 
supposedly say about human nature, ethics, the 
international system and recommendable policies; when 
the 'First Debate" allegedly took place and what the 
outcome was; and which role E.H. Carr is allocated in 
this account. As sources I use a number of treatises on 
IR history (beginning with a seminal article by Hedley 
Bull) as well as introductory textbooks. This will 
provide us with a framework within which, as a first 
step, we can discuss the writings of Curtis in Chapter 
Four.
Second, some alternative approaches are discussed: 
one which sees the idealism/realism debate not 
restricted to a certain phase of IR but actually 
encompassing the whole discipline; one which redefines 
the terms and gives them a meaning completely different 
from the mainstream accounts; and one which recommends 
dispensing with the terms idealism and realism 
altogether. Finally, a number of revisionist writers 
with liberal leanings are discussed, who question the 
conventional accounts of the 'First Debate" but 
simultaneously rise to the defence of the idealists.
Idealism and Realism According to Hedley Bull
What are the common conceptions of realism, 
idealism and of the 'First Debate"? Let us start with
an overview of IR's history provided by Hedley Bull at 
the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Aberystwyth 
chair.1 According to Bull, the foremost distinguishing 
characteristic of interwar idealism was its 
progressivisms the belief that through conscious 
intervention on the international system of enlightened 
minds a peaceful and just world order could be created 
and, indeed, was already in the process of being 
created. For this process, the past was poor guidance. 
The idealists gave precedence to internationalist 
morality over national interests, but thereby failed to 
explain how the former was determined, and confused it 
with international law. As a consequence, idealism 
became the doctrine of the status quo powers.
The idealists believed in the possibility of 
international cooperation and harmony, fostered by the 
spread of democracy and by the peaceful effects of 
global financial and commercial links. They discounted 
the principle of state sovereignty, old-style diplomacy 
and the balance of power. Instead, they recommended 
arbitration mechanisms, international law, disarmament, 
a system of collective security under the League of 
Nations, or the establishment of an international 
police force.
In contrast to the idealists" progressivism, the 
realists stressed the cyclical pattern of international 
politics and the need to draw lessons from the past.
The notion of national interest had to take precedence
1. Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics 
1919-1969" in Brian Porter (ed.), The Aberystwyth 
Papers: International Politics 1919 - 1969, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1972, pp.30-55, here pp.33-39.
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over international morals. By upholding the statesmen's 
duty to their own nations the realists criticized the 
moralism of the idealists in moral terms.
The international system was for them anarchical 
and conflict-ridden, thus necessitating the pursuit of 
power politics. Consequently, the realists favoured 
state sovereignty, secret diplomacy, the balance of 
power and, if necessary, limited war.
Despite these differences, for Bull idealism and 
realism have at least similar starting points in 
discussing questions of morality. Being more careful 
than many later writers, he also points out that many 
apparent similarities of IR realism with Machiavelli, 
Hegel or Treitschke are only skin-deep.
Bull identifies a specific period for the debate 
between both schools. Idealism rose as reaction to the 
experience of World War I and dominated IR during the 
1920s and early 1930s. It was then replaced by realism, 
which set the disciplines' agenda during the late 1930s 
and the 1940s. This was related to the highly 
conflictual character of international affairs during 
that time. Afterwards, realism was in turn challenged 
by behaviouralism.
Among the idealists mentioned by Bull are Zimmern, 
Noel-Baker, Mitrany, Dickinson, Woolf and Brailsford. 
Concerning the realists, he stresses their heterogenous 
character. The list includes Carr, Niebuhr, Morgenthau 
and Kennan. In the case of Carr, Bull foreshadows later 
revisionist accounts. He stresses the important 
influence that the Marxist analysis of ideology, as 
mediated through Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, 
exerted upon him. Bull correctly mentions the polemical
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character of The Twenty Years' Crisis, which had 
contemporary relevance and did not attempt to provide 
claims of universal and permanent validity. 
Nevertheless, in saying that Carr's target was utopian 
liberal internationalism, Bull plays down the degree to 
which Carr was equally distant to hard-core realism.
Bull's account of the 'first debate" is far from
neutral. For him, the substitution of idealism by
realism was a development beneficial to the discipline.
He dubs the idealists as superficial and as lacking
intellectual depth and explanatory power:
The quality that shines through all their work is 
innocence, a disposition to accept the externals of 
international relations at face value, which in later 
generations of writers was dislodged by greater
influence upon them of the social sciences.2
While realism also comes in for criticism - it is
dated, contains tautologies and shifting definitions,
and lacks high standards of theoretical refinement -
Bull still sees it as an advance over idealism. In
particular, realism has the function
of deflating the facile optimism and narrow moralism 
that passed for an advanced attitude to foreign affairs 
in the English-speaking countries.3
Despite all qualifications. Bull's article 
provides most of the ingredients of a story that is 
told over and over again: There was a somewhat immature 
foundation period of IR, during which a bunch of nice 
but naive people were busily creating cloud-cuckoo- 
lands based upon an unfounded faith in human progress. 
IR only reached the stage of a science proper once the
2. Ibid., p.36.
3. Ibid., p.39.
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hard-headed realists with their sober pessimism got in 
charge.
Of course, the details of the story vary, and not 
everyone depreciates the idealists in as stark terms as 
Bull. Nevertheless, if we combine the different 
information given by a number of publications, the 
following account emerges of what the terms idealism 
and realism are supposed to mean and how they are to be 
evaluated.
Human Nature and the Possibility of Progress:
In a recent introductory textbook about 
International Relations, the reason for studying 
liberalism (like in most conceptualisations, inter-war 
idealism, by which liberal internationalism is 
indicated, is seen as a subset of the liberal approach 
to IR) is given as the following:
To form your own opinion about the most keenly debated 
issue in IR: the pessimistic view of realism versus the 
optimistic view of liberalism.4
In many textbooks, similar general assumptions 
about how the realists and the idealists (or liberals) 
conceive human nature and the results of this 
conception for their respective views on world politics 
are made. According to these mainstream interpretations 
of realism and idealism, progressivism versus 
resignation as prime characteristics associated with 
these paradigms is connected to their differing 
conceptions of human nature and reason.
4. Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, Introduction to 
International Relations, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p.108.
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It is, therefore, this fundamental divide between 
the willing or unwilling submission, which 
characterizes realism, and the optimistic insistence to 
attempt to surmount the obstacles that is frequently 
taken to constitute the main narrative of the 
realism/idealism debate.
To give another example, we are told that idealism 
is concerned with how the realm of international 
politics ought to be, i.e. a peaceful world community. 
Realism focuses upon how the international realm is and 
tries to draw lessons from the past.5
Liberalism-idealism is habitually spelled in the 
same breath with concepts like:
optimism  .... . a belief in social and political
mutability, an emphasis on global interests and 
cooperation through international law and organisation, 
and a renewed faith in public opinion.6
In other words, it has the connotation of
progressivism: the belief in the possibility of the
reform of the international system and the desire to
reform it.
This image is wide-spread:
Indeed this attempt to reform the international milieu 
is a defining characteristic of the liberal tradition 
in international ethics.
asserts Michael J. Smith.7 Even Peter Wilson, who, as 
will be shown below, is aware of the artificiality of
5. Reinhard Meyers, 'Internationale Beziehungen als 
akademische Disziplin', in Dieter Nohlen (ed.), Lexikon 
der Politik. vol. 6, Internationale Beziehungen (ed. 
Andreas Boekh), Frankfurt am Main: Biichergilde 
Gutenberg, 1994, pp.231-42, here p.232.
6. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive 
Quest : Theory and International Politics, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1988, p.92.
7. Michael Joseph Smith, 'Liberalism and International 
Reform', in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), 
Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge etc:
the label idealism, still argues that the common 
denominator within the diversity of the thought of 
those dubbed idealists is their desire for conscious 
progressive change.8
The confidence in the feasibility of reform in 
idealism/liberalism stems from the “belief in the human 
capacity for wisdom', which is a “hallmark of the 
liberal tradition'.9 Human beings are in essence 
potentially reasonable and altruistic, although these 
characteristics are in competition with animalistic 
instincts and can be thwarted by imperfect political 
arrangements. Idealists thus stress the need for 
education and the primacy of ideas.10
Human beings have the potential to create a just 
order for the whole of humankind. In this broad form, 
liberal idealism is the reassertion of the 
Enlightenment project: It is the retrieving of the 
Kantian conception of partly rational human beings who
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.201-24, here
p.202.
8. Peter Wilson, “Introduction: The Twenty Years' Crisis 
and the Category of wIdealism" in International 
Relations', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.). 
Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War 
Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, pp.1-24, 
here p .13.
9. Lucian M. Ashworth, Creating International Studies: 
Angell, Mitranv and the Liberal Tradition, Aldershot 
etc.: Ashgate, 1999, p.203.
10. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1990, pp.19-20; Charles W. Kegley Jr., “The 
Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World 
Politics: An Introduction', in Charles W. Kegley Jr. 
(ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: 
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. 
Martin's, 1995, pp.5-23, here p.4; Michael Joseph 
Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton 
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press,
1986, pp.55-56? Trevor Taylor, “Utopianism', in Steve 
Smith (ed.), International Relations: British and 
American Perspectives, Oxford and New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985, pp.92-107, pp.94-95.
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are able to evaluate what is genuinely of benefit to
them, i.e. peace, and willing to achieve the harmonious
existence as a community of mankind as soon as they are
not prevented from doing so. The conclusions of
idealism/liberalism regarding the harmony of interests
or the possibility of the progressive development of
human society flow from this basic assumption about
human nature.11
At the same time, the alleged conception of human
nature according to the liberal internationalists that
such general accounts construct is somewhat mystifying.
The usual account starts with the premises "Liberals
generally take a positive view of the human nature."12
Then frequently, a connection is drawn between this
positive view about the goodness in humans and reasons
They have great faith in human reason and they are 
convinced that rational principles can be applied to 
international affairs.13
Next, typically, this potential for acting reasonably 
will be connected to long-run interests. The liberal 
internationalists
believe that individuals share many interests and can 
thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social 
action, domestically as well as internationally, which 
results in greater benefits for everybody at home and 
abroad.14
Such accounts create a confusion between the moral and 
interest-based arguments of the liberal 
internationalists.
11 . Ashworth, Creating, pp.7-16, 133-36.
12. Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction, p.108.
13. Ibid., p. 108.
14. Ibid., p. 109.
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In the same textbook mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, of the four basic premises of realism, 
two are
(1) a pessimistic view of human nature; ... (4) a basic 
scepticism that there can be progress in international 
politics that is comparable to that in domestic life.15
This, again, reflects the mainstream view.
We frequently find claims like "the core of human
nature, for realists, lies in the egoistic passions,
which incline men and women to evil"16 or "human nature
is plain bad; that is the starting-point for realist
analysis." Human inclination for aggressive behaviour
arises from Freudian urges for hatred and destruction
or, alternatively, from the Christian original sin.17
Humans are caught in a tragic contradiction between
their material capabilities and their spiritual
limitations, resulting in a chronic state of fear of
others. This fear, in turn, creates a boundless search
for security by gaining power over others.18
There are objective laws in human nature, which
has to be dealt with as it is, not as it ought to be.19
Consequently,
(r)ealists tend to hold pessimistic views on the 
likelihood of the transformation of the current world 
into a more peaceful one.20
15. Ibid., p.68.
16. Jack Donnelly, "Twentieth Century Realism", in Terry 
Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.). Traditions of 
International Ethics, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp.85-111, here p.86.
17. Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction, p.42.
18. Reinhard Meyers, Die Lehre von den Internationalen 
Beziehungen: Ein entwicklunqsqeschichtlicher uberblick, 
Konigsstein and Diisseldorf: Athenaum and Droste, 1981, 
pp.52-53.
19. Hollis and Smith, Explaining, pp.23-25.
20. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International 
Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, 
Identity, 2nd ed., Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall,
2001, p.21.
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Human lust for power and the resulting struggles cannot 
be abolished.21 For the forseeable future, power 
politics and the constant danger of war will remain 
with us.
Ethics
Another dichotomy between idealism and realism 
refers to the former's universalism and the latter's 
moral relativism. One textbook definition puts the 
matter into a handy nutshell:
Realism emphasizes what separates political entities 
and people. Idealism is another tradition of political 
thought that emphasizes what unites people.22
At other textbooks we are told that, for the idealists
politics is a function of ethics while for the realists
it is exactly the other way round. For the idealists,
there are universal and progressive standards with
which they want to guide their state's foreign policy.
For the realists, the state can at best set through its
own particular code of morals within its borders.
Otherwise, its behaviour must not be guided by
universal moral standards but by the principle of
national interest, i.e. ultimately its own survival.23
It is repeatedly stressed that idealism, in
implied contrast to realism, is a normative approach.24
21. Kegley, 'Neoliberal Challenge', p.5.
22. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations and World 
Politics, p.49. Emphasis in the original.
23. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 
Contending Theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey, 5th ed., New York: Longman, 2001, 
p. 508; Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, The Contours of 
Power: An Introduction to Contemporary International 
Relations, New York: St. Martin's, 1996, p.138.
24. Timothy Dunne, 'Liberalism', in John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World
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It presumes the principal absence of major clashes of 
interests both within human society as well as between 
states. However, the idealists differ among themselves 
over the question whether this harmony of interests 
comes into its own under conditions of national self- 
determination, of capitalism allowing the rational 
pursuit of self-interest, of socialism, or of following 
a natural moral order. But they agree that there is an 
objective justice deriving from universal morality 
which can be detected through reason and experience.25
The general conception of human nature in realism, 
on the other hand, precludes any straightforward 
application of morality to international relations.
Each state has its own particular values and beliefs 
affecting its behaviour while, in the absence of a 
culture common to humanity, there can also be no 
international moral community.26
Realists adhere to an ethic of responsibility, 
which considers the danger that an individual act, 
praiseworthy as it may be on its own, can have adverse 
effects for the greater good of a nation. Conversely, 
immoral acts can be justified if they foster this 
common good. Furthermore, realists tend to charge 
seemingly universal principles as covers for the more
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.147-63, here 
p. 152; Hollis and Smith, Explaining, p.19.
25. Taylor, 'Utopianism", pp.93-94. See also Reinhard 
Meyers, 'Idealistische Schule", in Dieter Nohlen (ed.), 
Lexikon der Politik. vol. 6. Internationale Beziehungen 
(ed. Andreas Boekh), Frankfurt am Main: Biichergilde 
Gutenberg, 1994, pp.200-04, here p.201.
26. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 
p.508; Timothy Dunne, 'Realism', in John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.
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parochial self-interests of the dominant states. Thus, 
they incline to moral relativism.27
It is also assumed that according to realist 
analysis the international arena is divorced from the 
domestic arena. Realists are supposed to believe that 
the conditions for a moral society do not apply at the 
international realm, because there it is national 
interest rather than morality which has the upper hand. 
Here, the hierarchical, orderly state of human 
relations that is provided domestically by the state 
does not obtain, and there is a worsened anarchical 
condition. Trying to act from the moral vantage point 
in international relations would not be prudent. Power, 
in this account, becomes an end in itself.
Consequently, realism is considered to be un-normative, 
juxtaposed to its idealist, i.e. 'normative" 
antagonist. According to Barry Buzan, post-WWII realism 
was distinguished from inter-war idealism by its 
emphasis on 'the need to study the international system 
as it was, rather than as one might like it to be".28
However, as Ferguson and Mansbach point out, the 
image of a normative idealism juxtaposed to an 
objective realism dealing with the 'facts' as they are 
is problematic. With their favouring of the national
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.109-24, here 
pp.116-17.
27. Dunne, realism, p.117.
28 . Barry Buzan, 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?" in 
Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge, 
New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1996, pp.47-65, here p.48. Although, to be fair to 
Buzan, he also asserts that 'the contrast between 
realists and idealists, though real, should not be 
overdrawn". Furthermore, he mentiones realisms 
normative bias towards conflictual assumptions." See 
ibid., pp.48-49.
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interests the realists themselves are guided by 
normative assumptions although they hide them behind 
the cloak of alleged objectivity. 'It is not that 
idealist analyses were more "normative and 
prescriptive", but that they were more overtly so."29
Image of International Politics
For textbook idealists, there exists a world 
community consisting of individuals and groups. 
International politics has the potential character of a 
non-zero-sum game. War simply does not pay and is also 
not inevitable. Making use of the domestic analogy, 
idealists see the need for a kind of international 
governance regulating interstate relations on the model 
of the societal order within a state.
Furthermore, they assume that state goals can 
change and are not necessarily of an aggressive kind. 
Democratic states tend to be peaceful and, 
consequently, the extension of democracy and national 
self-determination will make international affairs less 
and less war-prone. Another factor giving reason for 
hope are the forces of modernization and of economic 
interdependence, which have changed the character of 
interstate relations. Increased cross-border links and 
free trade promote peace.30
Ferguson and Mansbach, Elusive Quest, p.96. Emphasis 
in the original.
30. Arthouros-David Calamaros, Internationale 
Beziehungen: Theorien - Kritik - Perspektiven,
Stuttgart etc.: W. Kohlhammer, 1974, p.23; Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, p.66; Dunne, 
'Liberalism", p.152; Hollis and Smith, Explanation, 
p.18; Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction, p.39; Kegley, 
'Neoliberal Challenge", pp.4, 10-13; Meyers, 
'Internationale Beziehungen", pp.232-33; Taylor, 
'Utopianism", p.97.
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Realism comes up with the reverse picture. In the 
above-mentioned textbook, the two other defining 
characteristics of it are:
(2) a conviction that international relations are 
necessarily conflictual and that international 
conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; (3) a high 
regard for the values of national security and state 
survival;31
Instead of a world community, there is the 
anarchical system of states which are in continuous 
struggle for power with each other. International 
politics is a zero-sum game. As far as the domestic 
analogy is concerned, realists do not have a pacified 
society in mind but, rather, a Hobbesian pre-societal 
state of nature. In the absence of a world-wide 
monopoly of violence and due to the existence of 
limited resources, competition is the rule.
States are the only actors which count on the 
international stage. Their primacy is highlighted by 
the principle of sovereignty and they are 
conceptualized as unitary and rational. Motives and 
ideological preferences of statesmen are irrelevant for 
the observation of their behaviour. Only the pursuit of 
interest defined in terms of power counts. Acquisition 
of military capabilities is more important than 
economic performance. The latter gains relevance only 
in so far as it contributes to power.32
31. Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction. p.68.
32. Dunne, realism, pp.114-17; Hollis and Smith, 
Explaining, p.25; Kegley, 'Neoliberal Challenge", pp. 4- 
5; Meyers, 'Internationale Beziehungen", pp.232-33;
Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International 
Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism. Globalism. New 
York and London: Macmillan and Collier Macmillan, 1987, 
pp. 6-7; Michael Ztirn, 'Neorealistische und Realistische 
Schule", in Dieter Nohlen (ed.), Lexikon der Politik. 
vol. 6. Internationale Beziehungen (ed. Andreas Boekh),
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Policy Recommendations
For idealists, the establishment of a pacific 
international order is the ultimate aim. To achieve 
this, they put their bets upon education and the power 
of an enlightened public opinion; upon diplomacy and 
mechanisms for arbitration of international conflicts; 
and upon disarmament, the outlawing of war or even 
full-blown pacifism. But particularly high on the 
idealist shopping list are international organizations 
like the League of Nations, collective security and 
international law. Some idealists want to go even 
further and call for the establishment of an 
international police force dealing with offenders of 
peace.33
As Taylor points out, idealism is ambivalent 
concerning an even more far-reaching scheme: a world 
authority overriding the states. While many idealists 
favour this idea on both emotional and practical 
grounds, others believe that it is possible to reform 
the international system without the abolition of 
sovereign states.34
Frankfurt am Main: Bhchergilde Gutenberg, 1994, pp.309- 
22, here pp.310-11.
33. Calamaros, Internationale Beziehungen. pp.23-24; 
Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, Introduction 
to International Relations: Power and Justice. 4th ed., 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990, pp.8-9;
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories. pp.65- 
66; Dunne, 'Liberalism', p.152; Hollis and Smith, 
Explanation, pp.19-20; Jackson and Sorensen, 
Introduction. pp.38-39; Kegley, 'Neoliberal Challenge', 
pp.12-14; Meyers, 'Internationale Beziehungen', p.233; 
Smith, Realist Thought, pp.56-60, 62, 67; Taylor, 
'Utopianism', pp.95-97; Viotti and Kauppi,
International Relations Theory, p.61.
34. Taylor, 'Utopianism', p.98.
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Discounting the possibility of achieving world 
peace for good, the textbook realists propagate more 
modest goals, namely the successful pursuit of national 
interests within the context of a stable interstate 
system. Realists are not only sceptical about the 
effectivity of international organizations and 
international law but also consider military alliances 
between states as fragile. In the end, states must 
resort to self-help in order to guarantee their 
security and continuing existence.
This reliance upon self-help creates a ceaseless 
security dilemma: As one state increases its power to 
gain security, others feel bound to follow suit. This 
security dilemma can be mitigated by the balance of 
power system (being contrived or coming into place 
automatically), which, however, will occasionally break 
down. Making use of secret diplomacy complements the 
realist programme. So does recourse to war, if all 
other means fail to provide security.35
The Dichotomy Between Idealism and Realism
Viotti and Kauppi argue that a
too rigid idealist-realist dichotomy can be misleading 
... since many realists also incorporate value 
considerations in their analyses and prescriptions.36
This is correct, although they might have added that
35. Calamaros, Internationale Beziehungen, p.24; 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, p.67; 
Dunne, 'Realism", pp.117-18; Kegley, 'Neoliberal 
Challenge", pp.4-5; Meyers, 'Internationale 
Beziehungen", p.233; Viotti and Kauppi, International 
Relations Theory, p.7.
36. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations and World 
Politics, p.501. See also their International Relations 
Theory, pp.34, 522-23.
also many idealists incorporate power politics in their 
accounts. As it stands, Viotti's and Kauppi's 
qualification of the dichotomy implies that realists, 
but not idealists, have the open-minded approach.
Others stress that both realism and idealism have 
a normative and ontological orientation37 or that both 
schools are rooted in the Enlightenment belief in 
progress - although idealists understand progress in 
static-ethical terms while realists have a dynamic and 
relativist understanding of it.38
But many authors are less careful. They see a 
'marked contrast"39 or 'radically different 
philosophical foundations".40 Idealism and realism are 
polar opposites.41 They
stand in sharp contrast to each other ... because of 
their differing approaches to the origins of 
institutions and political behavior generally.42
This stressing of the dichotomy goes hand in hand with
a certain judgement between the two schools.
Evaluations
Given the implicit pro-realist bias in many 
textbooks, it is not surprising that they tend to agree 
with Bull that realism, though far from flawless, is an 
advance over idealism. The latter is charged with 
wishful thinking and illusions while the former brought
37. Calamaros, Internationale Beziehungen, p.26.
38. Meyers, Die Lehre, p.49.
39. Smith, Realist Thought, p.54.
Couloumbis and Wolfe, Introduction, p. 6.
41. Meyers, 'Idealistische Schule", p.200.
42. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 
pp.507-08.
the discipline from the realm of speculation down to 
earth, to the facts.43 Furthermore, idealism is 
journalistic and legalistic and is wanting in terms of 
methodology, theory and systematic collection of 
empirical support. In contrast, realism provides more 
coherent statements and an explicit terminology.44
Sometimes, the discounting of idealism is merely
implicit, coming to the fore in statements like this:
Norman Angell's high hopes for a smooth process of 
modernization and interdependence foundered on the 
harsh realities of the 1930s.45
Michael Smith, though not at all a scholar 
uncritical to realism, hardly hides his opinion about 
the idealists. He scornfully refers to 'the idealist 
hymn of internationalism" and charges them with 
'exasperated outbursts" and 'schoolmasterly 
admission",46
And, to give a final example:
After World War II a new generation of pragmatic 
scholars arose, determined never again to succumb to 
the lure of an idealism so powerful that it had 
prevented their predecessors from .•. confronting ... 
the probing tactics of Asian and European totalitarian 
powers in the 1930s.47
The 'First Debate"
There is some confusion in the literature about 
when exactly the 'First Debate" is supposed to have 
taken place. There are those who follow Bull in seeing 
the 1920s as the high-time of IR idealism, while 
placing the realist response to the period from the
43. Calamaros, Internationale Beziehungen, pp. 24-26.
44. Meyers, Die Lehre, pp.57-58.
45. Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction, p.40.
46. Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought, pp.54-55.
47. Couloumbis and Wolfe, Introduction, p.21.
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1930s to the 1940s or 1950s.48 Alternatively, and 
probably reflecting the point of view of American 
rather than British academia, the debate between 
idealists and realists is placed into the 1950s and 
said to have continued until today.49 Two widely 
divergent narratives about the timing of the alleged 
discussion between both schools or of the replacement 
of idealism by realism have found their way into the 
literature. Already this should make us beware of 
accepting at face value the image that there was a 
clearly identifiable 'First Debate" between idealism 
and realism in which the former was defeated by the 
latter.
Interpretations of Carr
Beyond launching the established understanding of 
realism and idealism, Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis 
has also provided us with 'the classic evaluation of 
the birth of the discipline of International 
Relations".50 As mentioned, this 'classic evaluation" is 
generally taken to indicate that the inter-war era was 
dominated by a (misguided) liberal internationalism, 
which failed to prevent the increasing ineffectiveness 
of the League of Nations and the rise of Nazism and 
Fascism. By matching the facts of the inter-war and
4S. Calamaros, Internationale Beziehungen. p.24; Jackson
and Sorensen, Introduction, p.44; Meyers, 
'Internationale Beziehungen', p.231; Snow and Brown,
The Contours, p.16. Viotti and Kauppi, International
Relations Theory, p.2.
49. Couloumbis and Wolfe, Introduction. pp.20-21, 157; 
Meyers, Die Lehre. p.57; Snow and Brown, Contours, 
p. 138.
5°. Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International 
Relations Theory. Manchester and New Yorks Manchester 
University Press, 1993, p.205.
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postwar eras more successfully, Carr's book has 
allegedly symbolized the paradigmatic victory of 
realism over idealism. Implicit in this assumption is 
the view of Carr as a pioneer of postwar realism. As 
Timothy Dunne points out,
there is without doubt a consensus in the discipline 
that Carr's text is the symbolic representation of an 
hierarchical dualism between 'political realism' and 
' utopianism '.51
No wonder, then, that Carr is often presented as a 
self-conscious realist. For example:
Carr astutely labeled the liberal position 'utopian' as 
a contrast to his own position, which he labeled 
"realist', thus implying that his approach was the more 
sober and correct analysis of international relations.52
Even when it is not claimed that .Carr called himself a
realist, he is frequently portrayed as the founder or
one of the founders of realism, who successfully
criticized the idealists.53
This is done by mentioning the anti-idealist 
polemics in The Twenty Years' Crisis and, at the same 
time, ignoring Carr's own version of utopianism and his 
rejection of unbridled realism. Thus, Carr is supposed 
to have a pessimistic view of the human nature - just 
like Morgenthau.54
Carr's morality, according to such a reading, is a 
morality stamped by power. International law for him is 
nothing but the reflection of power. It is the status
51 . Tim Dunne, 'Theories as Weapons: E.H. Carr and 
International Relations', in Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. 
Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave, 2000, pp.217-33, here p.231 n.26. Emphasis in 
the original.
52. Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction, p.41-42. My 
emphasis.
53. Buzan, 'Timeless Wisdom', p.48; Hollis and Smith, 
Explaining, pp.21-22; Snow and Brown, Contours, p.16.
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quo powers of the international system which determine 
the rules of the game. Idealism, which claims to 
provide a universal standard, is nothing but the 
reflection of the interests of such 'have" and 
consequently status quo powers. The progressivism of 
idealism and the attempt to apply universal standards 
of justice to the interpretation and conduct of 
international relations are only so many reflections on 
a thin veneer covering up ruthless calculations of 
self-interest and power. In other words, realism is the 
honest perspective and idealism something like the 
hypocritical version of realism.55
Furthermore, since realism is often taken to have 
remained essentially the same since its initial 
articulations, i.e. about power struggles between 
nation-states, Carr's conception of power is also 
interpreted in this way. According to this assumption, 
Carr's realism perceives international relations as the 
sum of the power-driven interactions of black-box-like 
sovereign states in an unchanging context of 
international anarchy.56
What he understands by idealism is, according to 
this view, the naive resistance against such 'facts" 
and the mistaken assumption that wishful thinking can 
change them. Carr's message is allegedly that one 
should focus upon how the world is instead of how it
54 . Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction. p.44; Snow and 
Brown, The Contours, p.16.
55. Jurgen Hartmann, Internationale Beziehungen, 
Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001, p.24; Hollis and Smith, 
Explaining, p.22.
56. Hartmann, Internationale Beziehungen, pp.23-24; 
Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction, p.44; Snow and 
Brown, The Contours, p.16.
ought to be, and that the achievement of permanent 
peace is unlikely anyway.57
Others qualify Carr's realism by mentioning that 
he was against extreme versions of it and that he saw 
international politics as an interplay between power 
and morality.58 While this interpretation of Carr is 
more to the point than simply describing him as an 
idealism-basher, it still reproduces the well-worn 
dichotomy. For example, Viotti and Kauppi stress that, 
although being a precursor of realism, Carr cannot be 
easily labelled. In his opposition to extreme realism, 
he sees idealism/values and realism/power as 
intertwined. So far, so good. But when referring to his 
image of international politics, Viotti and Kauppi 
simply mention his Thucydidean aspects (the role of 
fear and the exercise of power begetting more desire 
for power) and his emphasis on international anarchy.59
In the end, Carr has to be placed in a camp, and 
this seemingly can only be realism. Thus, even for 
these more balanced interpretations, Carr has 
effectively constructed a sophisticated image of level­
headed realism tempered with a slight but healthy dose 
of idealism.
57. John Baylis, "International Security in the Post- 
Cold War Era', in John Baylis and Steve Smith, The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997, pp.193-211, here p.196; Snow and Brown, 
The Contours, p.16
58. Calamaros, Internationale Beziehungen, p.25; 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, p.67; 
Dunne, "Realism', pp.112-13; Meyers, Die Lehre, p.48; 
Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations and World 
Politics, p.285.
59. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 
pp.40-41, 522-23.
So far, we have seen the mainstream version of 
idealism, realism and the 'First Debate'. While this 
version can still be found, particularly in the 
introductory textbooks to IR, there are by now a number 
of alternative accounts or criticisms. Some of them 
will now be discussed.
The 'First Debate' as the Debate
The general method of describing the history of 
the discipline is in terms of a succession of paradigm 
shifts.60 As such this is a useful analytical tool. 
However, with their generic, all-encompassing and 
ideologically loaded descriptions that prevail in IR, 
realism and idealism seem in one way or another to 
appear in all the paradigm debates. While it is 
probably correct that some of their elements remain the 
same throughout the paradigm debates, due to over­
generalisations the substantial ways in which their 
meanings change over time and across differing contexts 
are easily missed.
For instance, according to some writers, the 
reincarnation of the realism-idealism dichotomy has 
been pronounced within the context of the Third Debate, 
which is generally accepted to have been a debate 
between realism/neo-realism, liberalism/globalism/ 
pluralism, and neo-Marxism/structuralism. Indeed, 
according to some, the Third Debate itself is comprised 
of the controversy between state-centric accounts
60. Steve Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Disciplines A 
Genealogy of International Relations Theory', in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations 
Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, 1995, pp.1-37, here 
pp.13-21.
o
versus transnationalist ones, which partly corresponds 
to the debate between realism and idealism,61 Thus, the 
major dispute in the discipline is taken by some to be 
that between realism and idealism.
The debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
(the latter is also called the Harvard School of neo­
liberal institutionalism),62 which developed from the 
Third Debate, has, according to some scholars, been one 
space where the original confrontation between realism 
and idealism has been explicitly played out. In this 
view, neoliberalism is considered a form of 
'neoidealism".63 In the mid-nineties, Steve Smith has 
proclaimed this debate to be 'currently the most 
significant within the mainstream of US international 
theory".64 It is a debate which to some extent harks 
back to the 1970s controversies between state-centrism 
and transnationalism, but 'has much more to do with the 
debates between pluralist and neo-realist paradigms of 
the 1980s."65 The major issues of contention center 
around the prospects for international cooperation:
Both 'paradigms" are state-centric and start from a
61. Ibid., p.21.
62. Smith, 'Self-Images", pp.18-24. For a liberal 
critique of the Harvard School, see David Long, 'The 
Harvard School of Liberal International Theory: A Case 
for Closure", in Millennium 24 (1995), 3, pp.489-505.
63. See, for instance, David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993; Charles W. Kegley 
Jr.,'The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? 
Realist Myths and the New International Realities", 
International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), 2, pp.131- 
46; Kegley, 'Neoliberal Challenge", pp.9-14, and the 
other contributors to Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.). 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: 
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. 
Martin"s, 1995.
64. Smith, 'Self-Images", p.23.
65. Ibid., p.22.
given condition of international anarchy between 
nation-states. Neo-liberals represent the optimistic 
view that international institutions and the dynamics 
of the global economy contain within them substantial 
possibilities for mitigating international conflicts.
To those who consider this rather limited debate to 
represent the major controversy in IR, the whole 
history of IR has taken place in the clash between 
realist and liberal approaches:
Since its advent as a discipline, theoretical debate in 
(IR) has ranged primarily within the boundaries defined 
by the discourse between the realist and liberal 
visions. To a large degree, this division encompasses 
most of the other theoretical variants that have arisen 
at one time or another.
proclaims Charles W. Kegley Jr.66
This expanded conception of realism and 
liberalism, and of the substance of International 
Relations, enables writers like Kegley to see inter-war 
idealism simply as an earlier form of liberal 
internationalism. Indeed, in the context of this debate 
neo-liberalism is often used interchangeably with neo­
idealism. This is a significant distortion of the body 
of thought labelled inter-war idealism: Although there 
was a liberal internationalist flavour to much inter­
war idealist writing, interwar liberal internationalism 
was more varied than that subscribed to by the neo­
liberals. On the other hand liberal internationalism 
was only one"strand in the bulk of inter-war idealist
66. Kegley, 'Neoliberal Challenge", p.l.
writing, alongside currents further to the right and 
left of the political spectrum.67
The problem with such expanded understandings of 
realism and idealism is that not sufficient attention 
has been paid to their changing contexts, and to the 
different meanings realism and idealism have been given 
in different contexts and by different writers. The 
attempt to define the core of realism and idealism in 
sweeping accounts has inevitably led to distortions and 
anachronisms. Concerned about this, one writer has even 
gone as far as denying the epithet 'theoretical 
tradition" to these two concepts, seeing each of them 
instead as 'an interconnected series of themes".68
Same Terminology, Different Content
Martin Griffiths retains the idealism/realism 
dichotomy but expresses his dissatisfaction with how 
these terms are usually used within IR. Starting with 
realism, he asserts that its
content and epistemological status (and therefore the 
criteria for its evaluation) remain elusive. (...) In 
part this is due to the variety of contexts and debates 
within which Realism has been discussed in the field. 
In the 1930s and 1940s the debate was framed around a 
Realist-Idealist axis. In the 1970s Realism was 
contested by liberal analyses of the causes and 
consequences of an allegedly growing global 
interdependence. In the 1980s there emerged a three- 
cornered debate between competing Kuhnian 'paradigms", 
among which Realism dominated. Given that the meaning 
of Realism has been partly constructed by historically
67. David Long, 'Conclusion: Interwar Idealism, Liberal 
Internationalism, and Contemporary International 
Theory", in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.),
Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter-War Idealism 
Reassessed, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, pp.302-29, here
p.318.
68. Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: 
Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era, London, Thousand 
Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1999, p. 15.
variable theoretical and political issues, its identity 
has also varied over time.69
Griffiths's own solution to cracking this nut is 
using idealism and realism in a way that is very 
different from the textbooks. For him, both are defined 
according to their respective position vis-a-vis 
freedom and necessity. Idealism reifies either freedom 
or necessity. In the first case, it becomes an 
'idealism of imagination' that neglects the existence 
of any constraints. In the second case, it becomes 
either an 'idealism of nostalgia', which is in effect a 
reactionary utopia, or an 'idealism of complacency', 
which celebrates the world as it is as the best of all 
possible. While 'idealism of imagination' comes close 
to textbook idealism, Griffiths dubs two thinkers 
usually considered as arch-realist, i.e. Morgenthau and 
Waltz, as representatives of, respectively, 'idealism 
of nostalgia' and 'idealism of complacency'. In 
contrast, realism as defined by him presupposes the 
dialectical interplay of freedom and necessity. The 
foremost representative of realism as understood by 
Griffiths is Hedley Bull.70
Griffiths thus sees realism as a sum of negative 
claims, which can only be understood contextually and 
as juxtaposed against its idealist opposite.71 According 
to Stefano Guzzini:
R.N. Berki and Martin Griffiths go as far as to argue 
that realism consists merely of negative claims.
Martin Griffiths, 'Order and International Society: 
The Real Realism?', in Review of International Studies, 
18 (1992), pp.217-40, here p.217.
70. Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and 
International Politics: A Reinterpretation, London and 
New York: Routledge, 1995.
71. Ibid., p.159.
Indeed, philosophically speaking, realism is 
unthinkable without the background of a prior idealist 
position deeply committed to the universalism of the 
Enlightenment and democratic political theory.72
It may be added that the same could be said for 
idealism. It has also always been defined against its 
realist '“other", and since the specific components of 
this "other" have changed over time, the 
conceptualisation of idealism has changed accordingly. 
These two terms are frequently used in an intuitive and 
even pejorative sense, as a summary of what the other 
is not. This leads to two caricatured approaches in IR, 
which have difficulty standing on their own.
However, let us go back to Griffiths. While I
agree with his assumption that idealism and realism can
only be properly understood if seen as defined against
each other, I wonder whether he does not throw out the
baby with the bathwater, namely in asserting:
The labels are all wrong. Carr should not have couched 
his argument in terms of "reality" and "utopia" and 
therefore realism and idealism. Instead his posited 
dichotomy refers to the split between nostalgic and 
imaginative idealism.73
It is of course perfectly legitimate to reject a 
specific definition of a term and to use a different 
one instead. However, Carr can hardly be blamed for not 
having read Griffiths's book. And what Griffiths has 
done is not so much overcoming what is usually 
considered the idealism-realism debate but merely 
putting different labels: Textbook idealism becomes 
"imaginative idealism" and textbook realism
72. Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations 
and International Political Economy: The Continuing 
Story of a Death Foretold, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998, p.16.
73. Griffiths, "Order", p.233.
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metamorphoses into 'nostalgic/complacent idealism'. In 
any case, Griffiths's account focuses upon relocating 
what are usually understood to be the major postwar 
realists into his framework and has little to say about 
the inter-war thinkers.
Dropping the Terms
Martin Ceadel stresses the inadequacy of the
realism/idealism dichotomy. Testing the usefulness of
these categories for understanding the war and peace
debate,74 he has found them deeply unsatisfactory:
(R)ealism and idealism are so vague as to conceal 
important distinctions. It is self-evident that the 
term idealism cannot do justice to the diversity of 
ideological approaches adopted by crusaders, pacific­
ists, and optimistic and mainstream pacifists, and 
needs to be broken down into different sub-categories.75
The term realism does not fare any better.
According to Ceadel there are two major interpretations
of 'reality': The 'moderate' and the 'extreme'
versions. These versions are at odds with each other on
two intertwined issues: First, on the issue of whether
one should approach reality 'neutrally/normatively':
The 'moderate' majority of realists accept the need to 
be realistic about the current distribution of power 
and the direction in which social rivalries are 
heading; but they do not necessarily admire this 
distribution/wish to struggle to reach a final 
showdown. Indeed, they try to limit the role power 
plays in human affairs by fostering societal norms at 
the expense of anarchic tendencies ...76
For the 'extremists' (by which Ceadel seems to 
mean Hegelian nationalists), on the other hand, the 
anarchic condition of reality is good from a normative
74. Martin Ceadel, Thinking About Peace and War, Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.9-20.
75. Ibid., p. 15.
76. Ibid., p. 15.
point of view, and it should not only be tolerated, but 
even welcomed: In the most extreme versions of this 
mode of realism, for which Ceadel uses the term 
"militarism', war and human competition in general are 
perceived as Darwinian opportunities for self- 
improvement .
According to Ceadel, the distinction is a 
fundamental one. Ceadel enlists Raymond Aron as a 
thinker who has perceived the stark incompatibility 
between the "moderate' realists of post-WWII American 
academia, and the turn-of-the-century German militarist
school, a prime exponent of which was Treitschke.
The other issue which divides these two forms of
realism, again following Ceadel, is the extent to which 
the reality can be interpreted as constituting a state 
of anarchy. According to the moderates, the reality is 
anarchic enough to render idealist reforms impossible. 
However, it is "not too intractable as to prevent a 
modicum of order being salvaged in most cases',77 for 
example through the mechanisms of armed truce and 
balance of power. Extremists, in contrast, are 
thoroughly pessimistic about the prospects for even a 
minimal level of order and balance to be achieved for 
any noteworthy stretch of time.
Ceadel had tested the usefulness of the 
realism/idealism divide on the specific issue of war 
and peace and found it wanting:
As a characterization of the doctrinal dimension of the 
war-and-peace debate ... the realist/idealist dichotomy 
is problematical. For one thing, it produces some 
strange judgements: all militarists are deemed to be 
realists, even though some of them assert that every
77. Ibid., p. 16.
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effort should be made to transcend the constraints of 
'reality"; all crusaders are branded as idealists, even 
though some of them are conservatives; and pessimistic 
pacifists are classified as realists, even though all 
of them totally reject military force. For another, it 
has inappropriate philosophical connotations: in 
particular, although a militarist inspired by a 
Hegelian conception of the state as a moral being which 
must expand to fulfill its own destiny is clearly 
realist as the term is conventionally used in 
international relations, he would be classified in 
orthodox philosophical terminology as an idealist.78
What does Ceadel propose to get out of the 
straightjacket of realism/idealism? Ceadel presses 'the 
subdivions of ideologies which are already familiar 
from domestic politics",79 i.e. fascism, conservatism, 
liberalism, social democracy and socialism, to the 
service of creating a more adequate categorization.
This would capture all the arguments in the war and 
peace debate. Introducing domestic categories to what 
is apparently the prime international issue for him,
i.e. the war and peace debate, will provide us with 
'the possibility of almost limitless refinement" in 
distinguishing between different standpoints.80 
Ceadel rightfully points to the heterogeneity of the 
the terms idealism and realism. Particularly important 
is his distinction between moderate and extreme 
realism, which shows that mainstream realist IR writers 
should not be mixed up with militarists of the 
Treitschke school.
On the other hand, the fact that idealism and 
realism can be divided into a lot of different sub­
groups is, in itself, no reason to drop the terms 
altogether. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
78. Ibid., p. 15.
79. Ibid., p. 17.
80 . Ibid., p.17.
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Ceadel's recommendation to use the terminology of 
domestic politics instead is so much of an improvement. 
The problem of heterogeneity can hardly be overcome 
that way.
The Liberal Comeback
In line with the large-scale overhaul in the 
discipline of the established wisdoms of realism, there 
is an intensifying interest in the myths that the still 
predominantly realist discipline of International 
Relations has constructed about itself. The result is 
an increasing motivation to go back to the debates of 
the inter-war era. These recent explorations, which 
take the debates of the inter-war period seriously and 
evade superficial categorizations, have gone a long way 
to rectifying the myths mentioned above. There is now 
an increasing amount of literature questioning the 
realism-idealism dichotomy and the existence of a 
'First Debate". In the wake of the end of the Cold War, 
liberal-idealist discourse seems to have found an 
opportune moment for attempting to replace realism as 
the mainstream discourse in IR.81
To begin with, there is a problem with the labels 
in this discourse. A book called Thinkers of the Twenty 
Years" Crisis edited by David Long and Peter Wilson 
shows how variegated the group of writers usually
81. Scott Burchill, 'Liberal Internationalism", in Scott 
Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Theories of 
International Relations, Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan, 1996, pp.28-66, here p.28. Similarly, 
Ashworth claims that the end of the Cold War has given 
a new relevance to the ideas of liberal 
internationalists like Angell and Mitrany. See 
Ashworth, Creating, particularly pp.130-54.
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dubbed idealists was in reality. Consequently, both 
editors express reservations about using that term.
As Wilson writes in the introduction, 'it might be 
contended that realism and idealism are loaded terms 
par excellence.'82 Specifically for idealism, Wilson 
asserts:
There is hardly a word in the vocabulary of 
International Relations that is shrouded in as much 
confusion as idealism. It is a term widely used in 
debates on international relations but few attempts 
have been made to define it. It has all too frequently 
been assumed that anyone conversant in international 
theory knows more or less what it means. But this 
assumption is not well-founded ...83
This is a situation for which Carr's easy 
categorizations in The Twenty Years' Crisis are at 
least partially responsible. Wilson illustrates how 
difficult it is to unravel the definitional confusion 
by isolating a determining characteristic of all 
idealist thought. Although one can identify 
progressivism as the smallest common denominator,
Wilson concedes that it might be futile to consider 
idealism a coherent tradition.84
Long argues in a similar vein, calling the 
idealism-realism dichotomy 'something of a pretence'.85 
He stresses the diversity of inter-war thought on IR, 
distinguishing between two groups. On the one hand, 
there were the academics, whose writings shared a focus 
on states as prime units of the international level, a 
normative concern with the avoidance of war, and an
82. Wilson, 'Introduction', p.6.
83 • Ibid., p. 3.
84. Ibid., pp.3-14. See also Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of 
the „First Great Debate"', in Review of International 
Studies 24 (1998), pp.1-15, here pp.8-9.
85. Long, 'Conclusion', p.323.
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interest in international organizations like the 
League. To the degree that one can identify a 
battleline between idealists and realists, it was over 
the possibility of interstate cooperation under the 
umbrella of such organizations. A special sub-group 
were economists writing from an international 
perspective.
On the other hand, there were the non-academic 
publicists, an even more heterogenous group. Among them 
were left-wing and conservative internationalists and 
internationalist lawyers, but also nationalist and pro­
imperialist authors.86
From another perspective, Long divides the liberal 
internationalists into three groups: The Cobdenites, 
who stuck to free trade and non-intervention; the 
Hobbesian idealists, who advocated international 
organizations and collective security; and the new 
liberal internationalists, who called for functionalist 
international bodies reigning in global laisser-faire. 
In addition, there were socialist internationalists 
rejecting existing organizations like the League, and 
conservative cultural internationalists.87
To come back to Wilson, he also criticizes the 
mainstream account of realism defeating and replacing 
idealism during the late 1930s and the 1940s. Of these 
accounts he says:
Being usually part of a much wider account of the 
growth of International Relations as an academic 
discipline, they have been almost invariably brief and 
couched in the most general terms.88
86. Ibid., pp.302-12.
87. Ibid., pp.312-18.
88. Wilson, "Introduction", p.8.
fa
The consequence is that:
Postwar accounts of idealism have also created the 
impression that the inter-war years constitute a more 
or less hermetically sealed period of idealist thought 
beginning in 1919 with the creation of the League and 
ending in 1939 with the publication of Carr's critique 
and the outbreak of war.89
Wilson has conclusively shown that the 'First 
Great Debate' was born in the pages of Carr's The 
Twenty Years' Crisis. Exchange between realists and 
idealists was by and large not a consciously conducted 
disciplinary controversy. It was only by being 
polemically called 'Utopians' that the liberal 
internationalists rose to defend themselves, and then 
mainly to vehemently reject being seen as 'Utopians'.90
Connected to this, there was no general 
'paradigmatic' defeat of idealism by realism. Wilson 
reminds us that
although E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis is 
generally regarded to have had a devastating impact on 
the 'utopian' thinking of the inter-war period, the 
Utopians themselves, or at any rate those so labelled 
by Carr, did not feel particularly devastated by it.91
There was no inter-war paradigm-shift from idealism to
realism.
Similar arguments have been advanced by Lucian 
Ashworth. He, too, considers the whole concept of the 
'First Great Debate' as a myth that needs to be 
unravelled.
The re-articulation of the realist-idealist Great 
Debate is important, because it demonstrates that 
Angell's ideas, and by implication the ideas of the
89. Wilson, 'Introduction', p.16.
90. For a general survey of the responses of the liberal 
internationalists to Carr's book, see Peter Wilson, 
'Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, 1939-46', in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. 
Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave, 2000, pp.165-97.
91 • Wilson, 'Carr', p.165.
liberal internationalist paradigm leading up to 
Mitrany, were not the victims of a superior realism. 
Liberal internationalism, in the form it took with 
Angell and Mitrany, still awaits a proper and sustained 
realist critique.92
In juxtaposition to Carr's and Morgenthau's 
conception of human nature as the determinant of human 
behaviour, liberal internationalists like Leonard Woolf 
have upheld the more "realistic' (in a common-sense 
way) view that:
(B)oth human nature and human intellect effect action. 
Education, experience and other forces external to 
human nature can increase the role of the intellect in 
the determination of human nature, thus limiting the 
effects of nature. The all-too-frequent possibility 
still exists in liberal internationalist thought that 
people will not use their intellect properly, thus the 
realist notion of a nature-determined political realm - 
a realm of struggle - forms part of the liberal 
internationalist interpretation, albeit a 
representation of the World we have to move away from.93
Like Wilson, Ashworth holds that the image of a 
paradigm shift from idealism to realism is a 
misconstruction. According to him:
The period of the 1930s has been treated more as a 
vindication of realist thought, and the disproving of 
idealism, rather than as the site of different ideas 
about the international sphere.94
There were three different kinds of discussion in 
which the participants used an idealism-realism 
dichotomy. The first was the attack by Carr and 
Morgenthau on liberal internationalism and the limited 
responses of Angell, Woolf and Zimmern to Carr. Second, 
and unconnected to the first, there was the discussion 
between idealist supporters of the League and realist 
pursuers of appeasement in the late 1930s. Third, there
92. Ashworth, Creating, p.106.
93. Ibid., p.115.
94. Ibid., p. 107.
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was a postwar debate within realism about the 
relationship between power and morality.
In the 1930s, a more virulent discussion over the 
question whether capitalism causes war took place 
within IR, without invoking the terms idealism and 
realism. In Britain, the adherents of liberal 
internationalism were challenged not by the realists 
but by the left, and in the United States, by the 
isolationists.95
The aim of the reappraisals sketched above 
frequently seems to be to redress the discussion in 
favour of liberal internationalism. Undoubtedly, this 
liberal questioning of established wisdoms has had 
numerous beneficial effects like taking the progressive 
thought of the period out of the straightjacket of 
naivety, and of drawing our attention to the profound 
distortions involved in the mainstream ideas about 
realism, idealism and the First Debate. Despite a 
promising beginning, however, occasionally the very 
same myths which have just been demolished are quickly 
resurrected again. It is asserted, for example, that 
the idealists were not oblivious to questions of power, 
or that a First Debate, in the form in which it is 
usually raised, never took place and that realism never 
intellectually defeated idealism. Since, however, the 
aim is simultaneously to defend the positions of the 
liberal internationalists, both the dichotomy of 
realism-idealism and the myth of the "First Debate" 
have to be reconstructed.
For example, Wilson laments that
95. Ibid., pp.108-09, 126-28.
a rich variety of progressivist ideas have been 
consigned to oblivion as a result of an uncritical 
acceptance ... of Carr's ... text.96
Despite his earlier statements about the limited value 
of the term idealism, he on this occassion treats all 
writers called idealists as one group, just labelling 
them 'progressives' instead. Likewise, Long indicates 
that idealism means internationalism, of which there 
are liberal, socialist and cultural-conservative sub­
groups .97
Ashworth claims that the end of the Cold War has 
given new relevance to the ideas of liberal 
internationalists like Angell and Mitrany.98 Although he 
does not take the arguments of the liberal 
internationalists at face value and finds fault with 
them from a critical theoretical viewpoint, however, 
Ashworth believes that their 'claims put in normative 
terms may still give their ideas force in the modern 
era'.99
Three Cheers for Idealism
In a similar vein, Andreas Osiander100 claims that 
the 'shared paradigm' of the inter-war idealist writers 
has 'from E. H. Carr onward' been 'dramatically 
misconstrued'.101 Carr has established the view of the 
inter-war idealists as a group of writers oblivious to
96. Wilson, 'Myth', p.l.,
97. Long, 'Conclusion', p.318.
98. Ashworth, Creating, ch. 6.
99. Ibid., p.149.
10°. Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth-
Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', in 
International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), 3, pp.409- 
32.
101. Ibid., p.409.
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questions of power, inspired by a "naive, voluntarist
progressivism".102 In fact, it is not progressivism as
such that characterizes these writers as claimed by
Carr and subsequently by Bull, but their theory of
history based upon conceptualizations of "an
inescapable, directional historical process.'103
Osiander asserts in a very similar way to Wilson:
The narrative typified by Carr and Bull should be 
amended and reformulated because it effectively serves 
to suppress an important part of the intellectual 
heritage of the discipline.104
Realism and idealism, according to Osiander, are 
both responses to industrial modernity, but while the 
idealists have drawn the right lessons in forming 
adequate responses to increasing interdependence of 
communities under forces of globalisation, realism 
harks back to a pre-industrial time. In the inter-war 
era, it was not so much that realism had addressed the 
inadequacies of idealism, but rather that idealism had 
been a response to popular realist conceptions 
incorporated in the "traditional foreign-political 
attitudes and modes of behaviour".105 The idealists were 
only too well aware of these long-established arguments 
and had already successfully assimilated them before 
Carr portrayed the idealists as reactionary, and 
realism as a new, critical approach.
The main problematique of the interwar idealists 
for Osiander lies not so much in moralistic 
formulations about avoiding war, but in the historical
[bid., p.410.
[bid., p.409.
[bid., p.412.
Ibid., p.415.
analysis of industrial modernity. It was this analysis 
that led them to focus on the
dangerous discrepancy between the new reality of 
worldwide economic interdependence and existing 
political structures106
as well as the entrenched popular perceptions based 
upon these anachronistic structures.
The main implication of this is that the interwar 
idealists were by far not oblivious to issues of power 
and conflict. On the contrary, conceptualizations about 
the anarchical character of international relations or 
balance of power, 'two key aspects of realism'107 
(including, according to Osiander, Carrian realism), 
were given a much more satisfactory treatment by the 
idealists than by the realists with their cyclical view 
of history. It had, for example, been a member of the 
British League of Nations movement, Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson, who had popularised the term 'international 
anarchy' by employing it in his 1916 book The European 
Anarchy, and although Dickinson's analysis, according 
to Osiander, was largely realist (and according to 
David Long, 'Hobbesian idealist'), the concept had 
received wide recognition by idealist writers 
aswell, foremost among them Leonard Woolf, Norman 
Angell, and Alfred Zimmern.
Indeed, the idealists were very far removed from 
being the naive optimists who believed that advanced 
capitalism rendered war impossible. Instead, they 
provided sophisticated analyses of the contradictions 
between the entrenched nationalistic ways of thinking
106 . Ibid., p.415.
107. Ibid., p.412.
and increasing global interdependence, as well as the 
contradictions stemming from the joint existence of 
democratic and undemocratic state structures on the 
world stage. These analyses often led them to conclude 
that under increasing globalization, conflict and 
anarchy could even be intensified. The main idea was 
that the world had not yet adapted itself to the 
obsolescence of the political structures and ways of 
thinking which had corresponded to an earlier stage of 
capitalism. The idea of states as autonomous units with 
conflicting interests prevailed. The result, according 
to Ramsay Muir was threat of "chaos", while Angell 
feared, in the 1913 edition of The Great Illusion, that 
"the combination of advanced economies and backward 
politics actually made war more likely."108 Zimmern, on 
the other hand, with his particular emphasis on the 
contradictions between democratic and undemocratic 
forms of state, noted
the increasing fragmentation of the world as a result 
of the rise of the idea of national self-determination 
and the virulance of national feeling.109
The most common solution suggested by the 
idealists, continues Osiander, was not a misplaced 
trust placed on public opinion, but a learning process, 
whereby democracies would play the leading role. There 
was also no uniform trust placed on the League of 
Nations as an instrument for overcoming "power 
politics", as Carr claimed. Zimmern, for instance, was 
one of the staunchest critiques of the League of 
Nations, since it did not provide the mechanisms for
108. Ibid., p.416.
109. Ibid., pp.417. Emphasis in the original.
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the great-power management of the international system, 
which Zimmern considered to be essential until 
democracy had spread through the world. Collective 
security, under the existing conditions, could not be a 
policy for the world as a whole.110 Zimmern, who 
distinguished between democratic "welfare states" and 
undemocratic "power states", emphasized that the real 
contrast was not "between welfare politics and power 
politics but between welfare politics and pure power 
politics."111 Later, Zimmern, noting the impossibility 
of abolishing power from the political system, asserted 
that "the real distinction is not between power and no 
power, but between the right and the wrong use of 
power ".112
Thus, Osiander asserts:
Somewhat paradoxically perhaps (in light of their 
perception as apostles of world peace), authors like 
Angell, Woolf, and Zimmern were thus far more ready to 
advocate the use of force when it came to dealing with 
what Zimmern called the "power states" than was E. H. 
Carr, whose backing of appeasement in the original 1939 
edition of The Twenty Years' Crisis was famously 
expunged from the post-war re-issue.113
In sum, according to Osiander, from a post-1989 
perspective it appears that, after all, the IR 
idealists of the early part of this century were right 
in the long term. In contrast, realism is seriously 
hampered by not being able or willing to come to terms 
with the lessons of modernity.114
110. Alfred Zimmern, 'The Problem of Collective 
Security", in Quincy Wright (ed«), Neutrality and 
Collective Security, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1936, pp.3-89.
1J1. Ibid., p.59. Emphasis in the original.
112. Alfred Zimmern, Spiritual Values in World Affairs, 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1939, p.40.
113. Osiander, "Rereading", p.428.
114. Ibid., p.430.
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A problem with Osiander's account is with his 
portrayal of Carr as more or less a mainstream realist. 
Although he concedes at one point that Carr was not 
typical,115 he still emerges as a complete forerunner of 
postwar realism. If Carr's realism and concept of power 
comprised mainly of addressing anarchy and balance of 
power, why did he make the distinctive contribution and 
not, say, Dickinson? As we will see in the next 
chapter, it is precisely because he ignores the most 
important component of Carr's approach, the critical 
and non-positivist dimension, that Osiander arrives at 
this erroneous depiction of Carr and fails to 
understand the essence of Carr's critique of the 
idealists.
Thus, the myth of Carr as the founder of state- 
centric and positivist realism remains constant. It is 
not surprising that this myth proves to be the most 
resilient one, since it is precisely this conception of 
Carr which results in the other two myths, i.e. that 
there was a self-conscious 'First Debate' and that 
realism defeated idealism. The new liberal questioning 
of Osiander (but also of Ashworth) has kept Carr in the 
straightjacket of mainstream realism. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that in effect the claims raised in 
these reappraisals do not amount to much beyond what 
the liberal idealists had already articulated in 
response to Carr's critique.
Like the mainstream views, these accounts also 
start from the wrong premise of seeing Carr as a 
typical, positivist realist. Carr has overwhelmingly
115. Ibid., p.423.
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been portrayed as a power-obsessed realist (power seen 
as an end in itself) with no sense of the need for 
moral correctives to the exigencies of national 
interest. This results in a certain view of the inter­
war IR thought and of realism and idealism. However, a 
recent re-reading of Carr has questioned the image of 
him being a mainstream realist.
Conclusion
Let us, for convenience's sake and at the risk of 
doing some injustice to the more balanced accounts used 
here, briefly summarize the mainstream accounts of 
idealism, realism and the 'First Debate'.
1. Idealism has a positive view of human nature and 
believes in progress. Realism is pessimistic concerning 
the possibility of human improvement.
2. Idealism believes in universal ethics. Realism is 
relativistic. It puts the national interest and an 
ethic of prudence first.
3. Idealism assumes the existence of a world community 
with common interests, particularly between 
democracies. Realism sees mainly states and considers 
international politics a zero-sum game.
4. Idealism proposes structural reforms in the 
international system, for example collective security. 
Realism recommends adhering to the existing rules of 
the game like the balance of power.
5. Both schools are dichotomous and incompatible.
6. Idealists are well-meaning but naive. Realists take 
account of the facts and thus advance the discipline of 
IR.
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7. There was a debate between idealism and realism 
(either between the 1930s and 1950s or from the 1950s 
onward), in which the latter defeated the former.
8. Carr was the godfather of mainstream realism.
If we buy this version, the interpretation of 
Curtis seems to be fairly easy: one of these wholly- 
headed dreamers who came up with useless, because 
illusory and non-scientific, blueprints that ignored 
reality. But can we accept this? A lot of revisionist 
writers think not.
Kegley argues that the debate between idealists 
and realists has been going on throughout the 
discipline's history, its latest incarnation in the 
shape of neo-liberalism confronting neo-realism. 
Griffiths turns the traditional definitions on their 
heads, labelling arch-realists like Morgenthau and 
Waltz idealist and seeing in Bull the real realist. 
Ceadel points towards the heterogeneity of both terms 
and advocates their replacement by domestic political 
distinctions, like socialist, liberal and conservative.
Another group of revisionist writers tackles the 
works of those writing on IR during the alleged 'First 
Debate' head-on. Wilson, Long and Ashworth correctly 
point to the artificiality of the term idealism and 
deny that there was a big debate, with realism coming 
out as victor. Nevertheless, under their hands idealism 
simply becomes progressivism or (liberal) 
internationalism. Another revisionist, Osiander, puts 
up a straightforward defence of idealism over realism. 
All these writers agree that Carr had a key role in 
establishing the dichotomy. What, then, did he mean by 
these terms?
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Chapter Two
The New Look on Carr
Introduction
As we have seen, the authority for the primary 
mainstream assumptions about realism, idealism and the 
'First Debate" has frequently been drawn, implicitly or 
explicitly, from E. H. Carr"s The Twenty Years' Crisis, 
The widespread view of this era is one of idealist 
dominance, crushed by the devastating blow of Carr"s 
realist assault on the one hand, diplomatic crises, the 
collapse of the international liberal system and the 
onset of the war on the other. It is alleged that 
Carr"s book, by successfully accounting for the 
collapse of the League of Nations system, sparked off a 
paradigm shift.
All of these myths stem from a single cause: The 
postwar accounts of the book have often been rather 
crude and instrumental. For instance, although in The 
Twenty Years Crisis Carr had supported the policy of 
appeasement towards Germany, with the dropping of the 
status quo/non-status quo argument, it has been 
possible to adapt the book to the policy-requirements 
of the Cold War era as an argument of why Soviet Union 
should not be appeased. Thus, running blatantly against 
the grain of the compromise-minded stance of Carr vis- 
a-vis non-status quo powers, with a focus on its 
elaborations of power politics, The Twenty Years'
Crisis has almost effortlessly become a tome for 
postwar realism.1
In line with the recent body of revisionist 
literature on Carr, this chapter argues that little, if 
any, evidence for the mainstream versions of the 
idealism-realism debate can be drawn from his work. 
First of all, Wilson and others have convincingly shown 
that Carr fails to provide any clear-cut definition of 
what realism and, particularly, utopianism are supposed 
to mean. Starting from there, I will suggest that The 
Twenty Years' Crisis can best be comprehended by 
distinguishing between the polemical and the 
substantial arguments of Carr. While he vehemently puts 
down the Utopians in many sections of the book, he at 
other occasions betrays striking similarities with 
their approach.
Nevertheless, on the substantial level there is 
indeed a sharp criticism by Carr of unreflective and 
unhistorical modes of thinking. Having outlined the 
interpretation of Carr's approach, which will be 
applied to the main topic, i.e. Curtis, I will briefly 
discuss recent reappraisals of Carr as a utopian or a 
"critical' realist.
Turning the Tables on Carr
In the first place, for a book that is mainly 
about the realism-idealism controversy, and which has 
been of such crucial import for generating the 
mainstream textbook descriptions of realism and
1. William T.R. Fox, "E.H.Carr and Political Realism: 
Vision and Revision', in Review of International 
Studies 11 (1985), pp.1-16.
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idealism, it is striking that one looks in vain for
clear definitions of these terms in the text. Their
conception in The Twenty Years' Crisis is intuitive and
eclectic, in marked contrast to the clarity and
coherence surrounding these terms in the bulk of the
subsequent literature on how Carr allegedly defined
them and what they therefore mean.
Cecelia Lynch has taken Carr to task in an article
on the contribution of peace movements (in particular,
Anglo-American ones) to the evolution of international
norms.2 She points towards Carr's contradictory use of
the term utopianism3 and to his oversimplified and too
dismissive treatment of those criticized by him.
Idealism is neither unchanging nor monolithic. Carr's
dichotomy of realism and utopianism and his
historically unspecified, ideologically loaded use of
the latter term has seriously hampered our
conceptualization of a number of ideas and agents.4
The labelling of movement groups and campaigns as 
'utopian' as opposed to 'realist' ... has created a 
stigma around attempts by social forces to influence 
the course of peace and security affairs.5
Lynch, however, goes too far when she - in the vein of
Ashworth and Osiander - pictures Carr as a typical
realist dismissive of international law, ethics and
organization.6
According to Timothy Dunne, there is a striking
generality (and inconsistency) with which Carr assigns 
the category to a multitude of referents, from
2. Cecelia Lynch, 'E.H. Carr, International Relations 
Theory, and the Societal Origins of International Legal 
Norms', Millennium 23 (1994), 3, pp.589-619.
3. Ibid., p.593 n. 15.
4. Ibid., pp.594-99, 615-19.
5. Ibid., p.594.
6. Ibid., pp.595, 597.
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individual thinkers and particular texts, to different 
disciplines and finally to domestic and international 
political orders (blurring its ontological status as 
"principle" or "action" in the process.)7
His realism seems to be not "a theoretical construct
but a critical weapon that Carr turned against
^utopianism"".8
The most penetrating criticism of Carr"s use of 
terminology has been advanced by Wilson. As already 
discussed in the previous chapter, he asserts that 
realism and idealism are terms shrouded in confusion, a 
situation for which Carr is at least partially 
responsible. Carr himself did not "set out 
systematically the key features of the inter-war 
utopian school".9
Particularly utopianism is not a carefully defined 
scientific concept but a highly ambiguous and 
impressionist one. Carr only gives a vague outline of 
its core characteristics. It is mainly defined by its 
defects, which, however, are quite heterogenous - from 
fake universalism to certain faulty policy proposals.10
7. Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History 
of the English School, Basingstoke, London and New 
Yorks Macmillan and St. Martin's, 1998, p.29.
8. Ibid., p.24.
9. Peter Wilson, "Introductions The Twenty Years' Crisis 
and the Category of „Idealism" in International 
Relations", in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.). 
Thinkers of the Twenty Years" Crisiss Inter-War 
Idealism Reassessed, Oxfords Clarendon, 1995, pp.1-24, 
here p.12.
10. Ibid., pp.6, 12-13; Peter Wilson, "The Myth of the 
„First Great Debate"", in Review of International 
Studies 24 (1998), pp.1-15, here pp.10-11; Peter 
Wilson, "Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to The 
Twenty Years' Crisis, 1939-46", in Michael Cox (ed.), 
E.H. Carrs A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke and New 
Yorks Palgrave, 2000, pp.165-97, here p.190.
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Carr has used utopianism as denoting a widely- 
ranging set of meanings. For instance, as a doctrine 
that:
(i). rejects an existing state of affairs in preference 
for a more desirable, but not yet existent, other;
(ii). is based on unverified and artificial (meaning 
"concocted"? "abstract"? "false"?) generalizations; and
(iii). postulates as an economic, political or moral 
bench-mark a condition that has no historical 
precedent.
Moreover, at the beginning of his final chapters
in the space of three pages, Carr uses the term 
"Utopia" as a synonym and/or descriptive label for six 
significantly different things: (i) the peaceful and 
harmonious world order of the nineteenth century; (ii) 
the attempt to recreate this order; (iii) any liberal 
international order; (iv) any peaceful and harmonious 
world order; (v) any code of international morality;
(vi) "visionary hopes".11
If one considers, in conjunction with this inflationary 
range of meanings, the sheer number of concrete 
examples of Utopians (notably Angell, Zimmern and 
Toynbee, but also, for example, Churchill, the two 
Roosevelts, Rhodes and Bosanquet),12 the looseness of 
the term becomes obvious.
Most venomenously, utopianism for Carr is a term 
of abuse. It parades as an empty category with 
pejorative connotations against all things Carr 
happened to disagree with.13 The result is grave, for, 
as an effect of Carr"s indiscriminate and normatively 
loaded categories, a very rich slice of progressive 
thought within the discipline has been confined to the 
intellectual dustbin.14 Ironically, Carr"s own proposals
11. Wilson, "Carr", p.189-90.
12. Wilson, "Introduction", pp.14-15; Wilson, "Myth", 
p.11; Wilson. "Carr", pp.190-91.
13. Wilson, "Introduction", p.13; Wilson, "Myth", pp.l, 
12; Wilson, "Carr", p.190.
14. Wilson, "Myth", pp.l, 12, 14.
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for a reform of the international system, which are not 
that different from those of the liberal 
internationalists, have also been neglected.15
Carr's Contradictions
The criticism by Wilson and others concerning 
Carr's pejorative and confusing use of the word or 
idiom utopian is well-taken. Indeed, the problems with 
The Twenty Years' Crisis are by no means restricted to 
the lack of proper definitions. Working backward from 
our scheme of mainstream idealism-realism outlined in 
the last chapter, let us see what Carr has to say about 
the merits and dismerits of both approaches, about 
their compatability, about progressive change at the 
international level, and about the character of the 
international system.
On a superficial look, there is certainly plenty 
of material in The Twenty Years' Crisis on which the 
assumption that Carr was a self-conscious realist could 
be based. In the first part of the book, Carr provides 
the notorious juxtapositions of realism and idealism 
(or, in his terminology, utopianism), which have helped 
to spawn the postwar textbook desriptions of these 
terms. He starts with an account of how 'immature' and 
'purposeful' idealist thought, which is allegedly a 
symptom of the initial stages of thinking on any 
subject, in the face of the facts slowly has to give
15. Wilson, 'Introduction', pp.14, 19; Wilson, 'Myth', 
pp.12-13.
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way to ruthless analysis. The same, asserts Carr, 
applies for the 'science" of international politics.16
Through the polemical employment of associations, 
Carr (calculatively?) builds up an image of idealism as 
aspirational, teleological and wishful thinking, 
characterizing the early 'immature" phases of a social 
science. This is the stage where:
wishing prevails over thinking, generalization over 
observation, and in which little attempt is made at a 
critical analysis of existing facts or available 
means •17
In stark contrast to the introduction of utopianism 
with such an array of hopelessly negative connotations, 
realism enters the stage accompanied by a chorus of 
boisterous phrases like 'serious critical and 
analytical thought", 'hard and ruthless analysis", 
'hallmark of science" and 'thinking over wishing".18
But, having demolished it so ruthlessly in some 
sections of the book, in other parts Carr no longer 
blandly claims that utopianism is without merit. For 
example, he concedes that it has the vision that makes 
any progress in international relations possible in the 
first place. Crude realism, untempered by a reasonable 
measure of utopianism, would be bound for as 
catastrophic a failure as a totally unqualified, naive 
utopianism. If things would be left to such a realism - 
bereft of a finite goal, emotional appeal, moral
16. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years" Crisis 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
2nd ed., London and Basingstoke: Papermac, (1939) 1995, 
pp.6-10.
17. Ibid., p.8.
18 . Ibid., p. 9.
judgement and grounds for action - no change in the 
international order would be possible.19
The arguments in many sections of The Twenty 
Years' Crisis are built upon juxtapositions of utopia 
and reality or the alleged attributes of realist and 
utopian ways of thinking. For example, there is the 
juxtaposition of purpose and analysis, free will and 
determination, theory and practice, the intellectual 
and the bureaucrat, left and right, and finally, ethics 
and politics.20 This can easily lead to the assumption 
that these juxtapositions indicate that realism and 
idealism are two hermetically sealed, antagonistic, and 
therefore imcompatible perspectives.
Furthermore, Carr uses the term “antithesis' to 
characterize the relationship between realism and 
idealism.21 If all this is not sufficient evidence that 
Carr perceives the relationship between idealism and 
realism as a full dichotomy, a sentence from the book 
seems to provide the final proofs “Politics are made up 
of two elements - utopia and reality - belonging to two
different planes which can never meet.'22
Then again, there are passages which contradict
the impression of the hermetical separation of 
utopianism and realism. For example, Carr hints that 
“mature thought combines purpose', i.e. utopianism,
19. Ibid., pp.84-88.
20. Ibid., pp.12-19.
21. Ibid., p.12.
22. Ibid., p.87.
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'with observation and analysis', i.e. realism.23 And 
some pages later, we read:
Political science must be based on a recognition of the 
interdependence of theory and practice, which can be 
attained only through a combination of utopia and 
reality.24
Elsewhere, Carr calls for a compromise between the 
utopian concept of justice and the realist one of 
power.25 He even manages to make contradictory sentences 
like these:
This constant interaction of irreconcilable forces is 
the stuff of politics. Every political situation 
contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and 
reality, of morality and power.26
This confusion is heightened by Carr's 
explanations of how a sound policy should look like. On 
the one hand, a whole battery of textbook idealist 
projects and proposals is scornfully put down, be it 
trust in public opinion,27 the Briand-Kellogg-Pact,28 
collective security,29 the League of Nations in both its 
present and a potentially reformed shape,30 
international law and arbitration,31 or an international 
police force.32 European unity and world federation also 
do not get a mild treatment33 - although there is some 
ambiguity here, to which we will come back in Chapter 
Four.
23• Ibid., p.10.
24• Ibid., p.14.
25• Ibid., p.202.
26• Ibid., p.88. Emphasis added.
27. Ibid., pp.32-35.
28• Ibid., p.30.
29• Ibid., pp.8-9.
30• Ibid., pp.29-31, 219.
31• Ibid., pp.159-90.
32. Ibid., pp.8, 30.
33. Ibid., pp.9, 30, 78-80. 194,
On the other hand, the very Carr who discounts all 
these schemes comes up with ambitious projects of his 
own at the end of the books the formation of vast 
geographical units effectively superseding existing 
sovereign states and enjoying de facto autarky.34 To 
this is added an economic restructuring of the world by 
cross-border cooperation providing financial aid to 
poorer countries and replacing the profit motive with 
social ends.35
In his 1940s writings, Carr elaborated upon this.
He envisaged a future Europe functionally integrated in 
terms of military security and economic cooperation, 
including pan-European banking and planning 
authorities, but retaining its existing administrative 
and cultural units. In addition, he had the hope for a 
continuing postwar cooperation between the USA, the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain (including Washington's 
handing-over of nuclear weapons to the UN) and even 
hinted at the establishment of a global authority 
responsible for overseeing order and possessing its own 
forces.36 It is difficult to see why all this should be 
less utopian than the schemes Carr put down so 
mercilessly in The Twenty Years' Crisis.
Finally, there are his equally variable statements 
on the character of the international system. Again, it 
is possible to read Carr as drawing the picture of a
34. Ibid., pp.211-13.
35. Ibid., p.219.
36. Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace, London: 
Macmillan, 1942, pp.242-70; Edward Hallett Carr, 
Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan, 1945, pp.51- 
60; Charles Jones, E.H. Carr and International 
Relations: A Duty to Lie, Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.90-96, 
105-10.
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system of competing states locked into a ceaseless 
conflict. When he argues that peace may be good for 
countries like Britain but not necessarily for Germany 
and that an open world economy favours the industrially 
leading countries but not agrarian ones like Yugoslavia 
or Colombia,37 he takes states and their needs for 
granted.
The state is presented as a special kind of 
collective body, enjoying the loyalty of its component 
individuals to a degree not matched by other 
institutions. Given international anarchy, its recourse 
to self-help is seen as legitimate.38 What is more, 
domestic policies are described by Carr as irrelevant 
for the external behaviour of states.39 According to 
Rosenberg, the state for Carr is an "irreducible 
category's
In short, Carr's "science of international politics' 
poses questions not of the state but implicitly on its 
behalf. And this is, of course, a signature of realism. 
Its deepest assumptions are grounded in the ideological 
needs of the social practice - namely, diplomacy - 
whose norms it articulates.40
Furthermore, Carr upholds the view that
it is profitless to imagine a hypothetical world in 
which men no longer organize themselves in groups for 
purpose of conflict; and the conflict cannot once more 
be transferred to a wider and more comprehensive field. 
As has often been observed, the international community 
cannot be organized against Mars.41
The assumption of a separation between economics and
37. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, pp.50-57.
38. Ibid., pp.145-46.
39. Ibid., p.127. See also Jones, E.H. Carr, pp.38-40, 
48.
40. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A 
Critique of the Realist Theory of International 
Relations, London and New Yorks Verso, 1994, p. 11. 
Emphasis in the original.
41. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.213.
politics is foolish. In fact, the former is 
subordinated to the latter as an instrument of power 
policy.42
Nevertheless, Carr also tells us that the state is 
not a necessary form of human organization but 
historically contingent. Territorial power units may 
even disappear again at a future time, and Carr in any 
case assumes that the nation-state as it exists today 
is bound to decrease in importance. Already now, 
sovereignty is a blurred concept that says little about 
the actual degree of independence enjoyed by states.43
Carr thunders:
To make the harmonization of interests the goal of 
political action is not the same thing as to postulate 
that a natural harmony of interests exists ...44
However, it is obvious, when he writes about how to
achieve "peaceful change" by a process of bargaining
between "have" and "have-not" powers,45 that he deems
the harmonization of interests as both aspirable and
possible. War is not inevitable.
Furthermore, in his 1940s writings Carr finally 
replaces state-centrism by the image of "an incipient 
world society based on respect for individuals across 
state borders."46 In these publications, Carr deals with 
economic aspects not from the angle of how they can 
increase a state"s power. At issue is, rather, how 
living standards can be improved through planning under
42. Ibid., pp.106-10, 114-20.
43. Ibid., pp.153 n.4, 210-13.
44. Ibid., p.50.
45. Ibid., pp.191-202.
46. Paul Howe, "The Utopian Realism of E.H. Carr", in 
Review of International Studies 20 (1994), pp.277-97, 
here p.296.
conditions of international economic interdependence.47 
Instead of his previous dismissal of domestic factors 
he comes to see the beginning Cold War as a conflict 
between different ideologies and not just powerful 
states.48
Last but not least, the whole composition of The 
Twenty Years' Crisis is somewhat contradictory. The 
near-dogmatism of the first part of the book stands in 
stark contrast to the concrete proposals for an 
international planning authority which are advanced in 
the final section. It looks like something of a riddle 
how Carr initially describes realism and idealism as 
completely incompatible, then goes on to define the 
idealists as nothing more than hypocritical realists 
(so they are not a muddle-headed, feeble-minded and up- 
in-the-clouds bunch after all), and finally, in a last 
sweeping shift, how he arrives at a synthesis' of 
realism and idealism, himself coming up with strikingly 
idealistic proposals according to his very own terms. 
What are we to make out of all this?
Carr's Dialectics
Carr has simultaneously formulated a 
transhistorical conception of the dialectic of realism 
and idealism. According to Wilson:
In Carr's view, this dialectic permeated all political 
thought and action, including that province of the 
world's political life we call international relations. 
This simple and elegant framework enabled Carr to
47. Carr, Conditions, pp.129-53. See also Jones, E.H. 
Carr, pp.77-80.
48. Paul Rich, 'E.H. Carr and the Quest for Moral 
Revolution in International Relations', in Michael Cox 
(ed.), E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal. Basingstoke and 
New York: Palgrave, 2000, pp.198-216, here p.210.
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survey an astonishingly wide terrrain with seemingly 
remarkable coherence.49
According to Charles Jones's analysis of the 
polemical use of language in The Twenty Years' Crisis, 
Carr employs in the book a dialectical method, thereby 
drawing upon Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia in an 
idiosyncratic way. Mannheim understands by 'ideology' 
the apology for a conservative point of view and by 
'utopia' the rationalization of the demand for radical 
change. Both of them can be questioned by using the 
theoretical tool of the 'sociology of knowledge' which 
exposes 'ideology' and 'utopia' as rooted in the social 
conditions of their respective adherents.
According to Jones, under Carr's hands Mannheim's 
'ideology' becomes 'utopianism'. It is subsequently 
demolished by the critical weapon of 'sociology of 
knowledge', dubbed realism by Carr. Professing to tread 
the golden middle way between 'infantile' utopianism 
and 'senile' realism, Carr then enters the stage with 
his own views, which are presented as a 'mature' 
synthesis. With his skillfull rhetorics, Carr appeals 
to the overwhelmingly male, elderly and conservative 
part of his readership. Simultaneously, the dialectical 
method and frequent positive references to Marx are 
used as a bait for left-wing readers.50
For Tim Dunne, the relationship between realism 
and idealism has been completely misunderstood by the 
critics of Carr from opposite sides, including Hedley 
Bull, Hans Morgenthau and Leonard Woolf. United in 
condemning his relativism, they have not been
49 . Wilson, 'Introduction', p.2.
5°. Jones, E.H. Carr, pp.54-60, 127-32.
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perceptive to the subtle interplay of realism and
idealism in Carr's thought. Carr has in fact subscribed
to a revisionist interpretation of the relationship
between these 'two poles' which shows how history and
science move through dialectical stages. In contrast to
conventional approaches, there is no sharp dividing-
line between true and false. The misrepresentation of
Carr has been made possible by, on the one hand,
ignoring his specific recommendations for the
facilitation of peaceful change in international
politics and, on the other hand, by the tendency to
understate the degree to which Carr mentions the
necessity for moral foundations.51 Dunne also quotes
T.L.Knutsen who has made a similar point about the
conformistic suppression of the dialectical elements in
Carr's thought by postwar generations, who have
considered utopianism a naive alternative to realism;
... a straw man which they could knock over in order to 
better portray the mature wisdom of the realist 
alternative.52
We should, however, be careful not to assume that 
Carr in The Twenty Years' Crisis has no powerful axe at 
all to grind and is simply building up artifical 
extremes by utopianism and realism. The sociology of 
knowledge aka Carr's realism is more than just a 
rhetorical device. For a start, it could be asserted 
that in textual terms the book should be read at two 
levels: the polemical and the substantial.
Carr's vagueness when it comes to definitions, the
51. Tim Dunne, Inventing, pp.31-32.
52. Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International 
Relations Theory, Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1993, p.224.
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stark dichotomies that he sketches and the anti-utopian 
statements concerning the international order and 
potential ways to improve it all indicate the polemical 
purpose behind the argument. Nevertheless, there is 
also a not fully articulated theoretical core in Carr's 
assertions which is not necessarily in tune with the 
polemical aspects. If we shift through and put aside 
the extensive polemical and manipulative elements he 
employs, two important aspects stand outs his views of 
international ethics and of progress.
Unmasking 'Universalism'
Statements like the Utopians not being able to 
provide "a disinterested and universal standard'53 have 
been frequently read not as a general critique of the 
ideological construction of knowledge, but as a realist 
assault on idealism. In fact, Carr's proclamation that 
what seem to be disinterested universal standards are 
in fact the reflection of power at a certain time and 
under certain conditions of the 'status-quo powers'54 
and his concept of the relativity of thought have 
resulted in him being seen (in comparison, for example, 
to a Morgenthau or a Niebuhr) as a realist who is 
particularly insensitive to ethical questions. 
Allegedly, according to Carr, 'anything goes'. Many 
analysts 'have tended to conclude that Carr was an
53. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.80.
54. See, for example, ibid., p.80.
on
advocate of raison d'etat in which ethics was largely a 
product of power,'55
Carr, however, clearly states that there exists an 
international community, albeit one handicapped by the 
inequality between its component states and by the 
absence of the notion that the good of the whole 
overrides that of the parts. Nevertheless, there are 
wide-spread assumptions of certain moral duties of 
states towards individuals (avoidance of inflicting 
unnecessary suffering, protection of 'backward races" 
and of national minorities, refugee relief) as well as 
towards each other (keeping of treaties). Carr hopes 
that from this embryonic international community a 
wider sense of world-wide solidarity may develop. This 
solidarity is not to be rooted in an automatic harmony 
of interests but in the moral obligation of those 
states which profit most from the international order 
to make concessions to those who profit least.56 For 
once, he approvingly quotes the otherwise maligned 
Zimmern that ordinary people must realize that public 
affairs have become world affairs.57
Furthermore, in contrast to the wide-spread clich€ 
of Carr being a nihilist, a number of scholars have 
confirmed that he did base his own position upon 
certain values. Justin Rosenberg resolves the puzzle of 
the realism of Carr in Carrian pragmatism geared to the 
securing of British foreign policy interests:
55. Rich, 'E.H. Carr", p.198.
56. Ibid., pp.141-43, 147-53.
57. Ibid., p. 152.
Q1
For Carr shared the urgent policy orientation of the 
idealists he was criticising: if their utopianism was 
an involuntary recoil from 1914, his own realist 
corrective was equally an injunction to learn the 
lessons of the 1930s. He was, after all, an ex­
diplomat. But as a result, Carr's is from the outset a 
discourse of raison ddtat.58
Indeed, despite his left-leanings, 'Carr regarded his 
ideological position as wholly consistent with a 
thoroughly patriotic pursuit of British interests.'59 
This seems to conform to Jones' pragmatic/ 
Machiavellian/normative conception of realism, which 
is, however, not the same as textbook realism. 
Furthermore, Carr's own projects for a more harmonious 
international order based upon an integrated Europe, 
large-scale planning and concessions to the 'have-nots 
were all motivated by the goal of stemming British 
decline.60 Similarly, Peter Wilson asserts that, while 
difficult writer to categorize, Carr shared with his 
Fabian and socialist contemporaries 'the conservative 
purpose of keeping Britain in the front rank of 
nations '.61
What, then, is Carr's complaint against 
utopianism, if it is not as such the advocation of 
progressive change out of concern for the interest of 
one's own nation-state? The answer is given in Chapter 
Five of The Twenty Years' Crisis where, in Carr's
58 . Rosenberg, Empire, p.11.
59. Jones, E. H. Carr, p.xi.
60. Ibid., pp.19-20.
61 . Peter Wilson, 'Radicalism for a Conservative 
Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E.H. Carr' in 
Millennium 30, (2001), pp.123-36. The quotation has 
been taken from the abstract.
words, the 'by far ... most formidable attack which 
utopianism has to face'62 is launched.
Explicitedly drawing upon the sociology of 
knowledge, Carr is at his biting best in showing how 
analytical judgement is affected by one's social 
circumstances and interests. For example, when Germany 
was a rising power but not yet perceived with 
hostility, British philosophers admired Hegel and their 
historian colleagues discovered the Teutonic roots of 
English civilization. Once Anglo-German relations 
soured, these academic fads disappeared again.
Likewise, universally-sounding political 
principles are dependend upon specific interest 
configurations. As long as her strong position in naval 
and economic terms was assured, Britain considered the 
submarine or protective tariffs as immoral. The taint 
of immorality disappeared in the case of the latter 
once Britain found it convenient to shift to 
protectionism herself.
Even worse, representatives of strong countries 
first proclaim that what is best for the world is best 
for their country and then reverse the argument, saying 
that whatever their country does represents the 
interests of humanity. As a specifically devious case 
Carr singles out internationalism, which is embraced by 
the dominant countries in order to cement the status 
quo against catching-up powers.63
While having much fun in pointing out double-
62. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.65.
63. Ibid., pp.65-81.
standards, Carr does not castigate them as hyocrisy 
pure and simple but as result of inequality, whether 
domestically or internationally:
Theories of social morality are always the product of a 
dominant group which identifies itself with the 
community as a whole, and which possesses facilities 
denied to subordinate groups or individuals for 
imposing its view of life on the community. Theories of 
international morality are, for the same reason and in 
virtue of the same process, the product of dominant 
nations or groups of nations,64
In terms of the theoretical essence of the work, 
it was not the idealism in Carr's own mind that he was 
putting down. In other words, it was not idealism as 
such, seen in terms of the envisaging of reform in the 
international system, but the unreflective and 
hypocritical way of conceptualising reform displayed by 
many advocates of collective security that was being 
attacked, Carr's critique of unreflectivism, and not 
his critique of idealism, I argue, is his main 
contribution to the discipline. Unfortunately, his own 
polemicism has had the effect of obscuring this, most 
profound aspect of his work.
Realism for Carr is a tool for reflective 
thinking, for uncovering power structures. For him, 
knowledge is always embedded. Theory emerges out of 
practice and flows back into it, thus making change 
possible.65 This distinction corresponds partially to 
the distinction between the rationalists and the 
reflectivists that Robert Keohane drew at the ISA 
conference in 1988,66 and which for some time became a
64. Ibid., p.74.
65. Ibid., p. 14.
66. Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond', in Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.). 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge,
04
prime categorization of IR theories. However, 
considering that by now the term reflectivist seems to 
be reserved mainly for post-modern or post­
structuralist discourses in IR, i.e. those that totally 
reject the possibility of neutrally judging among 
different truth-claims, it might be considered to 
locate Carr in the category of reflexivism.67
Progress and History
Ashworth claims that realists (by which he 
indicates Carr and Morgenthau) think that human nature 
is determined by instinct and not reason.68 As far as 
Carr is concerned, let us look at the following 
passages from The Twenty Years" Crisis for the ultimate 
proof that this was not the cases
Man in society reacts to his fellow men in two opposite 
ways. Sometimes he displays egoism, or the will to 
assert himself at the expense of others. At other times 
he displays sociability, or the desire to co-operate 
with others, to enter into reciprocal relations of good 
will and friendship with them, and even to subordinate 
himself to them. In every society, these two qualities 
can be seen at work.69
For Carr, therefore, no less than for many of the 
liberal internationalists of the inter-war era, human 
nature was a composite of the impulses of "coercion and 
conscience, enmity and good will, self-assertion and
New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, pp.11-44, here p.12.
67. Reflexivism is a category originally developed by 
Anthony Giddens. For its application in IR see Mark 
Neufeld, "Reflexivity and International Relations 
Theory", Millenium 22 (1993), 1, pp.53-76.
68. Lucian M. Ashworth, Creating International Studies: 
Anqell, Mitranv and the Liberal Tradition, Aldershot 
and Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999, p.115.
Carr, Twenty Years" Crisis, p.91.
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self-subordination".70 These pointed, according to 
Carr, to
one important conclusion. The utopian who dreams that 
it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from 
politics and to base a political system on morality 
alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who 
believes that altruism is an illusion and that all 
political action is based on self-seeking.71
Carr does not hold the view that human nature is 
transfixed, as Morgenthau does. Neither does he think 
that history is simply the eternal repetition of power 
struggles between the different units of an anarchical 
system.72
There are a few passages in The Twenty Years' 
Crisis which seem to betray a transhistorical 
perspective, for example Carr"s mentioning of the Pax 
Romana and the Pax Britannica together73 or his 
comparison of modern internationalism with Ancient 
Egyptian or Chinese universalism.74 Generally, however, 
the book is bristling with a sense of change and of 
certain institutions and ideologies being rooted in 
very specific historical conditions. As mentioned, Carr 
reminds us that not only the state but any kind of 
territorial organization of power was absent during 
some phases of history and may also pass again in the 
future.75
In particular, Carr draws a contrast between the 
long 19th and the 20th century and interprets the
70 . Ibid., p.92.
71. Ibid., p.92.
72. Randall Germain, 'E.H. Carr and the Historical Mode 
of Thought", in Michael Cox (ed.), E.H. Carr: A 
Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke and New Yorks Palgrave, 
2000, pp.322-36, here pp.328-29.
73. Carr, Twenty Years" Crisis, pp.76, 215.
74. Ibid., pp.78-79.
75. Ibid., pp.210-11.
'crisis' as resulting from the persistence of outdated 
institutions and dogmas. Let us start with liberal 
democracy. According to Carr, it is based 'on a balance 
of forces peculiar to the economic development' of 19th 
century Western countries and failed to hold its own 
when after 1919 it was transplanted all over the 
world.76 National governments and one-party systems have 
now increasingly taken its place.77 'Mass production' of 
public opinion and its centralized control through 
state schooling and standardized mass media have taken 
over.78
Let us now look at the principle of national self- 
determination. Carr asserts that it only appeared 
compatible with a harmonious international order when 
the break-up of multiethnic empires and not, as after 
WWI, the drawing of borders between different nation­
states was at stake.79
In the third place, Carr goes into some detail to 
show how the ideology of laisser-faire and the 
accompanying notion of a harmony of interests are based 
upon very specific economic and technological 
conditions. In principle, Carr claims that the laisser- 
faire ideology had already become obsolete at the very 
time when it was formulated by Adam Smith in 1776. It 
matched a pre-industrial society of small producers, 
not the industrial one with its large-scale production 
and proletarian workforce.
76. Ibid., p.29.
77. Ibid., p.210.
78. Ibid., pp.121-22.
79. Ibid., pp.45-46.
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However, the very factor that undermined laisser- 
faire in principle, i.e. industrialization, also gave 
it a new lease of life. By propelling economic 
expansion and growth, it enabled the problematic 
aspects of the doctrine to be covered up.80
The prosperous and harmonious 19th century global 
order was held together by British hegemony, which 
manifested itself in naval supremacy, London's 
management of the global finance and monetary system, 
predominance in trade and the spread of English as 
second language.81 From the 1870s onward, this order 
started to pass with the rise of working-class 
consciousness and social legislation at the domestic 
level, and the emergence of protectionist-minded new 
industrial powers challenging British hegemony at the 
international level.82
Around 1900, the old order finally came crashing 
down as new territories for economic expansion were no 
longer available. Immigration restrictions and colonial 
rivalries followed, culminating in World War I, whose 
effects further stimulated economic competition between 
countries.83 A new era dawned, in which the principles 
of economic autarky supplanted free trade.84
Carr at one stage writes of the "abnormal, 
laissez-faire interlude of the nineteenth century.'85 
This could be interpreted as him seeing the post-WWI 
conditions as return to a transhistoric normalcy.
80• Ibid., pp.44-45.
81. Ibid., pp.114-15,
82• Ibid., pp.46-49.
83. Ibid., pp.57-58.
84• Ibid., pp.112-14.
85• Ibid., p.107.
However, although Carr considers autarky as such as 
age-old he clearly differentiates between its versions 
under pre-modern and modern conditions. Under the 
former, autarky was simply the natural state. Under the 
latter, it is a contrived policy aiming to restrict the 
disruptive effects of global capitalism and to bolster 
national power.86 Another indicator of the contrast 
between the 19th and 2 0th centuries is the relative 
decline of capital investments abroad and their 
increasing function of financing exports.87
In a sweeping overview, Carr envisions a 
historical period starting with the French Revolution 
and coming to a close at the time of his writing. This 
period is characterized by changing kinds of demand for 
equality: first between individuals, then between 
classes, and finally between nations.88 In a subsequent 
publication, Carr further elaborates upon the triple 
decline of liberal democracy, national self- 
determination and laisser-faire economics, upon the 
accompanying moral crisis and upon the general 
inadequacy of 19th century institutions to the new 
times.89
Carr's dynamic, and not static, image of the 
historical process links up with his criticism of 
unreflectivist ideologies. The problem with them is not 
just that they are rooted in the self-interest of the 
powerful but that they may also lose contact with 
reality. Given Britain's predominant role in the
86. Ibid., p.lll.
87. Ibid., pp.115-17.
88. Ibid., pp.209-10.
89. Carr, Conditions, pp.14-125.
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international economy during the 19th century, the 
doctrine of the harmony of interests, for all its 
flaws, was not completely implausible. Economic ruin 
for Britain would have affected the whole world 
negatively.90 However, under the more competitive 
conditions of the 20th century, it no longer made sense 
to stick to that doctrine. The tragedy, for Carr, is 
that obsolete 19th century ideologies were, under US- 
American influence, reintroduced into the treatment of 
international affairs.91
For all his despise of easy assumptions of 
harmony, however, Carr was not oblivious to the 
possibility of progress, as his own schemes for a new 
international order demonstrate. He also, on other 
occasions, forcefuly asserted his optimistic beliefs.92
Randall Germain has characterized Carr's approach 
as 'historical mode of thought' rather than commonplace 
realism. For him, it
resides in the series of claims it makes regarding the 
construction of social experience and the form of 
knowledge appropriate for comprehending the social 
world. In Carr's case, these claims center on how we 
are to understand the possibility of human agency 
(including the role of ideals and guiding myths in the 
making of history) and the nature of institutional 
change in the modern world.93
The writer, who finds on the basis of this historical
mode of thought affinities between Carr and among
others, Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi, asserts:
Considered on these grounds, Carr's singular 
contribution to the discipline of International 
Relations lies not so much in his celebrated 
articulation of political realism..•
90. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.76.
91. Ibid., pp.28-29, 49-50.
92. Jones, E.H. Carr, pp.18-19.
93. Germain, 'E.H. Carr', pp.322-3.
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Rather, his principal intellectual achievement in 
International Relations, and his enduring legacy, 
remains the way he infuses a concern with the 
historicity of knowledge into how both power and change 
are understood within the history of international 
politics.94
For Carr, there is considerable room for human 
agency, although an agency constrained by the social 
context within which one has to act. Furthermore, 
humans do not act so much as individuals but, rather, 
as members of an institutionalized group. Of particular 
importance in providing motivation for action are 
certain myths, of which the doctrine of the harmony of 
interests is just one example.95
Carr the Critical Realist, With Emphasis on the 
Critical
'There is certainly room for readers to develop 
quite divergent readings of Carr's realism.' says 
Charles Jones.96 The recent interest in Carr and the 
'First Debate' is not limited to the liberal 
questioning. There is also a substantial re-evaluation 
of Carr from the post-positivist direction. There seem 
to be two major conclusions that have resulted from 
these re-evaluations.
One conclusion, which is still largely based upon 
the mainstream understanding of realism and idealism, 
is that Carr was not a realist but a 'utopian realist'. 
To these revisionist writers, Carr even in The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, this most realistic of his works, is 
still to some degree a 'utopian realist'. His position
94. Ibid., p.323.
95. Ibid., pp.329-31.
96. Jones, E.H. Carr, p.105.
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is riven with more ambiguities than a simplistic 
realism would warrant. Emphasis is made upon how Carr 
perceived careful change possible,97 how he puts his 
hope upon the long-term empowerment of previously 
excluded groups into democracy,98 and how he envisaged 
the boundaries of political communities and their 
potential expansion, leaving nationalism behind.99 
Others draw parallels, but also find contrasts, between 
Carr and the English School.100
The second interpretation is more far-reaching: 
Carr was one of the earliest thinkers in IR who laid 
the groundwork for post-positivism.101 As realism has 
increasingly come under meta-theoretical fire in the 
last two decades, one major response of the writers 
sympathetic to this tradition, but simultaneously aware 
of the seriousness of the post-positivist challenge, 
has been an intensifying recourse to the 'classics" of 
realism. The main idea is that the historicist, 
pragmatic tradition of realism outlined by this 
pedigree stands in stark contrast to the shallow, 
'scientific" and dogmatic articulation of realist 
precepts by most of the postwar realists, reaching a 
culmination with neorealism. Therefore, realism should
97. Ken Booth, 'Security and Anarchy: Utopian Realism in 
Theory and Practice", in International Affairs 67 
(1991), pp.527-45.
98. Howe, 'Utopian Realism".
Andrew Linklater, 'The Transformation of Political 
Community: E.H. Carr, Critical Theory and International 
Relations", in Review of International Studies 23 
(1997), pp.321-38. Linklater, however, chooses to sail 
under the flag of critical theory rather than utopian 
realism.
100. Dunne, Inventing, pp.34-38.
101. Charles Jones, 'Carr, Mannheim and a Post- 
Positivist Science of International Relations", in 
Political Studies 45 (1997), 2, pp.232-46.
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shed the assumption of being able to provide the basis 
for a 'science of International Relations", and taking 
the intrinsically non-positivist implications of the 
classical pedigree on board, should turn the weapon of 
the post-positivists back on themselves.102
In the enterprise of expelling positivism from 
realism, the torch is held by Carrs
Meta-theoretical coherence is achieved by concentrating 
on the social construction of knowledge and of the 
central importance language plays therein. What follows 
is the resurrection of Carr"s scepticism and 
materialist theory of knowledge directed against 
Waltz.103
This interpretation has been criticized by 
Guzzini, for whom Carr should rather be
seen as belonging to this generation of classical 
scholars who, after the shock of the First and the 
Second World War, became historically conscious of, and 
theoretically active with regard to the problems before 
them, like Max Weber, Raymond Aron, Karl Polanyi and 
Istva"n Bibo".104
Guzzini emphasizes that Carr"s realism was simply a 
rhetorical strategy and adds:
And, indeed, what a Realism theory that would be, which 
does not recoil from optimism and which does not share 
a cyclical theory of history?105
Finally, Carr is also interpreted as approaching 
international issues in the same vein as the self­
102. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The 
Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993; Jack Donnelly, 
Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
103. Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations 
and International Political Economy: The Continuing 
Story of a Death Foretold, London and New York:
Routledge, p.222.
104. Stefano Guzzini, 'The Different Worlds of Realism 
in International Relations", in Millennium 30 (2001),
1, pp.111-21, here p.121.
105 . Ibid., p. 120.
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conscious proponent of critical realism, Robert Cox.106 
Locating Carr close to Cox, I argue, catches the 
compass of his work better than just an emphasis upon 
its sociology of knowledge, hermeneutic, or 
pragmatic/normative realist aspects. For Carr was at 
the same time a materialist, who saw the close 
connections between continuously changing domestic and 
global social forces, and the consequent forms of 
state/society complexes. His interest in states stems 
largely from this historicist approach, and not (at 
least not merely) from an attempt of achieving long-run 
British interests through the medium of a reified 
conception of state. All of these issues, as we will 
see below, overlap with Robert Cox's critical 
hermeneutical historical materialism.
According to Cox's own account, Carr was one of 
the major influences on his work.107 Cox clearly 
distinguishes between the classical realism of Carr, 
and the postwar realism of scholars like Morgenthau, 
whose attempt to create an ahistorical science of 
International Relations found its culmination in the 
neorealism of Waltz. Unlike the reified statism of 
postwar IR scholars, in Carr's work historical totality 
was not reduced to isolated spheres and states were
106. For this interpretation see particularly Richard 
Falk, 'The Critical Realist Tradition and the 
Demystification of Interstate Powers E.H. Carr, Hedley 
Bull and Robert W. Cox' in Stephen Gill and James H. 
Mittelman (eds.), Innovation and Transformation in 
International Studies. Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.39-55.
l°7. Robert W. Cox, 'Influences and Commitments', in 
Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to 
World Order. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp.19-41, 
here p.27.
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seen as embedded in their specific sociological and 
historical context.108
Carr, according to Cox, was aware of the dynamic 
interactions between social forces, states and world 
orders. For example, he approvingly refers to Carr's 
account in a less-known work, Nationalism and After, of 
the global changes from the late 19th century onwards: 
Then, the incorporations of the working classes (social 
forces) as participants in the Western states 
accentuated the movements towards economic nationalism 
and imperialism (forms of state). This, in turn, caused 
a fragmentation of the world economy and engendered a 
more conflictual phase in international relations 
(structure of the world order).109
In the words of Cox:
There was no disposition in Carr to isolate 'levels of 
analysis." He saw the interrelatedness of 
industrialization, change in the forms of state, change 
in ideas, and change in world order. Carr brought an 
historical mode of thought to whatever he wrote about. 
He was equally alive to economic, social, cultural, and 
ideological matters. He studied individuals, especially 
those whose intellectual influence marked an era; but 
most of all, he brought all these elements to an 
understanding of structural change.110
Unlike postwar scholars like Morgenthau and Waltz 
who 'transformed realism into a form of problem-solving 
theory", Carr was able to stand back from the 
historical structure which constrained the particular
108. Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World 
Orders" /1981), in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. 
Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
pp.85-123, here pp.91-92; Robert W. Cox, 
'Multilateralism and World Order" (1992), in the same 
volume, pp.494-523, here pp.502-05.
109. Cox, 'Social Forces, pp.100-01.
Cox, 'Influences", p.27.
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configurations of material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions of his time, 'treating it as historically
conditioned and thus susceptible to change."111
There is a parallel between Carr"s conception of the
worldview of status quo powers and Cox"s conception of 
problem-solving theory. Like Cox"s problem-solving 
neorealists of the postwar period, the liberal 
internationalist advocates of the (historically 
specific) national interests of status quo powers of 
the interwar era took the given order, and the power 
relations underpinning that order as given and fixed in 
time. Their attention therefore was mainly focused on 
the reestablishment of equilibrium, to create the 
prewar conditions which would sustain the anachronistic 
conditions of the Pax Britannica.
Conclusion
On inspection, it turns out that the common 
conceptions of realism, idealism and of the 'First 
Debate" are often grounded in a specific reading of The 
Twenty Years' Crisis• The arguments that Carr advanced 
in the book have been largely caricatured and 
distorted. Furthermore, many of the polemical 
assertions that Carr made have been taken at face- 
value, without an account of the historical context in 
which the book was written and of Carr"s political and 
normative stance and motivations. The result has been 
the ironing out of the complexities in the book.
Carr did not have just one conception of 
utopianism and realism. As Wilson has shown, these
111. Cox, 'Social Forces", p.91.
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terms are far from clear in The Twenty Years' Crisis. 
Furthermore, Carr stresses their dichotomous character 
but also claims that sound policies need to integrate 
them both. He bemoans that the Utopians neglect power 
and conflict and, with a slight of hand, disposes of 
their reform schemes. However, then he himself conjures 
up utopian-looking projects holding out the prospect of 
a juster world. Utopianism and realism seem to be 
firmly embroiled in each other.
Despite the apparent confusion coming from Carr's 
less than rigorous and frequently polemical use of his 
terms, there is also an underlying, coherent sense in 
which he employs them. In this substantial sense,
Carr's realism corresponds to a sociology of knowledge 
in the vein of Mannheim while his target, utopianism, 
is the unconscious hypocrisy of those in power.
The latter are unable to admit the embeddedness 
within their own interests of the seemingly universal 
standards propagated by them. It is this 
unreflectivism, not as such the attempt to create a 
better world, which is subject to Carr's powerful 
critique. Carr's upholding the possibility of progress 
and his unmasking of ideological fancy footwork are 
based upon his deep sense of the historical process and 
of collective human agency.
In this respect, there exist many overlaps with 
critical IR theory in its Marxist variant. Drawing on 
not immediately apparent aspects of Carr's work, they 
point to his ability to overcome the dichotomy of 
realism and idealism. Carr's sophisticated perception 
of the agency-structure, power-knowledge dynamics and 
his consequent ability to see the structures of the
107
international system not as immutables clearly run 
against the grain of orthodox realism. His ability to 
acknowledge the constraints arising from the 
distribution of international power, but simultaneously 
to see the possibilities of transformation within the 
existing system develops out of his dialectical 
conception of realism and idealism. These aspects of 
his work point to the existence of the dimension of an 
immanent critique in The Twenty rears" Crisis.
This immanent critique can also be directed at the 
work of Lionel Curtis, to whom we now turn.
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Chapter Three
Lionel Curtis: A Benevolent Imperialist
Oxford as an Influence on Curtis
Curtis was born in 1872 to a clergyman's family. 
After attending preparatory school at Malvern, he was 
educated at Haileybury, a public school which had 
originally been the East India Company College, and 
whose graduates filled the ranks of the Army or the 
Colonial Service. In 1891, Curtis went to New College, 
Oxford, to study Mods and Greats.1
Oxford always had a special relationship with the 
Empire. This was not only due to the immense number of 
Oxonians who subsequently filled the posts where the 
major decisions affecting the Empire were made. Being 
the breeding ground of many philosophers and historians 
with an imperialist vocation, Oxford was a most 
appropriate context for providing the elements of the 
specific kind of imperialism that Curtis would later 
subscribe to.
Two watershed events that took place in the 
nineteenth century paved the way to the patriotic 
imperialism that held the end of the century Oxford in 
its grip. The first, the Oxford Movement of the 1830s 
and 1840s, with its ruthless piety, alienated the 
unorthodox. The second event was the publication of 
Darwin's Descent of Man, followed by Winwoode Reade's
1. Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International 
Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995, pp.3-14.
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The Martyrdom of Man• These two events caused a 
precipitous decline in religious conviction, which was 
to be superseded by the concept of imperialism as an 
inspiring moral force.
In the second half of the nineteenth century,
Oxford was teeming with renowned imperialist scholars, 
and those that ascribed a greater role to the state: 
Ruskin scorned the parliamentary system and the 
Manchester School, advocating a positive role for the 
state in providing education, housing and pensions for 
the unprivileged in a hierarchically ordered society. 
Jowett focused on the vocation of imperialist 
administration as good government. T.H.Green elevated 
the state to a moral good, and similarly advocated 
social reform. His pupil Arnold Toynbee articulated the 
attack on the social effects of the Industrial 
Revolution further. Thomas Arnold, Professor of Modern 
History, considered the social progress of states as 
comparable to that of individuals. Focussing on the 
juxtaposition of the Teutonic (of which the British 
were considered to be a part) to the other races,
William Stubbs, Edward Freeman, and J.R. Green 
articulated "Oxford's ideas about race'. In the years 
when Curtis was at Oxford, Froude was preaching 
imperial federation there.
This intellectual atmosphere, which had reached a 
zenith at the time of his studenthood, irrevocably 
stamped Curtis's lifelong ideas. Furthermore, it was 
not only the classicists and historians of Oxford that
nn
had this impact, it was also some of his predecessors 
like Alfred Milner, an alumni of Balliol College, and 
the High Commissioner in South Africa under which 
Curtis worked. In combining the philosophy of the state 
of T.H. Green with a passionate imperialism, Milner 
already represented in flesh what was later to become a 
substantial component of the imperialistic philosophy 
of Curtis.2
First Steps Into Career
After graduating from Oxford in 1894, Curtis 
became the Manager of Haileybury Guild, a society of 
volunteers from his former public school doing social 
work at London's East End. He organized Salvation Army­
like activities for working-class boys and got involved 
in housing schemes.
Afterwards, while training to become a barrister, 
he worked as personal secretary, first for Leonard 
Courtney, a Liberal Unionist MP, and then for the Vice- 
Chairman of the London County Council. These spells 
into national and municipal politics prepared him for 
his later activities.3
In 1899, the Boer War broke out and was at first 
going badly for Britain. Amid the patriotic uproar the 
bad war news created, Curtis enlisted as volunteer and 
did war service as cyclist messenger. In June 1900, he 
was discharged and went back to England. On coming back
2. Richard Symonds, Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost 
Cause?, Londons Macmillan, 1986.
3. Lavin, From Empire, pp.14-21.
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to South Africa in October, Curtis applied to work with 
Lord Milner, Governor of the Cape and British High 
Commissioner in South Africa. Initially he was 
appointed as assistant to the Imperial Secretary, but 
was then transferred to Johannesburg.4
The Colonial Official
Curtis's spell of office consisted of his tenures 
as Town Clerk of Johannesburg (1901-03) and as 
Assistant Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal (1903- 
06). In both functions, he left his mark on the 
municipal organization of South Africa.
In Johannesburg, Curtis saw to the establishment 
of a Town Council, first nominated, then elected, and 
thus laid the foundations for municipal self- 
government. Compared to the previous Boer regime in 
Transvaal, the competences of the municipality were 
enhanced. Nevertheless, Curtis saw himself as guider 
rather than executor of the Councillers and undertook 
several measures to regulate business and social 
affairs. His most important - and most controversial - 
action was the enlargement of the town's boundaries to 
include the mining areas of the Rand and thus making 
the mining companies liable for paying municipal taxes. 
Not surprisingly, this was unpopular among the 
companies but Curtis mollified them by taxing only the 
value of land and buildings and not the mineral 
treasures underground.
4. Ibid., pp. 21-39.
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As Assistant Colonial Secretary, Curtis set up a 
completely new municipal system throughout the 
Transvaal. Again, it was built upon the principle of 
local government. He also dealt with poor relief, 
public health and 'Asiatic affairs'. After a row with 
the other Assistant Secretary over their division of 
competences, Curtis quit the Transvaal service.5
But his real work in South Africa had just begun. 
This has to be seen in the context of his participation 
in a group of young men devoted to Milner. They were 
collectively dubbed his 'Kindergarten'.
Milner and his 'Kindergarten'
Although the Round Table as a formal movement 
emerged in 1910, its origins go back to the group 
called Milner's Kindergarten, the coterie of young 
civil servants, most of them from the Oxford colleges 
of All Souls and New College. They were brought 
together by Milner in the aftermath of the Boer War to 
assist him in the reconstruction of the country in the 
specific way he envisaged. It was at the Kindergarten 
that Curtis developed his early ideas on federal forms 
of unification.
One of the most controversial figures of the 'new 
imperialism', Milner was a man whose genuine attachment 
to the Empire and non-partisan attitude were coupled, 
on a more negative note, with the traits of an anti­
democrat who despised party politics and parliamentary
5. Ibid., pp.40-62.
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democracy passionately.6 For him, the British Empire was 
the symbol and epitome of British racial supremacy. His 
influence over Chamberlain had been an immensely 
important factor on British government's decision to 
declare war against the Boers.7 Since his appointment in 
1897, Milner's aim had been to create a single dominion 
out of the colonies and republics of South Africa, an 
aim for the realization of which he had seen the war as 
a necessary sacrifice.
The end of the Boer War had brought the two 
republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, 
under British control, but with no intention of coming 
under a single dominion with the others. The practical 
difficulties of unification forced Milner to set his 
hopes on a federal system with wide-ranging autonomy 
for the member states: Federalism would not only solve 
the existing administrative problems but also be the 
surest way of holding the four South African colonies 
under the British flag.8
It was also not a coincidence that Milner had 
needed the assistance of a whole team of young recruits 
from Britain. One aim, indeed, was to break the
6. Hans-Christoph Schroder, Imperialismus und Anti- 
Demokratisches Denken: Alfred Milner's Kritik am 
politischen System Enqlands, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 
1978.
7. Eric Stokes, "Milnerism', in Historical Journal 5 
(1962), 1, pp.47-60.
8. Walter Nimocks, Milner's Young Men: The 
"Kindergarten' in Edwardian Imperial Affairs, Durham 
(NC): Duke University Press, 1968, pp.17-53.
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influence of what Milner interpreted as the corrupt and 
inefficient Boer bureaucracy.9
Milner's plans for the union of South Africa had 
one crucial prerequisite: There had to be an influx of 
the British population into the Transvaal and Orange 
River Colony before responsible government was restored 
to them. Otherwise, with the persisting dominance of 
the Boers in terms of population, the premature 
granting of self-government to these dominions, and the 
unification of South Africa under their terms, were 
bound to produce the diametrically opposite result: A 
white-ruled South Africa under Boer dominance, and the 
concomitant severing of the link to Britain. The 
expected immigration from Britain before self- 
government would be restored was therefore vital in 
Milner's vision of the future of South Africa.
Milner hoped that the economic overspill from the 
Transvaal mines, coupled with an agricultural boom, 
would draw settlers from the white dominions and 
Britain. Subsequent events caused the scheme to 
collapse: The mines could not be restored iii time, and 
an agricultural drought savaged the land. The labour 
shortage in the mines had to be met by the import of 
Chinese labourers, whose ruthless treatment caused a 
public outcry in Britain, ushering in the Liberal 
victory of 1906. To Milner, the election result
9. Kenneth Ingham, 'Philip Kerr and the Unification of 
South Africa', in John Turner (ed.), The Larger Idea: 
Lord Lothian and the Problem of National Sovereignty, 
London: The Historians' Press, 1988, pp.20-32, here 
p.22.
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signalled the ultimate death-knell of his hopes. In 
fact, by the time he was leaving office in April 1905, 
embittered by the catastrophic failure of his policies, 
he had already lost all hope of seeing the South 
African unification in his lifetime.
As Milner and his supporters had fearfully 
anticipated, the policies of the Liberal government 
changed the existing balances swiftly in favour of Boer 
dominances the establishment of responsible government 
in the two Boer-dominated former republics. The 
political livelihood among the Boers became unstoppable 
after the restoration of self-government. The unity and 
single-mindedness of the Boers contrasted sharply with 
the hopeless divisions among the English-speaking 
community of the Transvaal. They were divided between 
the Milnerite 'Progressives'* and the 'Responsibles', 
who were sympathetic to the Boers and against a South 
Africa governed from Whitehall.
Before the Transvaal election of February 1907 the 
Kindergarten threw their lot decidedly behind the 
Progressives.10 They were also deeply involved in the 
producing of a memorandum, as we will see below. 
Kindergarten's role in South Africa did not come to an 
end with the crushing defeat that the Progressives 
suffered at the elections. Curtis and Richard Feetham 
enjoyed new positions as appointed members of the 
Legislative Council, the upper house of the Transvaal 
legislature. The Council enabled the Crown Colony
Nimocks, Milner's Young Men, p.66.
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Government, despite the latter's official life coming 
to an end with the elections, to preserve at least a 
pocket of influence for a further five years. Two other 
members of the Kindergarten, Robert Brand and Philip 
Kerr continued in their positions as the secretary and 
assistant secretary respectively of the Intercolonial 
Council.
The year following the Transvaal elections saw a 
series of further electoral results which in a very 
short span of time changed the balances in South Africa 
radically to the favour of the Boers. The Boer 
electoral victory of November 1907 in the Orange River 
Colony was followed by the victory in the February 1908 
Cape Colony elections of the South Africa Party, which 
was favourable to the Boers and hostile to the 
Milnerites. Dr Jameson's trusted Progressive government 
was thus replaced by a government headed by an 
implacable foe of the Milnerites, Merriman.
Despite these catastrophic reverses, the members 
of the Kindergarten were able to preserve their 
optimism. They had started to approach the Milnerian 
aim, a South Africa faithful to the empire, from a 
different angle. Milner's dreams could yet be achieved. 
Furthermore, they could result from the immediate 
unification of the four South African colonies, despite 
the fact that the Boers were now in a strong position. 
Whatever the starting point, they argued, the political 
stability and economic expansion that would come in the 
wake of unification would produce large-scale
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immigration, which could only be British.11 In this 
belief they were backed by the new High Commissioner, 
Lord Selborne.
The Selborne Memorandum
It took some time for the Kindergarten to follow 
their pragmatic instincts and switch to this new 
tactic. The occasion triggering this shift in approach 
was probably their reading of the biography of 
Alexander Hamilton by Frederick Scott Oliver.12 A 
staunch advocate of imperial federation himself, 
Oliver's book was a plea to derive the lessons of the 
American unification as a model for more efficient 
government of the British Empire.
In formulating this new policy, the Kindergarten 
initially ran against opposition from both the Boer and 
the British sides. True, the unification of South 
Africa had been a part of British policy for the last 
fifty years.13 But just like Milner, many British 
leaders believed that unification would be safe only in 
the aftermath of a sufficient influx of British 
settlers to overbalance the Afrikaners.
The Boers were also principally favourable to 
unification, since they could see the golden 
opportunities it offered. However, they similarly 
thought that early unification, before Boer political
11. Ibid., p.75.
12. Ibid., pp.77-8. See also Lavin, From Empire, pp.68, 
71.
13. Lavin, From Empire, pp.64-65.
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power had been completely established, would not be 
wise.14
At the time that the Kindergarten had started to 
come out in support of immediate unification, i.e. by 
the middle of 1906, the Transvaal and the Orange River 
Colony had not yet gained responsible government and 
the subsequent elections ensuring Boer political power 
had not yet taken place. Furthermore, in the Cape 
Colony Dr Jameson was still the Prime Minister.
By the summer of 1906, Kindergarten was already 
deeply involved in clandestine meetings about immediate 
unification, whose first concrete outcome would be a 
memorandum on the issue. The memorandum would include, 
first, a review of the existing relations between the 
colonies and the underlining of the dissatisfactory 
aspects of division, and then a plea for unification 
with a draft constitution. Curtis was chosen as the 
editor of the memorandum, which would be the joint work 
of the group. Through Milner, Kindergarten secured the 
financial assistance of the Rhodes Trust for the 
project.15
Despite some delay due to the frictions between 
Selborne and the Kindergarten on the style of the 
material and the extent of Colonial Office involvement, 
the memorandum was completed by the end of 1906, before 
the Transvaal election took place.16 Anticipating that
14. Nimocks, Milner's Young Men , p.76.
15. Ibid., pp.78-80.
16. On the issue of the disagreements between Selborne 
and the Kindergarten, see Nimocks, Milner's Young Men, 
pp.83-84, and Lavin, From Empire, pp.73-76.
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the result of the elections would make the achievement 
of their aims more difficult, in the final part of the 
memorandum the Kindergarten pressed for urgent 
consideration of unification.
The next question was how to circulate the 
memorandum with the weight of Selborne behind it but 
without simultaneously stimulating suspicions of 
Downing Street interference among the South Africans. 
This was achieved through an ingenious scheme which 
enlisted the support of Dr Jameson. In November 1906 
Curtis visited the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, 
to convince him that the best way to fend off 
suspicions of outside interference was to make it look 
as if Selborne had been asked by Jameson to produce 
such a document. Jameson was enthusiastic in his 
support, and in January 1907 the memorandum was 
distributed to each of the colonial governments under 
Selborne's name, with the assurance that it had in no 
way been the result of an interference by the imperial 
government.
The same method was followed in the process of 
getting the memorandum published. This time, to gain 
yet more trust from the Boer side, the support of an 
Afrikaner leader was sought. The Kindergarten found 
this support in F.C. Malan, the editor of the 
influential Ons Land. In contrast to most of the 
Afrikaner leaders who at the time of the memorandum's 
publication objected to immmediate unification, Malan 
had been supporting the latter before the Kindergarten
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approached him. He was convinced by the Kindergarten 
first to lend his support to the memorandum.
It was finally published in July 1907.
Although the memorandum was received as favorably 
as it could under the present circumstances, the 
Kindergarten was determined not to rest on its laurels. 
They believed that the most effective means of 
harnessing support for immediate unification would be 
the founding of an organisation which would propogate 
their vision.17 It was planned to launch the idea of a 
country-wide and cross-party organization working for 
unification under Kindergarten leadership during a 
dinner party given by Abe Bailey. One of the biggest 
financial supporters of the Kindergarten, Abe Bailey 
was also one of the richest people in South Africa and 
a staunch supporter of the Progressives. In contrast, 
the Transvaal Boer leaders Botha and Smuts yet refused 
to cooperate. With its plan for an organization because 
of the obstacles shelved, the Kindergarten instead 
focused on the collection of information which could be 
resorted to when the unification process took off.18
The fruit of the information thus gathered was 
borne by the publication in 1908 of two books. One of
17. Nimocks, Milner's Young Men, p.91.
18. There was, in fact, an attempt to turn the 
Fortnightly Club, an organization previously created by 
the Kindergarten in October 1906, into the Transvaal 
committee of the proposed new organization. This was 
however not repeated in the other colonies.
Furthermore, the Transvaal committee thus established 
in April 1907 had a much more restricted function than 
what was originally foreseen: As mentioned, it focused 
only on the collection of information to assist Curtis. 
See Nimocks, Milner's Young Men, pp.95-97.
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them, edited by B.K. Long, contained the constitutions 
of several federal states and their comparison. The 
other one, which was much more important for the 
articulation of the unification philosophy of the 
Kindergarten, was a two-volume book by Curtiss The 
Government of South Africa. Despite the disclaimer at 
the beginning of the first volume that the aim was only 
to provoke discussion, the book was a plea that South 
Africa had no choice but to unite. Furthermore, there 
was a marked confusion in the book about the form of 
unification that was proposed, with the later sections 
leaning not to federal but to unitary government. 
According to Nimocks, 'Curtis's failure to restrict 
himself to the collection and digestion of facts' was 
not only because 'Curtis was a propagandist in spite of 
himself'. There was a further reason lurking behind the 
discrepancies in the book.19
By early 1908, the Boer leaders had made a 
complete shift in their approach to the issue of 
unification. By this time political power in the 
Transvaal, Cape Colony and Orange River Colony had 
passed safely to the hands of the Boers or to those 
friendly to them. In the changed political climate, the 
Boer leaders started not only to support unification, 
but to press for a unitary rather than a federal 
government. Not only was it cheaper, but it was an 
effective means of forestalling potential inter-state
Ibid., p.99.
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frictions that would create a sphere of permanent 
intervention from London.20
Towards South African Union
Following the change of heart of the Boer leaders, 
the unification process in South Africa finally and 
swiftly took off. Shortly after the publication of The 
Government of South Africa, the leaders of the four 
colonial states had began in earnest to draw up a 
constitution. It was not, therefore, the pivotal role 
of the Kindergarten alone, as they with their high 
self-regard were often inclined to claim, but also the 
initiative of the Transvaal politicians Botha and Smuts 
that had been determining in the process of 
unification. It was in fact only when they started to 
swim with the tide of Boer political leaders that the 
Kindergarten could see their vision of 'closer union' 
in South Africa taking flesh, and themselves having any 
impact on the process.
Despite this, the Kindergarten did have important 
influence on the flow of the events: Before The 
Government of South Africa was published, the 
statistical material which had formed the backbone of 
the study had been made available to Smuts, with whom 
the Kindergarten had started to develop a much more 
positive relationship from early 1908.21 Furthermore, 
Robert Brand was one of the architects of the draft
20. Ibid., pp.101-02.
21. Ibid., pp.104-05.
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constitution which was produced before the National 
Convention on unification began.
For the Kindergarten, the specific provisions of 
the constitution for the representation of the 
constituencies were vital for ensuring that their 
changed method of arriving at the Milnerian aim was 
successful. These had to be arranged such that the 
expected arrival of the British migrants could have a 
"cleansing effect at the ballot box.'22 Although the 
respective provisions of the draft constitution 
presented by the Transvaal delegation to the Convention 
were subsequently rejected by the colonial 
legislatures, the constitution in its final shape 
included electoral provisions the leaders of the 
British community felt able to accept. The Kindergarten 
had had a significant impact upon this outcome.23
Once the National Convention had agreed upon a 
joint constitution, the constitution had to be accepted 
by the legislatures of all four colonies. Finally the 
time had come for the Kindergarten to pour their 
proselytizing energies into the running of an 
organization whose aim it would be to convince the 
white population of South Africa that not just union, 
but the constitution with its specific provisions, were 
for their benefit.
For this purpose, the Kindergarten in May 1908 
launched the campaign of "the Closer Union Societies'.
22. Ibid., p. 106.
23. Ibid., pp.105-06.
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The method of conviction would be simples The emphasis 
on a national identity composed of both Boer and 
British elements. Curtis was at the vanguard of this 
attempt at the instrumental use of a non-Party and 
supra-racial South African identity (which, of course, 
did not include the native component) to create an 
organically united South Africa and a South African 
nationalism.24
The movement quickly grew to substantial 
proportions, and the first issue of the accompanying 
journal to the movement, the State, appeared in 
December 1908 under the editorship of Kerr.25 The State 
was an interesting medium reflecting both the 
philosophy of the Kindergarten and the means they 
employed to get this philosophy accepted. The method 
they had previously used in the Selborne Memorandum was 
once more resorted to with full vigours They portrayed 
themselves as South African patriots, and made a 
deliberate attempt at presenting unification as a 
'South African" issue rather than a means to secure 
British dominance. They were not after protecting the 
interests of Britain; they were neutral and benevolent
observers of the problems of South Africa.
The State went to great lengths to hammer this
point homes A unique South African culture as the joint 
product of the two white races was emphasized, rather 
than separate British or Afrikaner cultures. They 
underlined the existence of a 'Cape heritage", to whose
24. Lavin, From Empire, pp.86, 90-95, 97, 100.
25. Ingham, 'Philip Kerr", pp.27-30.
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formation the Cape Dutch had made as big a contribution 
as the British. They used any source they could lay 
their hands on:
Bibliography, archivism, conservation, architecture, 
and history were regarded as a means to the invention 
of a typically 'South African" heritage that would 
unite into one 'nation" the two dominant white 'races"
All matters of potential national relevance were 
canvassed: The 'native problem", railway union, and 
defense were presented as intractible issues which 
could only be resolved through unification; and the 
questions of a national language, anthem, capital, and 
all other symbolic expressions of national unity were 
explored. With its vehement emphasis on a common 
culture and common problems as the binding elements 
towards the formation of a union between previously 
separate states, the State was 'the testing-ground for 
the subsequent activities of Lionel Curtis and Philip 
Kerr".27
In the meantime, the Kindergarten had become 
increasingly more staunchly in favour of immediate 
unification. The autocratic and self-enclosed 
tendencies they had harboured all along, reached their 
zenith:
The Kindergarten, endorsing the local demand for the 
return of self-government, soon felt themselves at the 
centre of events and ceased to regard the Colonial 
Office in London as the fountain-head of policy.
Milner"s objective of a united Dominion of South Africa
26. Peter Merrington, 'The State and the ^Invention of 
Heritage" in Edwardian South Africa", in Andrea Bosco 
and Alex May (eds.), The Round Table: The
Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy, London: 
Lothian Foundation Press, 1997, pp.127-33, here p.128. 
See also Nimocks, Milner"s Young Men, p.115.
27. Merrington, 'State", p.133.
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under the British flag on the pattern of Canada or 
Australia assumed the dimension of a faith as they 
began to formulate orthodoxies they fancied were their 
own: that to rule an empire by party government at 
Westminster was 'a farce'; that federation of the South 
African colonies was the only means possible to solve 
the railway crisis and other local problems while at 
the same time furthering the imperial ideal.28
In the end, the efforts of the Kindergarten bore 
fruit and the South African union came into being in 
1910.
The Foundation of the Round Table
After what they assumed was a successful venture 
of uniting South Africa and their own omnipotent role 
in the process, the Kindergarten turned their attention 
to the whole Empire. They had by now started to feel 
that by employing the same tactics they had used in 
South Africa, they could act as an influential pressure 
and study group to help accomplish the daunting task of 
merging 'imperial' aspects of the sovereignties of 
Britain and the Dominions. In this way, the Empire 
would be transformed into an organic union. The group 
they formed would be called 'The Round Table'. Curtis 
was from the onset the most relentlessly energetic of 
the Kindergarten in pursuing the idea.
To offset any potential suspicion that this was an 
agenda dictated from London, it was crucial for the 
founders of the Round Table that their movement should 
be an Empire-wide one. To spread the gospel in the 
Dominions, numerous branches of the group would have to 
be founded in each of them. The central coordinating
28. Lavin, From Empire, p.64.
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office, the Moot, would be located in London, and there 
a journal, also called The Round Table, would be edited 
and published, with contributions from both the Moot 
and Dominion writers.29 With his boundless energy and 
dedication, Curtis gladly took the role of 'an 
itinerant delegate" who 'would spread the word and 
maintain personal connections with the Dominions."30
There were considerable differences of opinion 
between Curtis and the rest of the Round Table, which 
flared up as early as the 1910s. Initially, the 
controversies revolved around the timing of the 
movement towards imperial federation. The contrast, for 
example, between Kerr, who expected the maturing of the 
requisite conditions to take as long as fifty years, 
and Curtis, who expected a much shorter transition 
period, was striking.31 The fervour of Curtis, who was 
determined to override all restrictions of time and 
plausibility, was also at odds with the more down-to- 
earth approach of Leo Amery. According to Amery, it was 
a vain hope to dream of imperial federation before 
there was that certain 'practical federal spirit in the 
air. "32 There were further differences between Curtis 
and the others regarding the main target-country to 
which the Round Table should direct its attention. 
Curtis insisted on capturing the opinion-forming elite 
in the Dominions, since, in his opinion, it was these
29. Ibid., p.108.
30. Ibid., p.108.
31. Alexander May, The Round Table, 1910 - 1966, Ph. 
dissertation. University of Oxford, 1995, p.46.
32. Ibid., p.47.
countries which would have to make the necessary 
sacrifices, while the others thought the attention 
should focus on Britain. By 1913-14, however, 'the Moot 
had effectively agreed on the necessity for domestic 
propaganda. '33
More seriously, while it was agreed that the 
ultimate aim of the movement was 'imperial government', 
'federation' or 'organic/closer union' for the British 
Empire, there was no unanimity over what these rather 
vague terms were exactly supposed to mean and how the 
ultimate goal was to be reached. On the one hand, there 
were those, principally Curtis, who propagated 
federation from an all-or-nothing perspective. On the 
other hand, there were the advocates of a closer 
cooperation between Great Britain and the Dominions, 
stopping short of immediate federation. Unqualified 
Dominion support during the First World War 
strengthened the hand of these more careful Round 
Tablers .34
Such disagreements within the ranks of the group 
contributed to its secretive methods, which, combined 
with their genuine elitism created distrust against 
them within Britain as well as in the Dominions, as we 
shall see below. This image of the group is also
33. Ibid., p. 47.
34. Ibid., pp.3, 44, 46-47, 98-99, 108-09, 117-19, 165- 
71.
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sustained by some writers, for instance Nimocks and 
Kendle.35
The writer of a thesis on the Round Table, 
Alexander May confirms the Nimocks-Kendle view that the 
Round Table was not only an - at times irritatingly - 
secretive organisation, but that it was 'patently 
elitist".36 However, he holds a more sanguine view 
regarding the legitimacy of this secretiveness and 
elitism. The notorious elusiveness of the Round Table, 
asserts May, was more often a testimony to the divided 
councils within the group, than the result of a 
conscious strategy. Further, '(a) degree of 
disingenuosness was thought necessary to allow „the 
gradual formation of right opinion. ""37
May challenges the existing opinion that the 
'target-audience" of the Round Table was 'a handful of 
well-placed politicians". In fact, the Round Table 
aimed to reach out to the public, despite defining the 
'public" in a rather restricted way. The ideas 
propagated by the Round Table were addressed in the 
first instance to the selected few, the intellectuals, 
media representatives, businessmen and lawyers, 'the 
^opinion-makers" who could force politicians to act".38
35. John Kendle, Federal Britain: A History. London and 
New Yorks Routledge, 1997, pp.79-104; Nimocks, Milner"s 
Young Men, pp.138-219.
36. May, Round Table, p.51.
37. Ibid., p.48.
3S. Ibid., pp.50-1.
i^n
The Conflicts With the Dominion Groups
In 1909, Curtis visited Canada for the first time 
with the aim of establishing Canadian branches of the 
Round Table. During the visit, he was faced with the 
disillusioning reality of the Canadians" less than 
enthusiastic response to schemes of imperial 
federation. Contrary to the stipulations of the 
programme of the Round Table, whose lynchpin was the 
urgent necessity of positive action to keep the unity 
of the empire, the general feeling in Canada seemed to 
be for the cooperation of autonomous countries which 
would be held together by 'common sentiment and common 
interest", an attitude which was blatantly unpalatable 
to Curtis.39
Lurking behind this cool reception of the idea of 
imperial union was the distrust against the secretive 
methods of the Round Tablers, a feeling which, to 
varying degrees, was to emerge in the other Dominions 
and even in Britain. Despite the Round Tablers" claim 
in not being interested in politics, the record of the 
Canadian Round Tablers in being fairly deeply immersed 
in politics did not help to dispel the thickening aura 
of suspicion.40
James Eayrs, 'The Round Table Movement in Canada,
1909-1920", in Canadian Historical Review 38 (1957), 1, 
pp.1-20, here p.l.
40. Ibid. p.7.
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The Green Memorandum
In 1910, Curtis penned the first memorandum 
advocating the organic union of the Empire. The Green 
Memorandum was a tract outlining the ideas Curtis was 
to repeat, albeit with modifications that did not touch 
the essential substance, for the rest of his life.
Curtis set out the case for the organic union, or 
federation, of the British Empire, by dramatically 
depicting the dangers that the whole of it faced. The 
awareness that the British Empire was no longer in a 
position of unchallenged hegemony stamped the whole 
narrative. Urgent constitutional changes were required 
to protect the Empire.
The memorandum was addressed to the opinion-makers 
and politicians of all the five Dominions and of 
Britain. The focus, however, was on Canada. With 
detailed chapters about the geography, population, 
economic and political prospects of Canada and on 
Canada's relations with the United States, the ground 
for the core thesis was prepared: If Canada wanted to 
preserve its separate identity and not to be swallowed 
economically by its southern neighbour, it had to 
support the organic unity of the British Empire.
Without that, the independence of not just Canada, but 
of all the Dominions, would at best be only 'nominal'. 
Furthermore, the organic unity of the Empire was the 
only means of preserving the 'spirit of liberty', 
represented by Britain and the Dominions, from 
threatening states. Britain's own relatively meagre
13?
resources were not sufficient to curb the appetite of 
aggressive powers from attacking the Dominions and 
Britain herself.
Curtis saw the popular argument in Canada, that 
the cooperation of nations united by one flag, one 
crown, and one citizenship would ensure the unity and 
security of the Empire, as a policy of drift which 
would ensure the breakdown of it. The security of the 
Empire could not be based upon separate sovereignties 
but only be attained by the pooling of these 
sovereignties, in other words, through organic union.
What, however, was precisely meant by the "organic 
unity' of the Empire and the pooling of the 
sovereignties? According to Curtis these lofty concepts 
were in fact to be applied to a very specific realm: 
Namely defence and foreign affairs. What Curtis 
envisaged was an imperial parliament responsible for 
defence, foreign affairs and colonies. It would have 
the power to tax according to the financial capacity of 
each country. It was not only the Dominions that had to 
make changes for the highest common interest of all of 
them, that of preserving their national security and 
independence. Britain itself was equally taken to task: 
She would have to accept that it would be one unit 
among many.41
The Green Memorandum had been intended as a 
manifesto for the Round Table movement. Instead of 
support and praise, however, its publication stimulated
41. Lionel Curtis, The Green Memorandum, London and 
Bungay: Richard Clay and Sons, 1910.
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wide-spread criticism within the ranks of both the Moot 
and the Dominion groups. For members of the Moot like 
Brand, Craik, and even Kerr, the proposed imperial 
federation did not stretch far enough: Why, for 
example, could not the power to tax on matters other 
than defence, or to determine tariffs also be 
centralised? For the Dominion groups, on the other 
hand, the codified nature of the proposed changes were 
anathema.42
The Round Table and Ireland in the Context of "Home 
Rule All Round"
Nowhere is the duplicity of the motives of the
Round Table, and the rifts and twists of opinion this 
caused within its ranks more apparent than in the 
protracted discussions surrounding the Irish problem. 
For the solution that the Round Table advocated for 
this problem, i.e. "home rule all round", was directed 
not only at solving the Irish problem as such, but 
also, at a-greater measure, conceived as a means of 
solving the imperial problem. The whole discussion was 
consequently bedevilled by profound differences of 
opinion as to what it meant in terms of the organic 
union of the Empire, preventing the Round Table from 
taking a very clear stance.
"Home rule all round", i.e. the federalization of 
the United Kingdom, was a concept closely intertwined 
with the discussion about home rule for Ireland. Home 
rule for Ireland had been endorsed in a speech of 
Gladstone made in 1886. Joseph Chamberlain,
42. May, Round Table, pp.84-88.
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representing the radical wing of the Liberal Party, 
opposed this on the grounds that it would cause the 
separation of Ireland from Great Britain. Instead, he 
came up with the proposal for 'home rule all round", 
which to him 'offered a way meeting the Irish demands 
whilst maintaining a superior imperial Parliament at 
Westminster."43 At the same time, Chamberlain aimed to 
radicalise Liberal politics, for the local governments 
that he had in mind would have extended powers. The 
whole structure would be bolstered by
secularisation and free education, the establishment of 
popular local governments and sweeping land reform 
which taxed the propertied classes and thus underpinned 
financially these democratic reforms.44
Despite its decentralising appearance, it 'inevitably
implied a centralisation of politics, equating a strong
central government with efficient politics".45
Simultaneously, Chamberlain wanted to 'dish the Whigs
and challenge Gladstone"s position as party leader."46
There were two principal motives, beyond that of 
solving the Irish problem, which caused the Round Table 
to have a keen interest on the issue.47 The first one 
was the conviction that federalism in the United 
Kingdom had to precede the attempts at federalising the 
Empire. One could tie the issue of Irish home rule to
43. Elfie Rembold, '"Home Rule All Round": Experiments 
in Regionalising Great Britain, 1886 - 1914", in Ulrike 
Jordan and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), Political Reform in 
Britain. 1886-1996: Themes, Ideas, Policies. Bochum: 
Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1997, pp.169-192, 
here p.170.
44. Ibid., p.171.
45. Ibid., p.171.
46. Ibid., p.171.
47. J.E. Kendle, 'The Round Table Movement and „Home 
Rule All Round"", in Historical Journal 11 (1968), 2, 
pp.332-53, here pp. 334-35.
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the full-blown federalisation of the United Kingdom and 
see it as the first step towards the creation of 
separate domestic parliaments for England, Wales, and 
Scotland:
To separate 'Irish" from 'British" affairs could be 
construed as a start in the process of separating 
'British" from 'imperial" affairs; there would be 
created various levels of parliamentary government, and 
at each level the politicians and administrators 
concerned would become experts in, and address 
themselves seriously to, the particular problems with 
which they had to deal.48
In other words, this would be just the sort of 
constitutional shift they craved for to create an 
imperial parliament unburdened by local issues.
The erstwhile separation of powers in Britain was 
all the more important, because it would give the 
signal to the Dominions that in joining an imperial 
federation, they would be joining it on equal terms 
with the United Kingdom. It was also expected to create 
a better impression in countries like Canada and 
Australia which were already federations.
The second reason that was frequently upheld for 
justifying the federalisation of Britain was to prevent 
the congestion at Westminster as such, so that the 
parliament could deal with the domestic problems of 
Britain on a more efficient footing.
Curtis was convinced of the necessity of 'home 
rule all round", but the issue did not go undisputed by 
the group. The early controversy surrounded the amount 
of the possible financial burden to Ireland. The
45. D.G. Boyce and J.O. Stubbs, 'F.S. Oliver, Lord
Selborne and Federalism", in Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History 5 (1976), 1, pp.53-81, here p.63.
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ensuing discussion revealed that the whole group, in 
varying degrees, had started to be more cautious, even 
pessimistic, about the possible impact of "home rule 
all round' for imperial unity. The hard-liners in the 
movement, which happened to be the Unionists, Amery 
among them, had no qualms about it: 'Home rule all 
round' was a step towards the dissolution of the empire 
rather than its opposite. In this they were backed by 
Milner. Then there were the ones, Kerr and Curtis among 
them, who took a cautious middle-line.
Kerr was willing to use the concept of federation, 
simultaneously with the home rule issue, for the 
instrumental purpose of acquainting people with the 
idea. He was, however, unequivocal that the foundation 
of an imperial parliament could come about only through 
the joint acting of the Dominions and Britain together: 
The premature separation of powers within Britain could 
not serve the purpose. On the other hand, there was no 
reason why there had to be different parliaments 
dealing with local issues within Britain: The desired 
separation between the imperial parliament and its 
domestic counterpart could as well be achieved through 
the creation of a single domestic parliament for 
Britain.
Curtis was also losing his earlier conviction 
about the necessity of federalising Britain before 
bringing the empire together in a federal union. It was 
in this mood that the first phase of thinking about the 
issue by the Round Table was completed.
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When, in September 1910, the Constitutional 
Conference formed in the previous May appeared in 
danger of breaking up over the question of home rule 
for Ireland, the group was once more faced with the 
necessity of advocating federalism in the United 
Kingdom. This time it was not advanced as a theoretical 
endeavor related to the complicated question of 
imperial union, but as a practical and urgent solution 
to the looming crisis in the country. It was at this 
point that F.S. Oliver started to make more consistent 
efforts to help communicate the necessity of creating 
an Irish parliament, together with a single parliament 
for the rest of the United Kingdom, and a joint 
imperial parliament for both Ireland and Britain. The 
leader of the Conservative Party, Balfour, however saw 
home rule as the first step towards the dissolution of 
the United Kingdom. When the Conference finally broke 
down, a possible federalist solution as a means of 
resolving the immediate difficulties was shelved as a 
public discussion.
The Round Table, however, continued brooding over 
the matter. Unsurprisingly, Amery and Milner were 
firmly against the granting of home rule to Ireland. In 
this they were opposed by members like Brand and 
Oliver. However, it was the introduction of the 
Government of Ireland Bill in 1912 by the Liberal 
government that provoked the biggest rift in the 
movement up to that point and beyond, leaving a
1
permanent gap between hard-line members like Amery and 
Milner, and the rest.
The Government of Ireland Bill proposed the 
creation of a parliament for Ireland, which would deal 
with the domestic issues, including the tariff policy. 
Foreign affairs of Ireland, defence, taxes, foreign 
trade and similar matters were left to the British 
government.
The Bill provoked the critism of both hard-line 
members and those who were most open-minded about the 
federalisation of Britain. The former, particularly, 
Amery, saw it as going too far, while the latter, led 
by Oliver, and including Curtis, saw it as not going 
far enough in certain respects. The resulting split 
brought Milner and the federalists within the movement 
into opposite camps, particularly as Milner's position 
started to harden in 1914.
To make matters yet more complicated, there was no 
full agreement among those who supported the 
federalisation of the United Kingdom. Oliver, for 
example, while not questioning the principle of home 
rule for Ireland, was appalled by the content of the 
Bill: He was bitter that the right to control the 
tariffs had been left to Ireland, and that the Bill did 
not see Ulster as a separate unit within Ireland. The 
imperial federation that Oliver conceived could only be 
built upon strictly defined roles for different levels
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of Parliaments Trade was a topic which should be left 
to the imperial parliament.49
This shift of opinion among the core members of 
the group, including Curtis, testifies to the 
importance of the preservation of the empire for the 
Round Tablers. When worried about the effects of 'home 
rule all round' for the unity of the empire, the Round 
Tablers have proved to be much less enthusiastic about 
the scheme, than when more practical considerations had 
forced them to adopt it.
The Ireland crisis reached its apogee in 1913-14 
when Ulster refused to accept any autonomous all-Irish 
authority imposed by the Liberal government. With the 
Conservatives openly supporting the rebellious 
Protestants, the United Kingdom seemed to be on the 
brink of a civil war. In this situation, Curtis and his 
fellow Round Tablers Brand and Grigg tried to offer the 
'home rule all round' scheme as a compromise solution. 
While they won Churchill, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, as a temporary convert and got at least a 
sympathetic hearing from some of the Conservative camp, 
their mediatory effort failed due to the rejection by 
Prime Minister Asquith.50
The outbreak of World War I shelved the issue of 
Ireland, if only for the time being. While the Round 
Table's attempt to act as a mediator between government 
and opposition failed, it nevertheless is an indication
49. Ibid., pp.63-4.
50. Lavin, From Empire, pp.121-24.
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of their influence that they got serious attention from 
the top politicians.
The Commonwealth of Nations
The First World War was 'a watershed for the Round 
Table movement".51 Their attention claimed by different 
war-time duties, the members of the group were unable 
to retain the unity of purpose that had brought them 
together. With his staunch belief in the urgency and 
feasibility of an 'organic union", Curtis became more 
and more of a maverick. This was also the stage when 
for Curtis the discussion started to revolve around 
broader schemes of a world federation vanguarded by a 
federation among Britain, the white Dominions and the 
United States.
In terms of publications, the next stage was the 
publication of a - compared to the Green Memorandum - 
even more wide-ranging works The Commonwealth of 
Nations. As with its predecessor, this was also 
strictly speaking the fruit of a joint effort by 
members of the Round Table, although the one who 
actually synthesized their opinions, edited and wrote 
the work was Curtis.
In 1913, Curtis visited Canada to prepare the 
groundwork for the impending book and to get feedback. 
However, as usual his visit turned into an effort to 
proselytize his own rather dogmatic views. In an 
address at the University of Toronto, for example,
51. H.V. Hodson , 'The Round Table 1910-1981", in Round 
Table 71 (1981), 284, pp.308-33, here pp.316-17.
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after illustrating the infeasibility of the present 
state of the relations with the Dominions, he first 
'objectively" reviewed the possible ways in which their 
relations with Britain could develop.
Gleaned from his contacts in the Dominions, the 
alternatives that Curtis sketched were the followings 
The continuation of the existing status-quo; full 
independence; the development of a much looser 
connection to Britain based upon voluntary cooperation 
and symbolized by a common crown and common flag 
whereby the Dominions would control their own foreign 
policies and Britain would become one partner among 
many; and finally what was most dear to Curtis's hearts
That there should be created for the United Kingdom a 
government which exercises powers which are the exact 
equivalent to those exercised by the governments 
already established in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Newfoundland. Such a domestic 
government would have no more responsibility in the 
control of foreign policy or of the few but all- 
important functions which are inseparable from the 
conduct of foreign affairs than is now enjoyed by the 
Dominion governments.52
The crucial catch was of course the followings
These few but all-important functions would then have 
to be entrusted to a general government over which a 
Canadian, an Australian, New Zealander, South African 
or Newfoundlander would exercise exactly the same 
control as an Englishman, Scotchman, Welshman or 
Irishman.53
In 1916, Curtis published the result of his 
research as The Commonwealth of Nations. An abreviated 
version containing his specific constitutional 
proposals appeared in the same year as The Problem of
52. Lionel Curtis, The Round Table Movement, Its Past 
and Its Future: Address Delivered in the Senate House 
of the University to the "Round Table' Groups at 
Toronto, Nov.18, 1913, unpublished manuscript, p.18.
53. Ibid., p. 18.
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the Commonwealth.54 The books extended the argument of 
the Green Memorandum, with the term 'Empire' being 
replaced by the more flashy 'Commonwealth'. Curtis 
repeated his argument that present institutional 
arrangements within the British Empire/Commonwealth 
were insufficient and that only an organic union, 
namely a Commonwealth government responsible to a 
directly-elected Commonwealth parliament, would do. He 
bolstered this argument by delving into history and 
contrasting the 'Asiatic" spirit of autocracy with the 
European concept of commonwealth, built upon the rule 
of law and mutual responsibility among the citizens. He 
added a new twist by at least indicating that the torch 
of commonwealth did not need to be monopolized by the 
whites but that other races could also be uplifted.55
Not everyone in the Round Table group liked this 
added emphasis. Critics like Brand, Malcolm and also 
the vaunted Milner deemed the concept of commonwealth 
as too abstract and irrelevant to the principal aims of 
the group and objected to the indications of a future 
equality between the races.56
Critical comments also came from Australia, one of 
the Dominions where the Round Table recruitment drive 
had registered its greatest successes. The Melbourne 
Round Table group was formed by Curtis in 1910 during 
his visit to the Dominion. The general distrust which 
the methods of the Round Table evoked in all settings
54. Lavin, From Empire, p.128.
55. L. Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations: A Inquiry 
into the Nature of Citizenship in the British Empire, 
and into the Mutual Relations of the Several 
Dependencies Thereof, London: Macmillan, 1916.
56. May, The Round Table, pp.93-95.
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quickly became apparent in Australia, where the elite 
composition of the members, most of whom had close ties 
to Britain, created an "image of imperial conspiracy".57 
Further, having a genuine attachment to the Empire, but 
equally patriotic, the members of the Australian Round 
Table found it difficult to resolve the occasionally 
appearing conflicts of interest between Britain and 
Australia. In the wake of a series of incidents which 
strengthened their feeling of not being adequately 
consulted and taken seriously, by 1918 the Australian 
Round Table had already gone as far as dropping the aim 
of a full-blown imperial federation from its agenda. 
They still wanted advances in the imperial union, but 
these advances had to come about through the free 
choice of independent nations, and not dictated by 
Britain.
Indian "Diarchy"
Already from 1912 onwards, there was some 
discussion within the London Round Table whether and 
how India should be represented within the imperial 
parliament. This was another issue dividing the group. 
Some members openly upheld blatantly racist views, 
others - Curtis among them - were at least willing to 
consider some Indian representatives on a non-voting 
basis. When the impact of World War I made it obvious 
how much Indian nationalism had been boosted and that
57 . Leonie Foster, "The Australian Round Table, the Moot 
and Australian Nationalism", in Round Table 72 (1983), 
288, pp.473-83, here p.474.
no return to pre-war conditions in India were feasible, 
the Moot started to rethink their assertions.58
On invitation of the Governor of the United 
Provinces, Curtis went to India on a fact-finding 
mission in 1916 and stayed until 1918. Coming with 
already pre-conceived ideas, he managed to alienate 
both the British administrators of the Indian Civil 
Service as well as many sensitive Indian nationalists. 
The former, autocrats at heart, disliked Curtis's call 
for greater self-government. The latter were hurt when 
Curtis, in a leaked-out letter to Kerr, seemed to 
compare Indians with Africans. However, he mended 
fences with the moderate nationalists and also 
influenced the opinion of India Secretary Montagu.
Instead of a separation between a British- 
controlled executive and a powerless (and thus 
obstructive) legislative elected by the Indians, Curtis 
proposed a system dubbed (on loose parallels with the 
Ancient Roman Empire) "dyarchy'. According to Curtis's 
blueprint, responsibilities at the provincial level had 
to be divided. Issues like vernacular education, health 
services, public works and control of municipalities 
were to come under legislatures elected by Indian 
voters. Other issues as well as control over the 
Government of India were, for the time being, to remain 
in the hands of the British officials. As time went on, 
more and more issues could be transferred to the 
Indian-controlled bodies until, at the end, the central 
government would also become responsible to an elected
58. Lavin, From Empire, pp.115-16; May, Round Table, 
pp.189-92.
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body. India would then take its place as a fully self- 
governing part of the Empire/Commonwealth.
These ideas largely shaped the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms of 1919, although the latter in some ways 
diverged from Curtis's original plan. The separation of 
powers between the two provincial bodies was diluted, 
thus strengthening the hand of the governors. On the 
other hand, a greater representative element at the 
central government level than allowed by Curtis was 
implemented. All in all, Curtis's foray into colonial 
politics had been a success and was duly recognized as 
such by the bulk of the London Round Table.59
A historian dealing with the Indian reforms of 
1919 and, later, of 1935 has tried to identify their 
ultimate spiritual roots, which also throw light upon 
the general work of Curtis. According to Studdert- 
Kennedy,
dyarchy and federalism were only two of the weapons 
available from the imperialist armoury to politicians 
across the party spectrum.60
Those Britons willing to grant India more autonomy 
'were not completely governed by pragmatism and 
expediency.'61 They were inspired, at least as strongly 
as the urge to preserve British material interests, by 
'common models of historical change, national 
development and political evolution.'62
As the determining historical constituents of this
59. Lavin, From Empire, pp.135-57; May, The Round Table, 
pp.192-200.
60. Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, Indian 
Nationalists and the Raj, Delhi etc.: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, p.8.
61. Ibid., p. 12.
62. Ibid., p. 12.
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model, Studdert-Rennedy lists
a sophisticated common sense, which had been 
articulated and developed by figures such as Maine, 
Stubbs, and Burke,63
the lingering influence of Victorian versions of social 
Darwinism, 'German historicism associated with Ranke',64 
in particular 'British Hegelianism sustained at Oxford 
from before the turn of the century by the pervasive 
influence of T.H. Green.'65 It was the combination of 
these influences that was taught by the history schools 
of Oxford and Cambridge.
It was self-evident to these products of the Edwardian 
upper classes that any political development worthy of 
the name must be the natural outgrowth of organic 
continuities, of the rational consolidation over time 
of encapsulating social structures, evolving steadily 
towards a state of unitary nationhood, even perhaps, in 
the fullness of time, beyond it. The proof ... they saw 
in one society, the British one, a paradigm of rational 
organic evolution. A unique combination of geographical 
and historical circumstances had allowed the British to 
evolve a socially coherent community which was capable 
of resolving its difficulties and of acting through the 
mechanisms of political balance, that is, through the 
established and competing political parties. The 
parties were nested firmly into the institutional 
structure of the law and administration, themselves the 
product of experience or purposive history.66
In this view, British trusteeship in India, which 
would continue until Indian society could be deemed to 
have reached the requisite level of maturity, was a 
most natural, providentially determined phenomenon. 
Indeed, it was an obligation. As we will see, such 
notions also influenced Curtis's concept of the 
Commonwealth•
63 . Ibid., p. 12.
fc4 . Ibid., p.12
65. Ibid., p.30.
66. Ibid., p.13.
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Attending the Peace Conference
Having in effect included India in his vision of a 
federal Commonwealth, Curtis after his return to 
Britain in 1918 further broadened his vision. Zimmern 
introduced Curtis into the League of Free Nations 
Association, of which H.G. Wells was the most prominent 
member, and which later became the League of Nations 
Union. It was in this context that Curtis came to 
embrace the idea that war could only be permanently 
abolished if there would be a world government.
For the time being, however, Anglo-American 
cooperation was the call of the day. The Round Table 
tried to enlist new American members, and Curtis wrote 
an article calling for the US to take over the concept 
of trusteeship and to accept tropical mandates. Largely 
on account of this article, Under-Secretary of State 
Cecil invited Curtis to join the League of Nations 
Section at the Paris conference. However, his attempts 
to influence the American delegation on the mandates 
issue did not bear lasting fruit.67
The Foundation of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs
The establishment of an institute of international 
affairs, which would constitute a forum for discussion, 
for the meeting of public officials, lawyers and others 
interested in international affairs, and which would 
enlighten public opinion, was an idea that was realized
67. Lavin, From Empire, pp.158-63.
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during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It was 
initiated by the members of the British and American 
delegations, and originally it was conceived of as an 
institution which would have branches in both 
countries.
Curtis's role in the founding of the institute and 
in defending it against its Foreign Office opponents at 
the initial stages cannot be overemphasized. In 
particular, his gifts as a fund-raiser were very 
important. It was largely due to him (and to one of his 
Canadian businessmen friends, who footed the bill) that 
the RIIA acquired Chatham House.68
The 1921 Anglo-Irish Settlement
More than ten years after he had given up his seat 
in the Transvaal Legislature, Curtis briefly held 
office once again: first as Secretary to the British 
Delegation for the Irish Treaty (1921-22), then as 
Adviser in the Irish Branch of the Colonial Office 
(1922-24).
After the end of the war, the crisis in Ireland 
once more reached the boiling point. By now, Irish 
nationalism had radicalized that much that home rule 
was no longer acceptable. For Curtis, Dominion status 
was a possible way to reconcile Irish demands for 
independence with British wishes not to let the Green 
Island completely go. On the strength of an article at 
The Round Table and due to the influence of his fellow 
Round Tabler Griggs, who was then Lloyd George's
68. Ibid., pp.165-76; M.L. Dockrill, 'The Foreign Office 
and the Proposed Institute of International Affairs, 
1919", International Affairs 56 (1980), pp.665-72.
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private secretary, Curtis's view gained ground in the 
Cabinet and he was himself invited to join the 
negotiations with the Irish leaders.
This occasion necessitated Curtis to define what 
Dominion status meant, now that the relationship of 
Britain with Canada, South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand was undergoing changes. As he explained to the 
Irish delegation, all Dominions were on an equal basis 
to Britain and sovereign in both internal and external 
affairs. Nevertheless, each component member of the 
Commonwealth was to abstain from actions negatively 
affecting the unity of the whole.
Curtis successfully convinced the Cabinet not to 
insist upon obligatory free trade for the new Irish 
entity but to hold on to the concept of common 
citizenship. He also granted that the Irish Free State 
would become a member of the League of Nations and 
appoint its own diplomatic representatives. Ultimately, 
he was willing to accept de facto independence for the 
Free State as long as three elements remained between 
Britain and Irelands common defence at war, a common 
allegiance to the King symbolized by an oath, and 
common citizenship.
The treaty of 1921 met these conditions. It 
contained the establishment of a provisional government 
by the members of the Southern Ireland Parliament. The 
provisional government would be the Irish body 
responsible for signing the treaty and administrating 
Southern Ireland for one year after the signing of the 
treaty, or until the Free State was established. The 
Irish parliamentarians had to give an oath to the 
British Crown by virtue of common citizenship. Britain
i«:n
would, for the time being, maintain naval bases. 
Northern Ireland was free to decide whether it would 
join the Free State. If it opted out, a boundary 
commission was to define the new borders.
After the signing of the treaty, Curtis developed 
a good working relationship with Cosgrave, the 
President of the Irish parliament. This helped to make 
the treaty accepted in both Westminster and Dublin. 
However, the boundary commission never worked 
efficiently due to Ulster's rejection to appoint its 
commissioner.69
Arguably, the episode constitutes one of the high 
points of Curtis's political career. One writer goes as 
far as asserting that he was not only responsible for 
the articulation of the British position, but in fact
so vital a role did Lionel Curtis play in the 
formulation of British policies connected with this 
incident that the story is nearly as much about him as 
the incident itself.70
The importance of Curtis's influential position 
stems from the way Curtis interpreted the implications 
of the treaty from a staunchly imperialist perspective. 
The most crucial leg of Curtis's interpretation was 
that the foundation of the Irish Free State should not 
in any way be channeled by the Irish into the breaking 
of the union with Britain. Dominion precedent had to be 
firmly observed in all stages leading to the 
implementation of the treaty. For the British 
delegation, the most important element was to ensure
Lavin, From Empire, pp.180-226.
70. John McColgan, "Implementing the 1921 Treaty: Lionel 
Curtis and the Constitutional Procedure', in Irish 
Historical Studies 20 (1977), pp.312-33, here p.312.
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that the provisional government, which was dependent 
for its sources of finance as well as for its 
legitimacy on the British parliament, would be seen 
from the onset as the rightful Irish government.71
The Round Table in the Inter-War Period
An organic union of the Empire/Commonwealth 
remained the long-term goal of the Moot, and there were 
times when this goal was expressively stressed.
However, for the present the need for closer 
cooperation, stopping short of federation, between 
Britain and the Dominions was pointed out. In this 
respect, the group moved away from the ideas dear to 
Curtis. Even he, for a time, accepted that his 
federation projects could not be immediately realized.72
On the other hand, his Commonwealth principles now 
found greater favour. Together with the other 
catchword, trusteeship, it gave the Round Tablers 
intellectual ammunition for the preservation of the 
colonial empire against European and American 
internationalists, colonial nationalists, and the 
Communists. Simultaneously, it allowed the Moot to pose 
as opponents of 'old-style' (i.e. explicitly and not 
implicitly racist) imperialism.73
There were also new tendencies which Curtis shared 
with the rest of the group. Particularly, after WWI the 
Moot laid greater stress on British-American
71. Ibid., pp.312-33.
72. May, Round Table, pp.214-20, 249-51, 305-09, 324-31, 
356-58.
73. Ibid., pp.257-67.
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cooperation, although there was some disappointment 
about the US's relapse into isolationism.74 Furthermore, 
there was also some interest in Continental Europe.
After all, Round Table was not the only British 
pressure group which claimed a stake in informing 
public opinion and influencing policy formation over 
the reconstruction of the international system after 
the First World War. Another major pressure group, with 
a score of influential people, especially academics, in 
its ranks, was centered around the journal 'The New 
Europe'. Despite the journal's short life-span (1917 to 
1920), the New Europe movement was a major source of 
influence not only for the policy-makers but for the 
Round Table itself.75
Despite the discrepancy in the political bases of 
the two movements (the Round Table largely consisting 
of Unionists, the New Europeans of Liberals), and 
despite their original agendas being very different 
from each other, as a result of their joint influence 
on post-World War I policy, the aims of the two groups 
gradually started to cross-cut each other. This 
happened through two channels. First, an informal 
discussion group was formed at the beginning of the 
war. Tracing the connections between the two movements, 
Goldstein asserts:
This informal group illustrates not only the complex 
intertwining of those concerned with foreign policy.
74. Ibid., pp.220, 324-31.
75. Erik Goldstein, 'The Round Table and the New 
Europe', in Round Table 87 (1998), 346, pp.177-89.
but also the personal relationships between those often 
identified with differing public views,76
Second, some of the most vocal members belonging 
to both groups got governmental posts during the Lloyd 
George coalition, which came to power in 1916, The 
Prime Minister's Private Secretariat, nicknamed "the 
garden suburb', was an important channel through which 
especially the Round Table could exert influence upon 
policy-making.77 Philip Kerr became the Private 
Secretary to Lloyd George from 1917 to 1921.
There were, of course, other motivations, which 
meant that the agendas of the two movements were 
intermingled at a deeper level.
During and after WWI the Round Table showed a marked 
interest not just in imperial reform but in the postwar 
European order. The removal of sources of volatility 
of Europe would enhance British security, a prime 
interest of the Moot. This led the Round Table to 
develop an interest in the various solutions being 
proposed for the European settlement.78
Similarly, the New Europeans were by no means
interested only in a European vocation for Britain.
While the New Europe supporters were promoting a new 
approach to the continent for Britain, they likewise 
had to be aware of the other concerns of the British 
Empire. A focus on Europe by no means meant a 
distancing from the Empire.79
76. Ibid., p. 180.
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Indeed, they went as far as thinking of proposing the 
formation of a new 'Imperial Democratic Party", and the 
British Prime Minister to be someone from the 
Commonwealth.80
Africa and China
After the war, Curtis was no longer exclusively 
tied to the Round Table. Besides his role in the RIIA, 
he also from 1921 onwards held a Fellowship at All 
Souls College at Oxford and got involved with a 
movement to reform the university during the early 
1930s.81
A lot of his attention during the interwar period 
went to African affairs. First, there was the rather 
ill-fated affair of the 'Commonwealth Trust', involving 
the transfer of confiscated enemy property to a 
British-run philantropic venture. When the government 
considered restitution to its previous owners, Curtis 
as member of the Trust's board fell out with the 
Colonial Office.
Second, and more constructively, Curtis got 
stirred by reports about forced labour in Kenya and 
started a campaign for better treatment of the 
'natives". This campaign contributed to the 1923 
Devonshire declaration, in which the Colonial Office, 
if only rhetorically, stressed the primacy of 'native 
rights" for Britain's African possessions.
Third, it was Curtis who recruited Lord Hailey to 
compile the African Survey for the RIIA. Published in
80. Ibid., p.181.
81. Lavin, From Empire, pp.255, 261-63.
1938, the Survey was the first systematic and 
comparative study on African affairs, leaving its mark 
on that generation of Africanists.
Fourth, when Curtis once more visited South Africa 
in 1935, he was enthusiastic over the fusion of parties 
of the pro-British Smuts and of the Boer nationalist 
Hertzog. Under the impact of this enthusiasm, he 
publicly demanded the transfer of the British 
protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland and Bechuanaland 
to South Africa. With this campaign, he brought the 
Colonial Secretary and most British Africanists up in 
arms against him.82
With indefatigable energy, Curtis between 1927 and 
1932 also showed a strong interest in China. The 
background was the partial re-unification of the civil 
war-ridden country by the nationalist KMT under Chiang 
Kai-shek. British-Chinese relations got tense when 
China asked for the abolition of the International 
Settlement in Shanghai, a territorial enclave in which 
British interests were strongly represented. In typical 
Curtis fashion, he went - with already preconceived 
ideas - for a fact-finding mission to Shanghai in 1929- 
30, where he was lionized by the international business 
community but also by the prominent Chinese.
Curtis's good advice was for the British Foreign 
Office to take a more decisive policy in supporting the 
KMT government but, at the same time, to resist the 
latter's claim on the International Settlement. His 
Chinese phase ended with the publication of The Capital 
Question of China in 1932. The title reflected his
82. Ibid., pp.227-39.
conviction that Shanghai and thus China, if suitably 
reformed, held the key for world peace.83
Civitas Dei
Originally, Curtis's Oxford fellowship was to 
enable him to complete an additional volume of The 
Commonwealth of Nations. By the mid-1920s, however, his 
perspective had widened considerably into the direction 
of a different book. Called Civitas Dei, it was finally 
published in three volumes between 1934 and 1937. What 
was new in comparison to The Commonwealth of Nations 
was the explicit - albeit idiosyncratic - Christian 
message. The title was deliberately chosen to challenge 
Augustine's De Civitate Oei.84
In contrast to Augustine, who sharply 
differentiated between worldly and heavenly affairs, 
Curtis held that God's kingdom could already be 
achieved here on Earth. The principle of commonwealth, 
understood as the mutual devotion of people to each 
other was the key for it. From this mutual devotion 
sprang responsible self-government based upon reason 
and conscience. Curtis claimed that the commonwealth 
principle had been invented by the Ancient Greeks and 
been given universal appliance by the message of 
Christ, whom Curtis portrayed as a social reformer 
rather than a supranatural being.
He hammered these issues home by an extended 
overview of human history from Antiquity to the very 
present, and then extended his argument to the future.
83. Ibid., pp.239-52.
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Claiming that world peace was not to be the ultimate 
aim but rather the means toward the real aim, i.e. the 
growth of human devotion to each other, Curtis held 
that this means could not be achieved as long as the 
world was divided into several states. He thus ensued a 
world-wide commonwealth.85
Curtis had thus completed his mental travel, begun 
during WWI, from imperial federation to world 
government. Even though most reviews tended to be 
critical, Civitas Dei enjoyed wide acclaim.
Particularly to the younger generation it offered a 
majestic vision during difficult times. Indeed, the 
Mussolini and Franco governments took it serious enough 
to prevent translations into Italian and Spanish.86
Under the Shadow of War
As a whole, the Round Tablers in the second half 
of the 1930s tended at first towards a policy of 
appeasement towards the rising power of Nazi Germany. 
However, and in contrast to the Chamberlain government, 
they turned towards a more confrontational stance as 
the decade went on.87
Curtis had a similarly ambivalent position. On the 
one hand, he from 1936 onwards favoured rearmament and 
unilateral British guarantees for Western Europe 
against any attack. During the Rhineland crisis, he 
criticized his friend Kerr (by now Lord Lothian) for 
making a pro-appeasement speech in the House of Lords.
85. Lionel Curtis, Civitas Dei: The Commonwealth of God, 
Londons Macmillan, 1938.
86. Lavin, From Empire, pp.268-70, 272-73,
87. May, Round Table, pp.343-56.
On the other hand, as member of an All Souls study- 
group on foreign relations in 1937-38, Curtis rejected 
Foreign Office plans for Britain to play off Germany 
against the Soviet Union or, alternatively, to enter 
into an anti-German alliance with Paris and Moscow. 
Curtis's hope was that an internal reorganization of 
Czechoslovakia on the Swiss model would meet the needs 
of the German minority there and thus take the sting 
out of Germany's claims.88
In 1938, Curtis attended the Commonwealth 
Relations Conference in Melbourne. However, this 
conference turned out to be a big disappointment for 
him since most of the Dominion delegates proved to be 
unconcerned over specific developments in Europe, 
particularly the Czech crisis. There was no support for 
his well-worn plan for a closer imperial union. From 
his perspective, the only positive aspect was his new 
friendship with Ernest Bevin, then a union leader, who 
appeared to be open for a closer coming-together of the 
Commonwealth.
Curtis met another potential ally when he returned 
to Britain via the United States. There, he met 
Clarence Streit, who had just published a widely- 
acclaimed book called Union Now in which he called for 
an immediate union encompassing the remaining 
democracies, including the US. Enthusiastically, Curtis 
established close contacts with Streit and drummed up
Lavin, From Empire, pp.275-76, 278-81.
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support in Britain.89 At the same time, he became 
involved in another federal movement.
Zhe Federal Union
Federal Union was a pressure group which was 
founded in July 1938 as an informal movement by Derek 
Rawnsley, Charles Kimber and Patrick Ransome, three men 
steeped in the experience of the First World War and 
the draw towards the second. Its main purpose was to 
advocate a federation of the European democracies, to 
which Italy and Germany could join later. The aim was 
to prevent future European wars. To this end, it was 
most important to influence the public opinion in Italy 
and Germany. As a transition from the previous ideas of 
imperial federation to those about a European 
federation the Federal Union occupies a very 
interesting place.
The foundation of the Federal Union provided 
Curtis with a new forum to channel his energies of 
fund-raising and drafting programmes of action.
Together with Wickham Steed and Barbara Wootton he 
formed a panel of advisers to the group. Apart from 
formulating a statement of objectives for the Union, 
together with Kerr, who was by then Lord Lothian, this 
advisory panel wrote to many influential people of the
89. Ibid., pp.281-84.
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time, advocating the cause of federalism as a means to 
overcome the problems caused by national sovereignty.90
By 1940, however, Curtis had irrevocably fallen 
out with the group, in particular with Kimber. His 
efforts to affilitate the Federal Union to the Round 
Table had backfired. The Federal Union emphasized the 
European federation much more than the Atlantic
federation which Curtis defended.91
The roots of the split go back to the foundation
of the organisation. The foundation of the Federal 
Union had coincided chronologically with the 
publication of Clarence Streit's book, Union Now•
Curtis and Lothian tried hard to turn the Federal Union 
into a vehicle of the ideas propagated by Streit.92 A 
compromise was reached at the end between the 
"Hamiltonian' members of the group like Lothian and 
Curtis, and those advocating a European federation.
This compromise however, while accounting for the 
flourishing popular success of the Federal Union at the 
beginning, gradually caused the weakening of the whole 
movement•
After the fall of France, (there was) a very severe 
clash of ideas, (at the end of which) the younger 
generation came out on top. The price of internal 
battle was, however, a fall in the number of local 
groups and membership and a much more limited influence 
in the political debate on the aims of the war.93
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Thinking retrospectively over the fate of the 
Federal Union, Kimber does not restrain his disapproval 
of the methods used by the 'Hamiltonians", in 
particular by Curtis, to pull the movement into the 
direction they wanted. '(T)o us", declares Kimber, 
'Europe held the key to war and peace and we were 
thinking only of European democracies."94 Before he and 
his friends could develop their own idea of a European 
federation, however, they were 'overtaken by the wide 
publicity which Clarence Streit"s Union Now obtained."95 
The draws of people who were pulled towards the Federal 
Union on the success wave of Streit"s book, and who 
wanted an Anglo-American Union, according to Kimber,
were the cause of the future weakness of the movement.
Too many different ideas vied for support among
the movement"s sympathizers. There were Kimber and his 
friends, who were the representatives of a generation 
frustrated and angry at the wasted opportunity to 
establish a viable peace after the First World War. 
There were former members of, or those influenced by 
the Union of Democratic Control, like Leonard Woolf; 
and the likes of Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells, who 
were asking for world government without developing 
concrete ideas about how to reach this goal. And then 
of course there were the imperial federalists, led by 
Curtis and his Chatham House friends, as well as 
Lothian.96 While they were
9*. Charles Kimber, 'Foreword" in Patrick Ransome (ed.). 
Towards the United States of Europe, Londons Lothian 
Foundation Press, 1991, pp.1-11, here p.5.
95. Ibid., p.5.
Ibid., pp.6-7.
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all agreed that national sovereignty must give way to 
federation, there were wide disagreements over the 
question of which nations (to) propose as members of 
the federation.97
This was the reason, asserts Kimber remorsefully, that 
although the Federal Union had caught the imagination 
of a substantial part of their generation, it could not 
fulfill its promise of becoming the successor of the 
League of Nations Union in terms of popularity.98
There was another reason why the popular movement 
for a European union, after enjoying an unprecedented 
success from 1939 to 1941, started to sink inexorably 
into relative oblivion in Britain. This was loss of 
confidence in Europe as the war took its course, as 
well as the growing dependency on the United States, in 
a context when the postwar world order visions of the 
United States government centered on a power-balance 
sustained by the "big three". These developments 
gradually pulled the popular sympathies in Britain away 
from a union with Europe and towards a union with the 
United States.99
Thus, after the summer of 1940, the emphasis 
gradually changed. While the central themes of war aims 
and the need for a new international order continued to
97. Ibid., p.6.
98. Ibid., p.5. On the issue of the mixed groups 
harboured under the roof of the Federal Union also see 
Pinder and Roberts, Federal Union, pp.13-4.
Walter Lipgens, "General Introduction" in Walter 
Lipgens (ed.). Documents on the History of European 
Integration, vol. 2, Plans for European Union in Great 
Britain and in Exile 1939-1945, Berlin and New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1986, pp.1-20, here p.5. Also see in 
the same volume: Philip M.H. Bell and John Pinder, 
"Introduction to Part One", pp.223-25 and John Pinder, 
"Federal Union 1939-41", pp.26-124, here pp.26-34.
attract much intellectual labour, people ranging from 
Lionel Robbins to William Beveridge found their ideas, 
in tandem with the policies of the British government, 
going through a metamorphosis.
The upshot in the deteriorating relations between 
Curtis and the Federal Union came in 1944. As the 
result of a series of meetings between the 
representatives of the European resistance movements, 
as well as two representatives from the German 
underground movement, a manifesto was issued in Geneva 
in July 1944. The manifesto was advocating nothing less 
than a federal union between European peoples. The 
Federal Union warmly endorsed the manifesto. This was 
the last drop for Curtis. He protested vehemently that 
this was the death-knell of the British Commonwealth, 
and the harbinger of a Europe dominated by Germany.100 
It was not that Curtis did not support a possible 
European union, it was rather that he had his own ideas 
about the precise nature of this union.
World War II
With the outbreak of the new war, a section of the 
RIIA came under the wings of the Foreign Office as the 
Foreign Press and Research Service (FPRS). Curtis was 
on this organization's council in 1939-41 and briefly 
took over the editorship of a number of papers on world 
order and peace aims. However, he was unable to 
distinguish between his official work and his personal
100. Pinder and Roberts, Federal Union, pp.83-86.
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crusade for world federalism. This naturally affected 
the style of his editorship, caused opposition and 
ended in his resignation.
In 1940, when France was just going down to defeat 
in the face of the German blitzkrieg, newly-elected 
Prime Minister Churchill made his spectacular offer of 
a British-French union. Although this proposal has to 
be seen as an emergency measure to make France stay in 
the war, Curtis jumped at it. He wrote to the Foreign 
Secretary proposing important modifications: The union 
offer should be extended to the Dominions and the 
smaller European democracies. However, with this 
proposal he met almost unanimous opposition at the 
Moot.
He was more successful in another function. From 
1942 onwards, Curtis participated in a Balliol College 
scheme of a weekly course for British, Dominion and 
American servicemen on leave, among whom his lecturing 
and his propaganda for federalism were immensely 
popular. He also published a number of pamphlets, in 
which he stressed his idea of a federal union 
encompassing the Commonwealth and Western Europe, later 
to be joined by the USA. Such was the amount (and 
repetitiveness) of his wartime publications that many 
review editors, much to his chagrin, started to ignore 
them.101
101. Lavin, From Empire, pp.286-89, 293-97.
World War: Its Cause and Cure
The arguments of the wartime tracts were compiled 
and extended in his next big book, World War: Its Cause 
and Cure, published in 1945.102 The book opens with a 
mind-boggling and sweeping account of the history of 
the concept of commonwealth from Ancient Greece, via
the British Empire to the American federation.
Curtis seemed on the face of it to provide just
another war-time proposal for merging national 
sovereignties to overcome wars. He proclaims boldly at 
the beginning of the book:
The relations between sovereign states is a field of 
anarchy, where the will of the stronger must in the end 
prevail. And this must always be so until nations have 
ceased to be sovereign, and have brought themselves 
under the rule of one international state.103
As one goes through the book, however, it quickly 
becomes apparent that what he understood under 
'international government' was, as usual, rather 
limited. Curtis proposed in effect only a union for 
defence. All other matters including the control of the 
distribution of taxation and therefore tariffs were to 
be left to national governments. He conceded that 
issues like trade, migration and shipping could not be 
entirely divorced from the concerns of an 
'international government responsible for the common 
security'.104 However, all the international government 
would be entitled to do would be to make suggestive
102. Lionel Curtis, World War: Its Cause and Cure, 2nd 
ed.. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1946.
103. Ibid., p.13.
104. Ibid., p.177.
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proposals to the member governments, leaving the 
ultimate decisions on these matters to them.105
Ultimately, the federal union should consist of 
all the democracies. Curtis thought that the United 
States would not be willing to join the commonwealth 
from the beginning. However, as they saw the success of 
the world government, especially the example of Canada, 
they would also be drawn into it, which would seal the 
success of world peace once and for all.
The Round Table in the 1940s
Although the Round Table and its journal continued 
alive and well into an age very different from the one 
in which the Moot had been founded, Curtis became more 
and more the odd man out. The bulk of the older members 
now came to oppose his federalism and to opt for 
cooperation within a British Commonwealth consisting of 
sovereign states. The younger generation tried to 
mediate between Curtis and the others.106 In 1945, a 
compromise was adopted which once more reasserted a 
vague "union of nations in an organic Commonwealth' as 
the group's ultimate aim. However, this was merely seen 
as a possible ideal for the far future. Despite this 
attempt to build bridges between Curtis's 
unreconstructed federalism and the more pragmatic 
attitude of the rest, he became more and more isolated 
within the group.107
105. Ibid., pp. 177-78.
106. May, Round Table, pp.367-71.
107. Ibid., pp.375-81.
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United Europe
In an ironic twist of events Curtis, who had 
fallen out with Federal Union over his emphasis for 
Atlantic rather than European union, came to embrace 
the latter concept after the war. As usual, however, he 
tried to mould it into a specific way.
In the postwar atmosphere there was at any rate no 
shortage of schemes about how and why a union in Europe 
should come about. After the throwing of the atomic 
bomb on Hiroshima, the receptive public for the schemes 
of an international federation had also expanded 
cons iderably.
A varying degree of projects on European union 
were voiced, which partly competed, partly overlapped 
with the European vision of the Federal Union. On the 
one hand, there were ideas about Europe as a "Third 
Force" between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Ideally, this Europe had to include both western and 
eastern parts of the continent. Europe, stranded as it 
was between the two power blocs, held the promise to 
act as a mediator between the two, while standing forth 
as a haven of democracy - in particular, of social 
democracy.
The emergence and strength of the Third Force 
movement was contingent on the discrediting of the 
conservative elites due to their collaboration with the 
fascists. This was coupled with the widespread critique 
of capitalism as the cause of the war. As result of 
such factors, there was a general shift to the left in
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the postwar European political scene. Not only did the 
Communists manage to increase their public support to 
unprecedented levels in countries like France, Italy 
and Czechoslovakia, but the Christian Democratic 
parties in France, Italy and Germany employed anti- 
capitalistic programmes.
The victory of the British Labour Party in July 
1945 gave a new lease of hope to the proponents of the 
Third Force, particularly because in the election 
campaign the party had employed the idea of a 'United 
Socialist States of Europe', that would be uniquely 
placed to establish a constructive dialogue with the
Soviet Union.
In December 1946 the various groups advocating the
Third Force joined forces under a Europe-wide umbrella 
organization called Union Europeenne des Federalistes• 
However, the totally unsympathetic approach of the 
Soviet Union, which saw the Third Force movement as 
nothing more than a Westbloc targetting herself, was 
the undoing of the movement.
In the meanwhile, however, a specific 
interpretation of the Third Force movement was employed 
by the British Foreign Secretary under the Labour 
government, Ernest Bevin. Bevin's ideas of the Third 
Force were conditioned by his concern for the post-war 
power of Britain, in particular by his aim of anchoring 
Britain to the European market as a counter to the 
overweening power of the United States. To him, the 
Third Force meant essentially British dominance in a 
united Europe, which he saw as best represented as a 
third Monroe doctrine. The kern of this united Europe
1AQ
had to be a military pact between Britain and France. 
The end result of long negotiations was the Dunkirch 
agreement of March 1947, which made no reference to the 
German issue.108
A different group wanted the integration of 
Western Europe as part of a western bloc including the 
United States. Eastern Europe, according to the 
proponents of this view like Konrad Adenauer or Winston 
Churchill, was already lost. What was required was not 
to act as a mediator between the two non-European 
blocs, but to contain the Soviet aggression under the 
protection of the United States. It was in this debate, 
engendered by the Zurich speech of Churchill of 
September 1946, that Curtis found a more suitable forum 
to channel his enthusiasm about the new world order.
His lifelong dreams finally seemed to come close 
to realization when Curtis was invited to join 
Churchill's newly-launched United Europe movement in 
1946. Curtis from that point on started to vigorously 
propound a European federation, although he once more 
added his own emphasis. He was keen to recruit American 
support, including Secretary of State Marshall, for the 
European union project. At the same time, he wanted the 
Dominions and later other states to join in one way or 
another.
In 1948, Curtis attended the Hague Conference, 
organized by the International Committee for Movements 
of European Unity, as member of the British delegation 
and was exuberant when a motion for federalism was
108. Wilfried Loth, Per Weq Nach Europa: Geschichte der 
Europaischen Integration 1939 - 1957. Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1990, pp.28-34.
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passed. However, disappointment was to follow. The 
federalists within the British European movement were 
opposed by the functionalists, namely David Mitrany. In 
contrast to Curtis, the functionalists did not see the 
need for a supranational state and opted for 
intergovernmental economic and defence cooperation.
Furthermore, in what appeared to Curtis as a 
betrayal, Bevin prevented the establishment of an 
elected European assembly in favour of a nominated 
Council of Europe. Once more, the idea of a full-scale 
federation was not exactly scuttled but postponed to 
the future. Additional federal tracts by Curtis could 
not change this fact.109
Last years
As if to compensate Curtis for the failure of his 
projects, an impressive amount of honours were given to 
him. Already in 1947, he had been nominated for the 
Nobel Peace Price by Chatham House. In 1950, the Attlee 
government made him Companion of Honour. One year 
later, Cologne University gave him a honorary degree, 
claiming that he had inspired Chancellor Adenauer's 
federalist foreign policy. His eightiest birthday led 
to a torrent of congratulations from Britain's 
political and academic elite. A personal investiture by 
the King followed.110
Curtis had started a career of half a century in 
South Africa. It ended in connection with another 
British colony, Cyprus. A visit there in 1951 was the
109. Lavin, From Empire, pp.303-15.
110. Ibid., pp.305, 315-19.
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final occasion for Curtis to offer his advice. Calling 
for better Crown Colony government and rejecting 
nationalist demands for cession of Cyprus to Greece, he 
recommended the transfer of all British troops in the 
Suez Canal zone to the island to appease the Egyptians. 
As in the case of South Africa, India and Ireland, 
British imperial aims were to be squared with local 
nationalisms.
After that, Curtis spent his last years withdrawn. 
He died in 1955.111
111 . Ibid., pp.320.
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Chapter Four
Idealism and Realism in the Works of Curtis 
Introduction
In this chapter, elements of textbook idealism and 
realism in the thought of Curtis will be traced and 
connected to his works. We will, however, begin with 
his interpretation of the Christian message. His 
specific theological key assumptions are as important 
for an understanding of Curtis's body of thought as 
Niebuhr's pessimistic version of Christianity on the 
thinking of Morgenthau.1
Having introduced Curtis's theological argument, 
we will return to the textbook version of idealism and 
realism outlined in Chapter 1. Referring to Curtis's 
statements on human nature and progress, on 
international ethics, on the fundamental patterns of 
the international system, and on the necessary policy 
steps to be taken, I will show that he can be placed 
equally well in either the textbook idealist or the 
realist camp. We will also see that he himself referred 
to that dichotomy but had an understanding of idealism 
and realism that was rather different from the one used 
in contemporary textbooks.
The argument will not be that these idealist and 
realist elements in Curtis's work represent antinomies. 
On the contrary, Curtis successfully bridges the
*. On Niebuhr and Morgenthau see Torbjdrn L. Knutsen, A 
History of International Relations Theory: An 
Introduction, Manchester and New Yorks Manchester 
University Press, 1992, pp.223-26.
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apparent contradictions between idealism and realism 
thanks to a simple and coherent general argument 
transcending the artifical boundaries produced by the 
textbook accounts of the "First Debate".
In this analysis of Curtis's argument, I draw upon 
his writings irrespective of their specific year of 
publication. Thus, a statement from the 1910s may by 
supplemented or contrasted by one from the 1950s. While 
not unproblematic in the case of some other writers, in 
the case of Curtis this method seems to me defensible. 
After all, Curtis's general assumptions were largely 
fixed from his earliest writings onwards and only got 
refined, but not fundamentally revised, later on. For 
example, while he only pinned down his theological 
ideas in the 1930s, the conclusion he drew from them 
can already be seen in his earlier writings.
Many of Curtis's writings appeared anonymously in 
The Round Table. This produces two problems. First, it 
is not always absolutely clear which ones were really 
written by Curtis.2 If in doubt, I have assumed that the 
said article was by Curtis. This method is legitimate 
in view of what is at the same time the second problem: 
Articles in the magazine were to express the collective 
viewpoint of the whole London Round Table group.3 One 
might thus argue that certain statements in a Round
2. Compare the slightly different identifications of his 
authorship in Deborah Lavin, From Empire to 
International Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel 
Curtis, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, p.347 and Alexander 
May, The Round Table. 1910-66. Ph. dissertation, 
University of Oxford, 1995, pp.473, 478 for the 
articles "End of War" and "Price of Liberty".
3. May, Round Table, pp.78-79.
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Table article are not 'really" Curtis's but express the 
view of the larger group. However, given Curtis's 
strongly held opinions over the matters he found worthy 
of attention it appears unlikely that he bowed to group 
pressure in a substantial way. In any case, the Round 
Table articles fit well into his general body of 
thought.
Curtis, the Christian Imperialist and an 'Expounder of 
Commonplaces'
Gerald Studdert-Kennedy has drawn attention to an 
aspect of Curtis's work which has been almost totally 
marginalized in later works about him, but which, he 
asserts, was the kernel of his philosophy: The 
importance of Christianity for his political vision.4
Curtis's political schemes would not make complete 
sense as long as one interprets his motivations as 
those of an imperialist with a penchant for developing 
constitutional blueprints, asserts Studdert-Kennedy. In 
fact, 'Curtis derived his guiding theory as a man of 
affairs from an understanding of his Christian
commitment.'5
It was of course not only Curtis for whom
Christianity constituted an ever-present reference and,
4. Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, Indian 
Nationalists and the Raj, Delhi etc.: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, pp.27-46; Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, 
'Christianity, Statecraft and Chatham House: Lionel 
Curtis and World Order', in Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 
(1995), 2, pp.470-89; Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, 
'Political Science and Political Theory: Lionel Curtis, 
Federalism and India', in Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 24 (1996), 2, pp.197-217.
5. Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, p.32.
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indeed, pillar of political theory. The kernel of the 
discourse which was strong enough to 'define and 
circumscribe"6 Curtis's ideas were shared by his friends 
Hichens and Lothian: All adhered to Christian Whig 
historiography.7
This social gospel was spread by successive generations 
of recruits to public and imperial service, from public 
school and university men ...8
Whatever its variations, it was fairly broadly shared 
in the intellectual environment surrounding Curtis. In 
the case of Curtis and many others, this Christian Whig 
historiography was combined with another vibrant 
discourse, that of 'British orientalism"9 to form 
Curtis's vision not only of India, over which Studdert- 
Kennedy particularly focuses, but of the providential 
mission of the British in the evolution of humanity 
more broadly conceived.
Studdert-Kennedy challenges today's federalists, 
who assert the importance of the heritage of Anglo- 
Saxon federalism, with failing to see the focal point 
that Christianity had constituted for that earlier 
generation of federalists. The new 'specialist 
enthusiasm"10 centered around this Anglo-Saxon 
federalism disregards that
whatever the continuities that link the impulses behind 
inter-war and contemporary federalist conviction, the 
former have by no means been wholly incorporated into 
the latter.11
6. Studdert-Kennedy, 'Political Science", p.204.
7. Ibid., p.203.
8. Ibid., pp.200-1.
9. Ibid., p.204; Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, 
pp.16-26.
10. Studdert-Kennedy, 'Christianity", p.470.
n . Ibid., p.472.
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And, what is perhaps most tragic for our understanding 
of those past thinkers is that
what has not survived into the late twentieth century 
federalist debate was of crucial importance at the 
time,12
Studdert-Kennedy asserts:
Religious commitment of whatever kind separates both 
(Curtis) and them from today's neofederalist partisans 
of European and world unification, as it does too, of 
course, from the empiricism and realism which 
constitute the dominant discourse in contemporary 
international studies generally,13
For Studdert-Kennedy, Curtis's importance stems 
from his "comprehensive command of the span of 
„sentences" of which the discourse is composed.'14 Being 
in no way an independent thinker but an "expounder of 
commonplaces',15 Curtis gave voice to the beliefs and 
concerns of not only the "Anglo-India public', but also 
of a very big segment of the larger British public.
Studdert-Kennedy emphasizes particularly Curtis's 
influence over Hichens, whose involvement in the 
Industrial Christian Fellowship movement of the inter­
war period he has examined in a separate book.16 
Curtis's theology is "an extrapolation to the imperial 
context of the ideology described in that study.'17 
Curtis was in close contact with several high-level 
members of the church in India.18
12 . Ibid., p.472. Emphasis in the original.
13. Ibid., p.474.
14. Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, p.20.
15. Ibid., p.27.
16. Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, Dog-Collar Democracy: The 
Industrial Christian Fellowship 1919-1929. Oxford: 
Macmillan, 1982.
17. Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, pp.21-22.
18. Ibid., p.22.
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In a comparison between Curtis and his Chatham 
House colleagues Martin Wight and Arnold Toynbee, 
Studdert-Kennedy emphasizes the central place that 
St.Augustine occupied with respect to the political 
philosophy of them. Wight was the most pessimistic of 
all three, following the Augustinian distinction 
between the heavenly and earthly realms most strictly. 
Toynbee, with his broad-minded position with respect to 
the possibility of incorporating other cultures, 
occupied a middle position between Curtis and Wight. 
Curtis, locating the other end of the spectrum, with 
his suspect Christian philosophy, fully denied the 
Augustinian distinction.19
The Theological Argument in Civitas Dei
The core of Curtis's religious thinking is to be 
found in Civitas Dei, particularly in volume three. 
Curtis starts his argument with a comparison of the 
respective merits of the natural and the social 
sciences and their mutual relationship. This is a topic 
that had particularly affected the discussion within
19. Studdert-Kennedy, 'Christianity', pp.473-80.
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turn-of-the-century German sociology.20 Curtis is 
clearly in the anti-positivist camp. For him, there is 
a difference between the natural sciences and the 
humanities, the former concerned with knowledge and the 
latter with wisdom. The natural sciences are based upon 
the measurement of facts and testable hypotheses, which 
can sometimes be proved by dramatic demonstrations, 
like the invention of aviation. The humanities are also 
concerned with the collection of data and with 
hypotheses. But the aspect of free will makes those 
sciences concerned with the relations between human 
beings intrinsically less precise than the natural 
sciences•
Nevertheless, the contribution to the development 
of human affairs of major religious, political or 
philosophical thinkers is as big as that of great 
physicists. Curtis asserts that it is possible to 
discover through political sciences the principles of 
life. This is to be done by thinking through what the 
ultimate aim of human life is supposed to be. Once such 
a final aim is found all the other questions can be 
answered - even though, unfortunately - political 
sciences are too often unconcerned with practical 
policies.
But in any case, for finding the ultimate aim the 
natural sciences provide poor guidance since, because 
of their intrinsic character, they are
20. Alan Swingewood, A Short History of Sociological 
Thought, 2nd ed., Basingstoke and Londons Macmillan, 
1991, pp.128-33.
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compartmentalised. Thus, if the humanities try to 
emulate them, a problem arises: The means obscure the 
end and become themselves ends. In this case, the 
question of what the ultimate end should be is 
neglected.21
Having rejected a positivist understanding of the 
social sciences, Curtis turns to the issue of faith. 
With equal strength he asserts that the answers to the 
riddles of life cannot be found in miracles or 
supernatural revelations. In this respect, the founders 
of Christianity have misunderstood Jesus. Even if 
miracles would continuously happen there would not be 
any proof that they represent a message by God. 
Furthermore, if detailed answers to the questions about 
the ultimate meaning of life would simply be given by 
divine revelations, humans would not have any freedom 
to choose, it is this freedom which sets humans apart 
from animals. Curtis thus stresses that one has to try 
to use one's own conscience and mind to answer these 
questions.
He brings this point home by a short excursus on 
the development of religious thought. Originally, 
humans treated the forces of nature as anthropomorphic 
gods. As long as religious thought was passed orally 
from generation to generation, no more sophisticated 
creed could develop. With the invention of writing, 
this changed. It was now possible to refer back to the
21. Lionel Curtis, Civitas Dei: The Commonwealth of God, 
London: Macmillan, 1938, pp.827-34, 924-25.
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teachings of past sages and to reflect upon and develop 
them. On the other hand, writing at the same time 
enabled the codification of religious creeds, bringing 
about the danger of their ossification. The Catholic 
Church, with its claim to decide for the believers what 
is right and what is wrong, is an institutional example 
of that danger.22
But if neither natural sciences nor supernatural 
authorities answer our question, how are we supposed to 
do this? For Curtis, the use of reason and conscience 
gives at least some hints. He refers to two 
dichotomies: between pleasure and conscience, and 
between matter and spirit.
In life the principle of pleasure is in continuous 
clash with what the conscience demands. In response to 
the question which one should prevail, a hint is given 
by the fact that, if everyone just acted according to 
his pleasure, the world would sink into chaos. In 
contrast, if everyone acted according to the demands of 
conscience, society would break off its restrictions on 
genuine freedom, which could then develop to an ever- 
increasing degree. From this Curtis concludes that our 
instinctual senses of what is right and wrong are 
valid.23
Another issue concerns the dichotomy between 
matter and spirit. Human body is different from human 
personality. Like Descartes, Curtis explains that, even
22. Ibid., pp.835-38, 851-63.
23. Ibid., pp.839-41.
if we do not know what exactly we are, we know that we 
are. Matter or spirit - which one constitutes the basis 
of the ultimate reality? Curtis uses an argument going 
back to Pascal: Let us assume that matter is the 
ultimate reality. Our existence would then end with our 
deaths. In case that we would mistakenly assume that 
spirit would be all-important and the distinction 
between right and wrong is valid, that mistake would 
have no long-lasting consequences for us. On the other 
hand, let us assume that spirit is the ultimate 
reality. In this case, the choice between right and 
wrong would be of utmost importance. Mistakenly 
assuming the predominance of matter over spirit would 
have disastrous consequences. And since it is not 
possible to prove that matter is the ultimate reality, 
Curtis recommends assuming that spirit is more 
important and that our distinction between right and
wrong is a valid one.24
From these assumptions, Curtis draws the
conclusion that the final reality, i.e. God, is of the 
same order as the human personality, but only more 
perfectly developed. And as the highest expression of 
personality is creativity, we can assume that God is 
ultimately involved in constant creation. Thus, while 
it is not always possible to clearly define good and 
evil, they can at least be guessed from practical 
experience. The former is a creative principle, the 
latter a destructive one.
24. Ibid., pp.841-43. On Descartes and Pascal see 
Otfried Hoffe, Kleine Geschichte der Philosophie, 
Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001, pp.156-57, 163.
ift?
If God's qualities can at least be guessed by 
seeing Him as personality developed to the utmost 
degree, there is one further conclusion. God creates 
humans who are at least remotely akin to Him, and this 
means that they also have the capability for creation. 
Indeed, they are supposed by Him to participate in His 
work of creation.
Life has undergone an evolutionary development, 
resulting in the domination of humans. Through God's 
plan, His creatures became step-by-step aware of 
themselves and acquired a sense of right and wrong. 
Jesus was the so far most perfect of all men in this 
respect. However, in a system ordered by God's laws, 
most humans could be like him.25
In other words, Curtis asserts that humans, though 
imperfect, can principally develop more and more into 
the likeness of God. The material world is not to be 
damned but is undergoing a continuous process of 
creation in which humans should participate. Even if 
the meaning of life cannot be grasped as a whole, 
humans cannot avoid the necessity to act, using their 
power to distinguish between good and evil. Although 
God does not directly interfere into this work of 
continuous human creation, the example of highly- 
developed personalities - the so far most outstanding 
one being Jesus - can act as a guidance. By doing good, 
one gets into closer community with God.26 And, to come 
to a point that is the leitmotif behind Curtis's 
political prescriptions:
25. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.843-50.
26. Ibid., pp.864-71, 948.
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The sense of duty in men to each other was what bound 
them together and bound them to God. This, not 
pleasure, was the ultimate element of value in life. To 
increase and perfect this sense as the principle of 
life was the end and object of human existence. (...) 
The structure of human society itself must be based on 
the laws of God, on realities. The supreme task was to 
bring into being an order of society in which the 
indefinite duty of each to all was fully expressed, 
applied, and called into existence.27
This, then, is the meaning of the title Civitas Deii
To see and to do the will of God in this world ... and 
so to create his Kingdom on earth is the first and 
foremost duty of men.28
Human Nature and the Possibility of Progress
Curtis can indeed by characterized as a full-blown 
idealist - but in philosophical rather than IR terms.
He strongly asserts that force and material interests 
in themselves are unable to create a stable order, 
whether on the national or international level. Force, 
in particular, is only an instrument. Whether a state 
is able to use it depends ultimately upon the loyalty 
of its citizens, i.e. the spiritual factor.29 Indeed, 
the character and stability of a certain kind of 
government rests on the kind of moral principles 
possessed by its subjects or citizens.30
Taking the fatalism of old-style diplomats to 
task, Curtis asserts the importance of free will.31 This
27. Ibid., p.883.
28. Ibid., pp.950-51.
29. Ibid., p.8; Lionel Curtis, 'World Order", in 
International Affairs 18 (1939), pp.301-20, here p.304.
30. Lionel Curtis, The Capital Question of China, Port 
Washington-Londons Kennikat, (1932) 1970, p.67; Curtis, 
Civitas Dei, p.71.
31. Lionel Curtis, 'The Price of Liberty', in Round 
Table 10 (1919), pp.1-20, here p.l. See also L. Curtis, 
The Commonwealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature 
of Citizenship in the British Empire, and into the 
Mutual Relations of the Several Communities Thereof, 
London: Macmillan, 1916, p.10.
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is, of course, in line with his theological argument 
about the necessity to use one's reason and conscience. 
At one stage, he goes as far as saying that the word 
'impossible" has to be barred from the British 
political dictionary and that defeat is produced by the 
defeatists" state of mind.32 Thus, the difficulties in 
creating an imperial or world-wide federation are not 
of a technical kind. The problem is to convince the 
human mind - but this is a problem that can be 
overcome •33
Indeed, history is on the side of progress. Curtis 
interprets the course of human development as the 
struggle between three principles superseding each 
others the tribal one; the autocratic/despotic one; and 
the one of commonwealth, i.e. freedom.34 It was not so 
much material interests but the clash of two 
contradictory ideas, autocracy and freedom, that was 
behind wars like the ones between Spain and England 
during the 16th century.35
Like the spirit of freedom, autocracy is not so 
much based upon brute force or rational self-interest 
but on an idea - in this case that of religious duty to 
the deities, of whom the ruler is a representative.36 
This kind of government leads to stagnation: The
32. Curtis, Capital Question, pp.286-87.
33. Lionel Curtis, The Green Memorandum, London and 
Bungay: Richard Clay and Sons, 1910, p.61; Curtis, 
Civitas Dei, pp.934, 946.
34. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.12.
35. Ibid., pp.137-38.
36. Ibid., pp.7-8; Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis, The 
Prevention of War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1923, pp.139-43.
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rulers, intoxicated by the idea of their divine right 
for absolute domination, lose all sense of proportion. 
At the same time, the minds and characters of their 
subjects remain stunted.37
In contrast, a commonwealth is based not upon the 
feeling of duty of subjects to a ruler but upon the 
selfless devotion the citizens feel towards each other. 
Laws are not divinely set but decided upon by a 
competent public opinion.38 A state governed by the 
principles of commonwealth provides a continuous growth 
in the character and mind of its citizens, enabling 
them to judge about measures concerning the general 
welfare.39 Putting its trust into human reason, the 
commonwealth is ultimately bound to prevail over 
autocracy.40
Related to the commonwealth, the concept of 
freedom is one which appears frequently in the work of 
Curtis, being adapted to different circumstances. In an 
echo of "England's mission' ideas, he asserts that 
national greatness does not lie in wealth but in the 
spirit begotten of freedom which rises to 
responsibility in the running of colonial empires.41 In 
the progressivist spirit, he defines freedom as the 
power of society to control circumstances.42 On a
37. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.46-48.
Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.23-24; Kerr and Curtis, 
Prevention, pp.139-43. A more detailed treatment of 
Curtis's understanding of the commonwealth principle is 
given in Chapter 7.
Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.51-53.
4°. Ibid., p.71.
41. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.27.
42. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.11.
1
different occasion, he states that freedom and order 
stimulated the growth of a mutual sense of duty among 
the people, with material prosperity as a by-product.43 
Finally, in a Cold War tract Curtis says that the 
principles of freedom are more powerful than weapons, 
i.e. Soviet weapons.44
In this evolutionary development from tribe via 
autocracy towards commonwealth, religious faith plays 
an all-important role. As we have seen, autocracy is 
based upon religious legitimation. Most Ancient 
cultures imagined their gods as beings having the same 
passions but more power than normal human beings. The 
Hebrews developed the insight of a just God not 
belonging to the order of matter but being completely 
spiritual. Nevertheless, living in the autocratic stage 
of government, they still tended to imagine Him as a 
stern king.
The principle of the commonwealth was first 
developed by the Greek city-states. However, the 
devotion people felt towards each other was restricted 
to their respective polis and completely excluded non- 
Greeks. For Curtis, it was the genius of Jesus to 
connect and universalize these Hebrew and Greek 
concepts. He preached that the fatherhood of God also 
meant the brotherhood of men. To feel devotion and duty 
towards all one's fellow humans was the best way to 
express devotion to God. And this could be done best
43. Curtis, Capital Question, p.300.
44. Lionel Curtis, World Revolution in the Cause of 
Peace, Oxfords Basil Blackwell, 1949, p.153.
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within a society ordered by the laws of God. This idea 
of the divine commonwealth was supressed by the Roman 
Empire but re-emerged 1000 years later in Europe, 
particularly England, from where it has spread ever 
since.45 Given this, the possibility for a boundless
improvement of humanity exists.46
As we have seen in Chapter 1, faith in human
progress is seen as one of the characteristic of 
textbook idealism. From this perspective, the above 
seems to put Curtis firmly into that camp. However, 
Curtis's optimism is somewhat ambivalent and contains 
some darker aspects.
First of all, he is optimistic for the long rather 
than for the short term, proclaiming that a self- 
governing world commonwealth consisting of Christ-like 
citizens will take not longer than one million years to 
be realized (I).47 However, if the first steps into that 
direction will not be made within the next centuries, 
these centuries will bring great tribulations, which 
will be worse than the descent of Graeco-Roman 
civilization into the Dark Ages.48 In contrast to Bull's 
idealists, for whom the process of progress is already 
at work, Curtis is actually a pessimist on the short 
term - unless the crucial step of establishing a 
nascent world commonwealth is taken.
Second, Curtis echoes the classical realist motif 
of the mismatch between humankind's technological and 
moral development. Material progress has by far outrun
45. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.851-53, 873-87.
46. Ibid., p.284.
47. Ibid., p.931.
48. Ibid., pp.900, 906-07, 916, 932, 938.
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man's ability to control himself.49 With some foresight,
he in 1919 warns of the dangers the future control of
atomic energy might have in store.50
Third, like a good mainstream realist, Curtis
boldly proclaims that in human affairs there are
laws which work themselves out with the same 
uncompromising logic as those of Nature herself. It is 
not by ignoring those laws, but only by learning and 
obeying them willingly, that men may reach to freedom 
and dominate fate.51
Thus, Curtis insists that his analyses are based upon 
the 'facts', as can be seen in his criticism directed 
at President Wilson, i.e. one of the textbook 
idealists. Before proclaiming principles (i.e. the 14 
Points) one must first ask oneself how these principles 
would be applied in the light of the facts.52 It was the 
Englishmen's 'instinct for realities' that explains 
their role in history.53 A new League of Nations, this 
time 'based on realities', needs to be constructed.54 
Or, on another occasion:
But the problems of life cannot in fact be solved by 
action based upon wishful thinking. They can only be 
solved in so far as those concerned are prepared to 
face unpleasant facts and distasteful exertion.55
Is not all this similar to the realists' claim that
they base their prescription on how the world is rather
than how it should be? In any case, this stress on
49. Curtis, 'Price', p.6; Curtis, 'World Order', p.305; 
Lionel Curtis, Decision, London: Oxford University 
Press and Humphrey Milford, 1941, pp.36-37.
50. Curtis, 'Price', p.8.
51. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.705.
52. L. Curtis, 'Introduction', in: L. Curtis, Papers 
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy 
to the Government of India, Oxford: Clarendon, 1920,
pp.xxviii-xxix.
53. Curtis, Capital Question, p.261.
54. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.916.
55. Lionel Curtis, World War: Its Cause and Cure, 2nd 
ed., New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, p.3.
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'realities" stands somewhat in tension to the claim 
that everything can be done if only the right spirit is 
there•
In addition to these doses of realism, Curtis"s
progressivism is somewhat at variance with that of
mainstream idealism. He does not believe that people
should rationally pursue their interests, with a global
harmony of these interests thus coming into being. On
the contrary, this would throw humanity into chaos and
destroy civilization. What Curtis wants is rather that
people utilize their altruistic potentialities.56 While
in mainstream idealism there is, as I have argued, a
slight tension between proclaiming human goodness and
recommending enlightened self-interest, this tension
does not exist in Curtis"s thought.
Furthermore, he repeatedly mentions structural
constraints thwarting the development of the human
spirit. For example, the aggressive spirit of the
European continental powers is geographically
determined.57 And his experience within a yet divided
South Africa convinced Curtis that it was this very
division that caused virtuous politicians to
unnecessarily distrust each other.58
Curtis states that calamities like wars do not
arise due to the shortcomings of statesmen or of the 
masses but due to faulty political systems.59 Despite
56. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.840.
57. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.7.
58. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, pp.94-95; Curtis, 
'World Order', p.302; Curtis, World War, p.l.
59. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.899-900; Curtis, World War, 
p.l.
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the importance he attaches to education, however, he is
of the opinion that social and political structures
shape human characters more than race or education.60
The growth of the human mind depends
not merely upon what it is taught, nor even upon the 
example of others, but also upon the structure of 
society in which it grows up.61
Autocratic governments stifle the growth of the human 
character, while free institutions stimulate it.62 The 
character of humans depends, therefore, in the last 
instance upon the environment. Men cannot grow to 
perfection unless the structure of society is ordered 
in accordance with the laws of God.63
Of course, Curtis stresses the importance of 
social structures in order to bring home his point that 
fundamental changes in them are necessary.
Nevertheless, there arises a structure-agency problem 
in his writings: If the character of humans are 
decisively shaped by the structure of the society in 
which they live, where do reason and conscience come 
in? How can society be reformed if its own determining 
influence over people's minds prevents this very 
reform?
In fact, Curtis bridges this structure-agency 
problem by bringing in outstanding personalities. He 
assures us that, for a new idea to become powerful, it 
is not the number of its initial adherents but rather
60. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.901; Curtis, World War, p.9, 
20, 69-70.
61. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.881.
62. Curtis, 'Price', p.3; Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.46-51.
63. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.195-6, 881-82, 892-93; 
Curtis, World War, pp.9-10, 20, 70.
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their quality that counts.64 Who are these quality
people? At the first instance, 'helping the world
across the gulf which arrests its progress' is the
responsiblity of intellectuals and particularly
political thinkers.65 The task of implementing the
necessary improvements is, however, left to charismatic
politicians ('trusted leaders") who over the heads of
existing institutions appeal directly to the people.66
Indeed, such trusted leaders as well as more daemonic
personalities should be seen as agents of Gods
From time to time creation is brought to a standstill 
by obsessions, fixed ideas in the minds of men which no 
longer apply to the changing conditions of life. I 
think that when this happens the Master Creator Himself 
sees to it that some man has been born great enough to 
release the deadlock ••• Napoleons and Hitlers may be 
needed to shatter obsolete systems. Others far greater, 
like Washington and Lincoln, are sent at the right 
moment to show how the work of creation can be renewed 
on a higher plane.67
With his faith in the power of the right spirit, 
his evolutionary view of history, and his claim that 
human perfection is attainable Curtis thus resembles 
the textbook idealists. Nevertheless, there are some 
pessimistic strains in his argument qualifying this 
progressivism, particularly his insistence upon the 
power of social constraints. He bridges this apparent 
contradiction by referring to divinely-sent persons who 
are able to break out of the social constraints and
64. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.143-44.
65. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.925. See also ibid., p.930; 
Curtis, World War, p.3; Lionel Curtis, 'The 'Fifties as 
Seen Fifty Years Hence", in International Affairs 27 
(1951), pp.273-284, here pp.275, 284.
66. Lionel Curtis, The Wav to Peace, London: Oxford 
University Press and Humphrey Milford, 1944, pp.49-53; 
Curtis, World War, pp.91, 93-94, 104-06, 146-53;
Curtis, ''Fifties", p.283.
67. Curtis, World War, pp.270-71.
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provide the agency needed for creating a better world. 
This is progressivism, but - with the religious 
connotations and the reference to charismatic leaders - 
a kind of progressivism that one would not necessarily 
expect from textbook idealism.
Ethics
On the face of it, Curtis - like a good textbook 
idealist - adheres to universalist ethics. He rejects a 
viewpoint putting the national material interest at 
centre stage. Instead, Curtis favours 
internationalism.68 Curtis the textbook idealist also 
castigates "the evil doctrines of the Prussian 
autocracy' that in inter-state relations no ethics 
apply and that everything that serves the national 
interest is allowed.69 He singles out that alleged 
classical piece of transhistorical textbook realism, 
the Melian dialogue.70 For him, the Athenians' claiming 
that might is right find their present-day successor in 
the Germans invading neutral Belgium and Luxemburg.71 In 
contrast, according to Curtis, the British Empire is 
internationalist - it is built upon principles which 
are not narrowly British but human.72
Not only has the Commonwealth principle history on 
its side but it will be ultimately embraced by all
Kerr and Curtis, Prevention. p.146.
69. Lionel Curtis, "The End of War", in Round Table 5 
(1915). Pp.772-96, here p.789.
70. As an example for textbooks treating the Melian 
dialogue as a realist text see Paul R. Viotti and Mark 
V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, 
Pluralism. Globalising New York and Londons Macmillan 
and Collier Macmillan, 1987, p.78.
71 . Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.231-37.
72. Ibid., p.686.
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humans.73 Even now, it is at work within societies still 
under the spell of autocracy:
The Indian or Chinese peasant who urges his neighbours 
to remove filth through the agency of the village 
council is bringing a little nearer the day when the 
growing volume of spiritual life will issue in a 
commonwealth wide enough to include first his nation 
and then all human beings, and establish the rule of 
law for them all.74
True, England has pioneered the principle of freedom 
for the European nations. A successful application of 
this principle in India will also bring it to Asia and 
Africa.75 Bringing the Orientals to a higher order is 
indeed the noblest task yet done for the cause of 
freedom.76 As Curtis reassures an Indian readership: 
'Freedom, which in its political aspect is responsible 
government, is a human and not a Western ideal.'77 The 
commonwealth was first conceived in the West, but the 
monotheistic religions from which it has to draw today 
come from the East.78
So far, so good. God's Kingdom on Earth is open to 
everyone, even Orientals. But, as in the case of his 
progressivism, Curtis's universalism is subject to some 
heavy qualifications. First, being spiritually-based, 
it is not the kind of universalism embraced by liberal 
internationalism (and thus textbook idealism). Curtis
73. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.140.
74. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.894.
75. Curtis, 'Introduction', pp.lx-lxi.
76. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.176-77.
77. L. Curtis, 'Letters to the People of India on 
Responsible Government' (1917), in L. Curtis, Papers 
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy 
to the Government of India, Oxford: Clarendon, 1920, 
pp.357-466, here p.431.
78. Ibid., p.431.
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says that, contrary to the tenets of the Manchester
School, self-interest cannot bind people together or
provide a motive for the continuous cooperation of
humans.79 Material interests could initially draw the
members of the society together, but only selfless
devotion could be trusted to hold them together.80 
Second, his universalism is also somewhat
contradicted by his claims about the differences
between the peoples. That all Asiatic people have
similar characteristics, i.e. a mind-set leading to
stagnation,81 fits into the Orientalist discourse of
that time. But what are we to make of his assertion
that the British spirit of freedom is uncomprehensible
for the Continentals?82 True, one day Continentals and
Orientals will be uplifted to the stage the Anglo-
Saxons have already reached. But for the time being,
there are deep cultural gaps within the world which,
one would assume, do not make the spread of
universalist ideas easy.
Third, Curtis expressively celebrates cultural
diversity. This takes, on the one hand, the shape of
religious tolerances
Men view reality as they view a mountain from different 
sides, and there must be various kinds of worship to 
suit the different orders of mind.83
Any creed claiming to have solved the riddles of life
79. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.136; Curtis, World 
War, pp.10-11.
8°. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.319.
81. Ibid., pp.3-4, 124.
82. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.7-8.
83. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.871.
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for good has a totalitarian aspect.84
On the other hand, Curtis also supports the 
segregation of races. Writing about late Antiquity, he 
scathingly refers to cosmopolitan religions crushing 
the minds of men, contributing to the formation of 
mixed races and preparing them for slavery.85 For the 
present, Curtis rejects a kind of 'human society in 
which all the racial elements have been mixed into one 
conglomerate'.86 Instead, there must remain different 
nations, and
no attempt should be made to assimilate one to another. 
The utmost scope should be given to each to develop its 
own individual character.87
One might argue that the 'individual character' of 
nations could include ways of thinking that are not 
easily compatible with the universalism Curtis 
proclaims.
Nationalism is indeed an important creed for 
Curtis. Giving good advice to both British and Indians, 
he enthuses: '(B)y nationalism only can the soul of 
people be saved.'88 At the same time, however, he 
decries the spirit of national bigotry among the great 
powers that makes them either try to dominate others 
(i.e. German expansionism) or to refuse taking part in 
responsibilities for the rest of the world (i.e. 
American isolationism).89 Curtis wants a nationalism
84. Ibid., p.861.
85. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.61.
86. Curtis, World War, p.78.
87. Ibid., p.100. See also Curtis, Commonwealth. p.686.
88. L. Curtis, 'The Structure of Government Continued' 
(1917), in L. Curtis, Papers Relating to the 
Application of the Principle of Dyarchy to the 
Government of India, Oxford: Clarendon, 1920, pp.291- 
325, here pp.301-02.
89. Curtis, 'End', pp.773, 785.
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understood as ties of mutual esteem and affection 
between a people out of which love for a greater unit 
will develop. In the case of Indian nationalism, it has 
to be compatible with loyalty to the British 
Empire/Commonwealth.90 Likewise, it should be possible 
to simultaneously feel loyalty to one's nation and to 
humankind as suchs
The cosmopolitan who decries patriotism as such is 
usually a materialist at heart. He cannot understand 
how a special devotion to one land and the people it 
contains is compatible with devotion to the welfare of 
mankind at large.91
We see here how Curtis brings together universalist and 
relativist aspects. His universalism is actually quite 
limited - the mutual devotion of people to each other 
and the principle of freedom and self-government. These 
are, of course, very elastic terms under which multiple 
practices can be subsumed.
Again, as in the case of his progressivism, 
Curtis's universalism makes him resemble a textbook 
idealist. Nevertheless, there are some heavy relativist 
aspects in his ideas of ethics. If relativist thinking 
is a sign of being a textbook realist, Curtis's 
writings at least contain some elements of that as 
well.
Image of International Politics
Certain passages within Curtis's writings express 
a view of international politics that resembles, if not 
exactly that of textbook idealists, that of modern 
interdependence theorists. He refers to 'a highly
9°. Curtis, 'Letters', pp.397-98.
91. Curtis, 'Price", p.9.
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interconnected world' to which the 'old national state' 
is no longer adapted.92 As the effects of World War I - 
touching even the lives of Nepalese hillmen - 
demonstrated, all human communities have become 
dependent upon each other.93 By now, even actions on the 
part of small countries affect the whole human 
society.94 This 'growing interdependence' is the result 
of two centuries of technological progress.95
While Curtis's remarks on interdependence are few 
and far between, he has a lot to say about the 
different behaviour of autocratic states and 
commonwealths. In this, he in some respects foreshadows 
Michael Doyle's Kantian-inspired argument about the 
democratic peace.96
To begin with, for Curtis the internal conditions 
of a state affect its behaviour on the international 
level. Referring to Plato's remark that wars are caused 
by the internal diseases of states, he points towards 
Germany's autocratic system and Britain's exaggerated 
stress on individualism.97 Generally, however, it is 
autocracy only that is blamed for wars by him. He 
rejects the assumption that stronger states will 
necessarily bully weaker ones around. This is true for 
monarchical Germany and Austria-Hungary but not for
92. Anon, and Lionel Curtis, A Canadian Criticism on 
'The Problem of the Commonwealth' and the Author's 
Reply Thereto. 1916, p.37.
Lionel Curtis, 'The World in Conference', in Round 
Table 10 (1920), pp.721-55, here pp. 727-29.
94. Curtis, 'World Order', p.305.
95. Curtis, Decision, p.46.
96. Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', in 
American Political Science Review 80 (1986), pp.1151- 
69.
97. Curtis, 'End', pp.793-94.
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Great Britain and the USA, When a monarchy, France 
behaved aggressively; when a republic, more 
peacefully,98
Where does this difference come from? Dictators 
are intoxicated by power and 'seldom content with the 
mastery of their own people".99 At the same time, their 
subjects have got used to the idea that force is an 
ultimate value,100 Autocracies have other reasons for 
being warlike. They rest on military prestige101 and 
need strong armies to keep democratic movements down.102
While threats to peace come from autocracies and 
dictatorships, commonwealths are unlikely to go to war 
with each other-103 Citizens living in a commonwealth 
are used to putting public interests above their own. 
Consequently, they are also less likely to press 
parochial national claims at the expense of other 
peoples.104 Furthermore, they have learned the art of 
being compromise-minded and tend to be concerned with 
economic rather than military issues.105
All this fits well into a liberal internationalist 
image of the international system. On the other hand, 
Curtis also provides a more realist analysis. Because 
they affect matters of war and peace, foreign affairs,
Lionel Curtis, 'Windows of Freedom", in Round Table 
8 (1918), pp.1-47, here pp.5-6.
Curtis, World War, p.43.
100. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.889.
101. Curtis, 'Letter", pp.390-91.
102. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.684
103. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.889-91.
104. Ibid., p.893.
1°5. Ibid., pp.649-50.
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always take precedence over domestic issues for him.106 
He sees the idea that economic issues should take 
priority over political ones as "one of the profoundest 
fallacies'.107 Thus, in the early 1930s he expects that 
a recovery from the great depression will come through 
a successful disarmament conference.108
Likewise, after WWII he attributes the existence 
of economic protectionism to the fear of war. If the 
latter would be removed free trade will automatically 
follow.109 Taking issue with Richard Crossman from the 
left wing of the Labour Party,110 he emphasizes that, 
before a decision about the respective merits of 
capitalism and socialism can be made, military security 
against the Soviet threat has to be achieved first.111 
He also takes functionalists like Mitrany - according 
to Long and Wilson one of the major inter-war idealists 
- to task.112 They ignore that economic problems can 
only be solved once the political ones have been 
tackled.113
106. Lionel Curtis, "The League of Nations and the 
British Commonwealth', in Round Table 9 (1919), pp.468- 
94, here p.489.
107. Curtis, "'Fifties', p.284.
108. Curtis, Capital Question, p.235.
109. Curtis, World War, p.82.
110. Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International 
Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995, p.312.
111. Lionel Curtis, "Pool Resources for Peace', in 
R.H.S. Crossman and Lionel Curtis, United Europe - Yes, 
but how?. 1948.
H 2. Lavin, From Empire, p.312; Cornelia Navari, "David 
Mitrany and International Functionalism', in David Long 
and Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years' 
Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995, pp.214-46.
113. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.140-41.
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Furthermore, Curtis puts the state into the centre 
of analysis. The state cannot be dispensed with and in 
importance overrides all other kinds of human 
association.114
Curtis first extends the imperial federation 
principle to the level of a world state in a 1915 Round 
Table article. He starts from premises a realist would 
whole-heartedly agree with: Due to the division of the 
world into separate states, it is inevitable that their 
disagreements would cause wars from time to time. 
Attempts at international cooperation are incapable of 
preventing wars in the final instance.
So far, we have a staunchly systemic agenda. 
However, Curtis does not stop here. He now goes from 
the international level to that of the individual in 
explaining why agreements between states cannot prevent 
wars: The reason is the obligation for an individual to 
obey the commands of his own country, even if that 
meant violating these international agreements. The 
only solution is to extend the logic of the state to 
its consequent conclusions Instead of the existing many 
states, there has to be a single world state to whom 
the individual obligation is to be directed. Only this
can end wars.115
He repeats this argument vehemently in Civitas
Deiz If the only factor binding men together "in the 
last analysis' is the sense of duty to each other, then
114. Curtis, Commonwealtht p.89; Curtis, World War, 
p.15.
115. Curtis, "End', pp.783-85.
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the "attempt to relate national states to each other on 
a basis of compact' can only end in failure. There is 
no real hope for future peace
until some conscious effort is made to unite human 
society on the basis of the infinite claim of society 
to unlimited devotion from each of its members 
...(There had been) only one political thinker of 
recognized authority, Benedetto Croce, who has clearly 
and firmly stated this view.116
We have thus a mixture of the international and 
individual levels of analysis117 to explain why wars 
occurs Humans feel loyalty to only one sovereign 
political entity (individual level), and the world is 
divided into several of such entities (international 
systemic level).
Curtis repeats the systemic part of the argument 
again and again, making this concise statement: "A 
society divided into sovereign nations must from the 
nature of the case lapse into war from time to time.'118 
He also enlists the 'interdependence' analysis into 
this argument: In a world that, on the one hand, has 
become smaller as the result of technological progress 
and, on the other hand, remains fragmented into 
different states wars will inevitably pop up again and 
again.119 Economic dependence of states upon each other 
keeps fueling conflicts.120
116. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.922-3.
117. Compare Barry Buzan, 'The Level of Analysis Problem 
in International Relations Reconsidered', in Ken Booth 
and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory 
Today, Cambridge: Polity, 1995, pp.198-216.
118. Lionel Curtis, The Open Road to Freedom, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1950, p.15.
119. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.938; Curtis, Decision, p.46; 
Curtis, World War, p.4.
*20. Curtis, 'World', p.754.
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The unlimited obedience of citizens to one state 
only thus prevents them from feeling loyalty to an 
inter-state alliance.121 Furthermore, changes in 
population size and other internal conditions of the 
different states will sooner or later break such a 
compact apart.122 In his later works, Curtis expands 
upon this problem by distinguishing between two kinds 
of political systems, organic and inorganic ones. 
Organic systems simply refers to modern sovereign 
states. Under the term inorganic system, Curtis lumps 
together feudal polities, sovereign states combined in 
a confederation, sovereign states combined under the 
same monarch, military alliances, and the League of 
Nations.123 The fact that “inorganic' is a residual 
category into which every political entity which is not 
a sovereign state can be put shows that the latter is 
for him the basic unit of international relations. In 
this respect, he is once more on the side of the 
textbook realists.
Inorganic systems are highly unstable because 
people do not feel the same unlimited loyalty to these 
entities as they do towards their states. Under these 
circumstances, any attempt for sovereign states to 
abandon only parts of their sovereignty to an 
international body is bound to create paralysis. For
121. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.43-46.
122. Curtis, “League', pp.470-71.
123. Curtis, Decision, p.35; World War, p.61.
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Curtis, sovereignty and the accompanying loyalty cannot 
be divided - it is an issue of all or nothing.124
As far as Curtis's analysis of the existing 
international system is concerned, therefore, we have 
an idealist and a realist interpretation standing side 
by side. On the one hand, we are told that 
commonwealths are generally peaceful. From this one 
could conclude that the task at hand is to turn all 
sovereign states into commonwealths. This, of course, 
would not necessitate a world state. But, then again, 
Curtis asserts that it is the anarchical character of 
the international system as such that is behind wars.
How do these two arguments fit together?
The key is to be found in the effect international 
anarchy produces upon the commonwealths. On the one 
hand, people living in a democratic state tend to focus 
on domestic well-being and to hold themselves aloof 
from international affairs. Thus, Germany dared to 
start World War I because she did not expect Great 
Britain and the USA to intervene on the side of France 
and Russia.125
On the other hand, even though they are by 
inclination peaceful, when commonwealths fight for 
their freedom against autocracies the spirit of 
national egotism also infects them. Curtis demonstrates 
this with the case of Germany's treatment by the 
victorious allies. Instead of supporting the fledgling
124. Curtis, Decision, pp.35-38; Curtis, World War, 
pp.61-63. See also Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.910.
125. Curtis, 'League', pp.472-74.
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democracy of the Weimar Republic, the Allies undermined 
it by insisting upon harsh reparation clauses. This 
policy backfired. German democracy was overthrown and 
replaced by a new warlike autocracy.126
The lesson is clear. As long as the world remains 
divided into several sovereign states, even the more 
peaceful ones among them will not completely shed their 
more aggressive tendencies. This, in turn, results in 
policies which undermine the spread of the commonwealth 
principles to the autocratic parts of the world. Only a 
merger of sovereignties leading to the long-term 
abolition of international anarchy can simultaneously 
assure the extension of democracy.
In the context of the beginning Cold War, Curtis 
envisions how this would happen. Once a federal 
Commonwealth encompassing Western Europe and the 
Dominions is in place, the Eastern bloc will 
automatically break up and the Communist dictatorships 
be overthrown.127
Policy Recommendations
Despite publishing books with titles like The 
Prevention of War, The Way to Peace or World Revolution 
in the Cause of Peace, Curtis insists that the 
prevention of war should not be the ultimate aim of 
statesmen. A policy simply based upon the limited aim 
of preserving peace is a negative one and bound to
126. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.897-99.
127. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.151-54.
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produce opposite results. The real goal should be the 
spread of freedom and the increasing devotion of all 
humans to each other. If this is achieved, peace will 
come as a by-product.128
In giving his good advice for going into the 
direction of this aim, Curtis once again presents a 
cocktail of idealist and realist elements. In best 
idealist fashion, he puts his trust into public 
opinion, particularly if influenced by religious 
thought and the churches.129 True, public opinion needs 
time to mature for the right ideas.130 But '(a)ppeals to 
reason calmly and persistently made prevail in the 
end'.131 Men with a real case stated fairly and 
patiently can convince public opinion.132
Furthermore, public opinion is potentially 
peaceful since, as he states in several works, common 
people are less obsessed with national sovereignty than 
politicians, bureaucrats, political journalists and 
experts, who mistake their means as ends in 
themselves.133 Indeed, '(p)ublic opinion agreed that the 
„one thing which mattered to-day was the prevention of 
war" ".134
There are, however, qualifications to all this. 
Curtis particularly blames public opinion in the
128. Curtis, 'End", p.772; Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, 
pp.146-47; Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.286, 891; Curtis, 
Wav, p.54; Curtis, World War, p.184.
129. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.897, 920.
130. Curtis, Wav, p. 14.
131. Curtis, 'Introduction", p.lviii.
132. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.104.
133. Curtis, Wav, pp.6-9, 94; Curtis World War, pp.213- 
21; Curtis, World Revolution, p.53.
*34. Curtis, World Revolution, p.127.
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victorious Allied states for the faulty construction of
the League of Nations135 and for the disastrous
treatment of Germany. This is once again connected with
the shape of the international political systems
The public opinion of the peoples ... would not allow 
(the statesmen) to do what in the interests of those 
people themselves was so obviously wise. The 
institutions of a national commonwealth, however great 
and however highly developed, do not suffice to reveal 
to the people of one nation how inseparably its 
interests are bound up with those of human society as a 
whole.136
Curtis expresses his distrust of old-style secret 
diplomacy. While the proceedings of the conferences 
must be secret, their convening and their attendants 
should be open to the public.137
For a number of reasons, he is also critical of 
the balance of power system. First, there is its 
doctrine of compensation. It allows strong states to 
expand at the expense of weaker ones under the pretext 
of offsetting a similar power gain by a rival. Second, 
since an absolute equilibrium of power is not 
achievable, the logics of balance of power causes the 
formation of hostile alliances. This ultimately leads 
to war. Third, it breeds a kind of diplomacy geared 
towards intrigue. This, in turn, hides from the public 
and even many statesmen the importance of international 
relations. Fourth, it ignores that stronger states did 
not necessarily behave aggressively towards weaker 
ones. Thus, Great Britain and the USA command a greater
135. Curtis, "League", p.468; Curtis, "World", p.743.
136. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.899.
137. Curtis, "League", pp.481-82; Curtis, "World", 
p. 753.
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amount of power than Germany but, at the same time, are 
more peaceful.138 He goes as far as saying that the 
balance of power 'has outlived its time by a century" 
and only got a new lease of life during the 19th 
century because of Great Britain's and the USA's 
aloofness from permanent alliances.139
At the same time, Curtis the textbook realist 
questions the propriety of a number of measures to 
improve the harmony of inter-state relations.
Diplomatic attempts to convince Continental powers of 
naval disarmament will just backfire because, as we 
have seen, the Continentals are unable to comprehend 
Anglo-Saxon peaceful intentions.140 To prevent wars, 
international conferences and councils, the Hague 
tribunals and or arbitration treaties are all to no 
avail.141 The Locarno treaties and the Briand-Kellogg 
pact have failed.142 International arbitration 
arrangements in particular are too legalistic. While 
able to deal with the symptoms, they fail to address 
the underlying causes of conflict.143
Curtis also does not hold international law in a 
too high regard. According to him, if during the 
earlier stages of World War I 'a pedant obsessed with 
the technicalities of international law' had been US 
ambassador to Britain, the British blockade against
138. Curtis, 'Windows of Freedom', pp.4-6, 13, 20.
139. Ibid., p. 12.
Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.7-8.
141. Curtis, 'End', p.784.
142. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.830.
143. Curtis, 'World', p.733.
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trade with Germany might have caused an Anglo-American 
confrontation. Luckily, the actual ambassador, like a 
good textbook realist, had cared more about the 
security risks a victorious Germany would have brought 
to the USA than about legal niceties.144 Furthermore, 
the problem with international law under conditions of 
international anarchy is that it creates a conflict of 
loyalties.145
As we have seen, Curtis bases these pessimistic 
statements on the assumptions that inorganic political 
systems, or compacts between sovereign states, cannot 
be stable. Due to the devotion statesmen and people 
feel towards their respective state, national egotisms 
are sooner or later to break up such a system.
Curtis likes to illustrate this by the fate of the 
US Confederation of 1781-89. It was in a chronic 
financial crisis because the component states did not 
pay the contributions due to them and the Confederation 
itself lacked independent taxation powers. Furthermore, 
the component states erected customs against each 
other. The Confederation also proved unable to 
administer the jointly-held territories to the West and 
to execute treaties with foreign powers. Disagreements 
about how to proceed in a dispute with Spain nearly 
caused the same states to return to British rule. The
144. Curtis, Capital, p.257.
145. Curtis, 'World Order', pp.307-08.
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merging of state sovereignties into the US union turned 
out to be the only solution.146
Given this lesson of history, Curtis discounts the 
plans to bring greater unity to the British 
Empire/Commonwealth by simply establishing an Imperial 
Council in which Britain and the Dominions would be 
represented. Such a body can only effectively work if 
there would be unanimity between the members states. 
Since there would be no mechanism to settle disputes 
over policies it would increase friction rather than 
provide closer cooperation.147
However, his favourite negative example is the 
League of Nations. In 1918, when the idea of that 
institution had just been mooted, Curtis advised 
caution. Great Britain cannot allow her freedom of 
action to be bound by the League, which might, after 
all, misjudge the intentions of an aggressive state.148
In his 1918-20 articles, Curtis singles out three 
defects of the young League. First, it gives the wrong 
impression of being a world government even though it 
lacks effective powers to fullfill these expectations. 
Second, the presence of small states on the League's 
Council complicates the search for a joint policy, 
which should be settled by the great powers among 
themselves. Third, there is no mechanism ensuring that
Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.12; Curtis, 'Windows', 
pp.22-23; Curtis, 'World Order', pp.302-03; Curtis, 
Decision, pp.12-13; Curtis, World War, pp.37-38;
Curtis, World Revolution, pp.18-23
147. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.71-72, 83, 132-33. See
also Curtis, Wav, pp.87-91.
Curtis, 'Windows', pp. 10-11.
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heads of government, rather than ambassadors without 
power for responsible decisions, are attending the 
Council's session. In effect, Curtis wants the League 
to be a regular conference of the great power 
statesmen, including the USA. Only such a system, and 
not a premature international organization, could have 
avoided the turn of events leading to WWI.149
Curtis accepts the idea that the German colonies 
and the non-Turkish provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
should become administered by specific countries as 
League of Nations mandates. He, however, warns that, in 
order for that system to work smoothly, agreement 
between the major powers is necessary. This agreement 
might not always be forthcoming.150
Some years later, he recommends Britain to clarify 
its own policy regarding China rather than looking 
towards the League of Nations for a solution. The 
League's efficiency depends upon the degree to which 
its members were able to cooperate. The tendency to 
treat it as a world government, which it is not, will 
only backfire.151 He acknowledges that it does useful 
work, as in fighting drug traffic and white slavery and 
helping states in financial troubles, but that it 
ultimately has too many limitations.152
149. Ibid., pp.10-11, 16, 18-20; Curtis, 'League", 
pp.476, 482-87; Curtis, 'World", pp.731-52. See also 
Curtis, 'World Order", pp.319-20.
150. Curtis, 'Windows", pp.22-28.
151. Curtis, Capital Question, pp.273, 303-04.
152. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.908; Curtis, Wav, p.39.
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The later collapse of the League of Nations system 
is for him one of the best examples of the inability of 
sovereign states to achieve peace via collective 
security.153 The immediate reason of this collapse, 
according to Curtis, has been the fact that the League 
had needed the consent of all of its members for 
important decisions. Besides, statesmen representing 
member states had been distracted by domestic issues.154 
More generally, the problem with the League of Nations 
is that it, and particularly its Covenant, is
a travesty of the American constitution, drawn in 
disregard of all the principles upon which this 
constitution was based.155
The Covenant has been ignored because the prime loyalty 
of politicians rested with their own states. Thus, when 
countries like Abyssinia faced attack, they were left 
to their fate.156
Curtis thus argues that inorganic unions like the 
League paved the way to war because they provided the 
illusion of collective security. Thus, states did not 
see that they had to rely on their own strength.157
Given its limitations, the League cannot be 
reformed. Curtis discounts the idea - mooted by
153. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.908-18; Curtis, pp.18-19, 
97; Curtis, World War, p.46.
154. Curtis, 'World Order', p.320; Curtis, Decision,
p.21.
155. Curtis, 'World Order', pp.306-07.
156. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.909-10, 912-14. See also 
Curtis, 'World Order', pp.306-07; Curtis, Decision,
p.21; Curtis, Wav, pp.18-19, 40; Curtis, World War, 
p.46.
157. Curtis, Open Road, p. 13.
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idealists like Davies158 - to equip it with its own 
police force. Such a force would require the unlimited 
loyalty of its members and own financial resources and 
could thus only be achieved if the participating states 
would merge their sovereignties.159 Short of that,
Curtis actually recommends that Britain and the 
Dominions should leave the League of Nations and foster 
a new international organization with less ambitious 
aims, particularly without the pretension to provide 
collective security.160
After WWII, Curtis is also sceptical about the 
newly-founded United Nations, which, for him, is just 
another of these futile compacts between sovereign 
states. Observing the divisions among the UN's members 
and particularly the Soviet Union's refusal to whole­
heartedly cooperate he identifies the Security Council 
as actually being a danger to peace. The outbreak of 
the Korean War is for him a further proof that the UN 
has failed from the onset.161
Curtis also questions the abilities of military 
alliances to persist, particularly in times of peace. 
Because they need the consent of all the governments of 
the member states, such alliances have cumbersome 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, changing
158. Brian Porter, 'David Davies and the Enforcement of 
Peace', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers 
of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism 
Reassessed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995 pp.58-78.
159. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.910-12.
160. ibid., pp.914-16. See also Curtis, 'World', pp.752- 
53.
161. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.44-46; Curtis, Open 
Road, pp.15, 18, 20; Curtis, 'The 'Fifties', p.173.
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perceptions of national interests on the part of the 
member states sooner or later breaks such alliances 
apart.162
Writing during WWII, Curtis agrees with Walter 
Lippmann that the persistence of a triple alliance 
between the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union would be a good thing. However, he doubts 
that this alliance will endure for long or that, on its 
own, it will be able to prevent another war.163 He also 
does not hold NATO in very high regard. After the 
alliance's establishment, he just mentions it briefly 
and in a dismissive way. He quotes a military 
specialist, who decries NATO's cumbersome 
organizational structure, lacking a constant decision­
making apparatus at the top level.164
We see that Curtis in equally strong terms rejects
both the idealist attempt at inter-state cooperation 
and collective security and the realist reliance on a 
balance of power mechanism. Instead, he argues that 
Britain or, later, the Western democracies should make 
themselves strong enough that they can deter any 
attack.165 He stresses:
The safety of free systems is always to look to their 
own strength and not to measures for weakening their 
enemies.166
And the best way to foster the strength of free systems 
is for them to federate with each other. This is the
162b Curtis, Decision, p.38; Curtis, World War, p.63.
163. Curtis, Wav, pp.21-22; Curtis, World War, p.225.
164. Curtis, Open Road, pp. 18-19.
165. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.7-8; Curtis, Decision, 
p.29.
166. Curtis, Decision, p. 16.
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reason why in the late 1930s, as we have seen, he 
opposed playing off Germany and the Soviet Union 
against each other, or Britain entering an alliance 
with the latter.
His ultimate prescription for the international
political system is perhaps best captured in a number
of rhetorical questions he asks in Civitas Deis
Is not the strongest sense of patriotism as a matter of 
fact produced in the most highly developed 
commonwealths? Is not the end and object of the state 
to increase this sense of duty in men to each other? Is 
not the state in the form of the commonwealth the most 
effective agency for developing this sense of duty in 
men in the mass? On the other hand, can a state limited 
to one section of human beings, and organised on the 
basis of the infinite duty of all its members to that 
section alone, fully develop their sense of duty to 
human beings outside that section? (...) Can a 
system of compacts between sovereign states from its 
nature be trusted to restrain them from using force 
against each other? (...) Can the state fulfil its 
essential function of increasing the sense of duty in 
men to each other, in the form of the merely national 
state? Can the sense of duty in men to each other be 
developed to its utmost capacity until they are 
organised in one state, subject to one law, in such 
manner that they are led to feel that their ultimate 
duty is owed to the human race as a whole, and not to 
one part of it? Have men any prospect of attaining a 
higher plane of civilisation than that reached, so long 
as they are organised under national sovereignties?167
Yes, this all sounds like what one would expect 
from a textbook idealist. Indeed, world government, in 
attempting not simply to reform but completely to 
remodel the whole international system is as such as 
idealist as could be. Nevertheless, the important thing 
is that Curtis comes to his conclusion of the necessity 
for a world state after having provided a ruthlessly 
realist critique of idealist schemes like collective 
security.
167. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.926-27.
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The *First Debate"
In 1909, his patron Milner wrote about Curtiss
He is a bit of a visionary and an idealist, and he has 
great schemes. But I think he is thoroughly impressed 
with the necessity of caution.168
An American admirer of his article 'Windows of Freedom" 
of 1918 calls it 'one of the most eloquent statements 
of responsible idealism".169 The 'early" Curtis, who was 
more known for his plans of imperial rather then world 
federation, was then perceived by contemporaries as an 
idealist. This was then considered as nothing negative, 
the more so since he was also deemed 'responsible". 
Later on, when the World Commonwealth had moved to 
centre stage in his writings, the perception grows more 
critical. Edward Grigg, one of his fellow Round 
Tablers, writes in a review of Civitas Deit 'Lionel 
Curtis is already widely suspected and denounced as one 
of those idealists who undermine empires".170 As far as 
the undermining of empires is concerned, nothing could 
be further from the truth, as we will see in Chapter 7. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that by the 1930s the 
term idealist seems to have gotten a more negative 
connotation. Before the publication of The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, however, idealism had not yet found its 
realist sparring partner.
During the 1910s, Curtis is himself advocating 
something resembling Carr's later call for a synthesis 
between utopianism/idealism and realism. Mentioning two 
prominent Round Tablers, he indicates that Olivier is 
not amenable enough to Dominion and working class
168. Lavin, From Empire, p. 110.
169. Ibid., p. 160
17°. Ibid., p.268.
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sensitivities while Zimmern might 'lose touch with 
realities". However, both perspectives, if brought 
together, provides a valuable combination.171 On another 
occasion, Curtis criticizes Wilson for his 'reckless 
idealism". But he continues that the defects of 
visionaries losing connection with details and of power 
politicians lacking a sense of 'the wider aspects of 
truth" cancel each other out. Both kinds of people are 
necessary.172
He first uses the idealism vs. realism dichotomy 
in his early 1930s writings on China, although in a - 
for today - slightly puzzling way: Realists were those 
who wanted republican China in the 1910s to have a 
strong executive; idealists were the adherents of a 
strong parliament.173 Then again, he claims: 'A realist 
policy usually ends by proving that its authors were 
blind to the nature of genuine realities."174 Curtis 
seems to understand by realists those who lack the 
courage for bold changes. But, on another occasion, 
Curtis distinguishes 'genuine" realists, who favour 
self-government by the people, from fake realists, who 
live in the past and want China to return to a 
monarchic system.175
It is in his 1940s writings that Curtis self­
consciously puts himself into the utopian camp and 
keeps on criticizing the realists. The latter are those 
who are poking fun at the federal project and, indeed,
171. May, Round Table, p.221.
172. Curtis, 'League", p.469.
173. Curtis, Capital Question, pp.123-24.
174. Ibid., p.287.
175. Lionel Curtis, 'Shanghai", in Round Table 21 
(1931), pp.738-68, here p.753.
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any kind of change.176 They are also those who consider 
war as inevitable.177 And Harold Nicolson, diplomat and 
self-proclaimed realist, complained in a letter to 
Curtis that he seemed to think that realists were 
insensitive to human sufferings.178 Curiously, Curtis 
also charges the realists for wrongly expecting that 
Britain in cooperation with the Dominions and the USA 
would be able to secure world's peace again.179 In fact, 
we would today put those believing into the possibility 
of peace through interstate cooperation rather into the 
textbook idealist camp.
However, Curtis also gives us his definition of
the term "realist', a broad one and a more narrow one:
Realists always brand as visionary any suggestion for a 
radical change in the system to which they are used, 
and, in doing so, appeal to that deep-seated factor in 
human nature - inertia.180
And:
One school ... refuse to waste time on "Utopian" 
discussions. They are chary of projects which the 
politicians decline to consider. I know one 
distinguished professor who declines to discuss the 
idea of an international state, because he believes 
that no democracy will ever consent to relinquish its 
national sovereignty.181
If Carr uses the term "utopian" sometimes as a residual 
category, Curtis does the same with realist. Anyone who 
opposes change in general and the federal project in 
particular is a realist. The broad definition 
approximately corresponds to the identification of
I76. Curtis, Decision, pp.62-63.
177• Curtis, War or Peace?, London: Oxford University 
Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1946, p.33.
178. Lavin, From Empire, p.315.
179. Curtis, Decision, pp.31-32.
180. Curtis, Action, pp.33-34.
181. Curtis, World War, p.3.
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■textbook realism with pessimism. The narrower one, 
however, includes also most of those whom we would 
today consider textbook idealists. But, to make matters 
even more complicated, Curtis also declared himself to 
be on the side of "hardboiled realists" against groups 
like Federal Union.182 All this shows that the idealism- 
realism dichotomy, just established in the 1940s, was 
already subject to confusion - in any case in the 
writings of Curtis.
His remarks on The Twenty Years' Crisis are quite 
interesting. According to Curtis, Carr argues that 
"relative power will always determine the issues 
between sovereign states"183 and that Carr "is unable to 
contemplate a human society which is not split up into 
sovereign states".184 As we have seen in Chapter 2, this 
interpretation overlooks the "critical Realist" side of 
Carr and is an early example of the textbook version of 
Carr. At the same time, however, Curtis also says that, 
as long as there is no world state, Carr is completely 
right about the determining aspect of power.185 What, 
then, separates Carr and Curtis?
Curtis and Carr
First of all, both writers have completely 
different starting points. Curtis"s Christian argument 
is wholly alien to Carr. Indeed, despite frequent
182. Lavin, From Empire, p.303.
Curtis, Wav, p.85.
184. Ibid., p.86.
185. Ibid., p.85.
71Q
references to Niebuhr,186 Carr does not address 
theological issues directly. The only exception is the 
claim that Jesus deemed politics as inherently evil and 
thus boycotted it187 - a claim which is, of course, 
completely at odds with Curtis's dream of creating 
God's kingdom on Earth.
On the other hand, as we have seen, there is Carr 
the non-positivist. He asserts that in the humanities 
there is a much greater intermingling between the 
investigation of facts and the purpose of this 
investigation than in the natural sciences. A social 
scientist is inevitably not only observing but also 
changing social phenomena.188 This overlaps with 
Curtis's assertion that, due to the existence of free 
will, the humanities cannot have the same precision as 
the natural sciences.
Both Carr and Curtis are at one in upholding the 
faith in the possibility of human progress.
Furthermore, Carr like Curtis stresses that the reasons 
of calamities like wars cannot be blamed on the 
shortcomings of certain individuals but have to be 
found at a deeper level.189 On the other hand, Curtis 
one-sidedly stresses the importance of free will in 
contrast to Carr's more balanced, dialectical
186. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
2nd ed., London and Basingstoke: Papermac, (1939) 1995, 
pp.xi, 77, 85, 94, 95, 105, 145, 154 n.33.
187. Ibid., p.93.
188. ibid., pp.4-5.
189. Ibid., p.x.
approach.190 While Carr locates human action in social 
conditions and envisages it as collective, Curtis's 
argument runs into an unacknowledged structure-agency 
problem overcome by the existence of great thinkers and 
charismatic leaders•
One can guess that Carr would not be very 
convinced of Curtis's solution. He makes dismissive- 
sounding remarks about the intellectuals' self- 
important claim to provide guidance for the men of 
action191 and about Wilson's tactics of appealing to the 
people over the head of the established political 
"bosses ' •192
Carr and Curtis both see the existence of a world 
community and of international ethics. As in the case 
of the notion of progress, Carr is much more careful 
and circumscribed than Curtis. The latter's insistence 
that each nation should retain and fully develop its 
own characteristics and his call for an "unbigoted' 
nationalist spirit resembles the tenets of 19th century 
liberal nationalism as described by the former. Carr's 
critique of that movement - its untenable assumption of 
a harmony of interest between one's own nation and 
humanity at large193 - is also applicable to Curtis. On 
the other hand, like Curtis, Carr also rejects the 
Athenian position in the Melian dialogue - if only 
fleetingly.194
19°. Ibid., p. 12.
191. Ibid., p. 14.
192 . Ibid., p.33.
193. Ibid., p.46.
194. Ibid., p.200.
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Coming to the character of international politics, 
Carr writes about
the meaningless question whether ... our political 
troubles have economic causes or whether ... our 
economic troubles have political causes . ..195
This charge of being meaningless might also be directed 
at Curtis, who expressively argues that economic 
problems have political causes. However, what Carr 
himself writes about the way economic factors are used 
for the pursuit of power on the parts of states makes 
it obvious that he, too, sees politics as having 
priority over economics.196 In this respect, Carr and 
Curtis see eye to eye.
Carr's account differs from Curtis's with respect 
to the behaviour of democratic states. As we have seen, 
in The Twenty Years' Crisis Carr discounts domestic 
elements in terms of their influence on a state's 
external behaviour and does not see democracies as more 
peaceful than autocracies. In this respect, the gap 
with Curtis's model is quite wide.
Furthermore, in contrast to Curtis's expectations 
for a harmonious future, Carr strongly argues that 
conflicts between human groups cannot be eliminated.197 
These human groups need not necessarily be states. The 
state is not a necessary form of human organization but 
historically contingent. Territorial power units may 
disappear altogether at a time yet far ahead, and Carr 
in any case assumes that the nation state as existing
195. Ibid., p. 108.
1%. Ibid., pp.106-20.
197. Ibid., p.213.
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today is bound to decrease in importance and that 
sovereignty is a blurred concept. He believes that 
several formally sovereign states can be efficiently 
integrated in military and economic terms - a 
possibility discounted by Curtis.
If state-centrism is a characteristic of realism, 
than Curtis is a bigger realist than Carr. As we have 
seen, he considers the state as such as inevitable for 
developed human communities and he is adamant that 
sovereignty is indivisible. He would have counted 
Carr's blocs as inorganic political systems bound to 
break down.
Still, there is some common ground. Like Curtis, 
Carr also believes that an international order cannot 
be built upon a coalition between a multitude of 
nation-states each with their own power-resources.198 
The difference is that Curtis reifies the concept of 
sovereignty, while Carr does not.
Concerning policy recommendations, there is 
agreement between Curtis and Carr that there must be no 
apotheosis of international law and that not too much 
should be expected of international arbitration.199 Both 
see the Briand-Kellogg Pact or Davies' idea of an 
international police force as impractical.200 Carr's 
criticism of the League of Nations - that it uses an 
abstract rhetoric not in line with reality, that there 
are too many small powers on the Council and that it
198. Ibid., pp.x, 101, 216.
199. Ibid., pp. 159-90.
200. Ibid., p.30.
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has been neglected by influential politicians201 - reads 
like a carbon copy of Curtis's reservations twenty 
years earlier. And Carr, like Curtis, advocates a 
mixture of force and appeasement vis-a-vis Nazi 
Germany.202 In one respect Curtis turned out to be more 
in touch with 'realities' than Carr. While the latter 
during WW II hoped for a continuation of the wartime 
alliance between Washington, London and Moscow, the
former was more sceptical.
Carr was certainly not as optimistic as Curtis
that the British could somehow reserve for themselves 
the position of powerful junior partner of the USA. He 
writes cynically about the
dream that British supremacy, instead of passing 
altogether away, will be transmuted into the higher and 
more effective form of an ascendancy of the English- 
speaking peoples. The pax Britannica will be put into 
commission and become a pax Anglo-Saxonia, under which 
the British Dominions ... will be cunningly woven into 
a fabric of Anglo-American cooperation. This romantic 
idea goes back to the last years of the nineteenth 
century ... when Cecil Rhodes had one of the first 
recorded versions of world empire based on an Anglo- 
American partnership.203
Asking why the USA should be so keen to take the 
British on board, Carr clearly hedges his bets on 
straightforward American dominance.204 Given the joint 
impact of the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions on the 
rest of the Western world and the recent events in 
Iraq, one may perhaps wonder whether, after all, Curtis 
was not closer to the mark than Carr.
At other passages of The Twenty Years' Crisis Carr 
also appears dismissive of the world state idea. He
201. Ibid., pp.30-31, 40 n.12.
202. Ibid., p.202.
203. Ibid., p.214.
204. Ibid., p.215.
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says that few people want it205 and that it is usually 
only advanced by the dominant states.206 After outlining 
his own vision for a new international order, Carr 
finishes his book with the words:
This, too, is a utopia. But it stands more directly in 
the line of recent advance than visions of a world 
federation or blue-prints of a more perfect League of 
Nations. Those elegant superstructures must wait until 
some progress has been made in digging the 
foundations.207
Now, on a superficial reading it appears to be 
quite clear what Carr would have thought about Curtis - 
just one more of these starry-eyed Utopians coming up 
with unattainable blueprints. However, note well that 
Carr argues that a world federation must wait• He says 
neither that it is unattainable nor that it is not 
desirable. In other words, Carr would not necessarily 
have rejected Curtis' final goal.
Indeed, in his writings from the 1940s Carr calls 
for closer military and economic links between Britain 
and Western Europe. At the same time, Britain must 
strengthen her ties with the Commonwealth. Leading such 
a large multi-national bloc, Britain would act on an 
equal footing with the United States and the Soviet 
Union.208 As we will see, Curtis's plans were on similar 
lines. There was, of course, the difference that Carr 
did not immediately envisage a political federation and
205. Ibid., p.9.
206. Ibid., pp.78-79.
207. Ibid., p.219.
208. Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace, London: 
Macmillan, 1942, pp.187-209; Edward Hallett Carr, 
Nationalism and After, London: Macmillan, 1945, pp.72- 
74; Charles Jones, E.H. Carr and International 
Relations: A Duty to Lie, Cambridge, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.92-93, 
105, 115.
a merger of sovereignties - which was the specific 
issue dear to Curtis. However, at one stage Carr writes 
this about European integrations
(W)e may find that we have constructed something which 
mankind will come gradually to recognize as 
indispensable to its future well-being and which can 
some day be given •.. wider geographical extension and 
constitutional forms. When this stage has been reached, 
it will be time to think of formal agreements, of 
definitions of functions, and of constitutional 
rules.209
In this quotation, Carr comes close to the vision 
of a British-led integrated Europe becoming the kernel 
of a world-wide political entity. The difference with 
Curtis lies in the fact that Carr envisages formal 
federation as the end-point, not starting-point, of 
political integration.
We will come back to some other parallels and 
contrasts between Curtis's and Carr's respective 
approaches in the last two chapters. However, from the 
above it should be clear that, while there are clearly 
stark differences between both writers, these 
differences can only partially be related to the 
alleged dichotomy of the 'First Debate'. In some 
respects, Curtis was as realist as Carr, perhaps even 
more.
If Carr was more open to the kind of schemes 
Curtis propagated than first meets the eye where, then, 
is the difference between them in this respect? Where 
Curtis lays himself open to Carrian criticism is his 
insistence that his schemes have nothing at all to do 
with interests and power politics. The axe Carr had to
209. Carr, Conditionsf p.273.
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grind was exactly against such ignoring of the specific 
interests behind high-sounding internationalist 
phrases.
Conclusion
If we adapt the textbook understandings of 
idealism and realism, as summarized in Chapter 1, to 
Curtis, we end up in a quandrys Curtis believes in 
progressivism and the boundless improvement of the 
human character, but this progressivism is tempered by 
his stress on structural constraints to human agency.
He presents the Commonwealth as a universal principle 
but at the same time celebrates nationalism and 
cultural diversity. He develops a version of the theory 
of the democratic peace but contradicts this by the 
pre-Waltzian claim that war is inevitable as long as 
international anarchy persists. He rejects realpolitik 
and the balance of power but also deems international 
organizations and collective security measures as 
futile.
We might get out of this quandry of adequately 
placing Curtis by simply claiming that he was a 
contradictory thinker who happened to have both an 
idealist and a realist side. But by this we would 
seriously underestimate his capacity as a political 
thinker. His views may have been naive and hypocritical 
but they are internally coherent. Curtis successfully 
bridges the four contradictions mentioned above by 
referring to charismatic thinkers/leaders, by giving
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his universalism a very broad and elastic shape, by 
showing how international anarchy negatively affects 
the otherwise peace-loving behaviour of commonwealths, 
and, most importantly, by using a realist analysis of 
world politics to bring home the necessity of an 
idealist project, i.e. world federation. Curtis himself 
addresses the idealism-realism dichotomy but in a way 
different from what we know from the contemporary 
textbooks. Despite completely different starting-points 
there are a few interesting similarities between his 
argument and Carr's.
Of course, Curtis's particular blend of textbook 
idealism and realism may be idiosyncratic. However, the 
broad range of criticism against the traditional 
interpretation of the First Debate, as summarized in 
Chapter 1, indicates that he was not just the exception
which proves the rule.
If the textbook dichotomy is not helpful in
classifying Curtis, and indeed the other interwar 
thinkers, where else can we then turn? My assertion is 
that we must not remain simply at the level of ideas 
and exegesis of texts but also consider the economic 
and social conditions which were behind the works of 
political thinkers. Furthermore, we have to trace which 
classes, and faction of classes, these thinkers 
represented.
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Chapter Five
The Neo-Gramsciaa Perspective
Antonio Gramsci
Although he was influenced by thinkers as diverse 
as Machiavelli and Sorel, not to mention Marx, Antonio 
Gramsci's major intellectual mentors were the Italian 
philosophers Croce (who later arranged the translation 
of Curtis's magnum opus into Italian)1 and Labriola. 
Labriola had developed a critique of the positivistic 
interpretations of Marx. Croce's anti-positivism, in 
contrast, was based upon Hegelian idealism. While both 
thinkers criticised the positivistic, gradualist and 
mechanical interpretations of socialism prevailing in 
the Italian socialist movement of the time, Labriola 
considered this to be the result of a misinterpretation 
of Marx, while for Croce, the positivism of Italian 
socialists could be traced to Marx.2
Croce's anti-positivism, in particular, held Turin 
in sway around the time that Gramsci started his 
university studies there. Much of Gramsci's later 
thinking evolved within the frame of a polemic with 
Croce. Gramsci was also a supporter of Lenin's theories 
of positive action, that the revolution should be done 
at any moment that the opportunity arose, even in a 
country dominated by peasants. As we will see below, 
however, Gramsci did not think that this same
*. Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International 
Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995, p.470.
2. Lynne Lawner, "Introduction', in Antoni Gramsci, 
Letters From Prison: Antonio Gramsci (ed. and transl. 
by Lynne Lawner), New York: Noonday, 1989, pp.3-56, 
here pp.18-20, 45-47.
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revolutionary strategy was suitable for Western 
European countries. There, a premature attempt on the 
part of the proletariat to grasp power could produce 
opposite results.
According to Gramsci,3 the state encompasses not 
only the administrative, military and legal machineries 
enforcing a monopoly of coercion (political society), 
but also institutions like the church, the educational 
system, the press, political parties, or trade unions 
(civil society). The latter supplement the coercive 
character of the state via constructing popular 
consent. It is important to note, however, that Gramsci 
did not always use this expanded concept of state.
There are also times when he refers to the more 
conventional understanding of the state as an 
'administrative, governmental and coercive 
apparatus".4
In depicting civil society as a realm beyond the 
capitalist market, as a realm which stands between the
3. The following discussion is based upon: Walter L. 
Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio 
Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980; Robert W. Cox, 
'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An 
Essay in Method', in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. 
Sinclair, Approaches to World Order. Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
pp.124-43; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World 
Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp.409-10 n.10; 
Alan Swingwood, A Short History of Sociological 
Thought. 2nd ed«, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 
1991, pp.205-14.
4. Indeed, in Gramsci"s thought 'the concepts cannot 
usefully be considered in abstraction from their 
applications, for when they are so abstracted different 
usages of the same concept appear to contain 
contradictions or ambiguities." See Robert Cox, 
'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An 
Essay in Method" (1983) in Robert W. Cox with Timothy 
J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge:
individual and the state, Gramsci employed a Hegelian
understanding of civil society, which:
contained two important innovations. First, it made 
independent associations and public opinion a core 
component of civil society, granting them a role as 
political and ethical mediators between individuals and 
the state. Second, for all its invocation of the 
communal dimensions of human existence, Hegel's concept 
of civil society acknowledged the centrality of 
conscious, reflexive individuals in the construction of 
modern civil society.5
Understood as the combination of political and 
civil society, the state according to Gramsci is not a 
neutral arbiter above society, but is embattled by 
certain competing social groups or classes. If such 
groups/classes go beyond the stage of expressing their 
interests in purely economic terms and start to develop 
a coherent ideology for themselves, they form what 
Gramsci calls a "historic bloc'. There are times when 
such a historic bloc forges political alliances with 
other groups, without, however, weakening 
its own superior position in that process. In this 
case, we can talk of hegemony: The ruling class 
provides the intellectual and moral leadership for the 
rest of the society, a process during which it passes 
its own morality, customs and practices to the rest of 
the society.6 Consensual hegemony is achieved within the
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.124-143, here 
p.126.
5. Alejandro Col£s, International Civil Society: Social 
Movements in World Politics, Cambridge and Malden: 
Polity and Blackwell, 2002, p.42.
6. Gramsci used the concept of hegemony in two related, 
but separate senses. First, it was used in 
juxtaposition to "domination', namely "the state's 
monopoly on the means of violence and its consequent 
role as the final arbiter of all disputes'. In this 
sense, hegemony meant "the consensual basis of an 
existing political system within civil society.' In the 
second sense, hegemony meant a specific historical 
stage during the evolution of class consciousness. This
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realm of civil society, while political society relies 
upon coercive domination.
If a historic bloc achieves both domination and 
hegemony, its own position as a ruling class will rest 
upon quite solid foundations. This was, according to 
Gramsci, the case in Western European countries like 
Great Britain and France. But there were also cases 
where the ruling historical bloc exerted domination but 
failed to develop a strong hegemony. This was what 
happened in Czarist Russia and Liberal Italy.7 The 
reason that a socialist revolution triumphed in the 
former in 1917, but failed during the bienno rosso in 
the latter in 1919-21 had to to with a further, crucial 
variable: the strength of civil society vis-a-vis 
political society.
In pre-revolutionary Russia, civil society had 
existed only in a nascent form. Once the Bolshevists
was the stage when a rising class passed beyond the 
'economic-corporative' level, i.e., where individuals 
went beyond the levels of feeling a measure of affinity 
with members of their trade or profession, without, 
however, having any sense of common class interests, 
and the level of seeing mere common economic interests 
among themselves. The hegemonic level was the one when 
the members of a class gained true class consciousness 
through developing "a common intellectual and moral 
awareness, a common culture." See Adamson, Hegemony, 
pp.160-61, 170-71.
7. In fact Gramsci examined at least three types of 
nonhegemonic systems. One was simple class domination 
as in pre-revolutionary Russia. Another was the 
practice of transforismo in Italian politics between 
1860-1914, namely 'the predominance of political 
society over civil society in such a way that the 
subaltern classes are held in a passive position 
because their potential leadership is co-opted." A 
third system was the pseudohegemonic one where 'the 
government in power, in order to gain a functional 
equivalent of hegemony, pretends to exercise its power 
in the name of a class which in reality it does not 
represent", as in the Napoleonic Empire where 
Napoleon"s rule was exercised to some extent in the 
name of the bourgeoisie, but 'was essentially
1*1
had captured the coercive side of the state apparatus 
by a revolutionary "war of movement', they were in 
control.8 In Italy, by contrast, there was a strong 
civil society. However, the leading factions of the 
bourgeoisie controlling political society had only a 
relatively weak hold over this civil society. In such a 
situation, the right revolutionary strategy would have 
been the establishment by the working classes of a 
hegemony for themselves within civil society through a 
revolutionary "war of position'.9 Their failure to do so 
had opened the way for the fascists to take over the 
decomposing structure of political society and to make 
their own, though only partially successful, bid for 
hegemony over civil society.
Of crucial importance for the establishment of a 
hegemony are the intellectuals - broadly defined by
independent of bourgeois interests". See Adamson, 
Hegemony, p.175.
8. "War of movement" meant the actual revolutionary 
moment, when the proletariat seizes power.
9. By "war of position" Gramsci meant the stage when the 
proletariat, as an organised and class-conscious force, 
prepares itself for the next stage; namely the 
revolution as such, which will be brought about through 
a war of movement. According to Gramsci, it would be 
politically irresponsible to go ahead with a war of 
movement when the conditions for the successful 
completion of a war of position are not rife, i.e. when 
the power-balance is clearly in favour of the 
bourgeoisie. The war of position was crucial for the 
emergence of the cultural consciousness of the 
proletariat and their cultural delinking from the 
bourgeoisie. See Theo Votsos, Per Begriff der 
Zivilqesellschaft bei Antonio Gramsci, Hamburg and 
Berlins Argument, 2001, p.33. A war of movement, and 
the related concept of "permanent revolution" can make 
sense where the civil society is not developed, as in 
pre-revolutionary Russia. Where it is developed, where 
there are political parties and trade union movements, 
however, the classical revolution theory has to be 
altered, and the war of movement replaced by the war of 
position. A new revolutionary theory suitable for the 
conditions of Western societies was thus articulated by 
Gramsci. See ibid., p.81.
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Gramsci as all those who mediate ideologies within 
civil society as well as between civil society and 
political society. Thus, intellectuals do not only 
include members of the free professions like academics, 
journalists, publishers or lawyers, but everyone 
involved in the organisation of administrative, 
productive or cultural tasks.
Gramsci further distinguished between traditional 
and organic intellectuals. The former are an autonomous 
group not directly attached to a specific class. The 
latter, in contrast, are 'experts in legitimation', who 
grow out of a rising historical bloc and express its 
interests in a way that aimed to appeal to society at 
large. In order to establish its hegemony, a historic 
bloc has first to win over traditional intellectuals to 
its cause, and subsequently to develop its own organic 
intellectuals.
Seen from this perspective, Curtis's claim about 
the intellectuals' heavy responsibility for war and 
peace no longer appears so boisterous. Indeed, Curtis 
can be characterized as an organic intellectual who, 
quite successfully, contributed to the production of 
legitimacy - both domestically and internationally - 
for Britain's ruling historic bloc.
Given the penetration of civil society by those 
controlling political society in Western Europe, an 
economic crisis will not necessarily affect the state, 
since its effects can be offset by the stabilizing 
influence of hegemonic consensus. However, a hegemonic 
crisis is likely to appear if the ruling classes fail 
in an undertaking, particularly war, for which they 
have sought consent from society at large; if
?^d
substantial new groups entered the political stage and 
make their own bid for hegemony; and if the 
intellectuals threaten to withdraw their support from 
the historical bloc.
Short of revolutionary upheaval, such a crisis can 
be resolved either through the emergence of a single 
party unifying the different political factions and 
establishing a new hegemony, or by the emergence of a 
charismatic, 'Caesarist' leader. This was, of course, 
what had happened in Italy with the take-over of 
Mussolini.
As will be seen later on, early 20th century 
Britain also faced a hegemonic crisis. However, in 
contrast to 1920s Italy the ruling class in the United 
Kingdom was cohesive enough to weather the crisis. 
Instead of withdrawing their support, the organic 
intellectuals (including Curtis) provided new concepts 
like new liberalism and social imperialism that, while 
failing to offset Britain's decline on the 
international level, still helped to keep the domestic 
power structure intact.
Robert Cox
Notwithstanding doubts about the 'applicability" 
of key Gramscian concepts like hegemony, historical 
bloc and civil society out of the context of the 
nation-state,10 International Relations scholars 
inspired by Gramsci have extended the use of these 
concepts, particularly hegemony, from the domestic to
10. Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, 'Engaging 
Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New
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the international level.11 There is by now a rich 
literature of new Gramscians, what is also sometimes 
dubbed the "Italian school" in IR. Although the 
specific ontological units that are analysed vary 
(for example, international organizations in the case 
of Cox, a transnational ruling class in the case of van 
der Pijl, or the transnational state in the case of 
William Robinson,)12 in general this literature focuses 
on the emergence of a global civil society as the 
reflection of a hegemonic world order.
Despite denying belonging to any school,13 it has 
been Robert Cox, who through two seminal articles 
published in the early eighties, introduced IR scholars 
to Gramsci.14 There are other reasons, apart from this 
introductory function, why Cox is considered to be a 
key figure, not only of the new Gramscian school, but 
also of critical IR thought generally. One is the sheer 
compass of his work on the dialectics of change in 
historical structures which includes the dynamics 
between social forces of production, states, and world 
orders. The other reason is that:
Cox's unique method for understanding the structures of 
world order has not been matched elsewhere in the 
emerging critical tradition for its flexibility and
Gramscians' in Review of International Studies 24 
(1998), pp.3-21.
See for example, Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, 
Historical Materialism and International Relations, 
Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
12. William I. Robinson, "Social Theory and 
Globalization: The Rise of a Transnational State' in 
Theory and Society 30 (2001), 2, pp.157-200.
13. Germaine and Kenny, "Engaging', p.4 n.3.
14. Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations Theory' (1981), in 
Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to 
World Order. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.85-123; Robert 
Cox, "Gramsci'.
adaptability to research problems. Unlike other 
methods, Cox's approach is designed to incorporate both 
the static and dynamic aspects of structures, and thus 
the use of historicist and positivist epistomologies is 
conceivable within the parameters of his method, in 
different instances.15
Let us briefly look at these two articles. The 
first article fulfilled the joint task of outlining 
Cox's approach and positing 'critical theory' as a 
juxtaposition to 'problem-solving theory', by which Cox 
in specific terms targetted IR neorealism.16
Theory, according to Cox, 'is always for someone 
and for some purpose.'17 Theory can serve two diverging 
purposes. Either it is a 'problem-solving theory', 
which
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing 
social and power relationships and the institutions 
into which they are organized, as the given framework 
of action.18
Or it is 'critical theory' which poses questions about 
the given order. These questions include the power 
basis of this order, lying in material capabilities, 
ideas and institutions, and questions related to the 
attempt to historicise the order, i.e. to see it not as 
a transhistorical structure but as concretely located 
in a certain historical epoch.
The most that problem-solving theory attempts is 
to consider the potentials for tactical adjustments 
when the equilibrium within the given order is 
disturbed, in order to make the order work smoothly. In
15. Timothy J. Sinclair, 'Beyond International Relations 
Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order' in 
Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to 
World Order, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.3-18, here p.8.
16. Cox, 'Social Forces'.
17. Ibid., p.87. Emphasis in the original.
Ibid., p.88.
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contrast, with its historicist epistemology, critical 
theory demystifies the given order and looks for 
possibilities of transformation that lie within that 
order.19
In the case of Curtis, it might be argued that his 
more "practical" works on South African unification and 
Indian dyarchy represent a problem-solving approach 
while his calls for a world federation would be his 
critical-theoretical side. After all, he is aware of 
the historicity of the international state system and, 
far from taking it for granted, calls for its 
replacement. Nevertheless, this would be too generous 
on Curtis. As we will see, his federation proposals 
were just a big problem-solving device for his 
unquestioned assumption, i.e. Anglo-Saxon hegemony.
Distancing himself from a generic form of Marxism, 
Cox located his work in a specific, undeterministic 
understanding of historical materialism. This form of 
historical materialism, to Cox, is a synonym for 
critical theory and corrects the shortcomings of 
neorealism, to Cox a prime example of problem-solving 
theory, in four major respects.
The first correction is to neorealism"s conception 
of conflict. According to Cox, both neorealism and 
historical materialism focus on conflict. However, 
where neorealism considers conflict as determined by 
structural factors or as embedded in a never-changing, 
power-seeking human nature, historical materialism sees 
in conflict the potential for propelling structural 
change•
19. Ibid., pp.87-91.
Second, historical materialism directs the 
attention away from the horizontal level of rivalry 
between the great powers, the prime focus of 
neorealism, to add to this dimension the vertical one 
concerning issues of dominance, hegemony and 
imperialism in the global political economy.
Third, historical materialism broadens the realist 
perspective by paying attention to the relationship 
between the state and civil society. Neorealism, as we 
have seen, largely perceives of the state as isolated 
from the social structure within which it is 
historically embedded, or sees civil society in a 
conflictual relationship to the interests of the state, 
whereby the raison d'etat is reified. Coxian historical 
materialism, on the other hand, employs the 
conceptualization of the relationship between the state 
and the civil society in the works of Antonio Gramsci, 
to see state/society complexes as the prime entities of 
a world order and for discovering the specific 
historical forms taken by these complexes.
Fourth, historical materialism draws the attention 
to the production process and the power relations 
underlying this process, a field neglected by 
neorealism and collapsed onto the reified concept of 
the national interest. According to Coxian historical 
materialism, the production process, and the power 
relations it is based on and that it reproduces, are 
integral parts of the historical process which 
determines the specific forms that state/society 
complexes and world orders take.
According to Cox, each action takes place in a 
'framework for action", whereby the task of the
?3Q
critical theorist is to historically unravel this
framework. Cox's framework for action has
the form of a historical structure, a particular 
combination of thought patterns, material conditions, 
and human institutions which has a certain coherence 
among its elements.20
Cox further employs the concept of historical 
structures as ideal-typical devices to be applied to 
specific spheres of human activity. Cox's chosen 
spheres of activity are:
(1) organization of production, more particularly with 
regard to the social forces engendered by the 
production process; (2) forms of state as derived from 
a study of state/society complexes; and (3) world 
orders, that is, the particular configurations of 
forces which successively define the problematic of war 
or peace for the ensemble of states.21
Social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be 
seen as "particular configurations of material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions' that mutually 
influence each other.22
The concept of the historical structure in Cox 
bears a strong resemblance to Gramsci's historical 
blocs. The particular "configuration of forces' 
inherent in the historical structure comprising of the 
three dimensions of ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities does not cause actions in a deterministic 
way. Rather, it materializes itself in the shape of 
pressures and constraints. Each of the dimensions bears 
upon the other two and has the potential to bring about 
changes in them, producing a multidimensional and 
undeterministic conception of historical change.23
20. Ibid., p.97.
21. Ibid., p.100. Emphasis in the original.
22. Ibid., p.101.
23. Ibid., pp.95-97.
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Unlike neorealism which does not analyse those 
forms of dominance where the power structures get 
mystified behind universalized ideologies, and focuses 
on power as an aggregation of material resources, Cox 
distinguishes between hegemonic and nonhegemonic 
historical structures. Hegemonic structures are those 
in which the power basis of the structure is less 
openly displayed than in nonhegemonic ones.
A hegemonic world order does not simply mean the 
dominance of one state over the rest, as in 
conventional hegemonic stability theory.24 Rather, the 
dominant state and the historic bloc behind that state 
are able to spread their own ideological order globally 
and to find allied classes in other states. A hegemonic 
world order is thus based upon a degree of consent 
between the major state units. It reproduces the 
paramount position of the hegemonic state and of the 
classes controlling it, but it also gives some 
advantages to the less powerful.
A hegemonic order is contrasted with forms of 
dominance like imperialism, which rely on the exercise 
of naked power without resort to any consensual 
strategy. Both Pax Americana of the post WWII era, and 
the Pax Britanica of the mid-nineteenth century, were, 
according to Cox, hegemonic structures since they 
involved the establishment and sustenance of dominance 
not merely thorough the use of economic and military 
capabilities, but also the universalisation of an
24. For hegemonic stability theory see Isabelle 
Grunberg, "Exploring the wMyth" of Hegemonic 
Stability", in International Organization, 44, (1990),
4, pp.431-77.
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ideological structure which underpinned the dominance.25 
As we will see, Curtis had an important part in 
providing ideational support for both the declining 
British hegemony and its supersession by the American 
one.
In the second article, Cox deepened the Gramscian 
analysis. After introducing several Gramscian concepts, 
Cox reflects upon whether it is possible to employ 
Gramscian analysis of hegemony in international 
relations. In line with the arguments raised in his 
earlier article, in both Pax Britannica and Pax 
Americana Cox sees a hegemonic world order, with the 
political, economic and social aspects forming a 
coherent whole.26 According to Coxs
Hegemony at the international level is thus not 
merely an order among states. It is an order within a 
world economy with a dominant mode of production which 
penetrates into all countries and links into other 
subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex 
of international social relationships which connect the 
social classes of different countries. World hegemony 
can be described as a social structure, an economic 
structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be 
simply one of these things but must be all three.27
Kees van der Pijl
Drawing upon the insights of Gramsci and Cox, Kees 
van der Pijl asserts that the history of political 
thought cannot be adequately conceptualised in 
isolation from the changes in the process of capital 
accumulation.
The cosmopolitan, liberal internationalist 
philosophy of British hegemony, which reached its
25. Cox, 'Social Forces", pp.102-07; Cox, Production, 
pp.7-8.
26. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International 
Relations", pp.135-7.
27. Ibid., p. 137.
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pinnacle in the nineteenth century, was based upon the 
rise of 'sector A' industries and the process of 
extensive accumulation, as well as the accompanying 
predominance of the worldwide commercial circuit 
sustaining the distribution of locally produced goods. 
Extensive accumulation originated with the industrial 
revolution, and the dominance of the textile and food 
industries. It held its dominant position until well 
into the nineteenth century. Production was 
characterised by a low organic composition of capital, 
with the output comprising primarily the means of 
comsumption•
In the course of the nineteenth century, there was 
a gradual transition to intensive accumulation. 
Intensive accumulation was characterised by a high 
organic composition of capital and the primary supply 
of producer goods. The dominant industries were those 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely 
metals, oil and engineering, the so-called 'B" 
industries.
Since the period of intensive accumulation went 
hand in hand with the rise of protectionist rivals to 
Britain like Germany, the scale of operation of these 
industries was national, often related to the Hobbesian 
state-society configuration. This meant that they 
normally drew upon state support and that, 
consequently, the border between their foreign 
activities and offical foreign policy became blurred. 
The rise of an organised labour movement, and the 
accompanying organisation of the employers completed 
the picture, which was of a comprehensive
7 A*
countermovement to cosmopolitan liberalism and can be 
summed up as the state monopoly tendency.
However, for some time, the internationalisation 
of the circuit of the money capital hid this 
countermovement. Until World War I, and in the 1920s, 
high finance represented a transnational system holding 
the various national industrial blocs together. With 
the Great Crash of 1929, however, this mask could no 
longer be kept and:
The emergency tutelage under which bank capital was 
placed by governments and the policy of the "euthanasia 
of the rentier' prescribed by Keynes then inaugurated a 
period in which the productive-capital perspective, 
summed up in Polanyi's concept of social protection and 
reflecting the high level of socialisation typical of 
an economy centring on the production of investment 
goods, reigned supreme. The international circuit of 
money capital virtually collapsed.28
During the same period, in the United States there 
was a shift to progressive accumulation, characterised 
by a combination of labour and capital-intensive 
processes and the dominance of the research-intensive 
sector "C" industries like automobiles, chemicals and 
electrical engineering. As for the scale of operation 
of these industries, the emphasis on secure national 
markets was combined with a process of active 
internationalisation. This can be summed up as a 
corporate liberal phase.29
To connect the process of capital accumulation 
with the realm of ideology, van der Pijl resorts to the 
concept of "comprehensive concepts of control" which 
unite specific ruling class configurations behind them
28. Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and 
International Relations, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998, p.56.
29. Ibid., pp.56-7, 63.
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by providing implicit but definite joint programs. They 
are
political formulas that lend cohesion and cogency to 
the rule of particular classes and fractions of classes 
by translating idealized class and fractional 
viewpoints into a strategic orientation for society as 
a whole.30
In line with the Gramscian concept of hegemony, the 
authority for such concepts of control is derived from 
the key role that certain classes and fractions of 
classes acquire at specific stages in the capital 
accumulation process. This role goes beyond the strict 
functions of these classes in this process.31
Van der Pijl distinguishes between three concepts 
of control. First, there is liberal internationalism, 
based on the money-capital perspective. Due to the 
local scope of textile production and its resulting 
dependency upon far-flung commercial and credit 
networks, this specific concept of control is connected 
with the phase of 'A'-industries. Its adherents are 
mainly bankers, merchants, rentiers and smaller 
industrialists. Domestically, this concept embraces 
laisser-faire and sound money. On the international 
level, it stands for free trade and cosmopolitanism.
Second, there is the state monopoly tendency that 
is based on the productive-capital perspective, which 
is in turn connected with the growth of 'B'-industries. 
Economics of scale need the existence of a national 
market and strive to remain independent of the fetters 
of money capital. The productive capital perspective
30. Kees van der Pijl, 'Ruling Classes, Hegemony, and 
the State System: Theoretical and Historical 
Considerations', in International Journal of Political 
Economy 19 (1989), 3, pp.7-35, here p.8.
31. Ibid., pp.7-8.
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has been formulated by economists like J.A. Hobson and 
J.M. Keynes with their sharp criticism of rentier 
power. However, its most consequent applier was Henry 
Ford. The principles of 'Fordism" are three-folds 
First, assembly-line and mass production; second, high 
wages to stimulate demand; third, paternalistic welfare 
patterns. Elements of corporatist collaboration between 
employers and workers as well as state intervention 
into the economy were added to the recipe. Given its 
national focus, the state monopoly tendency looked 
askance at liberal internationalism.
However, after an abortive start under Wilson's 
Presidency, a synthesis between the money- and 
productive-capital perspectives was achieved during the 
later part of the New Deal. This reflected the rise of 
'C"-industries and is called the corporate liberalism 
concept of control. While state intervention, demand 
management and welfare elements were taken over from 
the productive-capital perspective, the new synthesis 
simultaneously embraced the internationalist and free 
trade aspects of the money-capital perspective. Given 
the hegemonic position of the United States after World 
War II, this synthesis of the two perspectives was 
well-adapted to American economic needs. Under US 
tutelage, it spread also through Western Europe.
These three concepts of control have also 
developed projects for greater political integration of 
existing states. Versions of European unity have been 
mooted by adherents of all of them. The European unity 
schemes of liberal internationalism and corporate 
liberalism were not directed against the USA, while the 
'Euronational" project of the state monopoly tendency
were. Projects for Atlantic integration were 
particularly an outgrowth of the synthetic concept of 
control although one can distinguish between two sub- 
types. The intergovernmentalist project of 'Atlantic 
Union", which had its apogee during the 1940s, was a 
corporate liberalism tinged by the older liberal 
internationalism, which still retained adherents in 
Great Britain. In contrast, the 'Atlantic Partnership" 
idea of the 1960s tried to accommodate corporate 
liberalism with a lingering-on state monopoly tendency 
as represented by Gaullist France.32
Van der Pijl completes his theoretical apparatus 
by an important distinction between two sets of 
state/society complexes.33 In correspondence with the 
needs of the capital accumulation process, since the 
seventeenth century there has been a continuous, 
transnational, and uneven expansion of the 'Lockean 
heartland" of originally Anglo-Saxon countries, which 
are characterised by the strict separation of the state 
from the civil society, and the predominance of the 
self-regulating forces in the latter. This expansion of 
the Lockean heartland has taken place at the expense of 
the Hobbesian state system, which is represented by the 
'catching-up" countries like France, Germany or 
Russia/Soviet Union, and their gradual incorporation 
into the Lockean realm. The expansion of the Lockean
32. Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling 
Class, London: Verso, 1984, pp.8-34.
33. In putting the emphasis on the ideal-types of 
Lockean and Hobbesian 'state-society complexes" instead 
of the emphasis on states that prevails in mainstream 
international relations, van der Pijl has been 
influenced by Robert Cox. See van der Pijl, 
Transnational Classes, p.64 and Cox, 'Social Forces", 
p.96.
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heartland further involved the process of incorporating 
the developing Hobbesian rim countries. Besides, there 
is also the 'Prize area", i.e. the periphery, where 
there are only weakly developed states or colonial 
territories. The Prize area is mainly controlled or 
dominated by heartland powers in order to provide 
additional resources•34
Since the Lockean state/society configuration 
found its ideal-typical form in the Anglo-Saxon realm, 
with Great Britain at its core, this begs the question 
of what was special in Britain. As in the other centers 
of the original bourgeois revolution (Holland, France, 
and the U.S.), in England capitalist society emerged 
under the auspices of a strong absolutist state that 
provided the conditions for the transformation of 
feudal or colonial conditions into capitalism. This 
kind of state was idealised in Hobbes" Leviathan of 
1651. However,
in England bourgeois society became largely self­
regulating, i.e., the state could remain in the 
background and only in case of emergency had to step in 
actively to regulate social relations. Only when state- 
guaranteed money and law no longer suffice to solve 
social conflict, the state appears in full view as 
active, public power, destroying the image of 
neutrality in the process.35
Through the industrial revolution, the industrial 
bourgeoisie of Britain proceeded to become the most 
powerful and self-conscious faction of that class. This 
was, however, a faction that was primarily oriented, 
not to production, but to commerce and finance, a 
perspective that was related to British supremacy as
34. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, pp.64-97.
35. Van der Pijl, 'Ruling Classes", p. 18.
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the workshop of the world and the center of 
international finance and shipping. It was therefore 
truly cosmopolitan. The British ruling classes, 
together with the ruling classes within the greater, 
Lockean "Anglo-Saxon nation", namely those in North 
America, Australia and New Zealand, and white South 
Africa, formed a cosmopolitan transnational society.36
In this way, the British Commonwealth, in 
particular, provided the original nucleus of the 
Lockean state-systems
In contrast to the strong interventionist state of the 
continental European type dominating a society lacking 
national cohesion (a factor also operative in the USA), 
the Anglo-Saxon "nation" in the late 19th century was 
spread across several states, together constituting 
what was to become the British Commonwealth. The 
Lockean state and the system of representative 
democracy and common law, organically complementing a 
vigorous civil society, thus assumed an 
intercontinental format in the Commonwealth. At the 
level of the ruling class, the Commonwealth operated 
"as a system of interlinked groups, organizations and 
societies within the greater community" that 
simultaneously "was able to avoid in very large measure 
the growth of rigidities and compartmentalization in 
its political, economic and social structure."37
The informal and private nature of the 
Commonwealth, the non-existence of a public structure 
meant that:
its inaccesibility to democratic demands was secure and 
class struggle lacked a clear focus. This was a 
subjective, class consideration on the part of the 
architects of the Commonwealth, but also reflected the 
remoteness of the international sphere to a working 
class under the sway of social imperialism. Given the 
level of wealth, ethnic homogeneity, civil freedoms and 
rule of law, the chances that demands for democracy 
would assume a class content moreover were limited. (In 
South Africa, racial segregation of course was the 
presupposition for this).38
36. Kees van der Pijl, Class Struggle in the State 
System. Amsterdam: Center for Economic and Political 
Studies, 1988, p.5.
37. Ibid., p.5.
38. Ibid., p.5.
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According to van der Pijl, the withdrawal of the 
Lockean state is accompanied by a "specific stage of 
socialization', the development of what Gramsci calls 
the first level of superstructures:
This level comprises that part of social life in which 
people, whether directly active in the labor process or 
not, are engaged in shaping their personal lives and 
engaging in social connections of a prepolitical 
nature. Such connections are friendships, families, 
clubs, and comparable bodies, and also those with an 
institutional form and even an economic basis of their 
own, such as churches. As the development of the 
productive forces proceeds, the shortening of the 
working day allows this area of life to develop into a 
sphere increasingly autonomized from class relations. 
Individualization, typical of this "first level of 
superstructures', to an ever greater extent complicates 
and cuts across the fixed juxtapositions of class 
relations properly speaking.39
The degree of emancipation of society in terms of 
the "first level of superstructures' that in this way 
parallels the withdrawal of the Lockean state in the 
Lockean state society configuration means that such 
states have only a limited degree of autonomy left.40
Traditionally centered in Continental Europe, the 
Hobbesian countries are the late-comers, who entered 
the capitalist development process during the heyday of 
the second-generation industries mentioned above: 
namely steel, chemicals and electricity. In contrast to 
the Lockean countries, where the capitalists were 
oriented to circulation (finance and commerce) instead 
of production, the ruling classes in these Hobbesian - 
countries oriented themselves to the production process 
in order to catch up with the more advanced Lockean 
core. Since the conditions for capital accumulation did
39. Van der Pijl, "Ruling Classes', p.18.
4°. Ibid., p.19.
not originally stem from the civil society, the state 
elite had to engender reforms from above, in the form 
of 'passive revolutions",41
Nationality was subordinated to the development of 
the productive forces, which, in turn, were considered 
as the tools of a strong state. The hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie of the Hobbesian state/society 
configuration, its concept of control, was therefore 
constructed from the vantage point of production, and 
made different kinds of economic forms restricting the 
self-regulating market possible, from the 
interventionist state down to cartels and corporatism.42
During the First World War, the Hobbesian states 
challenged the hegemony of the liberal internationalist 
bourgeoisie, namely the bourgeoisie of the English- 
speaking world, together with that from the Low 
Countries and Scandinavia, but also influencing class 
formation in France, Germany and Northern Italy. The 
anti-bourgeois wave continued with the abortive 
European proletarian revolutions which took place in 
the aftermath of the war, as well as the Bolshevik 
Revolution.
The hegemony of the liberal internationalist 
bourgeoisie had been sustained until the First World 
War through informal ties between elements of this 
bourgeoisie that were attached to the circuits of money 
and commodity capital. Beyond this, however, the 
Hobbesian orientation during its heyday (c.1900-40)
41 . 'By „passive revolution" or a ^revolution without a 
revolution" Gramsci generally meant elite-engineered 
social and political reform." Adamson, Hegemony, p.186.
42. Van der Pijl, Class Struggle, p.6.
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spread as state-monopoly tendency even to the
bourgeoisie in the Lockean area.43 Although the general
destiny of the Hobbesian bourgeoisie was to become
submerged into an expanding liberal-internationalist
bourgeoisie, this was not a one-sided process:
(T)he productive and state counterpoint to self- 
regulating liberal internationalism would leave an 
enduring imprint, captured by Polanyi in The Great 
Transformation of 1944 (1957) but also reproduced 
within specific segments of the ruling class on account 
of the accumulation requirements of particular 
industries. The prominence of productive capital in the 
profit distribution process here has remained an 
indicator of corporatist, and state-relayed forms of 
bourgeois hegemony.44
Thus, although the Lockean system has been 
expanding, its character through the twentieth century 
has been essentially different from the nineteenth 
century, the heyday of classical liberalism.
The phases of the state monopoly tendency and of 
corporate liberalism determined the transition from Pax 
Britannica to Pax Americana. In line with his general 
theory of the continuous but crisis-ridden and uneven 
expansion of the Lockean heartland since the 
seventeenth century, van der Pijl has developed his 
conception of hegemony. It differs not only from that 
endorsed by the mainstream conceptions prevailing in 
the International Political Economy literature, but 
also from the neo-Gramscian versions, including that of 
Robert Cox. Furthermore, it differs from the accounts 
of Paul Kennedy, Immanuel Wallerstein and George 
Modelski. What is shared by all the previous accounts 
is their conception of hegemony as based on the
43. Ibid., pp.5-6.
44. Ibid., p.6.
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dominance of a single power, and the consequent sharp 
split between British and American hegemonies.
According to van der Pijl, however, the expansion 
of the Lockean heartland should be conceptualised as 
the societal integration of more than one power. The 
transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana was 
part and parcel of a general process of the spreading 
out of a transnational civil society, and the internal 
pacification within the North Atlantic community of 
states. In this sense, British hegemony, as the 
representative of the Lockean state-society complex, 
has not disappeared, but simply got transformed into 
the dominance of the North Atlantic community, 
underpinned by American dominance.45
We have mentioned above the specific type of
socialization that culminates in the development of the
first level of superstructures that accompanies the
receding of the Lockean state from civil society. To
use van der Pijl"s words once more, this type of
socialization simultaneously increases the mutual 
dependence of people and the semblance of their 
independence. This is a transnational process, because 
it cuts across the fixed pattern of the state system, 
and supports a normative structure superior to those 
coinciding with particular states. Hence we should 
preferably speak of a Lockean heartland rather than of 
individual Lockean states. The transnationalization of 
society is essential here; a transnationalization 
propelled by the internationalization of capital.46
The Lockean heartland is associated with a process 
of pacification. Within its bounds, power politics 
takes back-stage in a double sense. On the one
45. Kees van der Pijl, Vordenker der Weltpolitiks 
Einfuhrung in die internationale Politik aus 
ideenqeschichtlicher Perspektive, Opladen: Leske + 
Budrich, 1996, p.21; van der Pijl, Transnational 
Classes, pp.70-71.
46. Van der Pijl, "Ruling Classes", pp.18-19.
hand, in the conduct of the relations between the 
component units of the heartland classical diplomacy 
has disappeared. This is reserved for their dealings 
with those outside of the heartland. Even in this case, 
however,
power-realist positions are increasingly undermined by 
the internationalization of capital and the cultural 
penetration of the periphery, and the shifting 
coordinates of the community boundaries that accompany 
them.47
With reference to the history of IR thought, we 
can draw one conclusion from the concepts outlined by 
van der Pijls The relationship between inter-war 
idealist thought, and the works of the classical 
realists of the 1940s and 1950s is characterised by a 
continuum. Both of these strands of thinking were 
connected, on the one hand to the shifts in the process 
of capital accumulation, on the other hand to the 
accompanying transition from the Pax Britannica to Pax 
Americana.48
Conclusion
We would do well always to remember Cox's 
assertion that a theory is for someone and for 
something. Thus, instead of trying to squeeze interwar 
writers like Curtis into the straightjacket of the 
idealism vs. realism dichotomy, it is more fruitful to 
ask ourselves what the interests behind his proposals
47. Ibid., pp.18-19.
48. Van der Pijl himself does not express this 
conclusion clearly but tends to retain the idealism- 
realism dichotomy. See Vordenker, pp.91-93, 214-16. 
However, in Transnational Classes, p.Ill he points out 
that both Zimmern, the idealist and Carr were members
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and assertion might have been. In this respect, 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony and of the organic 
intellectual are of particular relevance. Organic 
intellectuals are constructors of legitimacy for a 
ruling class, or class faction. They provide 
intellectual ammunition for such a ruling groups' 
penetration of civil society with their own world-view.
Hegemony can not only be analysed at the level of 
the nation-state (as Gramsci did, for example in 
demonstrating the insufficient penetration of civil 
society by Italy's ruling classes) but also at the 
international one (as Cox pioneered in the case of the 
Pax Britannica and Pax Americana).
Although the more successful class factions 
operate on a transnational scale rather than one 
limited to their specific nation-state, it is still 
necessary to look at the specific configurations of 
class forces within the state/society complex of a 
given writer. Employing the model of van der Pijl, we 
should look for indications of the money-capital and, 
respectively, the productive-capital perspective in the 
writings of a specific author. In other words, the 
question is not only whether he or she embraces a 
harmonious or competitive understanding of world 
affairs but also what he or she has to say about 
domestic economic matters, for example laisser-faire or 
corporatism. Furthermore, these issues can be linked 
with how a writer approached the relations of the 
Lockean heartland with the Hobbesian contenders. This 
is of particular relevance for the inter-war period,
of the same circle, the Rhodes-Milner group, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 8.
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which was a time when the heartland faced serious 
material and ideological challenges.
Admittedly, money-capital vs. productive-capital 
and heartland vs. contenders are again dichotomies. 
However, these concepts should not be considered as 
mutually incompatible. The Pax Americana rested on the 
successful integration of the two capital perspectives 
under corporate liberalism. Indeed, it is possible to 
interpret classical realism as a synthesis between the 
liberal assumptions of the heartland and the 
realpolitik world-view of the contenders. If the 
historical process we are talking about involves the 
expansion of the Lockean heartland in terms of the 
production pattern, it has found one aspect of its 
ideological counterpart in the synthesis that the 
classical realists, with their Continental background, 
have made.
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Chapter Six
The Intellectual Background: Empire Federalism, New 
Liberalism and Social Imperialism
Introduction
As we have seen, idealist and realist elements are 
equally important components in Curtis' body of works. 
The dichotomous textbook version is thus not very 
helpful for a proper understanding of his thought. An 
alternative approach is suggested here: Curtis' thought 
should be seen in the context of the intellectual 
ferment that shook Britain about the turn from the 19th 
to the 20th century. Then, the previously dominant 
version of liberalism was subject to a two-pronged 
attack: by new liberalism from the left and by social 
imperialism from the right. Curtis' work cannot be 
adequately understood without referring to the 
discourses of that time. These discourses, in turn, can 
be usefully interpreted by reference to the framework 
developed by van der Pijl.
This chapter aims to provide a thematic list of 
the main ideological currents which are of relevance in 
the context of Curtis' work. It begins with an overview 
of 'Gladstonianism' (aka 19th century liberalism), 
which was the particular bugbear of the new early 20th 
century movements, and of its decline. Then, we will 
deal with the development of the imperial federation 
idea. That section shows that the Round Table did not 
'invent' imperial federation but that this motif has a 
history going back to the earlier 19th century. Next, 
there will be a discussion of new liberalism and its 
successors. Curtis shared with it the rejection of an
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overtly individualist approach in favour of one putting 
the communal bonds between people and the mutual 
obligations arising therefrom into the foreground. A 
treatment of new liberalism can thus show the wide 
impact of the anti-laisser-faire ideology that also 
motivated Curtis. However, it is in the context of the 
early 20th century social imperialism that he can be 
best placed. In his writings, Curtis always retained 
some prime parameters of the social imperialist 
ideology but, dropping its overtly Social-Darwinist 
aspects, managed to present them in an internationalist 
cloak. An overview of British social imperialism in its 
Fabian, Liberal and Conservative versions will thus be 
given. Finally, the apogee of social imperialism in the 
Lloyd George coalition will be briefly described.
'Gladstonianism'
As we will see in the next chapter, Curtis 
repeatedly denounced what he called the 'Manchester 
School" or 'Cobdenism". However, in general the most 
favourite bete-noire for the early 20th century British 
social imperialists was another representative of 19th 
century liberalism, William Gladstone. There was an 
agreement between both supporters and antagonists of 
social imperialism in seeing it as a new creed in sharp 
opposition to an older one, 'Gladstonianism".1
1. G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A 
Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899 - 
1914. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971, p.132; Robert 
Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The 
Politics of Social Imperialism, 1900 - 1918. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975, pp.42, 49.
To uncritically accept this terminology does, of 
course, mean observing Victorian Britain largely 
through the eyes of the Edwardians. As Scally has 
pointed out, for the early 20th century social 
imperialists, Gladstonian liberalism was a catch-all 
phrase covering everyone not agreeing with their views-2 
With this note of caution in mind, let us have a closer 
look at Gladstonianism and its relationship to 
Cobdenism and the Manchester School. But prior to this, 
an excursus on the mid-19th century configuration of 
the general world order as well as the social forces 
and the state/society complex in Britain is in order.
During the first two-thirds of the 19th century, 
the dominant capitalist sectors were the labour- 
intensive industries oriented to consumption, for 
instance food and textiles. These industries operated 
on a local scale, but their products were distributed 
all over the world via far-flung commercial networks.3 
This was made possible by the dominating free trade 
system and, already towards the end of the liberal era, 
the general acceptance of the gold standard.
After the revolutionary upheavals of the first 
half of the century, the major European countries 
enjoyed political stability thanks to a modus vivendi 
between the aristocratic and bourgeois classes, and 
high levels of economic growth. Britain, as the leading
2. Scally, Origins, pp.23-24.
3. Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and 
International Relations, London and New Yorks 
Routledge, 1998, pp.55-56.
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industrial, as well as trading and financial country 
kept the whole system going. By her control of the high 
seas and manipulation of the European balance of power 
Britain had prevented the reactionary Holy Alliance 
from intervening against liberal revolutions in Europa 
and Latin America. Britain thus indirectly sponsored 
the spread of the liberal state and ensured the 
undisturbed workings of a world economy disembedded 
from the social and political realms.
While the United Kingdom was the prime gainer from 
the liberal world order, the tenets of this order were 
accepted by the other European countries as well. In 
the non-European world, indigenous governments and 
dominant classes were, wherever possible, converted to 
the liberal creed. However, Britain also resorted to 
military intervention and colonial rule when necessary.4
Mid-century Great Britain was the archetypical 
liberal state carrying out five basic tasks: The 
removal of residual feudal and mercantilist laws and 
practices; sponsoring a free market for goods and 
labour through tariff reduction and Poor Law reforms; 
ensuring the soundness of money through an autonomous 
central bank; protecting the market mechanism from 
potential disturbances by the provision of an effective 
administrative and coercive apparatus; mobilizing 
capital via enacting new laws conducive for private 
capital formation and via providing infrastructural
4. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: 
Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987, pp.126-29, 143-47.
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services5 - although, in this last respect, the British 
state already then lagged behind the Continental ones.6
What were the components of the hegemonic bloc 
running the British liberal state? On the Marxist side, 
Anderson and Nairn have highlighted the specifities of 
the British compared with the Continental European 
cases by their emphasis on the aristocratic hegemony, 
which stopped the fledgling bourgeoisie on its tracks 
and co-opted labour as a 'corporate body".7 This thesis 
overlaps with cultural explanations of British economic 
decline in the twentieth century. In an influential 
book, Martin Wiener held the 'nonmaterialist" culture 
of English middle- and upper classes responsible for 
the crippling of the 'industrial spirit" in Britain.8
However, the most sophisticated recent analysis of 
Britain's social structure has come from Cain and 
Hopkins. According to them, the dominant socioeconomic 
strata in Britain has not been the manufacturing 
classes (who, they allege, were representatives of 
fragmented and provincial business enterprises, and 
were relatively less wealthy and prestigious). Instead, 
who held the access to the circuits of power in 
conjunction with the state from the Glorious Revolution
5. Ibid., pp.130-3.
6. Perry Anderson, 'The Figures of Descent" (1987), in 
Perry Anderson, English Questions, London and New Yorks 
Verso, 1992, pp.121-92, here p.143.
7. Perry Anderson, 'Origins of the Present Crisis" 
(1964), in Perry Anderson, English Questions. London 
and New Yorks Verso, 1992, pp.15-47; Tom Nairn, 'The 
British Political Elite", in New Left Review 23 (1964), 
pp.19-25.
8. Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of 
the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980. Harmondsworths 
Penguin, (1981) 1992.
of 1688 onwards, were the rentier landowners and the 
merchants and financiers in the City of London. Cain 
and Hopkins label them 'gentlemanly capitalists'.9 In 
our view, it is more appropriate to refer to them as 
the capital factions related to the money-capital
perspective.
These factions staffed and controlled the
administrative apparatus not only through permanent 
networks between leading politicians and City bankers 
and merchants. They also implanted their value system, 
'a common view of the world and how it should be 
ordered', which had been borrowed originally from the 
landed aristocracy.10 The worldview of those committed 
to the money-capital perspective was reinforced 
ideologically through institutions like the Anglican 
Church and public schools and Oxbridge.11 Its influence 
was particularly felt in
those parts of the 'official mind' which were closely 
concerned either with the management of government 
finances, such as the Treasury, or with Britain's 
overseas responsibilities and possessions.12
It was within this complex edifice incorporating 
political, economic and cultural networks that the 
aristocrats, who experienced a general decline in their
9. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 
Innovation and Expansion 1688 - 1914. London and New 
Yorks Longman, 1993; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins,
British Imperialisms Crisis and Deconstruction 1914 - 
1990. London and New Yorks Longman, 1993. For some of 
the recent critiques of the Cain and Hopkins thesis see 
Raymond E . Dumett (ed•), Gentlemanly Capitalism and 
British Imperialisms The New Debate on Empire, London 
and New Yorks Longman, 1999. In the introduction, for 
instance, Dumett says that Cain and Hopkins perceived 
the gentlemanly capitalists as too monolithic a class.
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialisms Innovation, 
p.28.
n . Ibid., pp.22-42.
12. Ibid., pp.123-4.
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influence between 1850-1914, had found themselves a 
place.13 The co-option of the industrial bourgeoisie, on 
the other hand, was not nearly so complete.
The hegemonic ideology holding this historical 
bloc of landowners, city financiers, merchants and 
insurers as well as their provincial industrialist 
allies together has been dubbed "Gladstonian 
liberalism" or, alternatively, the "Manchester School".
The mainstream description of "Gladstonianism" 
presents it as the combination of laisser-faire at home 
and unfettered free trade and anti-imperialism abroad: 
The attempt to show the stark contrast between the "new 
imperialism" of the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and the Gladstonian liberalism of 
the middle of the nineteenth century, often culminates 
in a somewhat exaggerated reading of these aspects of 
Gladstonianism. Sykes, for instance, lists the building 
blocks around which Gladstonianism was centered as 
follows:
(F)ree trade, a non-interventionist, neutral, minimal 
state, lox taxation, low military expenditure, 
religious liberty and constitutional progress, a 
moralist foreign policy and avoidance of foreign 
entanglements •14
Domestically, Searle asserts, mid-Victorian 
government revolved around three elements: 
Responsibility to public opinion; cheapness, efficiency 
and impartiality; and a high degree of autonomy for
13. Ibid., p. 137.
14. Alan Sykes, The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism 
1776 - 1988. London-New York: Longman, 1997, p.73.
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local governments.15 Gladstonian liberalism was 
singularly intolerant to any form of centralization and 
to the leading role of "experts' in policy-making. For 
example, Gladstone supported the Civil Service Reform 
as proposed by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. 
This reform replaced patronage by competitive 
examination, but made knowledge of the classics, good 
character and all-round judgement rather than 
specialist skills the main criterion.16
Cain and Hopkins have addressed the motives behind 
the 19th century distrust to state regulation. This 
attitude towards the state in the domestic realm was 
embedded in a broadly-based consensus about the dangers 
of governmental mismanagement in the context of the 
remarkable success of the "natural economy' in Britain 
during the previous two centuries. For the bourgeoisie 
and many of the workers state interference into the 
economy was associated with the blocking of the natural 
circuits of the economy for political reasons, which in 
turn was related to corrupt aristocratic rule. Thus:
The desire for freedom of individual economic choice 
merged readily into a general hostility to aristocratic 
government, the national debt and "Old Corruption', 
providing a common anti-aristocratic focus for both 
middle-class and working-class radicals....17
On the one hand, there was the new, industrial society,
where the rational, commercial, pacific virtues and
interests of individuals brought forth the highest
common good. On the other hand, there was the old,
15. Searle, Quest, pp.15-16.
16. Ibid., pp.16-27.
17. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation,
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militaristic, landed aristocracy, bent upon war and 
conquest.
This was particularly the way how representatives 
of the Manchester School like Richard Cobden saw 
things. Their struggle against the remnants of 
'feudalism' concentrated upon two grievances. First, 
they were opposed to the privileged legal position of 
the Anglican Church to the detriment of other, 
'nonconformist' Protestant creeds. Second, they 
directed their rage against the power of the big 
landowners, which was manifested by the protectionist 
Corn Laws, low taxes on land, the system of 
primogeniture, and the general permeation of the 
Parliament, the Foreign Office, the diplomatic service 
and the army officer corps by the members of 
aristocratic families. Themselves manufacturers from 
Northern England or London professionals, the 
Cobdenites found the core of their supporters among 
artisans and shopkeepers.18
Although they were a very vocal minority within 
the Liberal Party, the Cobdenites never dominated 
British politics. Middle-class radicals like Cobden had 
made their bid for power in the 1830s and 1840s. 
However, they were ultimately integrated as junior 
partners into the hegemonic bloc by the Reform Bill of 
1832 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. These 
reforms from above separated the radicals from their 
potential allies, namely the working classes, whose own
pp.141-42.
18. G.K. Searle, The Liberal Party: Triumph and 
Disintegration. 1886 - 1929, Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan, 1992, pp.11-18, 20.
attempts to overcome the historic bloc through the 
Owenite and Chartist movements sunk without any trace. 
Once no longer perceived as a danger by the ruling 
bloc, the more 'respectable' sections of the working 
classes were granted voting rights in 1867 and 1884. In 
a repetition of the strategy of 1832, they were thus 
separated from the less prosperous sections.19
Within the Liberal camp, the Cobdenite radicals 
uneasily co-existed with the moderate Liberals, the 
Whigs. Although open to the interests of manufacturing 
and pragmatically committed to a reforming course, the 
Whigs were as much representatives of landownership as 
the Conservatives were. It was the achievement of 
Gladstone in his different positions as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal 
Party to hold these divergent factions together. While 
sometimes using a rhetoric quite similar to that of the 
Cobdenite radicals and sharing their vision of a 
minimal state, Gladstone had at the same time a high 
opinion of the aristocratic elite and of what he 
perceived as their disinterested service ethos.20
The fact that Gladstone never fully embraced the 
anti-landowner and anti-Anglican stance of the 
Cobdenites should make us beware of lumping 
Gladstonianism and Cobdenism together. One can, 
however, use Gladstonianism as a loose by-word for the 
mid-Victorian political consensus in Britain. What 
justifies naming a whole ideology after Gladstone is 
the fact that he managed to gather a large following
19. Anderson, 'Origins', pp.20-23; Anderson, 'Figures', 
pp.157-59; Cox, Production, pp.134-37.
20. Searle, Liberal Party, pp.11-28.
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from all classes, thus stabilizing the position of the 
hegemonic bloc. He achieved this feat by propagating a 
limited role for the state, thus embracing a tamed 
version of Cobdenite 'Manchester" radicalism shorn of 
its more limited middle-class ideology directed against 
both the aristocrats and the workers.21 The 
Conservatives, while posing as champions of traditional 
institutions like the monarchy, the House of Lords, the 
Anglican Church and landownership, in effect embraced 
the liberal ideology of individualism, free trade and 
responsible government as well.22
Turning to international relations, it was here 
that Cobden and Gladstone were closest to each other. 
Given their dislike of the aristocratic Foreign Office, 
the radicals rejected adhering to the balance of power 
doctrine and instead tended to favour a reliance on the 
positive effects of free trade and non-intervention. 
Alternatively, a policy of active support for oppressed 
nationalities was called for.23 For the radicals, free 
trade was 'a faith from which any deviation was 
characterised as a fall from grace."24
Gladstone likewise refused to accept the logics of 
power politics and international rivalry. He embraced 
the belief in international law, arbitration and 
morality instead. Most famously, he in 1876 castigated
21. Anderson, 'Figures", pp.146-47; Cain and Hopkins, 
British Imperialism: Innovation, pp.142-43.
22 . Searle, Quest, pp.26-27; Sykes, Rise, pp.79-80, 84- 
85.
23. Searle, Quest, pp.14-15.
24. C.C. Eldridge, England"s Mission: The Imperial Idea 
in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli: 1868-1880,
London: Macmillan, 1973, p.2.
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Disraeli's anti-Russian and pro-Ottoman foreign 
policies by publishing his best-selling pamphlet on the 
'Bulgarian Horrors'.25
The effects of Gladstonianism on British 
imperialism are widely interpreted as the privileging 
of a 'natural' hegemonic role for Britain in a world of 
free trade. The implication was that Britain should 
refrain from fostering agressive, expensive and formal 
forms of imperialism. The corollary of Gladstonianism 
in the conduct of international relations was liberal 
internationalism. According to Long, the latter was 
rooted in classical political economy, utilitarianism 
and the thought of Kant.26 Gladstonianism in 
international relations was simply the practical 
application to the conduct of Britain's global role of 
the theoretical tenets of liberal internationalism.
For Gladstone, Britain did not have to forgoe her 
own economic interests to constitute the central pillar 
of a world of general peace and prosperity. This neat 
overlap of the moral and the material realms was one of 
the most appealing aspects of Gladstonianism. On the 
one hand, it was widely believed that Britain would 
always emerge as the dominant industrial nation in a 
realm of free competition even in the absence of her 
formal imperial possessions. While he did not go as far 
as proposing the dismemberment of the Empire, Gladstone
2s. Sykes, Rise, pp.87-89.
26. David Long, 'Conclusion: Inter-War Idealism, Liberal 
Internationalism, and Contemporary International 
Theory' in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.). Thinkers 
of the Twenty Years' Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon, pp.302- 
28, here p •313.
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was convinced of the inherent physical and mental 
superiority of the British people. This would always 
lead to the commercial superiority of Britain even in a 
world where she would be deprived of all her imperial 
possessions and spheres of influence.27
Policies of retaining the colonies at the cost of 
military expenses and the possibility of war with other 
powers found little enthusiasm, putting butter on the 
bread of the "separationists' .28 Cobden and Bright 
agitated from the Parliament, enumerating the 
disadvantages of keeping the colonies, particularly 
those with responsible government (for instance that 
they had become a burden on the British Treasury and 
that they weakened Britain's defensive power), as 
compared to the diminishing advantages (that they 
refused to take any more British convicts and led an 
independendent commercial policy.)29
According to Max Beloff the dissolution of the 
Empire was even "taken for granted'.30 Since Gladstone's 
whole focus was upon the intrinsic strength of Britain, 
he was not concerned much with the defence of Britain's 
formal imperial possessions either. Even as far as the 
"white' colonies of settlement were concerned, he 
wanted them to shoulder their own responsibilities as
27. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation, 
p.204•
28. J.E. Tyler, The Struggle for Imperial Unity, 1868 - 
1895. London: Longman and Green, 1938, pp.7-20.
29 . Eldridge, England's Mission, p.2.
30. Max Beloff, The Imperial Sunset, vol. 1, Britain's 
Liberal Empire, 1897 - 1921, London: Methuen, 1969, 
p.39.
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soon as possible, relaxed in the belief that a close 
informal link would always exist between them and 
Britain.31
A glance at Britain's position in the world 
economy and the interests that sustained this position 
clarifies the cause of this attitude. We have to 
remember that the British Empire in this period was an 
'informal empire' geared to the interests of the 
financial and commercial sectors, who benefited from 
open markets rather than preferential arrangements. 
Furthermore, the investment and trade flows that these 
sectors engendered were not restricted to the areas 
under the sway of the Empire.32
Among its numerous benefits, free trade, 
particularly after the first signs of class conflict 
had loomed up in the horizon after the 1880s, was also 
resorted to as the bourgeois ideology most suitable to 
dissipate impending social unrest. The catch-word here 
was the 'cheap loaf'. As Cain and Hopkins put it:
Free trade and cheap government had different origins. 
But it is clear that, after 1840, both Peel and 
Gladstone accepted the view that free trade, like low 
taxation, was vital to stamp out corrupt vested 
interests, to remove politics from the contaminating 
influence of commerce and to confer a benefit - cheap 
food - which, being seen as universal, would damp down 
social conflict and lead to class reconciliation.33
These aspects of Gladstonianism, Cobdenism and the 
Manchester School have traditionally led to the 
interpretation that the period 1840 to 1870 represented
31. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation, 
pp.204-05.
32. Ibid., pp.276-315, 397-446.
33. I b i d . ,  p . 143.
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"the climax of anti-imperialism',34 and that reaching 
its apogee with the Gladstonian government of 1868, 
pacifism and a more or less cavalier attitude 
determined the general attitude towards the Empire. One 
should be careful, however, not to overdraw the anti­
imperialism of the Gladstonian era. During the 
Gladstonian age there might have been relatively less 
emphasis over working out the formal connections 
between different parts of the empire. Nevertheless, a 
general "empire feeling', also relating to the notion 
of prestige, was wide-spread.35 Indeed, it was under 
Gladstone's second spell as Prime Minister (1880-1885) 
that Egypt was occupied by British troops and 
Afghanistan and the Transvaal put under British 
suzerainty.36
Further, to the extent that there was a 
condemnation of the Empire, more often than not this 
stemmed from the concern that the Empire helped sustain 
aristocracy and corruption at home.37 Most of the so- 
called "Little Englanders' wanted a better-governed 
Empire, not necessarily a smaller one.38 The "Little
34. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 
1890-1902, vol. 1, New York and Londons Alfred A.
Knopf, 1935, p.70.
35. Ged Martin, ""Anti-Imperialism" in the Mid- 
Nineteenth Century and the Nature of the British 
Empire', in Ronald Hyam and Ged Martin, Reappraisals in 
British Imperial History, Toronto: Macmillan, 1975,
pp.88-120•
36. Sykes, Rise, pp.101-04.
37. Martin, ""Anti-Imperialism"', p.95; Miles Taylor, 
"Imperium et Libertas? Rethinking the Radical Critique 
of Imperialism during the Nineteenth Century.', in 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. 19 
(1991), 1, pp.1-23.
38. E. Green and M. Taylor, "Further Thoughts on Little 
Englandism", in Raphael Samuel (ed.). Patriotism: The
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Englanders", in other words, were not really for a 
Little England. Their criticism was directed not to the 
Empire as such but to what they perceived as a system 
which sustained aristocratic rule, corruption, and 
illiberal, undemocratic practices at home. Imperialism 
meant the necessity of a standing army and taxation at 
home. Because it was not just the white Dominions but 
other parts of the world that were forcefully brought 
under the sway of the Empire, it meant the corruption 
of the ruling classes.39 What the little Englanders saw 
as the ideal empire was
a centrifugal one, in which the forces which were 
conducive to political stability at home, such as 
commerce and responsible citizenship, would radiate 
outwards and be reproduced overseas, thereby leaving 
the metropole unencumbered by the financial burden, 
psychological delusion and vested interests which had 
characterised previous empires.40
On the face of it, the Conservatives under 
Disraeli and Salisbury were, in contrast to the 
Liberals, the imperial party. In his Crystal Palace 
speech of 1872, Disraeli had foreshadowed the social 
imperialist programme by calling for a 'national" 
instead of a 'cosmopolitan" foreign policy. Attempting 
to forge a coalition between aristocrats and workers
Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, vol.
1, History and Politics. London and New Yorks 
Routledge, 1989, pp.103-09, here p. 104.; Martin.
' "Anti-Imperialism4*".
39. Richard Gott, 'Little Englanders", in Raphael Samuel 
(ed.), Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British 
National Identity, vol. 1, History and Politics, London
and New York: Routledge, 1989, pp.90-102; Green and 
Taylor, 'Further Thoughts'; Taylor, 'Imperium".
40 . T a y l o r ,  ' I m p e r i u m " ,  p . 18.
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against the middle classes, Disraeli wanted to connect 
his imperial programme with social reform at home.41
However, in practice the contrast between 
Gladstone's 'anti-imperialism' and Disraeli's 
'imperialism' was not that stark. The difference rather 
resolved around the centrality of the white Dominions 
for Gladstone in contrast to the empire of trade and 
defence with an emphasis on India in Disraeli's concept 
of Empire.42 Indeed, for Disraeli the self-governing 
colonies were just 'millstones'. Another bone of 
contention between Gladstone and Disraeli were the 
latter's more aggressive policies vis-a-vis the Boers 
and Afghanistan and his firm opposition to any Russian- 
sponsored dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. His 
successor Salisbury whole-heartedly participated in the 
scramble for Africa, but the short Liberal government 
of 1892-95 did not provide much of a contrast. At the 
same time, not much had come out of Disraeli's call for 
social reforms.43
The End of the Liberal World Order and Its 
Repercussions Upon British Politics
During the last third of the 19th century and the 
first third of the 20th, global capitalism entered a 
new phase. There was a shift to capital-intensive 
accumulation focused on producer goods industries, 
namely metals, oil and engineering. These new
41 . Michael W. Doyle, Empires, Ithaca and Londons 
Cornell University Press, 1986, pp.281-83.
42. Eldridge, England's Mission.
43. Doyle, Empires, pp.283-88, 293-95.
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industries were no longer localized as those of the 
previous phase but were identified with their 
respective national economies and with state support.44
As we have seen, this shift in the mode of 
accumulation overlapped on the one hand with the rise 
of new powers like Germany which challenged the British 
dominance based upon liberal internationalism, on the 
other hand with the rise of the socialist labour 
movement•
By 1900, Germany had taken the lead in new 
industries like electrical engineering or chemicals.45 
Thanks to two factors - an educational system tuned 
towards technical efficiency and the availabity of 
venture capital - Germany was well-placed to profit 
from a new wave of technological change. This wave 
stimulated science and capital-intensive forms of 
production.46 Although the US was also emerging as a 
major competitor to the British economy during that 
period, due to her ability to overturn the European 
balance of power47 'it was Germany that stuck in John 
Bull's craw.'48
As for the rise of the labour movement, this 
necessitated a more vigilant attitude by the ruling 
class. In sum, accompanying the demise of the Pax 
Britannicas
44. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, p.56.
45. Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An 
Economic History of Britain 1700 - 1914, 2nd ed.,
London and New York: Routledge, 1983, p.383.
46. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: 
Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present# Cambridge 
etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p.327-58.
47. Ibid., pp.326-27.
48. Ibid., p.327.
?7d
new forms of class organisation and direction emerged. 
(...) The combined effect of this changing 
configuration of forces was to shift the emphasis in 
bourgeois class formation from the cosmopolitan to the 
national level, shaping a state monopoly tendency in 
the bourgeoisie (tendency, because a full state 
monopoly would be incompatible with capitalist 
relations of production.)49
This shift ushered in a new, non-hegemonic world 
order. To repeat briefly, liberal internationalism was 
replaced by a tendency for state monopolism.50 In 
relative terms, the organization of production in this 
non-hegemonic order was more insulated from the world 
economy and resolved more strongly around the state.51
Let us look briefly at the international and 
domestic components of this shift. As we have seen, 
this was the time when Britain not only lost her 
previous quasi-monopoly of industrial strength and 
started to lag behind some of the newcomers, but also 
stopped being able to single-handedly manipulate the 
balance of power. The latter underwent a transformation 
as new great powers, including extra-European ones 
entered it. Within Europe, two competing military 
alliances emerged, one of which Britain ultimately 
entered.
With the end of the liberal world order, the 
liberal state was likewise in for profound changes• On 
the international level, it now pursued protectionism 
and scrambled for colonies. On the domestic level, the 
liberal state metamorphosed into the welfare-
40. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, pp.106-07.
50. Ibid., pp.56, 63.
51. Cox, Production, pp.7-8.
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nationalist: state, which was characterized by 
nationalism, an emergent system of social security and 
economic planning, and tripartist corporatism involving 
a collaboration between the state apparatus, large- 
scale industries and the unions of the dominant 
economic sectors.52
In the case of Britain, these years saw the rapid 
growth of a new labour movement which, however, 
consisted largely of skilled workers and tended to 
focus upon narrowly economic rather than political 
issues.53 Under pressure from the rising labour 
movement, the hegemonic bloc enacted a number of 
welfare measures like workmen's compensation (1897), 
unemployment relief (1905), old-age pensions (1908) and 
national health insurance (1911).54
Great Britain, which had been the model for the 
19th century liberal state, in a piecemeal fashion 
transformed itself into a welfare-nationalist one. 
Nevertheless, the hegemonic bloc (City finance and 
service interests, the by now declining landowners, and 
the Northern industrialists as junior partners) 
remained largely in place.55
The demise of the Pax Britannica and its 
replacement by a new, non-hegemonic world order on the 
international level as well as Britain's transformation 
from a liberal to a welfare-nationalist state sparked
52. Ibid., pp.151-64.
53. Anderson, 'Figures', pp.157-60.
54. Ibid., p.160; Cox, Production, pp.166, 173-74.
55. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis, 
pp.11-30.
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off a number of new political movements, to which we 
come now.
'Federate or Disintegrate': Imperial Federation and 
Federating the United Kingdom
In contrast to the (as seen above, with 
qualifications) cavalier attitude of Gladstonianism 
towards the Empire, the imperial federation movement 
put it at the forefront of its concern. Imperial 
federation was a cyclically re-emerging, but nearly 
always integral part of British imperialism from mid­
eighteenth century onwards.56
Ged Martin, for example, challenges the view that 
imperial federation was 'a late nineteenth century 
phenomenon which grew out of a supposed reaction 
against earlier *anti-imperialism"'.57 Instead, he 
points to the striking continuity of the themes and the 
people between the debates that raged at the end of the 
century and earlier nineteenth century debates. 
'Imperial federation', as a generic description is in 
any case a misnomer. Imperial federation was only one 
of a set of proposals, all concerning the closer unity 
of the empire. This broader parcel of proposals, for 
which Martin prefers the name 'Empire federalism', was
56. Ged Martin, 'The Idea of Imperial Federation', in 
Ronald Hyam and Ged Martin, Reappraisals in British 
Imperial History, Toronto: Macmillan, 1975, pp.121-38. 
He argues that the renewed interest in imperial 
federation was usually occasioned by the emergence of 
federation in one of the colonies. In the early 20th 
century, this occasion was the South African union.
57. Ged Martin, 'Empire Federalism and Imperial 
Parliamentary Union, 1820 - 1870', in Historical 
Journal 16 (1973), 1, pp.65-92, p.65.
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a persistent debate from early nineteenth century 
onwards. In fact, he reminds his readers 'the Imperial 
Federation Leaguers were just as divided as their 
predecessors' among this 'family of ideas'. In other 
words, one cannot talk about an epochal shift from 
earlier ideas about closer union to a more specific 
'imperial federation'.58
Martin emphasizes that 'Empire federalism' covered 
three main forms. There were, first, relatively tame 
ideas that stretched only as far as the limited 
representation of the white Dominions in the British 
parliament. Secondly, there were ideas concerning the 
founding of extra-parliamentary units, like 
conferences, which would provide a link between the 
constituents of the Empire. Thirdly, there were super- 
par liamentary proposals, involving the foundation of a 
single Imperial Parliament with executive powers in 
certain issues: the full-blown 'imperial federation' 
tradition. Urged as early as mid-seventeenth century, 
the more limited forms of representation were the 
fundamental ingredients of Empire federalism. Extra- 
parliamentary ideas had emerged in the 1830s, to be 
followed shortly afterwards by the first super- 
parliamentary ideas.
The history of 'Empire federalism' is a history of 
phases of enthusiasm, followed by periods of lull. It 
was often a problem in one of the Dominions that gave a 
fresh zeal to the idea. The troubles in Canada in the
58. I b i d . ,  p p . 6 5 - 9 2 .
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1830s, for example, had triggered a panic and a 
sustained campaign to offer parliamentary 
representation to Canada as a tactical means of 
containing the unrest. By 1837, this more limited form 
of Empire federalism had already become a standard 
element of imperial thinking. It had its heyday between 
1846 and 1852. However, once Canadian self-government 
had crossed a critical threshold, Empire federation in 
its most limited form was shelved. The American Civil 
War discredited federal forms of government for a 
while, and it was only after the end of the war and the 
foundation of the Canadian Confederation that empire 
federalism came back onto the stage.
The enthusiasm for empire federalism after the 
1870s was characterised by 'the same confusion of aims, 
with colonial representation only slowly giving way to 
super-parliamentary union'.59
John Kendle reminds us that the issue of 
federating Britain with the self-governing Dominions 
was often closely embroiled with the issue of creating 
federations in the Dominions and in Britain herself. 
When looking at the development of federal thought in 
Britain we should not focus only upon imperial 
federation, but should see the debate, at these three 
levels: Proposals about federating the different parts 
of the empire, especially the white Dominions; those 
about bringing the Dominions and Britain together in an
59. I b i d . ,  p . 71.
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organic federal union; and those about federating the 
United Kingdom itself.
Starting from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, when the thorny issue of the conditions of the 
unification of England and Scotland surfaced, the 
federal idea in general was a sporadically appearing 
topic of discussion.60 Whatever its distinct forms, it 
was always the perception of a domestic, i.e. 
pertaining to the United Kingdom, or external, i.e. 
pertaining to the Empire, crisis that sparked off the 
federalism debate. In the case of the debate about 
federalizing the Dominions, it was the crisis in North 
America, the agitation in Ireland, and the discussions 
over the unification of Australia and Canada in federal 
forms that first brought the issue forth in the 
nineteenth century.61
The idea of 'imperial federation", although going 
as far back as the beginning of the nineteenth century 
in its origins, was cast into a more clearly defined 
form only from mid-nineteenth century onwards. Then the 
problem of the congestion at the Westminster parliament 
and the ideas over uniting imperial defense started to 
be discussed.62 It was, however, as late as the 1860s, 
that concerns over the future of the Empire started to 
shake off the established centralist constitutional 
orthodoxy with a more sustained force. Increasingly,
60. John Kendle, Federal Britain: A History, London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997.
61. Ibid., p.19.
62. Ibid., p.37.
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proposals about yet vague concepts of the closer union 
of the empire surfaced. They were a reaction to what 
was perceived as the cavalier attitude of the 
Gladstonian administration to the colonies and 
Dominions.63 The foundation of the Royal Colonial 
Institute in 1868 was a clear sign of the growing 
interest in the closer union movement.
The early 1870s saw the ideas of imperial 
federation voiced even more frequently and forcefully. 
During the decade
at least 150 schemes for the consolidation of the 
empire were published. An increasing number of 
commentators believed that they had found in the 
federal system a solution to the problem.64
Without concrete, clear analyses of what was truly 
implied by imperial federation or closer union, 
however, the new proposals rang as hollow as their 
predecessors. It was against a backdrop of widespread 
suspicion and lack of sustained support by any 
political party that the advocates of imperial 
federalism continued to forge and voice their 
proposals. Their apparent naivety about the 
plausibility of their schemes stemmed from their apathy 
to systematically analyse the meaning of federalism. 
This was only to be expected, since they continued to 
see imperial federation only as a means of offsetting 
the waning hegemony of Britain and the perceived 
inefficiency of the Westminster parliament. There was 
no convincing response to their critics, who ruthlessly
63. Ibid., p.39.
64. Ibid., pp.39-40.
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revealed the essential deficiency in their positions 
After all, federation meant the voluntary coming 
together of equals, not the condescending handing over 
of certain powers by an imperial power to her colonies. 
Simultaneously, with a flagrant ignorance of the 
budding nationalism in the white dominions, it was 
taken for granted that the rulers of these dominions 
would be as willing as the empire enthusiasts in 
Britain to join in an imperial federation dominated by 
Britain.
In 1884, one year after Seeley's seminal book The 
Expansion of England was published, the imperial 
federation movement was finally emerging from the 
marginal sidelines. It tried to claim a stake in the 
discussions of the more influential circles through the 
foundation of the Imperial Federation League. The 
League attracted many Liberals dissatisfied with 
Gladstone's dilatory foreign policies as well as 
Liberal Unionists advocating social reform, namely 
Chamberlain and Milner. There were also federalists by 
conviction, like Seeley.65
The League was dissolved in 1893. From its 
inception it had been beset by the very same problems 
that had doomed the imperial union movement since its 
earliest stirrings in the 1850s: The problem of 
defining what was exactly meant by 'imperial
65. John Pinder, 'The Federal Idea and the British 
Liberal Tradition', in Andrea Bosco (ed.), The Federal 
idea, vol. 1. The History of Federalism from the 
Enlightenment to 1945, London and New York: Lothian 
Foundation Press, 1991, pp.99-118, here pp.109-10.
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federation", and the resulting inability to set up a 
clear strategy of how to proceed.66 In fact, in order to 
bring unity to the movement and to gain a broad-based 
public appeal, potentially cumbersome issues like 
detailed definitions and programmes had been 
deliberately avoided. Like their predecessors, what 
most members of the League understood from imperial 
federation was some sort of closer, strengthened union 
between Britain and her Dominions.67 The use of the word 
imperial federation in the title of the League was 
blatantly pointless. The League included not only self- 
proclaimed federationists, but also people whose 
understanding of imperial federation stretched only as 
far as a loose advisory council.
With the collapse of the Imperial Federation 
League, the movement lost some momentum. A fresh 
impetus had to await the foundation of the Round Table 
in 1910. Imperial federation had been a remarkably 
persistent topic in the face of the strength of its 
critics, and at certain points it had been widely 
discussed. Nevertheless, its success rate in capturing
66. Michael Burgess, "Empire, Ireland and Europe: A 
century of British Federal Ideas" in Michael Burgess 
(ed.), Federalism and Federation in Western Europe, 
London, Sydney and Dover: Croom Helm, 1986, pp.127-50, 
here p.128; Martin, "Idea", pp.130-31.
67. Michael Burgess, "Federalism and Empire: Edward 
Freeman, Imperial Federation and British Federal Ideas 
for the British", in Preston King and Andrea Bosco 
(eds.), A Constitution for Europe: A Comparative Study 
of federal Constitutions and Plans for the United 
States of Europe, London: Lothian Foundation, 1991, 
pp.253-66; Kendle, Federal Britain, p.48.
the mainstream British political opinion during the 
nineteenth century had been less than brilliant.68
John Kendle lists a number of reasons for this. 
There were, first, doubts about the plausibility of an 
imperial federation. Realistic observers of dominion 
nationalism and of the sheer distance separating 
Britain from her far-flung empire were not convinced by 
the bombastic statements of empire enthusiasts. The 
second group of reasons were related to the concerns of 
those who questioned that Britain herself would be 
better off in an imperial union. This was the position 
of people who were staunchly convinced of the merits of 
undivided sovereignty and of Britain's dominant 
position in the Empire. They stressed the flexibility 
of the unwritten British constitution, which would only 
be harmed by being put into the straightjacket of a 
federal constitution. In their eyes, imperial 
federation would inevitably involve the handing over of 
power by Britain to the Dominions. It spelled the first 
step towards the dissolution of the empire, rather than 
being a step towards its consolidation. Thirdly, 
socialists were not happy about the conservative 
implications of imperial union.69
The imperial federation movement brought under a 
common rubric a panoply of political positions. In a 
broad sense, the Round Table can be located within 
these changes sweeping across party lines.
68. Kendle, Federal Britain, pp.48-54.
69. Ibid., p.54.
New Liberalism
Like its social imperialist rival, the new liberal 
creed was primarily represented by members of the 
professional middle classes. But, in contrast to the 
social imperialists, the new liberals were not so much 
active politicians but intellectuals inside and outside 
of academia. They made themselves heard through printed 
media and provided the theoretical background for 
policies executed by some members of the Liberal 
government of 1905-15. Foremost among new liberal 
thinkers were the "two Hobs" - the sociologist Leonard 
Hobhouse and the economist John A. Hobson.70
Flourishing during the quarter-century preceding 
World War I,71 new liberalism was a branch of liberal 
thought in general. Liberalism as such can be 
characterized by four tenets. First, the faith in the 
rationality and perfectability of humans, accompanied 
by the belief in progress through gradualist reforms. 
Second, the concept of freedom as necessary 
precondition and, at the same time, expression of man's 
rational and just behaviour. Third, the emphasis upon 
the well-being of society as a whole over sectional 
interests. Fourth, the demand for a political system 
allowing maximum space for individual freedom through 
limited and representative government.
70. Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of 
Social Reform, Oxford: Clarendon, 1978, pp.3-4, 160 n. 
172; Searle, Liberal Party, pp.65, 101-02.
71. Freeden, New Liberalism, p.2.
Despite continuity among these broad parameters, 
new liberalism disposed of three elements belonging to 
its 19th century predecessor. First, the notion of 
natural rights innate to the individual and independent 
of society. Second, the idea that private property is 
an inviolable expression of man's freedom. Third, 
distrust of the state and particularly the demand that 
it should refrain from interfering in the workings of 
the economy. All this went overboard and was replaced 
by new concepts.72
Coming close to textbook idealism in this respect, 
new liberalism had an optimistic view of the human 
character and gave priority to ethical aspects.
Assuming a fusion between man's rationality and his 
ethical behaviour,73 the new liberals believed in his 
ability to rationally control both society and 
himself.74 Social reforms aimed at the removal of 
obstacles to the exercise of these abilities. At issue 
was the fullest possible development of individuality, 
understood as creative self-expression of one's 
personality and not to be mistaken with atomistic 
individualism.75
For the growth of individuality, not only liberty 
- as upheld by traditional liberalism - but also 
material welfare was considered important.76 Another 
expression of new liberalism's optimism was the
72. Ibid., pp.22-23.
73. Sykes, Rise, p.129.
74. Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.8, 92.
75. Ibid., pp.15, 18, 23, 29-30, 66.
76. Ibid., pp.52-55.
assertion that mankind underwent an ethical progress, 
leading to ever wider and more intense solidarity 
expressed in orderly cooperation between humans.77 
Consequently, the existence of a world-wide human 
community and the importance of international law was 
stressed.78
While sharing 'old" liberalism"s optimism 
concerning progress and human rationality, new 
liberalism gave these notions a new twist by 
emphasizing the individual"s interrelationship with 
society. The idea of society being an artificial 
creation resulting from contractual relations between 
individuals was discarded.79
In this respect, the thought of British 
philosophical Idealists - namely T.H. Green, who left 
his mark on the spiritual life of Oxford at the time 
Curtis was studying there - provided an important 
springboard. However, the degree to which new 
liberalism fed upon Idealism is controversial.80 Green 
dwelt upon the concept of the common good and the need 
to consider the well-being of others as crucial for the 
well-being of each. However, like traditional
77. Ibid., pp.48-49, 92-93.
78. James Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing the State: 
Innovation and Dispute in British Political Thought 
1880 - 1914. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995, pp.159-60.
79. Freeden, New Liberalism, p.23.
80. For an account stressing the importance of Green see 
F. R. Flournoy, 'British Liberal Theories of 
International Relations (1848 - 1898)", in Journal of 
the History of Ideas 7 (1946), 2, pp.195-217. For the 
sceptial interpretation see Freeden, New Liberalism, 
pp.16-18, 55-56.
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liberalism he did not transcend individualism, lacking 
any supra-individual concept,81
In contrast, for the new liberals the interests 
and rights of individuals could only be realized 
through the well-being of the whole community, which 
was understood as an organization of rationally 
cooperating persons. The community had to protect the 
individuals" liberties. However, it did not primarily 
exist for that purpose, as 'old" liberalism had 
asserted. Rather, the community was itself best served 
by the full personal development of its individual 
members. Likewise, material welfare fulfilled the needs 
of individuals but, through this function, also 
benefitted the community as a whole.82 This was, once 
more, the assumption of a harmony of interests between 
individuals and society, which - far from being 
discarded towards the end of the 19th century, as Carr 
would have it83 - remained alive and well.
The links between the interest of the individual 
and that of the community was an indirect one. In other 
words, the interest of the community did not 
necessarily correspond to the immediate interest of the 
majority of its members.84 Consequently, social reforms 
were not pursued to result in short-term private 
happiness but rather in the 'good life" of the
81. Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.18, 57-58.
82. Ibid., pp.49, 66-67, 110-13, 238-39.
83. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years" Crisis: An Introduction 
to the Study of International Relations. London and 
Basingstoke: Papermac, (1939) 1995, pp.48-49.
84. Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.13-14.
citizens.85 Because the short-term interest of 
individuals could (despite the long-term harmony of 
interests) clash with the good of the whole, compulsion 
was sometimes necessary.86
Everything was to be judged according to how it 
contributed to the well-being of the whole. Baptized 
"social utility" by Hobson, this communal good was, 
somewhat contradictorily, seen as an objective standard 
that, at the same time, was based on an increasing 
consensus.87 In any case, society was not simply the sum 
of its component parts but a moral entity in its own 
right. In line with its optimistic assumptions, new 
liberalism considered society as held together by 
growing altruism and self-sacrifice.88 There was, 
however, some disagreement among the advocates of new 
liberalism as to whether one could go as far as seeing 
society equipped with its own "mind" or "general will". 
If so, new liberalism was also unsure to which degree 
the individual wills were fused with this collective 
will.89
Despite dabbling with such Idealist concepts, new 
liberalism did not rely on meta-physical speculation.
On the contrary, it stuck to the positivist notion that 
moral truths can be discovered by science. In terms of 
method, the new liberals made use of a mixture of 
induction and deduction. Ultimate principles had first
85. Sykes, Rise, p.171.
86. Freeden, New Liberalism, p.67.
87. Ibid., pp. 101-02.
8s. Ibid., pp.28, 74, 93.
89. Ibid., pp.67-68, 105-08.
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to be established to order and synthesize external 
facts. Values were not considered inferior to science. 
Rather, the latter was to bring awareness of the 
ethical potentiality of the historical process. Whether 
this potentiality would be realized remained subject to 
human decisions.90
The new liberals enlisted the findings of biology 
to sociology. Darwin and Spencer were appreciated for 
making the application of general evolutionary laws to 
the study of society possible. Nevertheless, this did 
not mean the embracement of Social Darwinism. On the 
contrary, the new liberals used Darwinian methods to 
claim that the higher a species stood on the 
evolutionary ladder, the more it was prone to 
cooperation and altruism rather than competition. 
Ethical, not physical fitness was the key to survival.91 
Despite this, not all new liberals managed to keep 
clear of the pseudo-science of eugenics or calls for 
the tight control of the physically or mentally 
'unfit".92
While asserting the importance of free will and 
ideas93 and of the superiority of mind over matter, new 
liberalism interpreted the human mind as a natural 
phenomenon and as part of the evolutionary process. 
Human consciousness was to that degree an evolutionary 
factor in that it replaced natural selection between
90. Ibid., pp.8-11.
91. Ibid., pp.78-82.
92. Ibid., pp. 172-94.
93. Ibid., pp.9, 91, 251.
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biological characteristics by intellectual selection 
between different ideas. The rational self-direction of 
society under the guidance of reformers was thus also 
an aspect of evolution.
New liberalism also parted with Spencer over his 
extreme individualism. Besides evolution, it borrowed 
another element from biology. This was the image of 
society as an organic unit whose parts are mutually 
dependend upon each other but which is more than the 
sum of its parts. While usually enlisted to bolster 
conservative ideologies, in the hands of the new 
liberals the organic analogy provided intellectual 
ammunition for social reform.
Society, like a biological unit, had physical 
needs. Since diseases of the parts affected the whole, 
reform measures could not be piecemeal but had to 
address the whole social body. Most importantly, the 
organic analogy brought home new liberalism's point 
that the individual only had a meaning as part of the 
whole - just like a cell belonging to a body. However, 
to reconcile this with the emphasis on individuality it 
was at the same time stressed that the different cells 
of the social organ need not be uniform. On the 
contrary, they should possess as much variation between 
each other as was compatible with the functioning of 
the whole. Finally, state action could be justified by 
drawing parallels between government and brain.94
94. I b i d . ,  p p . 8 9 - 9 1 ,  9 4 - 9 7 ,  1 0 3 - 0 4 ,  1 1 3 - 1 5 .
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State agency was a key concept for new liberalism. 
Again, it owed something to T.H. Green, who wanted the 
state to remove hindrances to the individual's full 
development. In practice, however, he just came up with 
demands for land reform and temperance.95 New liberalism 
went far beyond this. By compulsion and regulation, but 
also by protecting liberty and providing welfare,96 the 
state was to establish the conditions which would 
enable individuals to become active members of the 
community.97 Furthermore, the state could serve as 
instrument for the rational transformation of society.98
In these functions, the state was seen by the new 
liberals as an outgrowth of cooperative action by 
individuals, not classes.99 In the higher interest of 
the community, it had to prevent selfish minorities 
from sabotaging general improvements.100 Most 
importantly, the state had the moral function of 
reforming the mind of its citizens. This aspect was 
based upon the premise that individual willpower, while 
important in itself, was not sufficient for personal 
character improvement. A physically and ethically 
healthy environment was indispensable. This is where 
the state came in.101
95. Ibid., pp.18, 58.
% . Ibid., pp.54-55, 68-70.
97. Ibid., pp.59-60; Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing, 
p.149.
98. Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing, pp.170-71.
Freeden, New Liberalism, p.114.
10°. Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing, pp.147-48.
101. Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.15, 58-59, 163, 170-77.
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In institutional terms, the state was considered 
by new liberalism as a specific type of organization.
It differed from others like the family or voluntary 
associations by possessing coercive power within 
specific territorial limits. While earlier forms of 
social units had been bound together by kinship or, 
already on a higher evolutionary plane, by the 
authority of a supreme ruler, the modern state was 
based upon the concept of citizenship. Since the state 
served the common good, the citizen in turn owed it 
loyalty. This loyalty was bound to the state's 
democratic, participatory characteristics. Voting was 
not only a right but also a duty.102
In more specific terms, the political reform 
agenda of the new liberals included universal adult 
franchise, proportional parliamentary representation, 
an elected Upper House replacing the House of Lords and 
the introduction of referenda. Autonomy for minority 
nationalities (i.e. the Irish) was upheld and 
opposition to colonialism stressed.103
However, there existed some contradiction between 
the espousal of democracy by the new liberals and their 
underlying elitism. On the one hand, the power of 
bureaucracies and of 'experts' was to be curbed.104 On 
the other hand, social reformers were to arouse 
individual minds to their ethical potential.105 Together
102. Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing, pp.138-39, 144, 197.
103. Ibid., pp.142-43, 165, 197-202.
104. Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.29, 183.
105. Ibid., p.91.
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with the notion of an objective communal good (to be 
identified by whom?), this adds an elitist element.
The biological analogy also created some 
ambivalence in this respect. A government of experts 
could be compared to the organism's nerve centre, to 
which the cells sent information but whose directions 
they had to follow. Furthermore, the fact that 
different parts of an organic unit have different 
functions and degrees of importance could be 
interpreted as heavily qualifying the notion of 
democratic equality. But, on the other hand, the 
organic metaphor also stressed the indispensability of 
each part to the whole. From this one could conclude 
that no social class must be prevented from exerting 
its obligation to take part in the governing process.106
The core of new liberalism's reform agenda was, 
however, in the economic and social realm. 19th 
century-style laisser-faire was either rejected or 
reinterpreted.107 In contrast to traditional economists, 
who focused upon the productive process, new liberals 
gave greater weight to distribution and consumption. 
Quality of human life rather than productive efficiency 
was to be given priority. New liberal economists were 
aware that production remained important. Drawing upon 
the proto-Keynesian theory of underconsumption, 
however, they held that a redistribution of income 
would increase purchasing power and consequently have a
106. Ibid., pp.109-10, 113.
107. Ibid., pp.32-35.
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positive feedback on the general state of the 
economy.108
Considering that it was society that ultimately 
enabled individuals to acquire wealth, it had thus a 
right over that wealth. During the 19th century, this 
kind of reasoning had already been used for demanding 
taxes on rising land values. Now, new liberalism used 
it to qualify the individual's right on property vis-&- 
vis society.109 Instead of a class-based concept of 
redistributive taxation, in which the rich owed some 
obligations to the poor, new liberalism embraced the 
notion of the social community as a quasi-person having 
its own property rights. This societal property was to 
be used for a comprehensive social policy.110 Another 
area where the new liberals gave a new meaning to old 
concepts was their treatment of monopolies. Since the 
latter restricted free economic competition (hallowed, 
after all, by 'old' liberals) the state could justly 
subject them to administrative control or, at least, 
heavy taxation.111
In terms of welfare provision, the new liberals 
moved from a restorative notion of social reform (i.e. 
giving help to certain disadvantaged groups) to a 
regenerative one, by which society as a whole was to 
profit.112 Old-age pensions, right to work, feeding of 
schoolchildren and obligatory health and unemployment
108. Ibid., pp.19, 100-01, 128
109• Ibid., pp.20, 42-44.
110• Ibid., pp.45-46, 140-45.
111. Ibid., pp.44-45.
112• Ibid., pp.118-28.
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insurance were seen as expressions of the mutual 
obligation between individual and society and as 
enabling the former to contribute to the smooth 
functioning of the latter.113
Together with these welfare measures, a 
progressive income tax and free education,114 new 
liberalism also envisaged large-scale nationalizations. 
The state was to take over routine industries while 
activities demanding a greater amount of creativity and 
competition would be left to the private sector.115 This 
meant state ownership of railways and power industries, 
plus nationalization of urban and most rural lands and 
the establishment of state-operated credit 
facilities.116
All this, however, was not intended to clip the 
wings of the upper classes. New liberalism had an 
ambivalent attitude towards organized labour (after 
all, a sectional interest) and vacillated between 
wooing the working and the middle classes. In the end, 
the organic concept of community previsaged a 
harmonious society free of class conflict. Social 
reform was not aimed at specific groups but was to 
improve the ethical character of all members of 
society.117
113. Ibid., pp.200-06, 215-38.
114. Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing, pp.178-79.
115. Ibid., pp.194-95; Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.70-
74.
116. Freeden, New Liberalism, pp.149-50; Meadowcroft, 
Conceptualizing, p.179.
117. Freedem, New Liberalism, pp.150-58; Searle, Liberal 
Party, pp.67-68; Sykes, Rise, pp.173-75.
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Despite adhering to some elements of liberal 
internationalism (a world-wide community and 
international laws), new liberalism was an expression 
of the state monopoly tendency. As mentioned above, 
Hobson has been identified by van der Pijl as one of 
the major economists developing the productive-capital 
perspective. Given new liberalism's emphasis on 
distribution and consumption over production, this 
might appear contradictory. However, it was new 
liberalism's goal to overcome underconsumption by 
income redistribution, its demand for welfare measures 
and state intervention and its organic approach 
indicating the absence of class contradictions that 
fitted well into the patterns of the state monopoly 
tendency.
With respect to the Liberal Party itself, the new 
liberal mood was already reflected in the policies of 
the government that came to power in 1905. After a long 
time in opposition, the Liberals showed a greater 
attention to wide-spread poverty and set their bets 
upon state action to overcome a potential source of 
social instability. While sticking to free trade, the 
Liberal government implemented some welfare schemes and 
a bureaucratic national insurance system.118
Left and Centrist Liberalism
World War I triggered a crisis for liberalism - 
both as a party and as an ideology - that continued
118. Anderson, 'Figures', p.160.
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unabated in the interwar period. The memory of the war 
and the starkly accelerating economic problems 
propelled a sharp decline in liberal faith. More 
specifically, the emerging consensus around new 
liberalism within liberalism at large was abandoned in 
response to the pressures generated by the war and by 
the economically and politically turbulent period in 
its aftermath. This was the result of several factors.
First, the events of the world war badly shook the 
optimistic faith in progress and in human rationality 
that had sustained new liberalism's reform impetus. 
Second, rising national prosperity, the material 
underpinning of welfare schemes, likewise fell away. 
Instead, the concrete economic problem of chronic 
unemployment came to the fore.119
Third, wartime military and industrial 
conscription made the liberals rethink their previous 
enthusiasm for the state. Instead of acting as a 
benevolent and rational instrument for pursuing the 
well-being of the community, the state showed its more 
seamy, oppressive side. The new liberals now went at 
distance to 'German' Idealism,120 a development 
mentioned by Carr to illustrate his thesis of the 
relativity of thought.121
Fourth, there was an intellectual polarization. 
British liberalism was challenged from the left, as
119. Michael Freeden, Liberalism Divided: A Study in 
British Political Thought 1914 - 1939. Oxfords 
Clarendon, 1986, pp.9-10.
12°. Ibid., pp. 18-44.
121. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.67.
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well as from the right. Although liberal intellectuals 
largely stuck to the Liberal Party, the seduction of 
the Labour Party was simply too strong for some. 
Socialism was eating into the reserves of influential 
middle-class opinion, as witnessed by cases like the 
Webbs. Liberalism had to renew itself by fresh ideas.
As it happened, these ideas were generated by the 
Liberal Party at a time of serial splits within the 
party, which ushered its irreversible decline.122
Debates over the place of labour, the role of the 
state and industrial organization eventually divided 
liberal opinion into two wings: left and centrist.
Taking on board the legacy of new liberalism 
(including its two master thinkers, Hobhouse and 
Hobson), the left wing of liberalism continued to focus 
on the interaction of politics and ethical issues. For 
the left liberals, the harmonious collaboration of 
individuals as part of an organic community 
necessitated the ascendancy of a society-based 
morality. Ever willing to enlist natural scientific 
support, the left liberals integrated new trends of 
psychology into their societal models. Especially the 
theory of a collective group mind appealed to them.
Left liberalism kept embracing the liberal 
shibboleths of equality, property and liberty but gave 
them a particular twist. Equality was not to lead to
122. John Campbell, 'The Renewal of Liberalism: 
Liberalism Without Liberals', in Gillian Peele and 
Chris Cook (eds.), The Politics of Reappraisal: 1918- 
1939, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1975, pp.88-
113.
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sameness but to the fullest expression of 
individuality, and it was to be dependent upon the 
individual's fulfillment of communal obligations. 
Property rights were important but had to be qualified 
by social needs and communal priorities. Liberty could 
be disentangled into different kinds, with one aspect 
(the development of one's potentiality) sometimes 
necessitating limits on another (the absence of 
constraints).
While still seeing the state as the organized 
expression of the community, left liberalism tended to 
consider power as something to be overcome by the 
extension of the democratic principle. It was argued 
that states did not rest upon force but upon the inner 
psychology of those organizing them.123
Centrist liberalism overlapped on a number of 
issues with new/left liberalism but diverged from it in 
some major respects. First, while accepting that the 
inroads made by the state into industry and commerce 
should not be rolled back, centrist liberals rejected 
the notion of the state as a neutral instrument acting 
for the whole society. Second, centrist liberalism 
stressed the ideological contrast to socialism and 
trade unionism. Third, it was not philosophically 
oriented124 but stuck to straightforward economics. 
Indeed, one of its most prominent representatives was 
no one less than John Maynard Keynes.125
123. Freeden, Liberalism Divided, pp.223-93.
124. Ibid., p. 128.
125. Ibid., pp. 154-73.
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De-emphasizing the community-oriented aspects of 
new liberalism, the centrists rediscovered the notion 
of man as a rational maximizer of economic 
opportunities. Welfare definitely took second place 
behind individual liberty. The necessity for productive 
efficiency and for industrial rationalization was 
highlighted. Centrist liberalism did not throw social 
reform overboard but approached it under material and 
expediency-related aspects rather than ethical 
considerations. It celebrated capitalism and gave 
priority to the financial interests of capital owners 
over those of the state and of the workers. In 
particular, the idea of a capital levy on war profits 
was staunchly opposed. Instead of theoretical models, 
centrist liberalism upheld the merits of pragmatic 
experimentation.126
Centrist liberalism's recommendations for economic 
policies were outlined in a programmatic manifesto 
called Britain's Industrial Future, produced by 
teamwork in 1928. In it, the state was allocated an 
important role in the running of the economy, most 
strikingly by a public works scheme to fight 
unemployment and by a national investment board 
channelling savings into desirable ventures. But, in 
contrast to new liberalism, individual and state 
activities were seen as existing side by side rather 
than as interpenetrating. The manifesto took a 
favourable view upon economic monopolies. Property
126. Ibid., pp.129-54, 173-76.
ownership, instead of being qualified by communal 
control, was to be more widely distributed.127
While pre-war liberalism had focussed upon 
improving the material circumstances of the working 
classes, the increasing assertiveness of organized 
labour during and after the war necessitated a 
conceptual adaptation. Left and centrist liberals were 
at one in being sceptical of unions making use of the 
strike weapon as bargaining stick. Institutionalized 
conflict between social groups was against the grain of 
liberal tenets, whether it was the centrist one of 
industrial efficiency or the left one of a harmonious 
community. Either way, union power was seen as a 
sectional interest holding the community at large at 
ransom.128
Thus, even left liberals wanted restrictions on 
the right to strike in order to prevent "private 
quarrels' from harming the whole community.129 On the 
other hand, even centrist liberals could express their 
concern about the inappropriate amount of power exerted 
by the managers running joint-stock companies.130 As far 
as nationalizations were concerned, liberals had a 
middle-of-the-road attitude, neither opposing them 
completely nor seeing them as panacea. Left liberals 
were moderately in favour but giving greater importance 
to "public control' of industries than to the ownership
127. Ibid., pp. 105-18.
128. Ibid., pp.49-50, 112, 197-209.
129. Ibid., p.204.
13°. Ibid., p.260.
issue as such. Centrists tended to be relatively more 
circumspect of nationalizations.131
There was, on the first look, agreement between 
both wings of liberalism on the necessity for greater 
worker involvement in the running of industries. The 
short-lived Whitley Councils, established at the end of 
the war, were generally applauded by the liberals. 
Providing equal representation for employers' 
associations and trade unions, the councils dealt with 
working conditions, including wage levels. The liberals 
also called for giving the workers a share in 
industrial profits and in the management of the 
companies.
However, the different liberal factions meant 
different things by this call for the extension of 
democracy into the economic arena. For the centrists, 
there was no question that 'democracy' in industry was 
to be very different from political democracy. In 
effect, what they were after was merely dividing the 
labour movement by giving some sections of it a greater 
stake in the companies but leaving capitalists' profits 
and control largely in place. In contrast, left 
liberals, while not trying to dispose with businessmen 
as such, were taking the notions of co-management and 
profit-sharing more literally.132
Although perhaps not centrist liberalism's most 
sophisticated thinker, Philip Kerr aka Lord Lothian is
131. Ibid., pp. 188-93.
132. Ibid., pp.49-66, 112, 151.
of specific interest for our topic. Being a fellow 
Round Tabler and close friend of Curtis, he also came 
to share the latter's apotheosis of world government. 
Having entered the fold as Prime Minister Lloyd 
George's private secretary, Kerr was a newcomer who up 
to that point had little to do with established 
liberalism. If Lloyd George's social policies were to a 
great extent a bid to save labour from socialism, Kerr 
was a particularly successful synthesizer of this mood. 
This was illustrated especially by his proposal in 1924 
of a version of 'self-government for industry', in 
which the economy was to be run independently of the 
government by a hierarchy of councils with a permanent 
council at the top formed of the representatives from 
the Federation of British Industry and the Trades Union 
Congress. Kerr, who was by now Lord Lothian, was also 
sympathetic to the issue of planning, as long as it did 
not involve what the Labour Party was propounding, i.e. 
nationalization.133
Although he was reserved about too much state 
interference into the economy, Kerr/Lothian argued for 
granting more 'responsibility' to labour, for tackling 
excess inequalities of wealth by redistributive 
taxation and for the control of economic monopolies. In 
this way, he hoped to achieve class harmony and thus to
133 ^ John Turner, 'Introductions Lord Lothian and His 
World', in John Turner (ed«). The Larger Idea: Lord 
Lothian and the Problem of National Sovereignty, 
London: The Historians' Press, 1988, pp.1-19, here 
pp.7-9.
preserve the ultimate control over the economic realm 
by the upper classes.134
Even more than new liberalism, centrist liberalism 
adapted elements of the productive-capital perspective. 
Retaining the concepts of state intervention and of a 
harmonious society without class struggle, it also 
embraced corporatism and, compared to new liberalism, a 
strong pro-business perspective emphasizing the need 
for productive efficiency.
The Rise of the Social Imperialist Movement
'Gladstonianism' was bolstered, among others, by 
the concept of the 'cheap loaf'. Accordingly, with the 
above-mentioned qualifications, the attitudes to the 
Empire were relatively lukewarm. By the end of the 
century, however, British informed opinion was 
discussing imperialism with a remarkable vigour. We 
have already seen some aspects of this new imperialist 
wave while discussing the imperial federation movement. 
At this section, we shall deal with those aspects which 
combined imperialism and social reform at home.
In these debates, it was not only the elite that 
was involved: The discussions of the second half of the 
nineteenth century brought in their wake a palpable and 
gradually intensifying strengthening of the British 
interest in the Empire at the level of the policy­
makers as well as the general public. The vigour with 
which the benefits of the Empire were juxtaposed to its
134. Freeden, Liberalism Divided, pp.103-04, 115-16,
192, 347-48.
costs was noteworthy because it was succeeding decades 
of utilitarian, commerce and finance oriented and 
'informal" attitudes to the relations with the Empire.
As far as the concrete policy proposals about the 
restructuring of the Empire were concerned there were 
many points of divergence. However, there were three 
aspects where most of the new interpretations differed 
essentially from Gladstonian imperialism. One was the 
way the underlurking fears of decline had found their 
way into these discussions: The concern with decline 
induced a tariff reformer as much as an imperial 
federationist to look at the white Dominions and to see 
there the genesis of a new, 'Greater Britain."
Secondly, imperialism was tied in these discussions to 
the welfare of the masses and the related issue of 
'national efficiency" in Britain. It was now 
imperialism, not the advocacy of free trade that was 
used as the dominant bourgeois ideology to provide the 
bulwark against labour unrest and socialism on the one 
hand, the erosion of British global hegemony on the 
other. Thirdly, there was the consensus that 
imperialism had to be directed, and not left to its own 
workings: The state had to step forward to take the 
role of an efficient manager of the Empire and the 
engineer of domestic social reforms. Further, this had 
to be an authoritative state led by capable experts 
immune to the vagaries of political life. Taken 
together, these three points represented such a 
substantial alteration of the entrenched parameters
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that from the 1880s one could talk about the increasing 
challenge of Gladstonian liberalism by a new paradigm, 
whose components will be examined more closely below.135
The causes of this change were various. Trying to 
uncover these causes involves, accidentally, going back 
to some of the themes raised earlier, since, as 
mentioned, the movements of empire federalism, new 
liberalism and social imperialism were quite enmeshed 
in each other. Not only the motivations for these 
movements were frequently common, but so were the 
policies proposed.
Coming to social imperialism, let us start with 
the international factors. According to one somewhat 
fatalistic interpretation, the old, informal and 
commercial empire contained the seeds of its own 
destruction: The unstoppable dynamics of global power 
shifts dictated that in order to protect her commercial 
interests, the British state would in any case be 
gradually drawn towards more formal forms of control.136 
Even if one would not subscribe to the determinism in
135. This strengthening of the imperialist tide however, 
should not be seen in unqualified terms. It has been 
argued, for example, that contrary to the frequent 
claim that the working class by the end of the century, 
for instance during the Boer War, gave its undisputable 
support to the war and to imperialism, there were 
significant voices within the labour movement which 
were against imperialism. See for example, Preben 
Kaarsholm, 'Pro-Boers", in Raphael Samuel (ed.). 
Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National 
Identity, vol. 1, History and Politics, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1989, pp.110-26. About the late 19th 
century not constituting a general watershed in 
imperialist feelings see Martin, '"Anti-Imperialism"", 
p.117 and Eric Stokes, 'Milnerism", in Historical 
Journal 5 (19622), 1, pp.47-60, here pp.59-60.
136. Bernard Porter, The Lion"s Share: A Short History 
of British Imperialism. 1850-1995, 3rd ed., London and 
New York: Longman, 1996, pp.8-12, 28-29.
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this particular interpretation, however, it is clear 
that by the end of the nineteenth century the 
established interests of Britain were endangered on not 
just one, but several planes.
On the one hand, there was the relative decline of 
Britain, which made itself felt simultaneously in 
military, industrial and commercial fields. The British 
army and navy were jointly challenged. Hobbesian 
Continental countries were strengthening their armies 
through compulsory conscription. In addition, they had 
started to carve out empires of their own. Germany and 
the United States had emerged in the 1890s as two new 
naval powers. The concrete foreign-policy consequences 
of the weakening of British power had already been 
displayed in 1870, when there had been a big shift in 
the European balance of power with the exclusion of 
Britain's say.137 Traditionally having put less emphasis 
on Europe, Britain was now witnessing with alarm that 
she was losing her grip on the continental balance of 
power.138
At the same time, there was an ever-growing 
pressure on the fiscal system. Gladstone's great 
budgetary achievements were only possible because of 
specific favourable political conditions in Europe, 
which enabled Britain to square naval supremacy with
137 . Beloff, Imperial Sunset, p.22-23.
138# This awareness of a Continental challenge was, of 
course, also the spark that ignited a new wave of 
schemes for imperial union, like Curtis's.
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low defence expenditures. The Boer War, however, put a 
lot of pressure on the budget.
The response the two main parties to this state of 
affairs was different. The Liberals continued to adhere 
to free trade with an emphasis on direct taxation 
directed mostly towards the landed aristocracy (as 
exemplified by Lloyd George's 1909 budget, the House of 
Lords crises of 1909-11 and the Liberal land campaign 
that followed), thus attenuating the connection of the 
Liberals with the aristocrats. In contrast, the 
Conservatives, as defenders of aristocracy and the 
status quo, resisted direct taxation but resorted to 
tariffs by 1910. Furthermore, all this occured in a 
context in which, after the 1867 and 1884 Reform Acts, 
an expanded electorate made new demands upon the public 
purse.139
What, however, made the military weakening and the 
fiscal problems really severe was that they were 
intertwined firmly with the relative British decline in 
the industrial and technological spheres at a time when 
'A'-industries were eclipsed by 'B' ones.140
According to Searle, it was the rise of 
continental powers which could command wide resources 
that made the British first become aware of the concept 
of power - power not only to underwrite the liberal 
world system, but as a moral good in itself. The moral 
and utilitarian aspects of Gladstonian liberalism had
139 . Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation, 
pp.202-03.
14°. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, p.56.
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neatly overlapped. Protectionism not only made no sense 
from an economic point of view, but it was rendered 
immoral. With the rise of new powers, it became obvious 
that these old tenets were not valid for economic 
success. For a while, British public and political 
discourse conceded the success of the continental 
powers while proclaiming these policies to be 
undemocratic and immoral. In the end, however, the 
reformulation of the liberal edifice that had 
underpinned the policies of the nineteenth century 
became inevitable.141
The ultimate implication of all these 
developments, even to the most convinced Cobdenite, was 
clear. Whatever its credentials in the past, the 
concept of embroiled peace and economic prosperity 
promised by the proponents of the Manchester School did 
not seem to be the order of the future. What mattered 
in this new world were: First, size; second, military 
as well as economic success underlined by an 
'efficiently" organised state apparatus and economic 
system; third, a newly born national-consciousness and 
aggression, as displayed in the policies of the newly- 
unified Germany and the United States, and of Russia. 
War itself had become an instrument of national policy
and a symbolic reaction to laissez-faire.142
To make matters more complicated, however, the
mood prevailing among the British elite at the turn-of- 
the-century was not conditioned only by these
141. Searle, Quest.
142. Tyler, Struggle, pp. 14-16, 20.
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"external" developments which challenged the power-
political position of Britain on the world stage. There
were also a set of domestic factors, which drew the
attention of this elite in a way that had not been
experienced before to the problems of the "working
man". According to Paul Kennedy, behind this concern
was increasing population and urbanisation.
The creation of formal political parties to ensure the 
implementation of the aims of the working classes was 
an outgrowth (of this).143
Seen from the perspective of both the industrial and 
financial bourgeoisie and their landed class allies, 
the rise of a class conscious labour movement opposed 
to bourgeois social hegemony144 and the vulnerability of 
this newly created electorate to socialism signalled a 
very serious threat. One way of facing this threat was 
to gain the support of this electorate, a concern which 
spurred both major parties to emphasize social reform 
in their policy programmes.
Wilfried Fest comments with respect to social 
imperialism:
(R)esonance in public political debate (of social 
imperialism) achieves a new quality in the late 
Victorian epoch. The year 1886 can be taken as a 
watershed in the development of Britain"s political 
system. From then on both major parties turned their 
attention to social factors like income and 
employment.145
143. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German 
Antagonism: 1860 - 1914, London: Ashfield, 1980, p.322.
144. Keith Williams, The British State, Social 
Imperialism and Emigration from Britain, 1920-22: The 
Ideology and Antecedents of the Empire Settlement Act, 
Ph. dissertation. University of London, 1985, p.40.
145. Wilfried Fest, "Jingoism and Xenophobia in the 
Electioneering Strategies of British Ruling Elites 
Before 1914" in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls 
(eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain 
and Germany Before 1914, Oxford: Macmillan, 1981,
pp.171-89, here p.171.
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And, in the view of Taylor:
Two imperialists, each in other ways so different from 
each other, Disraeli and J. Chamberlain, were both, 
after all, to be social reformers.146
The turning point was the Third Reform Act of 1884
which transformed the electorate into a mass one.
In this context, it is appropriate to mention a 
debate which has thrown additional light on the social 
and intellectual background of these groups and their 
motivations. This debate has been initiated by Arno 
Mayer's controversial argument that the eve of the 
First World War witnessed a revolt, not from the 
European left, but from the European right. Mayer has 
argued that industrialisation and the creation of an 
autonomous middle and a potentially revolutionary 
working class caused a reaction from an anachronistic 
landed and aristocratic elite. This reaction came to a 
head in the years following the pacifisation of the 
working class prior to the First World War. Although 
Mayer's thesis was limited to central Europe, his ideas 
have provided a stimulating starting point for a 
comparative analysis of the Edwardian right. To what 
extent can Edwardian 'constructive imperialism', of 
which the Round Table was a part, be considered as the 
by-product of this broader 'revolt from the right'?
Geoffrey Searle argues that Edwardian right was a 
very different species from the Central European right 
of the same period. It was not a consistent anti­
modernisation movement instigated by an atavistic
146. Tyler, Struggle, p.19.
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landed class. Although there were such elements, the 
Edwardian right was a very complicated movement. This 
refers to its social composition, but also to the 
wildly contradictory aims it pursued. Instead of being a 
homogenous group of disenchanted aristocrats a la 
Mayer, the Edwardian right included men who, in terms 
of class, socialization and their understanding of 
politics, could be best interpreted as a rising stratum 
of intellectual bureaucrats and professionals. They 
rejected the amateurism of the traditional elite. As 
far as their approach to industrialisation is 
concerned, their proposals as a whole added up to a 
curiously ambivalent mixture of pro- and anti-modernist 
views. They were able to combine two contradictory 
kinds of critique. On the one hand, they lambasted 
against alienating urban conditions, social problems, 
class hatred, materialism, pacifism and 
cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, they also took the 
idle and feeble-blooded aristocracy to task.
Furthermore, they were also able to combine the 
critique of bureaucracy with the advocation of German- 
style efficiency.147
The discourse which prevailed among the ranks of 
Edwardian imperialist intelligensia, argues Karl Rohe, 
was a modernising discourse, not a moralising one. It 
was "post-liberal": For them, the classical liberalism
147. Geoffrey Searle, "The ^Revolt From the Right" in 
Edwardian Britain" in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls 
(eds.)f Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain 
and Germany Before 1914, London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1981, pp.21-39.
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of the mid-Victorian era with its embracement of 
laisser-faire had to be left behind. It was out of 
touch with realities and no longer a hallmark of social 
progress. Prime inspirations for the emergence of post­
liberal discourse were perceived decline and the 
example provided by Germany. The admiration for German- 
style organisation, which was widely perceived as 
boosting production, captured the imagination of groups 
which otherwise had substantial differences: Witness 
the gulf separating the Fabians from Conservative 
groups•
There was a further factor uniting the Edwardian 
intelligensia as a novel generation: their social 
composition. Post-liberal social thought went hand in 
hand with the growth in numbers of non-commercial 
middle-class people. The Victorian university reforms 
had provided them with new opportunities and increasing 
self-confidence. This post-liberal attitude to 
modernisation reached a culmination in new imperialism, 
which, like German-style efficiency, claimed a broad 
commitment from the Edwardian elite.
Under the impulse of new imperialism, Britain 
finally made the transition from the small-scale 
society of liberal mid-Victorian Britain to a post­
liberal "large-scale one. This process fitted well into 
the interests - of both material and non-material kind 
- of the new middle classes. Thus, Edwardian 
imperialism was not primarily conditioned by the 
defensive mood of a declining elite, but the vigour of
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a rising one.148 Curtis can be well placed into this 
rising elite.149
Leaving the simultaneous rise of organised labour 
and of the professional intelligentsia aside, there was 
a third domestic factor relevant for the rise of social 
imperialism: rival economic interests within Britain. 
E.H.H Green has propounded the thesis that in certain 
key respects, the sociological bases of Gladstonian 
liberalism and imperialism at the turn of the century 
had not been eroded. On the contrary, with the 
transition to the gold standard the financial sector 
had tightened its grip within British economy, and the 
dependence of Britain on 'invisible exports" had 
intensified. At the same time, the gold standard and 
the increasing power of the financial bourgeoisie vis- 
a-vis the British administration was perceived by 
sections of the industrial sector as fundamentally 
contradictory to their own interests.
There was a 'great hinge" in British society 
whereby prosperity, economic dynamism and population 
moved away from the industrial north and Midlands 
towards the service sector of the south and south-east. 
Not only the pressures for Tariff Reform and 
bimetallism, but also the realised projects of the new
148 . Karl Rohe, 'The British Imperialist Intelligentsia 
and the Kaiserreich', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony 
Nicholls (eds.). Nationalist and Racialist Movements in 
Britain and Germany Before 1914, London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 130-42, here pp.136- 
41.
149. As we have seen in Chapter 3, he had a middle-class 
background and was heavily influenced by his spell at 
Oxford.
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imperialism like the scramble for Africa, claims Green, 
partly stem from the reaction of significant sections 
of the industrial bourgeoisie to their worsening 
predicatement. Tariff Reform would, thanks to its 
protectionist aspect, shield them from the vagaries of 
the international market, bimetallism would reduce the 
detrimental effects of the gold standard, and the pre­
emptive acquisition of new areas would provide for them 
protected new markets before other protectionist powers 
could get hold of them.150 The strengthening of Cain's 
and Hopkins' 'gentlemanly capitalists' - or, better, 
those committed to the money-capital perspective - had 
in a paradoxical way been one of the causes paving the 
way to the strengthening of the new imperialist 
philosophy.
Finally, mention should be made of the autonomous 
development of certain kinds of thought. First, there 
was the 'efficiency' discourse, which was influenced by 
Continental theories of Social Darwinism and the works 
of Kidd, Pearson and Bosanquet. In a Fabian tract of 
1896, for example, Sidney Webb
first began to draw upon the arguments of the Social- 
Darwinists and neo-Hegelians in developing the concept 
of 'social efficiency,' later to blossom into the 
influential Fabian 'National Minimum' program. The 
concept of 'social efficiency' was formulated by Sidney 
Webb in the context of the 'race struggle', integrating 
Fabian collectivism with the currently esteemed 
theories of Benjamin Kidd, Karl Pearson, and Bernard 
Bosanquet. Fabian social analysis and prescription was 
to be scientific, empirical, and unburdened by sacred 
shibboleths, in the manner of Darwinist biology and the 
young science of sociology. The ultimate rationale for
15°. E.H.H Green, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British 
Economic Policy 1880-1914: The Debate Over Bimetallism 
and Protectionism' in Raymond E. Dumett (ed.), 
Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New 
Debate on Empire, London and New York: Longman, 1999, 
pp.44-67.
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the suspension of individual freedoms and the laws of 
nations preached by Kidd and Pearson was, put simply by 
Webb, 'the lesson of evolution ... that interracial 
competition is really more momentous in its 
consequences than the struggle between individuals.'151
Originally, 'national efficiency' was an attempt 
to make cultural and institutional changes in Britain 
to create a social organization that would follow the 
German model. Two culprits of decline that come up 
pretty often in the recent literature (lack of 
systematic development and application of modern 
science, and an educational tradition aimed at 
gentlemanly amateurs) were already then held as two of 
the reasons for the beginning decline. Running through 
many of the discussions, there was a curious mixture of 
glorification of Bismarck's combination of social 
policy and military strength, and anti-German 
rhetoric •152
Second, there was also the need for an 
intellectual defence of the empire. The Boer War was a 
turning-point regarding the feelings of a considerably 
large section of the British public for the Empire - at 
least for the empire that Chamberlain, but especially 
Milner, cherished. The atrocities of the war had 
created a public outrage against what was widely 
perceived to be an illiberal, aggressive notion of 
imperialism, while the defeats suffered by the British
151. Robert J. Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George 
Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism, 1900 - 
1918, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975,
p. 50 •
152. Searle, Quest. For the simultaneous admiration 
towards and disparaging of Germany at this period see 
Gunther Hollenberg, Englisches Interesse am 
Kaiserreich: Die Attraktivitat Preuflen-Deutschlands fur 
konservative und liberale Kreise in Groflbritannien 1860 
- 1914, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1974.
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army had caused a high level of demoralization.
Particularly loud were the protestations of orthodox
liberals, radicals, and socialists who pointed out that
the imperialism exhibited in South Africa
could no longer be portrayed as a defense of the 
interests of all classes in the nation at home - not 
while the Colonial Office and the governor in the Cape 
were widely pictured as no more than willing 
instruments of the Rand mine owners and City 
financiers.153
At the end of the Boer War, a new language of 
imperialism had to be invented. As the logical 
culmination of the processes described above, this 
could only be a social-imperialistic language, i.e. one 
that tied the domestic and international effects of 
imperialism into an inseparable whole.154
All these developments called for a double­
thronged state action which had both domestic and 
international facets. Economic and political power; 
social reform and defense; industrialisation and 
international prestige were now firmly intertwined 
issues which had to be jointly addressed by both the 
Unionists and the Liberals. "Industrialisation, market- 
seeking, commercial rivalry and the foundation of 
colonies" were now closely related issues.155 The
153. scally, Origins, p.30.
154. Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt,
Imperialism: The Significance of a Political Word 1840 
- 1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, 
pp.81-249; Andrew S. Thompson, "The Language of 
Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial 
Discourse in British Politics, 1895 - 1914", in Journal 
of British Studies 36 (1997), pp.147-77.
155. Tyler, Struggle, p.17. On the close relationship 
between state interference in the economy to promote 
industrialisation in the context of a successfully 
appeased working class, and imperialism abroad, see 
Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English
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precise nature of the 'social imperialist' inclinations 
within different parties and pressure-groups varied, 
but in a general sense it was a common theme.
The Social Imperialist Agenda
The social imperialist revolt against
'Gladstonianism' was a movement crosscutting the
traditional divisions between left and right. The
Fabians, Liberals and Conservatives each had their
social imperialist wing. The first to be affected by
internal divisions was the Liberal Party during the
Boer War. A strong minority led by former Prime
Minister Lord Rosebery refused to go along with the
party leadership's demand for immediate negotiations
with the Boers.156 The Boer War also galvanised the
Webbs and Shaw into a pro-imperialist position which
won a narrow majority among the Fabian Society in 1900.
Faithful to the Fabian strategy of permeating existing
parties, the Fabian imperialists hoped to turn the
Liberal imperialists into a vehicle for their aims.
This failed due to Rosebery's vacillations.157 However,
once the Liberals came into government in 1905, Liberal
imperialists like Foreign Secretary Grey and War
Secretary Haldane were in a position to shape Britain's
foreign and defence affairs while leaving domestic
Social-Imperial Thought, 1895 - 1914, Londons George 
Allen & Unwin, 1960.
156. Scally, Origins, pp.32, 57; Semmel, Imperialism, 
pp.59-60.
157. Scally, Origins. pp.29-72; Searle, Quest, pp.107- 
41; Semmel, Imperialism, pp.53-82.
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matters to the traditional and left wings of the 
party.158
In 1902, the Webbs made another attempt at shaping 
a new political force by rallying Fabian, Liberal and 
Conservative imperialists into an exclusive club called 
the Coefficients. Unfortunately for them, the emergence 
of the Tariff Reform movement split the club and 
strangled all hope of turning it into the core of a new 
'national" party.159
Launched by Colonial Secretary Chamberlain in 1903 
and masterminded from the vanguard-like Compatriots 
club, the Tariff Reform movement included prominent 
conservatives like Milner, Amery, Oliver (all, at one 
stage, also Round Tablers), the influential journalists 
Garvin and Maxse, and the geographer Mackinder.160 
Although, by dividing the party, the Tariff Reform 
movement contributed to the loss of the 1906 election, 
a majority of Tory MPs was nominally committed to 
protectionism. But after the lost 1910 elections and 
the coming of new issues like Home Rule and House of 
Lords reform to the fore, it lost influence. The 
imperial preference aspect, the core of Chamberlain's 
programme, was dropped in favour of straightforward 
protectionism by the Conservative party.161 The social
158. scally. Origins, pp.135-36; Semmel, Imperialism, 
pp.134—36.
159. Scally, Origins, pp.73-95; Semmel, Imperialism, 
pp.53-82.
160. Scally, Origins, pp.110-15; Semmel, Imperialism, 
p.92.
161. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation, 
pp.218-21; Semmel, Imperialism, pp.126-27.
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imperialists of all parties had only partial success in 
putting their agenda into reality, it was under the 
wartime Lloyd George government that they got new 
opportunities•
The starting point of social imperialist thought 
was the criticism of Gladstonian laisser-faire and 
exaggerated individualism. Particularly Sidney Webb 
accused these notions as reactionary and as leading to 
degeneration.162 To alleviate this situation, the state 
was to take a greater role for economic development and 
for the well-being of the whole national community.163 
Fabian and Liberal imperialists still managed to 
combine this celebration of the state with a pluralist 
vision in which intermediate institutions like the 
Church would have their role.164 Conservatives praised 
the Britons' high sense of public duty, which was, 
however, to be fostered by the beneficial effects of 
conscription.165
The necessity for military reforms, including a 
well-trained citizen army, was stressed in all versions 
of social imperialism.166 Another common plank was 
better education. Besides addressing vocational
162. Scally, Origins, pp.42, 49-50; Semmel, Imperialism, 
pp.72-73.
103. Searle, Quest, pp.63, 97.
164. Ibid., pp.98, 100-01.
105. Wolfgang Mock, '"The Function of Race" in 
Imperialist Ideologies: The Example of Joseph 
Chamberlain", in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls 
(eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain 
and Germany Before 1914, London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1981, pp.190-203, here pp.197-98; Scally, 
Origins. p.130.
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training, the social imperialists put specific emphasis 
upon elite education. They criticized the public 
schools and Oxford for concentrating too much on high 
culture and character training instead of practical 
matters.167
The Webbs in particular mooted plans for welfare 
measures like slum removal and housing reforms, 
sanitary improvements, public health services and 
actions against sweatshops. This was to achieve a 
"National Minimum" standard of living, below which the 
individual was not allowed to fall. An elaborate 
bureaucratic system was to grade and control people, 
with job training for the unskilled, moral training for 
the lazy and semi-penal colonies for the 
recalcitrant.168 Likewise, the Liberal imperialists 
wanted reform with respect to housing and temperance in 
order to turn the British into an "imperial race". 
However, they tended to neglect domestic issues over 
military reform.169
When he had been mayor of Birmingham during the 
1880s, Chamberlain had enacted municipal "socialism' 
(i.e. public ownership of utilities and transport) and 
had argued that the rich owed a "ransom" to the poor.
He made the Conservative government adopt a workmen's 
compensation scheme in 1897 and argued, less
167. Scally, Origins, pp.65-66; Searle, Quest, pp.75-76, 
78-80, 84.
168. scally, Origins, pp.51-52; Searle, Quest, pp.235- 
43.
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successfully, for old-age pensions.170 Chamberlain's 
followers adapted the Fabian and Liberal imperialist 
demands for temperance, for improvements in education, 
housing and sanitation, for fighting slums and sweated 
trades, and for a minimum wage, national insurance and 
public health. All this was to be paid for by the 
revenues arising from tariffs.171 However, when the 
Liberal government enacted a very similar programme, 
although not one financed by tariffs, their reaction 
was less than enthusiastic. Milner set the priorities 
clears Social reforms should not just have a 
humanitarian aspect but aim at the fostering of order 
and discipline. Most importantly, they should not be 
financed at the expense of funds for the army and the 
navy.172
Tariff Reformers also raised the spectre of 'red 
revolution' and spoke out against class conflict and 
internationalism. Some were critical of the trade 
unions, others like Milner propagated the 
nationalization of vital industries and a corporatist 
collaboration between management and organized labour, 
overseen by bureaucratic experts.173 This was a 
consequent application of the state monopolist concept 
of control.
170. Semmel, Imperialism, pp.90-91, 96-97.
171. Scally, Origins, pp.104, 147, 190, 223, 313;
Semmel, Imperialism, pp.163, 174, 182-84.
172 . Scally, Origins, p.138.
173. Scally, Origins, pp.206-07, 264, 313; Semmel,
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The social imperialists did not have a very high 
opinion of the masses the proposed reforms were to 
uplift. The Webbs and Shaw used words like 'stupid", 
'sottish" and 'riff-raff" for them and looked for 
eugenic measures to increase the birthrate of the 
'abler" classes, decrease that of the 'thriftless" and 
breed a future race of supermen.174 The economist 
Cunningham, another prominent Tariff Reformer, deemed 
the British population at large 'apathetic and 
ignorant".175
Consequently, the social imperialists had a - to 
put it mildly - rather reserved attitude towards 
parliamentary democracy. While elder leaders of the 
movement like Rosebery and Chamberlain expressed their 
faith in the positive correlation between Empire and 
democracy,176 others like Mackinder and Garvin were not 
so sure.177 Others again, namely Beatrice Webb and 
Oliver, did not hide their dislike of the democratic 
system at all.178
While Fabian and Liberal imperialists were wont to 
criticize the 'barrennes of the Parliamentary 
machine"179 and the 'evil" party system,180 it was the 
Conservative social imperialists who were most 
outspoken in this respect. Lambasting against the
174. Searle, Origins, p.95; Semmel, Imperialism, p.51.
175. Scally, Origins, pp.252-53.
176. Mock, 'Function", pp.193-95; Scally, Origins, p.29.
177. Scally, Origins, p.118, Semmel, Imperialism, 
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"Rotten Assembly" at Westminster, Milner faulted the 
"system" for giving power to an ignorant population, 
reducing politics to a meaningless struggle for office, 
producing an oversized cabinet consisting of 
mediocricies and treating all-important issues on the 
same level as banale ones. At one stage, he spoke about 
closing down the parliament for three years.181
Amery, too, bemoaned the politicians' obsession 
with keeping office and saw the danger that a 
determined bloc of MPs might force through policies at 
odds with "the general wish of the nation".182 Amery 
also favoured reducing the power of the Treasury (one 
of the hallmarks of "Gladstonianism") and putting the 
House of Commons "in its proper place".183 For Maxse, 
the particular culprits were lawyer-politicians without 
any genuine convictions of their own, who saw politics 
as career only and who were good talkers but bad 
administrators.184
There were two kinds of way to change this state 
of affairs. One had a centralizing and elitist 
character and was embraced by Fabian and Liberal 
imperialists as well as the group of Tariff Reformers 
around Milner. In its tamer versions, it consisted of 
the strengthening of parliamentary committees and
181. Scally, The Origins, pp.107-08; Searle, ""Revolt"', 
p.27; Semmel, Imperialism, p.185.
182. scally. The Origins, p. 159.
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London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979, pp.79-96, here 
p. 88.
limiting the time of MPs speeches. More sweepingly, 
there were demands to empower the supposedly more 
efficient bureaucratic 'experts' or big businessmen at 
the expense of parliament. This was to be done through 
the establishment of a special body responsible for 
imperial affairs or even by forming a 'government of 
national efficiency' above party lines consisting of 
them. In one way or another, parliament's role was to 
be limited to choosing the experts who would then do 
the actual administration and to simply approve or 
reject measures initiated by them.185
The second solution was of a more populist and 
plebecitary kind. Rosebery pointed out that people were 
not so much interested in parties but in particular 
leaders they trusted. And Tariff Reformers around Leo 
Maxse, a demagogic journalist, set their bets upon the 
imperialist instincts of the people rather than upon 
experts. They demanded the introduction of referenda.186
The Liberal and Conservative imperialists were 
opposed to Home Rule, although some like Milner were 
willing to contemplate the federalizing of Britain in 
return for tariffs as a compromise solution.187
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Some Tariff Reformers like Chamberlain and Maxse,
but also Sidney Webb were not free from anti-semitic
traits and wanted Jewish immigration to be
restricted.188 At the same time, Milner and Amery
advocated fostering emigration from the British isles
to the "white' Empire.189
The Empire was, of course, dear to the hearts of
all social imperialists. This notion was most
eloquently expressed in a Fabian Manifesto of 1900
edited by Shaw. It declared that the issue at stake was
whether Great Britain would be the "nucleus of one of
the world-empires of the future' or whether, by
foolishly losing its overseas possessions, it would "be
reduced to a tiny pair of islands in the North Sea'.190 
Imperialism was a new stage of international
politics and small nations were anachronistic. The
manifesto challenged the radical sections of the
Liberal Party who persisted in clinging to
the fixed-frontier ideals of individualist 
republicanism, non-interference, and nationalism, long 
since demonstrated both by experience and theory to be 
inapplicable to our present situation,
and who did not see that the world had grown "far
beyond the primitive political economy of the founders
of the United States and the Anti-Corn Law League'.
Likewise, the imperialist model upheld by the
188. Mock, "Function', p.199; Searle, "Critics', p.92; 
Semmel, Imperialism, pp.51, 194; Anne Summers, "The 
Character of Edwardian Nationalism: Three Popular 
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Conservatives also gave reason for criticism, in
particular the lack of efficiency it entailed. It was
held that the Fabians were not approaching the empire
from any particularist standpoint, be it the workers or
any other class, and that they were concerned with
the effective social organization of the whole Empire, 
and its rescue from the strife of classes and private 
interest.191
As for the Liberal imperialists, Rosebery had been 
Chairman of the Imperial Federation League at one time 
during the 1880s, calling for a kind of political union 
between Great Britain and the self-governing parts of 
the Empire.192 Likewise, the imperial enthusiasm of the 
Tariff Reformers focussed upon the Dominions rather 
than the tropical dependencies.193
With the exception of Rosebery, who was relatively 
more concerned with Britain's traditional rivals France 
and Russia, the social imperialists warned of the 
German menace, both in military and economic terms. At 
the same time, the efficiency of the Germans and, even 
more pronouncedly, the Japanese was admired. Not 
restricting their worries to the Hobbesian contenders, 
some Tariff Reformers like Oliver and Amery saw in 
President Wilson a dangerous schemer pursuing American 
hegemony by subtle means.194
191. Cf. Semmel, Imperialism, p.71.
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Tariff Reform
In 1903, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain 
divided not only the Conservative Party but also the 
social imperialist movements by coming out in favour of 
protectionism and imperial preferences and by founding 
the Tariff Reform League. His agenda was seemingly 
straightforward and referred to the establishment of 
customs duties: 25s per quarter on grain and flour; 5% 
on meat and dairy produce; c. 10% on manufactures; and 
the exemption of Empire products from all these 
charges.195
What was the purpose behind this attempted break 
with Britain's free trade tradition? Tariff reform 
could in fact have four very different aims. First, 
tariffs could simply be a retaliatory device against 
protectionist countries. Second, there was the 
protectionist motive to preserve the home market for 
the British. Third, tariffs could have the function of 
providing revenues which would be used to finance 
social reform. Fourth, if in combination with imperial 
preferences, Tariff Reform would turn the British 
Empire into one big economic bloc comparable to the 
United States.196
For sections of the British industry, especially 
hard-pressed iron, steel, electricity and engineering, 
the protectionist aspect was attractive. In contrast,
Semmel, Imperialism, p.173; Thompson, Imperial Britain, 
p. 67 •
19s. Semmel, Imperialism, p.92.
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export-oriented textile and coal production, 
shipbuilding (receiving cheap German steel) and finance 
stuck to free trade.197 Tariff Reformers, with only 
moderate success, tried to woo the working classes by 
arguing that the increased price for foodstuff would be 
offset by increased employment once foreign dumping was 
stopped.198
The imperialist wing of the Fabians was divided 
over the question of Tariff Reforms.199 In contrast, the 
Liberal Imperialists remained faithful to free trade. 
Although they were not dogmatic on this issue, they 
clearly objected to the full-scale protectionist 
demands of the Tariff Reform League. As the Liberal 
imperialists argued, it was efficiency and not tariffs 
that were needed.200 In fact, financial rather than 
industrial interests were heavily represented among the 
Liberal imperialists. Mackinder, when he was still a 
Liberal before later joining the Tariff Reformers, 
pointed out that British industry might be in for a 
relative decline but, more importantly, that London's 
position as world financial centre remained intact and 
was even bound to increase. The Liberal Imperialists 
had thus a more cosmopolitan outlook than their 
Conservative counterparts.201 And, different to them,
197. Semmel, Imperialism, pp.102-04, 146-50; Summers, 
'Character', p.71.
198. Semmel, Imperialism, pp.93-96, 106-21, 146-48.
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they did not break with an important ingredient of 
liberal internationalism.
That tariff reform was mainly a fiscal device has 
recently been argued by John M. Hobson. According to 
him, the support of tariff reform by the Unionists has 
happened because of their fear of a recasting of the 
societal hierarchy, occasioned through the fiscal 
policies of the Liberals from 1905. It was neither a 
genuine concern over the 'decline of Britain" nor over 
unemployment that spurred the Conservatives to give 
their ultimate support to tariff reform. Instead, it 
was their response to the increasing proportion of 
direct to indirect taxation from mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, a situation which reached its culmination 
through the fiscal exigencies that emerged during and 
after the Boer War. The free-trade Conservatives would 
either continue supporting free trade, which they saw 
as being in the long term interests of the economy, and 
have to take on board more direct taxation; or they 
would, against their own convictions, have to switch 
sides to the protectionist camp, in order to forestall 
any further increase in direct taxation.202
Now, a hegemonic ideology cannot just be built 
around the straightforward advance of specific economic 
interests. Rather, it needs to be expressed in terms 
that address the real or alleged needs of the whole 
community. This explains a fact neglected by Hobson's
202• John M. Hobson, The Wealth of States: A Comparative 
Sociology of International Economic and Political 
Change, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press,
1997, pp.115-29.
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fiscally-oriented analysis: Tariff Reform was presented 
as much as an imperial as a domestic strategy. Its 
preferential dimension assumed the most prominent role 
in the campaign. Even though the movement attracted 
many different groups, its leadership expressed itself 
mainly in terms of Empire unity.203
Nevertheless, in contrast to the Liberal 
imperialists the Tariff Reformers all considered 
manufacturing as more important for Britain's well­
being than finance and services.204 They were 
unambivalent propagandists of the productive-capital 
perspective. Chamberlain saw the increasing power of 
the finance and services with forebodings of doom and 
pointed out to City representatives that their 
prosperity rested ultimately upon the strength of
British industry.205
After Chamberlain's premature retirement from
politics in 1906, others like Amery carried on the 
flag. Amery"s world was the insecure, competitive world 
of the realists. In such a world, the need for strong 
defence was apparent. This, in turn, required strong 
industries built upon the flourishing, secure markets 
that only vast economic units held together by organic 
bonds could provide. Such vast units would at the same
203. semmel. Imperialism, pp.121-27; Andrew Thompson, 
Thinking Imperially? Imperial Pressure Groups and the 
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time allow population growth, stimulate and sustain a 
dynamic economy, and unite all the social classes.206
For Amery
the question of "decline" was relative to national 
resources and the will to exploit them effectively. The 
rise and fall of states would be determined not only by 
resources but also by skilled and inventive scientific 
management. He wished Britain to retain and increase 
her competitiveness and believed that her future as a 
world power would rest on industrial progress and 
colonial development.207
It was this focus on industrial strength on the 
one hand, and Anglo-Saxon imperial unity on the other, 
which determined the hostility of the Tariff Reformers 
to laisser-faire. Imperial unity was the basis of 
industrial viability in the modern world. The 
industrial strength of Britain and economic interests, 
and not abstract notions of culture, would in turn 
provide the locomotive drawing together the Anglo-Saxon 
Empire. Sapping away both her industrial and imperial 
strength, laisser-faire was the thorn on the flesh of 
Britain. As the Chairman of the Management of the 
Tariff Reform League, Amery in particular argued that 
by supporting only the financial bourgeoisie free trade 
policies directed the resources away from the 
manufacturing base of the country, undermining her 
overall strength.208
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Of Amery"s views on the subject, Thompson says:
In 1907, Amery published a series of papers which 
presented preference not as an abstract economic theory 
but as a fundamental political principle. Supporters of 
preference, it was explained, took as their starting 
point the unity of the Empire, and then analysed 
economic policy from that viewpoint. They regarded free 
trade as indifferent to Empire, and inconsistent with 
the higher political objective of reconstructing 
relationships within the British world.209
Amery in other words was a modernizing and aggressive 
reformer, aware of the tensions between domestic 
commitments and overseas defence. At the same time, he 
believed in the proposition that Britain could afford 
both a welfare state and defence forces overseas.
The Lloyd George Coalition
Much of the social imperialists' thunder was 
stolen by the social reforms enacted under the Liberal 
government between 1908 and 1911: an eight-hour day for 
miners, old-age pensions, minimum wages in sweated 
trades, housing and town planning reforms, and 
unemployment and health insurance. What was more, these 
measures were financed not by tariffs but by higher 
direct taxation falling upon the wealthy. One might 
assume that the men largely behind these reforms, Lloyd 
George as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Churchill 
as the President of the Board of Trade,210 were the 
bete-noires of the social imperialists and particularly 
the Tariff Reformers.
leaving valuable natural resources undeveloped." See 
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Instead, Lloyd George's apparent dynamism and his 
rejection of laisser-faire rather produced a more 
ambivalent, love-hate relationship between the Liberal 
Welshman and the Tory social imperialists. In 1910, 
during the deadlock over the House of Lords crisis, 
Lloyd George went as far as proposing a Liberal- 
Conservative great coalition - Milner's cherished 
national government on a programme that not only 
included a social reform agenda shared by both new 
liberals and social imperialists, but also addressed 
the wishes of the latter with respect to conscription, 
tariff reform and the dropping of home rule.211
The national coalition failed to materialize. 
Nevertheless, Lloyd George had risen in the esteem of 
the Tory social imperialists. During the war, Lloyd 
George's successes at the head of the Ministry of 
Munitions further recommended him to the social 
imperialists. The latter got increasingly angry with 
Prime Minister Asquith and the Liberal imperialists in 
his government for their perceived failure to break the 
stranglehold of "Gladstonianism' even under wartime 
conditions. At the end of 1916, Lloyd George finally 
succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister, heading a 
coalition of the Conservatives with his faction of the 
Liberals.212
Having finally joined the social imperialist fold, 
Lloyd George gave members of the Fabians and of the
211. Scally, The Origins, pp.187-97.
212. Ibid., pp.172-87, 197-370.
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Milner clique important positions at the Ministries of 
Reconstruction and Labour and as advisers for his new 
War Cabinet. Milner himself joined that body of five 
and thus became part of the inner decision-making 
circle.213
Lloyd George enacted much of the social 
imperialists' demands on administrative 'efficiency" by 
curbing the influence of the Parliament and of 
established bureaucracies in favour of the streamlined 
War Cabinet, to which a permanent Secretariat was 
added. He also appointed a number of 'specialists" and 
successful businessmen to the normal cabinet, 
fulfilling another part of the social imperialist 
agenda. Compulsory education and the old-age pension 
and unemployment insurance schemes were extended and a 
major housing programme launched. At the same time, 
there were experiments with a corporatist structure in 
the shape of industrial councils based on equal 
representation of employers and unions. Industrial 
unrest was dealt with by a combination of force and 
reconciliation.
The war brought unpredecented control of 
government over the economy, and there were voices 
which wanted to retain much of this apparatus under 
peacetime conditions. Well-placed under Lloyd George, 
the Tariff Reformers re-launched imperial preferences 
and added imperial settlement schemes. At the same 
time, the government tried to mollify Irish and Indian
213. Ibid., pp. 347-49, 355.
nationalists - a process in which, as we have seen, 
Curtis was heavily involved. After having caved in to 
the demands of the jingoist press and come out in 
favour of heavy reparations to be imposed on Germany at 
the Versailles Conference, Lloyd George's foreign 
policy tried to prevent future German revanchism by 
revising the peace treaty. French desire for security 
was to be met by an Anglo-American security guarantee. 
Good relations with Washington were ensured by the 
acceptance of the mandate principle and by going at 
distance to Japan. Even Soviet Russia was to be brought 
back into the fold by starting trade relations again.
Lloyd George's unique combination of welfare 
corporatism at home and renewed liberal 
internationalism abroad failed to get off the ground. 
The postwar economic crisis enabled those class 
factions related to the money-capital perspective to 
start a counteroffensive using sound finance as their 
battle-cry. A qualified return to the "normalcy' of 
Treasury control and laisser-faire followed. At the 
same time, America's return to isolationism prevented, 
for the time being, a closer cooperation among the 
heartland countries.214
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Conclusion
"Gladstonianism" was the hegemonic ideology with 
which Britain's ruling bloc bolstered its control 
domestically and internationally- On the domestic 
level, the embracement of laisser-faire and of cheap, 
good government allowed the dominant capital faction 
tied to the money-capital perspective to pose as 
antagonist of aristocratic corruption- While a minimal 
state was in its own interest, this anti-aristocratic 
rhetoric allowed the dominant faction to draw upon the 
support of the industrialists, the middle class and the 
workers. On the international level, the policy of free 
trade and peace and the relatively relaxed attitude 
towards the Empire was also in the best interest of 
Britain's ruling class. Given her lead in the financial 
and industrial realms during much of the 19th century, 
Britain could only profit from an open and peaceful 
world order. In both its domestic and international 
aspects, 'Gladstonianism' was a fine specimen of 
liberal internationalism.
Once that hegemonic world order came apart and was 
replaced by inter-imperialist competition, the 
hegemonic ideology also got under siege inside Britain. 
While 'Gladstonianism" no longer seemed to provide the 
goods it promised, the productive-capital perspective 
that was so successfully applied in Germany appeared as 
a more promising alternative. As a result of this 
disenchantment with liberal internationalism, there was 
an intellectual ferment during which a number of 
attempts to forge a new hegemonic ideology arose.
Movements aiming at a closer unity of the Empire 
predated the end of the Pax Britannica. Nevertheless,
the schemes for imperial unity which mushroomed in the 
last third of the 19th century were clearly connected 
with the onset of a new world order. If Britain's 
hegemonic position could no longer be upkept on a 
global scale, it was better at least to draw as much of 
the Lockean heartland as possible together. At the same 
time, by enlisting both Liberals like Rosebery and 
future Conservatives like Chamberlain and Milner into 
their ranks, groups like the Imperial Federation League 
provided a common ground for members of different 
political camps.
While Empire federalism did not challenge the 
basic tenets of liberal internationalism as such, new 
liberalism was a head-on attack on the latter's 
domestic aspects. With its rejection of laisser-faire 
and its propagation of a greater role for the state it 
can be counted as a version of the productive-capital 
perspective. Despite toying with nationalizations, new 
liberalism remained faithful to capitalism. With its 
emphasis on ethics and the provision of good life it 
had all the necessary ingredients for a new hegemonic 
ideology. While adhering to the state monopoly tendency 
domestically, however, new liberalism still retained 
the free trade and cosmopolitan elements of liberal 
internationalism. It was thus a hybrid movement.
The social imperialists were generally more 
clearly related to the state monopoly tendency, even 
though its Liberal component still stuck to free trade. 
Like the new liberals, the social imperialists called 
for greater state intervention. But, unlike them, they 
accepted the competitive character of the new non- 
hegemonic order on the international level.
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Particularly the Tariff Reformers advanced the 
interests of Britain's 'B '-industries facing foreign 
competition. Furthermore, tariffs as revenue-raising 
devices could make higher taxation unnecessary. This 
was, of course, in the interest of the more propertied 
groups. But Tariff Reform and social imperialism in 
general qualified as hegemonic ideology by hiding these 
interests behind the call for national solidarity and 
efficiency in the face of a hostile world.
It was during the Lloyd George government that 
social imperialism came into its own, with 
representatives of the movement occupying important 
posts. Administrative changes aiming at greater 
efficiency, welfare measures and experiments with 
corporatism met the agenda of the state monopoly 
tendency. But in foreign affairs, Lloyd George aimed at 
cooperation among the heartland and at, wherever 
possible, integration of the Hobbesian contenders, thus 
pursuing liberal internationalism by new means. Despite 
the ultimate failure of its programme, the Lloyd George 
government foreshadowed the corporate-liberal synthesis 
of the post-WWI period.
My argument is that we can only adequately 
understand Curtis's thought if we interpret him in the 
context of the shift from one comprehensive concept of 
control to another in early 20th century Britain and of 
the search for hegemonic ideologies propping up this 
shift. Empire federalism, new liberalism and social 
imperialism were such attempts, and Curtis's work 
contains many elements similar to those of these 
movements.
Chapter Seven
Empire Federalism, Hew Liberalism and Social 
Imperialism in the Works of Curtis
Introduction
The discussion of the previous chapter will now 
be connected to the work of Curtis. The argument is 
that many - though not necessarily all - of the 
agendas raised by the different political movements 
just discussed can be found throughout Curtis's work. 
The intellectual ferment of the turn of the century 
had stamped him troughout his intellectual life and 
is still expressed in his publications as late as the 
1940s.
Accordingly, after dealing with his criticism of 
Gladstonianism/the Manchester school we will see how 
Empire federalism was expressed in Curtis's specific 
schemes and, at the same time, transformed to the 
world level. Then, it is argued that many of the 
basics of his commonwealth principle hold elements 
also raised by new liberalism. And in his demands for 
political and social reform, numerous social 
imperialist elements pop up. Finally, Curtis's stance 
towards the question of protectionism, and the place 
of economic issues in general, is discussed.
This does not mean that he self-consciously 
understood himself as a follower of these movements.
It is not clear whether he was aware that there has 
been a rich tradition of imperial federation schemes
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in the 19th century. It is also questionable whether 
he read any of the new liberal writers. And while he 
moved closely in social imperialist cycles, his 
rhetoric was much softer and less outspoken than, 
say, that of Milner. In terms of substance, however, 
the similarities are quite striking.
The "Manchester School"
Similar to all the groups discussed in the 
previous chapter, as well as to Carr,1 Curtis rejects 
19th century-style laisser-faire. His whipping-boy is 
not so much Gladstone but rather Cobden and the 
"Manchester School". His stress on the need for the 
unlimited devotion of the members of a society to 
each other is expressively used to debunk that group. 
Curtis claims that, contrary to the tenets of the 
Manchester School, self interest cannot bind people 
together.2 He also criticizes the Cobdenites' 
mistaken tendency to see trade as a country's 
ultimate goal.3 On another occasion, probably making 
a pun at Norman Angell's expense, Curtis says that 
"the great illusion" that the profit motive was 
behind human action has been shattered by World War
1. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years" Crisis: An Introduction 
to the Study of International Relations, 2nd ed.,
London and Basingstoke: Papermac, (1939) 1995, pp. 7, 
43-46.
2. Lionel Curtis, World War: Its Cause and Cure, 2nd 
ed.. New York: G.P. Putnam"s Sons, 1946, pp.10-11.
3. L. Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations: An Inquiry 
into the Nature of Citizenship in the British Empire, 
and into the Mutual Relations of the Several 
Dependencies Thereof, London: Macmillan, 1916, pp.307-
OS.
I. Instead, 'courage and patriotism" are restored to 
their rightful place.4
More specifically, according to Curtis, the 
Manchester School"s persisting influence caused low 
taxation rates in both the UK and India. The money 
kept by the population was spent on wasteful 
expenditures, while education starved. Thus, both 
countries fell back in the race for industrial and 
general efficiency.5 On another occasion, Curtis 
argues that the disunity of South Africa before union 
prevented the adequate dealing with the issue of 
native troubles. Again, the doctrines of the 
Manchester School are to be blamed for this.6
Finally, Curtis puts the protectionist wing of 
social imperialism into the same compartment as the 
'old orthodoxy" of Cobden, Russell, Gladstone and his 
former employer Courtney. Although these four were 
free traders, for Curtis they share with the Tariff 
Reformers the fault of being satisfied with a mere 
resemblance of imperial unity instead of the 
political bonds which Curtis prefers.7
In these 'anti-Manchester" paragraphs, we have 
the Curtisian vision of social imperialism in a
4. Lionel Curtis, 'Windows of Freedom', in Round Table 8 
(1918), pp.1-47, here p.4. See also Lionel Curtis, 'The 
Price of Liberty', in Round Table 10 (1919), pp.1-20, 
here pp.9-10.
5. L. Curtis, 'Land Revenue' in L. Curtis, Papers 
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy 
to the Government of India, Oxford: Clarendon, 1920, 
pp.239-90, here p.274.
6. Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis, The Prevention of War, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923, p.84.
7. Lionel Curtis, The Green Memorandum. London and 
Bungay: Richard Clay and Sons, 1910, pp.78-79, 83.
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nutshells The concern with social integration, which 
- by implication - is to be achieved through a more 
interventionist state; the guest for efficiency; 
'constructive imperialism"; worries about the threat 
coming from the 'dark races"; the realist favouring 
of security-related 'high politics" over economics- 
related 'low politics"; and, of course, imperial 
unity.
From Imperial Federation to World State
In his earlier attempts at federal 'constitution- 
mongering" Curtis is in line with what Martin calls 
Empire federalism proper. His first work after 
leaving South Africa, The Green Memorandum (1910), 
contains a blueprint for a federation in which the UK 
is on formally equal terms with Canada, South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand. (The fifth and smallest 
Dominion, Newfoundland, is seemingly overlooked.) 
Great Britain herself is to receive Dominion status, 
with control over defence and related matters 
transferred from her legislature to a two-tiered 
imperial parliament.
The Lower House of this imperial parliament is 
directly elected, with representatives distributed 
between the five component states according to their 
relative population strength. In other words, it 
will, for the time being, be dominated by 
representatives from Britain. In contrast, in the 
Upper House, which is to act as a brake on the other
7.AA
chamber and to consist of elder statesmen, each 
component member state is given an equal number of 
deputies. They will be elected either by the people 
or by the state legislatures. The imperial parliament 
elects an imperial government responsible to it and 
seated in Westminster. The parliament itself is 
peripatetic and has its session interchangeably in 
the different major cities of the Empire.
The imperial parliament and government are 
responsible for three issues: First, defence against 
aggression, which for Curtis is the most basic need 
of society. In order to efficiently defend the 
British Empire against the different beasts of prey, 
major military efforts need to be centralized and the 
main striking force has to be under the control of 
the imperial government. Local defence can remain 
under the component states.
Second, foreign policy, since it affects 
decisions about war and peace. There will be an 
imperial Foreign Office and diplomatic corps. 
Component states remain at liberty to make separate 
treaties with foreign powers, but subject to 
ratification by the imperial Upper House.
Third, control of the tropical dependencies.
There will be an imperial colonial service, and 
governors are appointed by the imperial government. 
All other issues, including tariffs, are left to the 
discretion of the member states.
To discharge its duties, the imperial parliament 
enjoys direct taxation power. An independent 
commission assesses the wealth of the different 
component states and calculates their respective 
contribution to the imperial purse accordingly. 
Component states can decide over their system of 
taxation but the state banks are obliged to pay out 
the revenues due to the imperial level in any case.
As far as possible, the contributions of a member 
state will be spent on defence measures within its 
borders•8
Under pressure from other Round Table members, 
who - at this time - wanted to go even further then 
Curtis, he in the following year published a slightly 
different version. The Form of an Organic Union of 
the Empire. Instead of two houses, the new plan 
simply calls for a non-peripatetic single-chamber 
parliament, with the majority of deputies from the 
UK. In wartime, this imperial parliament will be 
given absolute power.9
Similar proposals are mooted in one more 
blueprint, The Problem of the Commonwealth (1916), 
where some additional details on the structure of the 
imperial administration are listed. There will be an 
imperial Foreign Office, an Admiralty, a War Office,
8. Ibid., pp.99-125.
9. Cf. Alexander May, The Round Table, 1910-66. Ph. 
dissertation. University of Oxford, 1995, p.87.
an India Office and a Colonial Office - hitherto all 
reserved to Britain.10
All this is traditional Empire federalism, 
referring to an 'organic" union between Britain and 
the (white) Dominions. It in effect means that the 
Dominions are given a voice in imperial foreign 
affairs, defence and colonial administration 
(hitherto issues decided upon by Britain alone). At 
the same time, however, they are also to participate 
in footing the bill for all that.
Already while he was busily drafting this pan- 
British federation, Curtis"s mind worked into the 
direction of even more ambitious schemes. First, he 
came round to give non-white people a share in the 
imperial federation, too. As early as 1912, he 
suggested that 'natives" from the tropical 
dependencies could be included in the imperial 
parliament - albeit only in an advisory, non-voting 
function.11 In the following years, his opinions on 
the topic quickly advanced and he soon came round to 
accept the idea that, one day, a self-governing India 
could take its place within the Empire-Commonwealth 
in a position of equality with the white component 
states.12 In 1917, he envisages Indian deputies 
elected to the imperial Lower House while the Upper
10. Cf. Anon, and Lionel Curtis, A Canadian Criticism on 
'The Problem of the Commonwealth" and the Author's 
Reply Thereto. 1916, p.3.
11. Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International 
Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995, p.116.
12. Ibid., p. 127.
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House will contain representatives of the Indian 
Princely States and the India Muslims.13
Curtis also made his first suggestion for a world 
state in order to end wars once and for all in a 1915 
article. There, he already provides the basic 
outlines for his future, more elaborate blueprints. 
The world state will grow out of a union of the most 
democratic states. Other countries can join step by 
step. The union will pool control over colonies and 
semi-colonies and gradually train them for self- 
government and equal participation in the union. 
Curtis gives no details over the constitutional 
arrangements of this world state, except that world 
law is to be paramount and, if necessary, backed up 
by force. Curiously, he mentions the (unfederated) 
British Commonwealth as an example of how the world 
commonwealth might ultimately look like. This 
suggests that, at this stage, he still expects the 
world state to be rather loosely constructed.14 Some 
years later, he reasserts that the British 
Commonwealth is a practical step in the direction of 
a world government.15
Compared to the detailed outlines for imperial 
federation, these suggestions for a world state have 
a tentative and sketchy character. This may have to
13. L. Curtis, "A Letter to the People of India", in L.
Curtis, Papers Relating to the Application of the
Principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India,
Oxford: Clarendon, 1920, pp.38-95, here pp.86-88.
14. Lionel Curtis, 'The End of War", in Round Table 5
(1915), pp.772-96, here pp.781-88.
15. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.157.
do with the fate of the earlier blueprints. Not only 
federation proper but any kind of organic union for 
the British Empire was unambiguously turned down by 
the Imperial Conference of Britain and the Dominions 
in 1921.16 About this time, for all his federal 
enthusiasm, Curtis accepted the fact that imperial 
federation would take generations to materialize.17 
Under these circumstances, it did not make much sense 
to keep on producing blueprints. After The Problem of 
the Commonwealth, it took Curtis over twenty years 
before he resumed drafting international federations.
His first exercise after the long interval takes 
place in the third volume of Civitas Dei (1937) and 
still only provides rather broad outlines. Once more, 
there is a federal legislature and an executive with 
their own taxation power controlling federal foreign 
relations and the administration of dependencies.
A start will be made by a closer coming-together 
of countries of the British Commonwealth, although 
initially on a much more modest fashion than in the 
1910-16 blueprints. Only Britain, Australia and/or 
New Zealand will merge their sovereignties at first. 
This rather limited union is made possible by the 
cultural and political similarities and the common 
security requirements connecting them (by which he 
probably refers to the fact that the Anzacs depend 
upon the Royal Navy for their defence).
16. Lavin, From Empire, p.114.
17. May, Round Table, p.217.
With the principle of international commonwealth 
having become reality, other coutries can be induced 
to join. Given their geostrategical position on the 
sea-route connecting Britain and the Antipodeans, 
Egypt and India are natural candidates. At the time 
of their joining the federation, both countries will 
not yet be fully self-governing. Thus, Curtis wants 
an (unspecified) special membership status for them. 
Having these two countries in the fold, the 
international commonwealth gets a multi-racial 
character•
Next to join are the Western European countries 
likewise interested in the road towards the East: The 
Netherlands (Curtis obviously has her colonial 
possession in present-day Indonesia in mind) as well 
as Belgium and the Scandinavian countries (where the 
connection to the East is less clear)• After them, 
countries like France will follow. With these new 
entries, the federation has outgrown its British 
Empire origins.
Now, the remaining Dominions (Ireland, South 
Africa and Canada) will enter, followed by the USA. 
With American participation, the international 
commonwealth will be strong enough to secure global 
peace. It will now only be a matter of time until the 
remaining states as well as the dependencies, once 
they govern themselves, can enter the federation.18
18. Lionel Curtis, Civitas Deis The Commonwealth of God. 
London: Macmillan, 1938, pp.931-39.
Curtis's resumption of federal planning was 
timely, because in the late 1930s federal schemes 
mushroomed. As we have seen, Curtis warmly endorsed 
Streit's Union Now, which envisaged a super-state 
embracing Britain, Western Europe, the Dominions and 
the USA.19 His support was largely tactical. Compared 
to Curtis's vision, Streit's union was more 
centralised, had also competence over economic 
matters, and neglected the question of the 
dependencies. Nevertheless, Curtis's enthusiasm was 
big enough that he rejected all plans for a purely 
European federation, as advanced by the Federal 
Union, in favour of Streit's Atlantic union.20
Another vision that seems to have grown out of 
expediency rather than complete conviction was 
Curtis's idea to extend the June 1940 British offer 
to France about an immediate union. Curtis wanted 
this offer also to be made to the Dominions, the Low 
Countries, Norway and (envisaging, however, a 
subordinate status for them) Poland and 'Bohemia'.21 
As Curtis was aware, the original plan for an Anglo- 
French union included not only a wartime joint 
cabinet and the 'association' of both parliaments but 
also joint organs for foreign policy, defence and 
economic and financial matters.22 As in the case of
19. Clarence K. Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a
Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic,
London and Toronto: Jonathan Cape, 1939.
20. May, Round Table, pp.358-59.
21. Ibid., pp.367-68.
22. Lionel Curtis, Decision, Oxford and London: Oxford
University Press and Humphrey Milford, 1941, p.42.
Streit's book, Curtis jumped on the bandwagon of a 
project that went in some respects further than he 
liked.
It is in his publications of 1941-46 that Curtis 
comes back to his specific version of an 
international union. Since these works refer to each 
other and contain more or less the same proposals, 
they can be treated as a whole. Under the slogan 'a 
British initiative proposed", he wants the British 
government to pick up the courage telling the 
Dominions that the UK is no longer able to carry the 
peacetime defence burdens of the Commonwealth alone. 
Instead, a federal structure encompassing Great 
Britain and some or all of the Dominions is to be 
erected - imperial unity once more. However, it does 
not stop here.
After having been told that no guarantee of 
protection against renewed German aggression can be 
given to them if they stay outside, the Scandinavian 
and Low Countries, Switzerland and (provided that a 
democratic system has been restored) France will join 
the union. They may soon be followed by Britain's 
Eastern European allies, i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Greece.
Once this truly international commonwealth has 
had a successful existence for a time, the United 
States can be convinced to enter the fold. And after 
that, time will be ripe for a reformed Germany and 
for countries like India and China to follow suit.
Instead of London or of a peripatetic 
arrangement, Curtis now proposes Quebec as the 
federal capital. He lists strategic and cultural 
reasons as well as the fact that the United States 
will be more willing to join if the federation has a 
North American capital.
In terms of constitutional arrangements, Curtis 
harks back to his 1910s plans. There is to be a 
federal executive, a two-chamber parliament and a 
Supreme Court. In the Upper house, which has only 
advisory function, each component state gets the same 
number of deputies. Concerning the more important 
Lower House, Curtis at first settles again for 
distribution of deputies to member states according 
to population size while granting some over­
representation to the Dominions. In the later 
versions, he instead proposes that representation is 
to be tied to taxation capacities and thus to 
national wealth. In other words, the richer countries 
will be over-represented.
In the case that one country will send a number 
of deputies surpassing those of all the other 
countries combined (which will be the case with 
Britain vis-a-vis the Dominions in the earliest stage 
of the federation), Curtis does not expect them to 
vote en bloc but to divide according to political 
stances. This, however, is the reason why only 
democratic states are allowed to join.
The federal parliament has its own taxation 
powers. Again going back to the earlier imperial 
federation plans, an independent committee will 
assess the taxation capabilities of the member 
states, after which the state banks have to transfer 
the necessary sum to the federal bank.
The federal government and parliament will exert 
control over defence and matters inseperable thereof. 
Curtis lists foreign affairs and colonies (as in the 
old imperial federation blueprints) but now adds a 
federal merchant marine (to be used in wartime) and 
control over civil aviation between the component 
states. Furthermore, during a war the federal level 
will be given emergency powers. But, under normal 
conditions, its competences are limited to the issues 
just mentioned. Parting way with other federalists 
like Streit, Curtis is particularly adamant that 
control over economic issues (namely tariffs) and 
social composition (i.e. immigration laws) is to be 
left to each member country.23
Although not exactly a carbon copy of Curtis's 
imperial federation schemes, his 1941-46 proposals 
still follow the earlier blueprints quite closely.
The main difference is that organic union will not
23. Ibid., pp.45-69; Lionel Curtis, Action, Oxford and 
London: Oxford University Press and Humphrey Milford, 
1942, pp.11-17, 38-56, 66-69; Lionel Curtis, The Wav to 
Peace, Oxford and London: Oxford University Press and 
Humphrey Milford, 1944, pp.23-26, 29-32, 61-76; Curtis, 
World War, pp.77-88, 111-17, 134-48, 154-62, 167, 171- 
72, 179-83, 201-02, 222-33, 262-64; Lionel Curtis, War 
or Peace?, Oxford and London: Oxford University Press 
and Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1946, pp.42-54.
stop with the British Commonwealth but that 
Continental Europe, the USA and, at the end, the rest 
of the world will also come in. Nevertheless, the 
coming together of Britain and the Dominions, i.e. 
the good old imperial federation, will be the first 
step.
From 1946 onwards, there was a shift of emphasis 
in his federation plans as Curtis got involved in 
Churchill's United Europe movement. Already in late 
1945, Curtis proposed to Foreign Secretary Bevin an 
international assembly of Europe to which the 
Dominions would join later. As a member of United 
Europe, he likewise came out in support of a Western 
European federation. Propagating a union of Britain 
with Western Europe rather then with the Dominions as 
the first step to a world state is seemingly a break 
with his previous tenets. However, as in the case of 
his endorsement of Union Now, this was probably 
tactical.
In any case, Curtis remained faithful enough to 
his old ideas to be concerned that the Dominions 
would not be left out of the federation. Using the 
argument that a European union controlling the bulk 
of Africa would concern them anyway, he in 1947-48 
urged Southern Rhodesian politicians to send deputies 
to the planned European Assembly.24
In World Revolution in the Cause of Peace (1949), 
Curtis stresses that during the convention framing
24. Lavin, From Empire, pp.301, 304-05, 308-11, 314.
the Western European union (which will also include 
West Germany) Dominion statesmen should be present. 
They can bring in their federal experience and shape 
the federation in a way that the Dominions can join 
it quickly. Curtis repeats his argument about the 
necessity to restrict federal competences to defence 
and related matters like colonies and about taxation 
and parliamentary representation according to 
national wealth. There are two new elements:
Component states will also keep issuing their own 
passports. And there is to be a federal currency that 
will exist side by side with the national currencies 
and which may ultimately replace them. A Cold War 
aspect is provided by the vision of the Eastern Bloc 
collapsing and its states joining the union.25
His last exercise in federal blueprinting, The 
Open Road to Freedom (1950) similarly repeats most of 
the above points. Here, he simply writes of a general 
Western federation without going into details about 
which states will join and in which order. A new 
element is the idea of a floating capital that will 
visit all the major union port towns in turn. Here, 
Curtis goes back to his peripatetic imperial 
parliament of 1910. Otherwise, the book includes a 
draft constitution for the federation by a Professor 
Hanbury, endorsed by Curtis. In this version, there 
is a single-chamber parliament elected for two years
2S. Lionel Curtis, World Revolution in the Cause of
Peace, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949, pp.132-43, 149-
54, 158-62.
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with representation approportioned among states 
according to national wealth. Furthermore, there will 
be a federal President elected for three years and an 
executive Council. The President and at least 2/3 of 
the Councillers will have to come from the ten 
richest member states. A Court of the Union is also 
provided.26
The Principles of Commonwealth and of the State
Having similarly been influenced by the Idealism 
of T.H. Green, Curtis shared with the new liberals 
the faith in a rational humanity, in the importance 
of ideas and of free will, in altruism and self- 
sacrifice, and in the state as the prime agent for 
the collective good of the community. Furthermore, he 
like them discounts excessive individualism27 in 
favour of the idea that the individual is an organic 
part of society. It is this idea that is behind his 
concept of the commonwealth, on which his political 
programmes are based.
As we have already seen, Curtis sketches an 
evolutionary development in which three concepts - 
the tribal one, theocratic despotism and the 
commonwealth - succeed each other. This development 
corresponds to a moral progress, with the 
commonwealth being on top.28 A similar threefold 
division has also been advanced by new liberal 
thinking, as has the optimistic notion of mankind's
26. Lionel Curtis, The Open Road to Freedom. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1950, pp.26-28, 32-48, 59-64.
27. Curtis, 'End', p.780.
28. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.3-12.
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ethical evolution, Curtis foresees an ultimate stage 
in which man's sense of unlimited duty to his fellow 
human beings will not stop at national borders but 
encompass the whole world.29 This links with new 
liberalism's notion of ever widening and intense 
solidarity.
Like the new/left liberals, Curtis stresses that 
it is not force as such that holds states together 
(whether autocratic or democratic) but the moral 
ideas behind them.30 While autocratic systems are 
based on the belief in man's duty to the Deity 
personified in the despotic ruler, the commonwealth 
in contrast is founded upon the citizens' recognition 
of their personal obligation to contribute to the 
common good. It is this infinite obligation of each 
to all, and not a social contract in the vein of 
Hobbes or Rousseau, which is the main principle 
holding society together. Founded on this sense of 
public duty, the commonwealth demands unlimited 
obedience from its citizens. Furthermore, these 
obligations create a responsibility for action, 
guided by reason and conscience.31
Indeed, according to Curtis citizenship is based 
more upon obligations (including, if necessary, 
sacrificing one's life).32 Political liberties are
29. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.926-27.
30. Ibid., p.8; Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.7-8, 137-38.
31. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.23-24, 603-06; Kerr and 
Curtis, Prevention, pp.139-43; Curtis, Civitas Dei, 
pp.160-65; Curtis, Decision, pp.7-8; Curtis, World War, 
p. 62.
32. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.76. See also Lionel 
Curtis, 'Untempered Mortars The Case for Organic 
Union', in Round Table 38 (1948), pp.524-34, here 
p.530•
also, first of all, an obligation. Curtis mentions 
'the need and the duty of men to govern themselves, 
and not ... their right to do so'.33 As shown in the 
previous chapter, new liberalism in a similar vein 
considered voting not just a right but also a duty. 
And the social reforms it advocated aimed not so much 
at private happiness but at making the individual 
better able to fulfill his public duties.
For Curtis, the authority which enables the
commonwealth to appeal to its citizens' sense of duty
is based upon the rule of written law. This law, in
turn, is derived from a public opinion competent to
establish and to change it.34 In a commonwealth, most
citizens recognize the common interest as being above
their own and do not have to be coerced to obey the
laws. However, there will always be those who fail to
put the general interest before their own.
Unless they are constrained, the law will cease to 
operate at all, and the decisions upon which it rests 
lose their effect. If the commonwealth is to exist, 
it must call upon those who recognize their duty to 
obey it to enforce its decisions on those who do not. 
The basis of law is devotion, not force, but a 
commonwealth must use that devotion to enforce its 
law.35
In this context, Curtis likes to quote Mahan that the 
function of force is to give moral ideas time to take 
root.36 Interestingly, this assumption is 
characterized (and criticized) as a typically realist
33. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.151.
34. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.23-24; Kerr and Curtis, 
Prevention, pp.117-19.
35. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.51-52. See also Curtis, 
World War, pp.12-16.
36. Curtis, Commonwealth. p.59; Kerr and Curtis, 
Prevention, p.142.
one by Carr.37 In any case, this coercive aspect of 
Curtis's concept is in line with new liberalism's 
call for the state to constrain recalcitrant 
minorities trying to sabotage reforms and for the 
need of compulsion in the interest of the whole.
But despite the binding force of laws, the
possibility of conscientous objection remains.
In the last resort, however, there is no external 
authority, not even that of a law made by general 
consent, which a man may accept as overriding his own 
conscience. The commonwealth rests on the principle 
that in the last resort each man must decide for 
himself between right and wrong. For its end and 
object is to render them fitter for such decisions.38
The power of the state ensuring the safety of life
and property of its citizens is merely a means to an
ultimate end: The continuous growth of the character
and mind of the citizens, of their devotion to each
other, and of their capacity to judge measures for
the general welfare.39 This echoes the new liberal
idea that right political and social conditions, and
in particular the state, contribute to an improval of
the character of the individual.
Curtis parts, however, with new liberalism on the 
question of voting rights. While thinkers of the 
latter movement criticized restrictions on the 
franchise, Curtis provides an apology for such 
practices. The principles of the commonwealth, 
despite being linked to those of democracy, do not 
completely overlap with them. The commonwealth rests 
upon mutual responsibility, which, however, is seldom 
distributed equally. The governing power in the
37. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.93.
38. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.52.
39. Ibid., pp.52-53. See also pp.160-65, 219, 813-14.
commonwealth therefore has to rest with those who
have more knowledge.40 Commonwealth thus does not
necessarily mean everyone having a vote.
The idea that the principle of commonwealth implies 
universal suffrage betrays an ignorance of its real 
nature. That principle simply means that government 
rests on the duty of the citizens to each other, and 
is to be vested in those who are capable of setting 
public interest before their own.41
Nevertheless, progressing towards democracy is the
ultimate goal of a commonwealth. A balance needs to
be found that stays clear both of enfranchising too
many people not fit to the task and of, by going too
slow, preventing people from learning the art of
self-government.42 He explains:
The more the voters, the greater the difficulty of 
practical government. Where those who exercise power 
are few it is for the moment easier to govern and 
maintain order. So those who recognize the vital 
importance of order are disposed to limit power to 
the few. But in doing so they are apt to forget that 
they leave unexercised and undeveloped the sense of 
devotion in the many to the state as a whole. The 
wise democrat is one ready to risk immediate order to 
a certain degree in order to cultivate in a large 
number of citizens that loyalty and knowledge of 
public affairs upon which in the long run the 
structure of the state can alone rest in security.43
His elastic conception of voting rights leads 
Curtis to give some idiosyncratic examples of 
'democracy". In 1919, just after a voting reform in 
Britain, he writes that 'no important section of 
citizens are now debarred from casting a vote",44 even 
though women under 30 still were. Even more 
strikingly, in his 1940s tracts he counts the USA in
Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.154-55.
41 • Ibid., p.181.
42. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.72; Kerr and Curtis, 
Prevention, pp.152-54.
43. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.72.
44. Curtis, 'Price", p.11.
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1789, South Africa in 1910 and Southern Rhodesia in 
1948 as democracies45 - despite property-, race- or 
gender-related restrictions on voting in these cases. 
Conversely, he mentions the outcomes of the 1917 
Russian and 1911 Chinese revolutions as warning 
examples of democracy without responsibility.46
Curtis's link between possessing voting rights 
and having the correct spirit of public devotion is a 
fine example of a hegemonic ideology that allows him 
(and the dominant bloc within Britain) to have their 
cake and eat it, too. In principle, one upholds 
democracy as a universal value. In practice, one can 
withhold democratic rights from the bulk of humanity 
(namely people in the colonial dependencies, but also 
certain groups within Britain and the Dominions) with 
the argument that they are not yet fit for it. The 
question of how this fitness is to be defined and who 
has the intrinsic right to define it is conveniently 
ignored. New liberalism, for all its elitist traits, 
never went that far.
On the other hand, Curtis is at one with the new 
liberals in giving prime importance to the state. His 
definitions vary: 'a community of human beings 
organized on the basis of mutual service',47 'an 
institution designed to adjust the relations of its 
component members of communities without 
(unnecessary) violence',48 'composed of the
45. Curtis, Wav, p.61; Curtis, World War, pp.262, 264; 
Curtis, 'Untempered Mortar', p.525.
46. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.151.
47. Curtis, 'End', p.775.
4®. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.114-15.
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people inhabiting definite areas ... who are all 
expected to obey one common direction"49 or 'simply 
all the citizens who compose (it)".50 In line with 
most British writers dealing with the state at the 
turn of the century,51 Curtis seems to understand it 
as the whole community and not just as specific 
institutions concerned with administration and 
coercion. He is indeed critical of the German 
understanding of the state, calling it an 'obedient 
dedication to an impersonal abstraction misnamed the 
state ".52
Like new liberalism, Curtis expects from the 
state the provision of a good life for the 
population.53 Statehood, not anarchy, is the road to 
freedom. A commonwealth can only be realized in a 
state.54 Again, like new liberalism, Curtis stresses 
that the state and its claim for duty overrides all 
other kinds of association, like churches, 
corporations or unions.55
Aside from these rather abstract notions, Curtis 
uses the concept of the state and of the commonwealth 
in order to bring home the need for organic imperial 
unity: The British Empire secures the conditions that 
none of its component parts go to war with each other 
and protects them against attacks from the outside.
49. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, p.135.
50. Curtis, World War, p.70.
51. James Meadowcroft, Conceptualizing the State:
Innovation and Dispute in British Political Thought
1880-1914, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.
52. Curtis, 'End", p.780.
53 . Curtis, Open Road, p.36.
54. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.89.
55. Curtis, World War, p.15.
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According to the second definition above, it 
qualifies as a state from the international point of 
view. Within the British Empire, governing power is 
restricted to citizens of European origin. This is an 
acceptable situation because the premature extension 
of representative institutions to the other racial 
components of the Empire would cause anarchy. But it 
is because of the exclusion of Dominion citizens from 
a share in the imperial responsibilities that the 
British Empire loses the character of a state from 
the domestic point of view. It also fails to realize 
the principles of the commonwealth.56
Curtis shows an awareness of the changing 
functions of the state. Looking back at the 
connection between science and the increasing 
authority of the state at the end of the 19th 
century, he asserts:
At the close of the eighteenth century the functions 
of government were thought of as limited to the 
maintenance of order. By the end of the nineteenth 
science had forced government to invade every 
department of human life. The state had become of 
greater importance to the life of each citizen. The 
demands which it made on him were also greater.57
This links to the issue of social reform, where
Curtis draws upon both new liberalism and social
imperialism, but especially upon the latter.
Social Reform
As we have seen, Curtis already had an interest 
in social problems when he was a young man. For 
instance, he dressed up as a tramp in order to get
56. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.14-17.
57. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.818.
first-hand experience of poverty and for a time was 
social worker in the East End.58 With these 
activities, he aimed at
bridging the gulf between the classes and to lead 
some of the lower and middle classes to a sense of a 
higher purpose in life apart from the hard struggle 
for existence.59
What this higher purpose in life would be was, of 
course, to be decided by Oxbridge-educated members of 
the professional elite, including Curtis. The call 
for harmonious relations between the classes is a 
handy hegemonic device. By implicitely stamping class 
struggle as illegitimate, it bolsters the established 
social order. This is in the interest of the ruling 
classes, who are merely asked to give some minor 
material concessions to the underclasses in return.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, class 
harmony was also an important issue to both the 
liberals (whether new or centrist) and the social 
imperialists.
The need for this became more urgent during World 
War I. In a 1915 article, Curtis bemoans the 
prevalence of class contradictions in pre-war 
Britain. The rich were not willing to share their 
privileges and the workers forgot the welfare of the 
nation as a whole.60 Three years later, he goes as far 
as claiming that, had WW I not broken out, the Irish 
crisis might have turned into a civil war between the
58. Lavin, From Empire, pp.11-12, 15-18.
59. Ibid., p. 15.
60. Curtis, "End', p.794.
classes in the whole UK.61 He refers to 'the millions 
in these Islands who were under-fed, under-clothed 
and under-housed" but continues that '(t)he blame for 
these evils could not be located or assigned to any 
... body of men".62
This motif continues in the later works. In 
Civitas Dei, he asserts:
The worst feature of slums was ••. the segregation of 
rich and poor in separate communities, where they 
lost sight of their duty one to another.63
One may assume that the 'duty" of the lower classes
is acceptance of their subordinate position, and that
of the ruling classes to buy this acquiesence with a
few material benefits. Echoing Chamberlain"s argument
about the rich owing 'ransom" to the poor, after WW
II Curtis demands the use of capital supplied by the
prosperous classes for providing a decent standard of
living to slum dwellers.64
Like the Webbs, Curtis combined the call for 
social reform with a despising attitude to the 
masses. Already at public school, he argued that only 
the morally fit are entitled to vote. Not yet using 
his flowery commonwealth rhetoric, we for once get 
Curtis"s opinion expressed bluntly:
(L)iberty misused is no liberty, and all the liberty 
the poor gain by their votes is a power to starve or 
get drunk. ... (V)otes were given to the slum 
population, who, in turn, became the national 
rulers.65
61. Lionel Curtis, 'The Better Government of the United 
Kingdom", in Round Table 8 (1918), pp.750-77, here
p.763.
62. Ibid., p.750.
63. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.891.
64. Curtis, War, p.53.
65. Lavin, From Empire, p.10.
In The Green Memorandum, he elaborates upon this. The 
growth of industry and commerce has negative effects 
on the efficiency (i.e. virility) of the British. The 
best people have emigrated. Curtis idealizes those 
living in rural areas as healthy and energetic. 
Particularly a tough landscape creates virile people. 
In contrast, he depicts those living in towns as 
physically and psychologically weak and as prone to 
fall prey to the yellow press. By now, most British 
immigrants to Canada are unfit townies, who 
constitute the human wastage of slums.66
In his subsequent works, such Social Darwinist 
lambasting is replaced by a more patronizing tone. 
Thus, we are assured that the '"qualities essential to 
a courteous gentleman are not limited to any one 
class' but - hear, hear - can also be found among 
railway guards and inspectors.67 Referring to WW II, 
he points out that the humblest of the British have 
sacrificed themselves most freely.68 Neverthless, some 
kind of negative Social Darwinism lingers on in his 
thinking. Wars, through causing the deaths of the 
"best people', trigger a process of moral decline.69
While it is obvious that Curtis writes as an 
organic intellectual supporting upper-class interests 
and values, it is more difficult to place him into a 
specific class faction and its concept of control.
Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.20-22, 31, 34-35.
67. L. Curtis, "Introduction', in L. Curtis, Papers 
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy 
to the Government of India, Oxfords Clarendon, 192 0, 
p.xlix.
68. Curtis, World War, p.106.
69. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
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Especially in his earlier works, he showed some 
hostility to the corporative elements of the state 
monopoly tendency, which was embraced by social 
imperialists like Milner. Although as Oxford student 
he had come out publicly in favour of mining workers" 
right to strike,70 his opinion of Canadian unionism 
was quite circumspect. He calls it 'sinister" because 
it supports unreliable British workers. This, in 
turn, forces employers to take Italian labourers.71 On 
another occasion, Curtis approvingly quotes a 
criticism of the British Trade Dispute Act of 1906 
providing for legal immunities of employers and 
workmen, According to this criticism, this violates 
the rule of equal law.72
In a 1919 article, Curtis dwells upon the power 
of big business and organized labour from a different 
angle. The dependence of society upon industrial 
production, transportation, communication and 
utilities gives extraordinary degrees of power to 
certain groups. On the one hand, there are the 
captains of industry. (Significantly, City bankers 
are not mentioned.) On the other hand, the workers 
become increasingly aware that they can hold the rest 
of the population at ransom by striking. Curtis 
points at the spectre of the Russian Revolution but 
also praises British and American labour leaders for
70. Lavin, From Empire, p.14.
71. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.38.
72. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.121 n.l.
their moderation,73 About the same time, left and 
centrist liberals got concerned about the power of 
what they considered labour's sectional interests.
Besides his rejection of corporatism, there are 
other elements of the money-capital perspective in 
his works. In the 1930s, he considered continued 
adherence to free trade in Britain's best interest.74 
In 1949, with Britain recovering from her postwar 
economic problems, he stresses the importance of a 
stable Pound and of the meeting of debts.75 The Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Dalton is subject to 
Curtis's criticism for his unsound finances while his 
successor Cripps gets praise for winning back "the 
confidence of the City and of public opinion'.76
On the other hand, Curtis approves of the 'aid, 
guidance and authority of the State' in tackling 
poverty.77 Initially, he hesitated a bit. In 1910, he 
deems the Liberal scheme for old-age pensions as one 
of these 'sensational measures' an inefficient 
government is forced to resort to.78 This is in line 
with the social imperialist criticism of the Asquith 
government. As we have seen, they were not opposed to 
these welfare schemes as such but did not want them 
to be paid at the expense of defence.
73. Curtis, 'Price', pp.7, 9.
74. May, Round Table, p.295.
75. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.144-45, 162.
76. Ibid., p. 171.
77. Curtis, 'Better Government', p.750.
78. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.91.
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Then, writing in 1917, Curtis supports Lloyd 
George's taxes on land, as in the infamous 'red 
budget' of 1909. Because certain rises in the value 
of land are due to the general efforts of the 
community and not of the landowner, the former has a 
just claim on the unearned income of the latter.79 
This is a kind of argument also used by the new 
liberals, although not just with respect to land but 
to property inequalities as such.
Curtis's most original contribution to the issue 
of social reform is his argument for the 
establishment of an imperial or, later, international 
parliament responsible for defence, foreign and 
colonial affairs. He stresses that the need to deal 
with such imperial matters prevents the Westminster 
parliament from tackling domestic problems 
adequately80 and that the efforts to run a vast empire 
has had negative effects upon Britain's 'internal 
efficiency'.81
Conversely, domestic affairs also distract the 
politicians from conducting foreign affairs in an 
efficient way, specifically in the shape of a firm 
foreign policy, which would have prevented World War 
I.82 Finally, voters are at a loss whether they should 
choose the party they prefer on social reform issues 
(the Liberals?) or the one which they trust more on
79. Curtis, 'Land Revenue', pp.245-46.
80. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.92-94.
81. Curtis, 'Windows', p.30.
82. Anon, and Curtis, Canadian Criticism, pp.33-34, 36.
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foreign affairs (the Conservatives?),83 Separation of 
domestic and imperial affairs into two different 
parliaments, one responsible for the United Kingdom 
only and one for the Empire, is thus a way for 
greater efficiency.
There is also the financial aspect calling for 
imperial federation. As Curtis points out in 1917, 
especially due to the war debts it will be difficult 
for the United Kingdom to provide a navy and army 
capable of defending the whole Empire and, at the 
same time, to finance public education and other 
social measures at home. Revenues for defence now 
need to be raised from all inhabitants of the Empire. 
This, in turn, necessitates a separation between an 
imperial and a British parliament.84
Curtis repeats this reasoning some decades later, 
this time in the context of the international 
commonwealth. In 1945, he argues that for national 
governments to be able to deal with social reform, 
security issues have to be taken over by an 
international government.85 Four years later, he comes 
back to his major themes of efficiency. Governments 
are overburdened, and what is required for effective 
social reform is the separation between national and 
international issues.86
In these 1940s writings Curtis also says that
83. Ibid., p.27.
84. Curtis, 'Letter to the People of India', pp.83-84.
85. Curtis, World War, pp.167-72.
86. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.146-47.
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the menace of war distracts from social reforms, 
particularly those concerning the tackling of 
unemployment, education, housing, and health.87 This 
list shows that he has by now fully endorsed the 
concept of the welfare state attributed to the 
productive-capital perspective.
Curtis on one occasion even seems to come out in 
favour of radical change. In Civitas Dei, he goes as 
far as saying that the principle of commonwealth 
needs to be applied not only to politics but also to 
economics. The quest for personal gain cannot provide 
stable social relations and the dependence of firms 
on the control of a handful of directors is not to be 
sustained in the long term.88 It is not clear what 
kind of economic arrangement Curtis favours instead. 
As we have seen, both left and centrist liberalism 
were also wont to talk of industrial democracy, but 
only the former had substantive changes and workers" 
participation in management in mind.
While Curtis criticizes those Labour politicians 
who only support European unity if it will contribute 
to a socialist Europe,89 he is not hostile to their 
party as such. Thus he argues that, had national and 
international issues been separated in the 1945 
British elections, the Labour Party could have gotten
®7. Curtis, Decision, pp.20, 55; Curtis, Action, pp.43-
44, 47-48; Curtis, Wav, pp.26-27; Curtis, World War: 
pp.44, 61, 79, 210, 228-29.
Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.165-66.
Curtis, World Revolution, pp.86-88, 97-99, 127.
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an even bigger majority.90 This prospect does not seem 
to greatly upset him. He even says that in a federal 
union, capitalist and socialist states can exist side 
by side.91
But although he is quite tolerant or even 
favourably disposed to the Attlee government, Curtis 
strongly opposes the more radical alternatives to the 
existing hegemonic bloc. For him, thinkers like Marx 
have fostered the belief that social reforms can only 
be undertaken by a dictator.92 Curtis goes as far as 
mentioning Hitler's Mein Kampf, the Qur'an and Marx's 
writings in one spell.93 He considers Catholicism, 
Islam, Communism, and Nazism as equally authoritarian 
creeds94 and argues that Fascism and Nazism are by­
products of Marxism.95
In this respect, there is another overlap with 
Carr, who considers both Marx and Hitler as realists 
advocating the rights of the "have-nots' (in Marx's 
case: classes, in Hitler's: states) against the 
"haves'.96 Curtis, of course, has other 
preoccupations. For him, there is a mortal combat 
between the principles of the British Commonwealth 
and those of Marx.97
90. Ibid., p.166.
Curtis, Open Road, pp.38-39.
92. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.715, 723, 889-90; Curtis,
Decision, p.19; Curtis, World War, p.43.
93. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.738.
94. ibid., p.862.
95. Ibid., p. 890; Lionel Curtis, "World Order', in
International Affairs 18 (1939), pp.301-20, here p.311.
90. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p.77.
97. May, Round Table, p.259.
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Political Reform
As has already been shown earlier in this 
chapter, Curtis did not embrace the democratic system 
whole-heartedly but wanted the franchise to be 
limited to those with the right sense of public duty. 
Leaving aside his more abstract elaborations on the 
commonwealth (which Milner, who otherwise had a high 
opinion of Curtis, called 'flapdoodle"),98 Curtis 
followed the social imperialists in their critique of
the existing parliamentary arrangements.
In The Green Memorandum, Curtis argues that the
British parliament is overburdened with trivial 
issues. The political business goes at the expense of 
administrative work. There is also lack of 
coordination between Cabinet members. An inefficient 
government and parliament are unable to address 
issues of social reform (by which Curtis understands 
eugenics and tackling poverty) systematically. Party 
discipline on imperial issues further stifles free 
discussion of domestic problems. Their declining 
influence on the course of legislation leads MPs to 
pursue unconstructive policies. Politics degenerate 
into a struggle for office and acquires an emotional 
character. As a result, reform measures cannot be 
discussed on their merits.99
In other contexts, he diagnosed the declining 
quality of MPs and the incapability of politicians to 
approach issues from the perspective of better
Ibid., p.95.
Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.86-94, 135-36.
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government. Then, Churchill was for him a good 
example of an unprincipled politician.100
In 1918, using similar arguments in a memorandum 
to the Ministry of Reconstruction's Committee on the 
Machinery of Government and in a Round Table article, 
he bemoans the inability of the British parliament to 
meet an increasing number of complex issues. Despite 
its unwieldy oversize, the House of Commons has 
become congested with an immense number of 
parliamentary acts. There is no longer time available 
to debate all of them and, if necessary, to amend 
them properly. Consequently, demagogery and the 
treatment of issues on the basis of emotions are 
increasing. Given how precious parliamentary time is, 
the government does not dare to introduce acts likely 
to produce opposition but unlikely to create public 
sentiments. This enables vested interests to block 
unspectacular but necessary meassures concerning 
local taxation, poor law or land-titles. Acts which 
prove faulty cannot be revised properly because a 
move for amendment might end up in raising opposition 
to the whole act.101
What, then, was to be done? As seen in the 
previous section, Curtis advocated ending 
parliamentary over-congestion by stripping 
Westminster of its competences to deal with foreign, 
defence and colonial matters in favour of an imperial 
parliament. Furthermore, in 1918-19 he uses the
10°. Lavin, From Empire, pp. 112, 121.
101. Curtis, "Better Government", pp.751-63; Robert 
Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The 
Politics of Social Imperialism, 1900-1918. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975, pp.350-51.
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congestion argument to call for federalizing the 
United Kingdom itself by setting up provincial 
parliaments.102 This is 'home rule all round" once 
more, an issue on which the social imperialists had 
an open mind.
Curtis"s stance on one of the pet schemes of some 
social imperialists - transfer of parliamentary 
powers to experts and committees - is contradictory. 
In his memorandum to the Reconstruction Ministry, 
Curtis wants important issues to be taken out of the 
hand of parliament and be given into that of experts 
and non-partisan committees.103 And, two years later, 
he writes that 'many of the evils of party 
government" can be avoided if parliament spends less 
time with debating and more with collecting evidence 
through select committees.104
Conversely, in 1916 he claims that the control 
over foreign policy by secret committees (the 
Committee for Imperial Defence?) prevented the 
British population from realizing the seriousness of 
international affairs before WWI.105 More starkly, in 
a 1919 article he charges parliamentary committees as 
being ploys used by opponents of reform and of 
stiffling public debate.106 Here, the new liberal 
rather than the social imperialist in Curtis is 
expressing himself.
102. Curtis, 'Better Government", pp.766-77; Curtis, 
'Price", pp.12-13.
!03. Scally, Origins, pp.350-51.
104. Curtis, 'Introduction", p.xliv.
105. Anon, and Curtis, Canadian Criticism, pp.33-34.
106. Curtis, 'Price", p. 12.
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One gets the impression that between 1916 and 
1920 Curtis was undecisively wavering between two 
social imperialist recipes: The elitist one, 
represented by his cherished Milner, and the populist 
one, represented by Maxse, with whom Curtis was not 
in contact. The populist version of social 
imperialism wanted to cut the wings of parliament by 
the introduction of referenda (also, for different 
reasons, advocated by the new liberals), thus 
expressing a greater trust in the public than the 
Milner group. Although Curtis did not take up the 
referenda proposal, there is a populist element in 
his writing.
For example, in 1916 he opposes the idea of 
indirect elections to the future imperial parliament 
by claiming that people are to be trusted more than 
politicians. This is so because the latters' 
judgement is to a greater extent affected by personal 
interests.107 Some years later, however, he 
contradicts this by arguing that a responsible 
government needs electorates who follow public 
interests. The efficiency question thus concerns the 
voters, not the politicians.108
Finally, in 1932, he expresses a stance critical 
of bureaucracies. They are unable to originate 
policies, tend to be opportunistic and try to evade 
publicity. Curtis particularly complains that since 
World War I Britain's overseas representatives no 
longer send dispatches to press and parliament. Such
107. Anon, and Curtis, Canadian Criticism, pp.31-32.
108. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, pp.127-28.
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dispatches would not only keep the people informed on 
imperial and international matters but also force the 
men on the spot to adapt a perspective wider than the 
local one. Curtis claims that Milner, when in South 
Africa, had been very keen to make the people of the 
UK understand his policies.109 As if touched by a 
magical stick, the elitist Milner now appears as a 
man trusting the people.
Subsequently, Curtis develops his own version of 
plebicitary democracy. In World War, he no longer 
maintains that the quality of politicians is 
declining. On the contrary, as far as personal 
character is concerned, "politicians as a class are 
... much better than the average human being'.110 
Nevertheless,
(t)he nature of their task denies them the time and 
also the detachment required for the thinking 
necessary to see what the wider issues are.111
Subsumed under the slogan "democratic pathology' in
his works from the mid-1940s, he diagnoses three
problems with representative democracy. First,
politicians usually tend to follow public opinion
rather than leading it and tell people what they want
to hear. Second, politicians consider the kind of
political arrangements they are used to as almost
sacred. Consequently, they instinctively oppose any
structural change. Third, they fail to mention
unpalatable facts.
109. Lionel Curtis, The Capital Question of China. Port 
Washington (NY) and London: Kennikat. (1932) 1970,
pp.275-81.
110. Curtis, World War, p.266.
HI. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.919.
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However, the population is usually less 
conservative than the politicans. From time to time, 
there appear charismatic men who dare to say 
initially unpopular things. At the end, they convince 
the people over the head of the established political 
apparatus to get the right things done. As examples 
for such charismatic leaders Curtis lists Washington 
and Lincoln, a number of turn-of-the-century 
Australian and South African politicians who 
implemented union, and the once-despised Churchill.112 
In other words, there are two kinds of politicians:
The mediocre ones preferred by people during normal 
times and the great leaders, whom they follow during 
crisis periods.113
This discounting of the normal parliamentary 
procedure in favour of trusted leaders resembles the 
attitude of Rosebery. That Curtis in the 1940s still 
sticks to the social imperialist criticism of 
parliamentary democracy becomes obvious when he 
bemoans 'the terrible strength of party machines'.114
Tariff Reform and Immigration
Curtis' assertion that farming, trade and 
manufacturing are public services as necessary to a 
state as fighting115 resembles the neo-mercantilist
112. Curtis, Decision, pp.73-75; Curtis, Action, pp.59- 
61; Curtis, Wav, pp.45-53; Curtis, World War, pp.90-91; 
93-94; 104-06, 246-53. See also Curtis, 'Introduction', 
p.lviii.
113. Lionel Curtis, 'South Africa since the Union', in 
Atlantic Monthly 140 (1927), pp.253-63, here p.258.
114. Lionel Curtis, The Political Future of the British 
Commonwealth and Empire, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1945, p.8.
115. L. Curtis, 'The Structure of Government Continued', 
in L. Curtis, Papers Relating to the Application of the
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ideology of the Tariff Reformers. However, Curtis was 
clearly divided from Chamberlain and Amery over the 
issue of imperial preference. In this respect, he 
also parted ways with Milner. As we have seen, he was 
inclined towards free trade.
In his plan for an imperial federation as 
outlined in The Green Memorandum, Curtis rejects the 
idea that the imperial parliament should also 
regulate the tariffs of the Empire. This will create 
the danger of overcentralization, bring no economic 
advantages to the Empire at large and not be 
acceptable to the Dominions.116
Curtis's version of imperial unity was thus quite 
different from that of the Tariff Reformers. 
Nevertheless, the gap was not as wide as it might in 
the first instance appear. Curtis is aware of the 
possibility that trade between a component state of 
the imperial federation and a foreign country could 
drive a wedge into the British Empire. In particular, 
he thinks of the economic lure the USA exerted 
towards Canada.117 To offset dangers like this, he 
envisages a safeguard in the imperial constitution: 
The imperial Upper House will have the power to veto 
all tariff treaties between the component states and 
foreign powers.118 In other words, Curtis sees tariff 
policy in the light of how it would affect the unity
Principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India,
Oxford: Clarendon, 1920, pp.291-325, here p.301.
116. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.115-17.
117. Ibid., pp.39-40.
118. Ibid., p. 117.
of the British Empire as such rather than from a 
purely economic point of view.
In his 1940s proposals for an international 
commonwealth, Curtis again explicitly leaves the 
issue of tariffs to the component states,119 giving a 
number of reasons for this: Protective tariffs as 
such are not a menace to peace but, rather, owe their 
existence to the fear of war. Due to the existence of 
the federal union diminishing that fear, its 
component states will voluntarily reduce their 
tariffs.120 National governments need to retain 
control over taxation in order to be able to adjust 
the relations between the rich and the poor within 
their borders.121 Federal control over the economic 
and social affairs of the component states would re­
create the old problem of governmental over­
congestion. 122 Finally, it would not be accepted by 
the member states.123
Instead of the by now moribund protectionists, 
Curtis singles out the economic functionalists like 
Mitrany for criticism. Aside from the claim that 
someone from the Balkans is not supposed to advise 
Anglo-Saxons,124 the functionalists according to him 
put the cart before the horse. It is not the case
119. Curtis, Decision, p.49; Curtis, Wav, p.25? Curtis,
World War, pp.80, 201-02, 228; Curtis, War, p. 51.
120. Curtis, Decision, p.52; Curtis, World War, p.82.
121. Curtis, World Revolution, p.137.
122. Curtis, Decision, pp.48-49? Curtis, World War,
pp.79-80; Curtis, Open Road, p.37.
123. Curtis, World Revolution, p.138; Curtis, Open Road,
pp.55-56.
124. Lavin, From Empire, p. 312.
that the solution of economic problems, for example a 
customs union, is the key for the solving of 
political ones. It is exactly the other way round. 
Like appeasement, functionalism tries to go the way 
of the least resistance.125
Another motif unifying Curtis's pre-WWI and post- 
WW II writings was the immigration issue. Emigration 
of people from the British Isles to the Empire had 
been another issue dear to the hearts of social 
imperialists like Milner and Amery. In The Green 
Memorandum, Curtis discusses the problems of English 
migration to Canada.126 He expects that with 
population growth Canada will become as populous and
wealthy as Great Britain in the not too far future
and that hegemony in the imperial federation will 
ultimately pass from the United Kingdom to Canada.127 
Thirty-six years later, he again foresees that, once 
the fear of war is banned, people from the 
overcrowded United Kingdom and Western Europe would 
move to the Dominions. The latter will experience a 
vast growth of population and industries, making the 
20th century 'Canada's Century".128
However, not everyone would be allowed to enter 
the Dominions. As Assistant Colonial Secretary of the 
Transvaal Curtis, even though not without regrets, 
proposed to check Asiatic immigration to the country
125. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.140-41.
126. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.32-39.
127. Ibid., pp.42, 124. See also Anon, and Curtis,
Canadian Criticism, p.16.
128. Curtis, War, pp.52-64.
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by the introduction of fingerprint passes.129 In The 
Green Memorandum, Curtis expresses his opposition to 
the entry of coloured labour. Rather, the Dominions 
should only let in people of their own blood.130 It 
was important for him that under imperial federation 
the Dominions would still be able to formulate their 
own immigration laws.131 Free entry for coloured 
people would endanger the establishment of a 
European-style civilization in these countries132 and 
"social, moral and political evils" would follow.133
Thirty years later, Curtis sticks to his guns. In 
1949-50, he asserts that the white-only immigration 
policies of the Dominions is acceptable because these 
countries would otherwise be swamped by Asians and 
Africans who are yet incapable of governing
themselves •134
It is thus hardly surprising that Curtis is
adamant that the free movement of people and the 
mixture of the races within the world federation is 
not aspirable. As a biological analogy shows, human 
diversity is a good thing because it ensures the 
performance of different functions and allows the 
existence of nations more distinguished than the 
others. The component states of the federal union 
thus have to retain control over their immigration
129. Lavin, From Empire, p.60; May, Round Table, p.133.
130. Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.134.
131. May, Round Table, p. 135.
132. Curtis, "End", p.782.
133. May, Round Table, pp.135-36.
134a Curtis, World Revolution, pp.136-37; Curtis, Open 
Road, pp.39-40.
policy.135 It is interesting to dwell for a moment
upon the organic analogy Curtis uses:
(A) human society in which all the social elements 
have been mixed into one conglomerate ... would have 
acquired the uniformity of a jelly-fish ... the 
lowest form of physical life (...) The highest form 
of organism is made up of highly differentiated 
organs .•• And so the supreme unity which human 
society should attain is one in which its component 
nations are highly differentiated in composition as 
well as in structure.136
As we have seen, the insistence that the cells of the 
social body must be different from each other was 
advanced by the new liberals in order to square their 
stress on individuality with the organic analogy 
borrowed from biology. Under the hands of Curtis, it 
becomes an argument in favour of racial segregation.
Conclusion
Curtis's work can best be interpreted as a bid 
for hegemonic ideology to be used by the dominant 
classes in Britain. In this context, his writings 
particularly draw upon, or have close similarities 
to, three political movements: empire federalism, new 
liberalism and social imperialism.
In the case of empire federalism, the initial 
connection is pretty straightforward. Curtis's plan 
for imperial federation was just one among many such 
blueprints made since the 19th century. Curtis's 
originality comes from the fact that he did not stop 
there. In his later works, an organic imperial union
135. Curtis, Decision, pp.47-48, 67-68; Curtis, World 
War, pp.78-9, 99-100, 180; Curtis, Open Road, pp.34-35.
136. Curtis, Decision, pp.47-48; Curtis, World War, 
pp.78-79.
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is to be broadened to include Western Europe, the USA 
and, ultimately, the whole world. Curtis thus 
transforms Empire federalism into something more 
ambitious.
Coming to new liberalism, the connection is more 
indirect, going back to the influence of T.H. Green. 
On a first look, there seems to be little similarity 
between the new liberals, with their criticism of 
voting restrictions and colonial rule and their 
enthusiasm for international law, and Curtis, who 
wants to limit democratic rights, celebrates the 
educational mission of colonialism and discounts 
inter-state compacts.
Nevertheless, his concept of the commonwealth 
comes close to how new liberalism defines the 
individual's place in society. In both cases, the 
individual only realizes and perfects himself through 
the community. Political rights are at the same time 
duties. Furthermore, both Curtis and the new liberals 
put much emphasis upon the role of the state for the 
provision of a good living and for using force 
against anti-social elements. Curtis also embraces 
the new liberal argument that society has the right 
to tax 'unearned' wealth. Finally, Curtis even seems 
to be favourably disposed to something like 
industrial democracy.
In the case of social imperialism, the connection 
between it and Curtis is much more obvious. Indeed, 
many of the Round Tablers (including his mentor
Milner) were convinced adherents of that movement. 
Especially in his earlier writings, Curtis shares 
their Social Darwinist concern about the degeneration 
of the British. Like them, he calls for social reform 
and class harmony without expressing much genuine 
respect for the lower classes. He, however, draws the 
line when it comes to corporatism.
Curtis also embraces the efficiency-related 
criticism of parliamentarism and the party system as 
advanced by the social imperialists. While supporting 
the Milner clique's recipe of empowering experts and 
committees only in a half-hearted way, he like the 
populist faction wants to limit parliamentary rule by 
more direct democracy. He puts his trust to 
charismatic figures winning the trust of an otherwise 
passive population. Curtis is firmly opposed to the 
Tariff Reform wing of social imperialism. But, on the 
other hand, he enthusiastically joins them as far as 
British emigration to the Dominions and immigration 
restrictions on unwanted peoples are concerned.
In the terminology of van der Pijl, Curtis (like 
Streit) can be placed into the 'Atlantic Union" group 
which aimed to integrate the Lockean heartland under 
a version of corporate liberalism leaning more to the 
money-capital than to the productive-capital 
perspective.137 His political and economic programme 
retain a number of elements belonging to liberal 
internationalism, namely free trade and sound money.
137. Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling
Class, Londons Verso, 1984, pp.26-31.
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He is unhappy with the power of big industrial 
businesses and of organized labour. Nevertheless, he 
fully accepts the expanded role for the state as also 
included in the state monopoly tendency. Labour 
government is well received by Curtis as long as it 
performs a foreign policy compatible with his 
federation plans.
Indeed, Curtis's contribution to an ideology 
bolstering Britain's hegemonic bloc of City 
financiers and attached industrialists was not only 
concerned with domestic class harmony but put the 
emphasis on the Lockean heartland and Britain's 
position within it. This is the topic of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Eight
The Lockean Heartland, the Hobbesian Contenders and 
the Prize Area
Introduction
In this chapter, Curtis's work is analysed 
according to the second major distinction of van der 
Pijl: between the Anglo-Saxon dominated heartland 
with its strong civil societies, the Hobbesian 
contenders with their dominant state, and the Prize 
area encompassing the bulk of the non-Western world.
On the face of it, Carr's criticism of an 
unreflexive version of idealism, advancing the 
interests of 'have'-countries behind their universal 
values, might not apply to Curtis. After all, we have 
seen that his federation projects involve a partial 
diminution of Britain's control over the Empire to 
the Dominions and that he embraced ultimate self- 
government for the coloured races. Despite all this, 
British power - and Britain's right to have power - 
remained centre stage for Curtis. This can be seen 
from both the way he writes about other countries or 
people and from a close look at the content of his 
federation proposals.
After summarizing van der Pijl's analysis of the 
Rhodes-Milner group to which Curtis belonged and 
briefly showing how he stresses Britain's benevolent 
role throughout world history, this chapter follows a 
threefold division: It deals with the heartland
countries other than Britain (the Dominions, Western 
Europe and the USA) and then comes to Curtis's 
treatment of the contender countries (mainly Germany, 
but also Japan and the Soviet Union). Finally, his 
attitude to the Prize area (India, the Middle East, 
China and Africa) and its people is discussed.
The Rhodes-Milner Group and the Round Table
Van der Pijl has drawn attention to the existence 
of transnational ruling class networks providing for 
elite cooperation throughout the Lockean heartland 
and trying to integrate elements of the bourgeoisie 
in the Hobbesian contenders. Between the late 17th 
and the late 19th century, this role was performed by 
the Freemasons. With the impending demise of liberal 
internationalism, a new kind of network, the 
transnational planning group, made its appearance. 
These groups oversaw the shifts from one kind of 
capitalist accumulation to another and contributed to 
the transformation of Hobbesian contenders like 
Germany or the Soviet Union into parts of the Lockean 
heartland.
The Rhodes-Milner group and the Morgan network in 
the United States are cases from the time when 
liberal internationalism gave way to the state 
monopoly tendency. Bodies like the Bilderberg 
conferences and the Trilateral Commission belong to 
the phase of corporate liberalism. And the recent 
victory of neo-liberalism was sponsored by, for
example, the Mont Pelerin Society and the World 
Economic Forum.1
Curtis's ideas on imperial, European, Atlantic 
and world federation have to be seen within the 
context of his membership in one of these planning 
bodies, the Rhodes-Milner group, which included the 
Round Table. The background to the formation of this 
group was the domestic and international challenges 
thrown up by the waning of liberal internationalism. 
The then most powerful part of the capitalist class, 
the international investment bankers, were on the 
lookout for new ways to advance their interests, now 
in the face of the rising state monopoly tendency. 
Freemasonry, having previously executed the (in 
Gramscian terms) 'intellectual' function of a 
planning institution on the international level was 
too loosely structured to respond to these new needs. 
With the Rhodes-Milner group there emerged a vehicle 
for behind-the-stages organized policy-planning. As a 
new form of the conduct of class struggle on the part 
of the bourgeoisie it harmonized state monopolist and 
social imperialist tendencies with the continuing 
influence of the investment bankers.2
The origins of the Rhodes-Milner group go back to 
the Oxford lectures of John Ruskin, who told his 
upper-class students that their cherished values -
1 . Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and
International Relations, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998, pp.98-135.
2. Ibid., pp.107-08.
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rule of law, freedom, decency, self-discipline, etc., 
etc. - could only be saved if they were spread to 
those yet unenlightened by them: the lower classes in 
Britain, and the unfortunate non-English abroad.
Among those undergraduates spellbound by Ruskin 
were Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner. Having made a 
fortune with South African diamonds and gold, Rhodes 
together with Britain's leading journalist William T. 
Stead in 1891 established a secret 'Society of the 
Elect', whose membership also included Milner, Lord 
Esher (confidant of several British monarchs and 
unofficial chairman of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence) and a scion of the Rothschild banking 
dynasty. Outside this innermost cycle, there was to 
be the Association of Helpers, which later overlapped 
with the Kindergarten and the Round Table.3
We have so far discussed the Round Table with 
reference to the more narrow question of which shape 
the closer organic union of the Empire should take.
In fact, imperial union was only one aspect of the 
Rhodes-Milner group's and its Round Table 
incarnation's agenda. The other aspects were: 
fostering ideological coherence among the ruling 
classes; gaining the acquiesence of the working 
classes (or at least of a privileged section thereof) 
for the existing domestic order by appealing to 
imperial sentiments; coordinating the activities and
3. Ibid., pp.108-09; Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: 
A History of the World in Our Time, New York and 
London: Macmillan and Collier-Macmillan, 1966.
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outlooks of the whole English-speaking world, namely 
by "reclaiming' the USA in one way or another to the 
fold, and thus in effect integrating the heartland; 
spreading the vision of Britain's historical bloc for 
order and development to the non-Western world, 
particularly Britain's colonial dependencies; 
maintaining world peace; and offsetting challenges to 
the heartland on the part of Hobbesian contenders and 
colonial independence movements by finding compromise 
solutions.4 This general agenda left room for 
disagreements over details, for example about full- 
fledged imperial federation, support for the League 
of Nations or the appeasement of Germany.5
Despite the deaths of Rhodes in 1902 and of 
Milner in 1925, the "Association of Helpers' aka the 
Round Table contained members extremely well-placed 
within the British political, economic and cultural 
institutions: Amery was a Tory MP, acted as assistant 
to Lloyd George's cabinet secretary and rose to the 
positions of Colonial Secretary (1924-29) and India 
Secretary (1940-45). Kerr/Lothian was Lloyd George's 
private secretary and died as ambassador in 
Washington (1939-40). Grigg was a maverick Liberal MP 
and, in the second half of the 1920s, Governor of 
Kenya. As far as the economic elite is concerned, the 
London moot had members in high-level managing 
positions: Brand, Horsfall and Marris of Lazards, a
4. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, pp.109-12, 118-
19; Quigley, Tragedy, p.954.
5. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, p.111.
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well established City bank; and Hichens of Cornell 
Laird, an industrial conglomerate. The press was 
represented by Dawson, between 1912 and 1919 and 
again between 1922 and 1941 editor of the prestigious 
Times. Academics included, besides Curtis, the Oxford 
historian Coupland, the Africanist Lord Hailey and 
the IR idealist Zimmern.6 Even Carr is listed as a 
member of the wider Rhodes-Milner group,7 although 
the exact connection is not quite clear. In the 
Dominions, landowners, financiers, businessmen, 
lawyers and academics dominated local Round Table 
branches.8
The group was financially well-supplied thanks to 
the Rhodes trust and a number of wealthy benefactors, 
particularly from the banking sector. However, as the 
presence of Hichens shows, the Rhodes-Milner group 
recognized that capital accumulation depended 
increasingly upon heavy industries and thus contained 
elements and adherents of both liberal 
internationalism and the state monopoly tendency.9
Thanks to the high positions of its members and 
financial supporters, the Round Table exerted 
influence over a number of media and academic 
institutions. Besides a number of other papers and 
journals there was, as mentioned, The Times. It was
6. Alexander May, The Round Table. 1910-66. Ph. 
dissertation. University of Oxford, 1995, pp.52-62, 
221-40, 249-51, 364-65.
7. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, p.111.
8. May, Round Table, pp.70-74.
9. Ibid., pp.65-68; van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, 
pp.111-12.
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owned by the Anglo-American Astor family, after whose 
country house the Round Tablers were sometimes also 
dubbed the "Cliveden Set". Within academia, the group 
was strongly represented at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs and All Souls College in Oxford 
and held a number of chairs at London, Oxford and 
Aberystwyth.10 Finally, there were connections with 
similar American networks centered around the Morgan
bankers and the Council on Foreign Relations.11
Given all these first-class connections, which
impact was the Rhodes-Milner group able to make? Van 
der Pijl, drawing upon the somewhat dated work by 
Quigley, almost gives the impression that the Rhodes- 
Milner group, displacing the loose family network of 
the so-called Cecil bloc, became Britain's real 
rulers until it was replaced by the corporatist- 
liberal Nuffield group in the 1950s.12 In contrast. 
May, who has written what is now the standard 
monograph on the Round Table, characterizes the power 
of the group as marginal. He grants it (i.e. Curtis) 
influence over some aspects of Lloyd George's 
policies in India and Ireland but thinks that the 
Round Tablers were, all in all, interpreters rather 
than instigators.13 He argues:
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the Round 
Table's influence on the level of "public opinion'. 
... (W)hen it came to the more easily quantifiable
10. May, Round Table, pp.233-45; van der Pijl, 
Transnational Classes, p.110; Quigley, Tragedy, pp.132-
33.
11. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, pp.112-14; 
Quigley, Tragedy. pp.952-54.
12. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, pp.110, 120.
13. May, Round Table, pp.448-49.
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level of influence on 'men and measures', it is clear 
that the Round Table was altogether less successful.14
This is probably true. However, in looking for
'quantifiable' evidence of the group's influence May
adopts a too restrictive perspective. The function of
planning groups is not so much to formulate and
instigate specific policies but to provide a forum
where different programmes could be synthesized and
intellectual ammunition for the historic bloc be
prepared•
In the case of the Rhodes-Milner group and the 
Round Table, this intellectual ammunition was 
particularly used to prepare the integration of the 
heartland in a way that left Britain in an 
influential position. This was done by hammering home 
to the public, again and again, the intrinsic 
positive qualities of Anglo-Saxon political culture 
in general and of the British in particular. Rhodes's 
and Stead's claim that British supremacy would be in 
mankind's best interest has been observed and duly 
exposed to realist critique by Carr.15
Admittedly, it cannot be quantified how much the 
public in Great Britain, the USA and elsewhere really 
bought that message. But the fact that the heartland 
not only held together but also vastly expanded 
during the 20th century is at least an indication 
that their efforts were not in vain. Let us now look 
at Curtis's specific contribution to this feat.
14. Ibid., p.114.
15. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction 
to the Study of International Relations, London and 
Basingstoke: Papermac, (1939) 1995, pp.71-72.
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A Benevolent Hegemon
To provide further legitimacy for this project, 
Curtis highlighted Britain's role as the eternal 
champion of freedom. In The Commonwealth of Nations, 
Curtis argues that in contrast to stagnating Asia, 
Europe has the capacity to change. Initially, however, 
the commonwealth principle has been realised only in 
England.16 England has a specifity due to her insular 
isolation, which enabled democratic/commonwealth 
principles to flourish originally there.17 With the 
partial exception of Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
the commonwealth principle was not established in 
Continental Europe until recently. Rather, theocratic 
and despotic traditions predominated and partially 
survive until today.18
The special place reserved for the British 
according to Curtis comes out clearly in quotations 
like this:
The British, American, Swiss, Dutch, Scandinavian and 
other self-governing nations are political expressions 
of the Sermon on the Mount, though imperfect 
expressions.19
With the partial exception of Switzerland, all 
countries named are Protestant. Indeed, the dichotomy 
Curtis paints between Anglo-Saxon freedom and 
Continental autocracy seems to partly correspond to a
16. L. Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations: An Inquiry 
into the Nature of Citizenship in the British Empire, 
and into the Mutual Relations of the Several 
Dependencies Thereof, London: Macmillan, 1916, p.124.
17. Ibid., p.89.
18. Ibid., pp.76-7. See also Curtis, The Open Road to 
Freedom. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950, p.8.
19. Lionel Curtis, World War: Its Cause and Cure. 2nd. 
ed., New York: 6.P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, p.9.
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religious one. His opinion of Catholic peoples is
certainly not high: Ireland has never been a part of
the Roman Empire, with the result that tribalism
persists until today.20 The British mix much better with
the Protestant Boers in South Africa than with the
Catholic French in Canada.21 And the leaders of the
quasi-Fascist Vichy government are dubbed by Curtis as
men whose religion combined with their naval and 
military training to dispose them in favour of 
authoritarian systems.22
This goes together with the appraisal of English 
imperialism as specifically benevolent as compared to 
other imperialisms, bringing the ideas of Curtis in 
line with the concept of 'England's Mission'. In Asia 
and Africa, the contact between the Europeans and other 
societies was disruptive for the latter, especially if 
they ended up being oppressed by European adventurers. 
It was thus necessary for Western countries to take 
over political control and to end the prevailing 
anarchy.23 The British, in particular, only acquired 
their colonial possessions in Africa in response to 
Continental European actions and in order to control 
European adventurers.24
British and American rule over non-European races 
is more successful and also more readily accepted by 
the indigenous people than Continental European 
colonialism. The reason for this is the stronger sense
20. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.60.
21. Lionel Curtis, 'South Africa Since the Union', in 
Atlantic Monthly 140 (1927), pp.253-63, here p.261.
22. Lionel Curtis, Decision, p.43; Curtis, World War, 
p.67.
23. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.157-63.
24 . Curtis, World War, pp.185-88.
3Q7
for the rule of law in these two countries, which also 
bring justice to the "natives",25 British success in 
colonial rule compared with that of the Continentals 
is, in other words, not due to racial but institutional 
differences.26 Curtis admits, however, that compared to 
colonial rule by Continental Europeans, British control 
over non-European people has a more caste-like aspect.27
Curtis also vindicates British rule with respect 
to specific countries. Initially, the British have gone 
to India for material interests. But in the long run 
their good character prevailed and they committed 
themselves to the moral and material regeneration of 
the Indians.28 As in Africa, British intervention was 
necessary because of the corruption in the native 
states and the activities of European adventurers. The 
Indian Mutiny was just the result of a too fast 
transition from the Medieval Ages to modern times.29 
Curtis grants that the British should have given the 
Indians doses of responsible self-government earlier 
on. Nevertheless, he still holds that the British rule 
in India fosters the cause of freedom in the East.30
In South Africa, the war against the Boers was 
inevitable because of the political divisions of that 
country and the German threat.31 The notorious
25. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.167-76.
26. Ibid., p.210.
27. L. Curtis, "Introduction", in L. Curtis, Papers 
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy 
to the Government of India, Oxford: Clarendon, 1920, 
p.liii.
2S. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.155-57.
29. Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis, The Prevention of 
War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923, pp.114-15.
30. Ibid., pp.149-51.
31. Ibid., pp.84-85, 91.
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concentration camps into which the Boer civilians were 
put had the object to protect them from the 'natives'.32 
And in creating the South African Union, the British 
motivation was primarily to give good government to the 
country.33
Occasionally, Curtis mentions that there is also a 
seamy side in British history. He describes in some 
detail the cruelties of English rule over the Irish 
during the Early Modern period,34 and concedes that 
Ireland was then held not for her own interest but for 
that of England/Britain.35 Another example is Curtis's 
statement that the present chaos in China was 
ultimately caused by Britain's opening her up to 
foreign trade.36
However, these are the exceptions confirming the 
rule. For Curtis, both British seapower and colonial 
rule exist for the common benefit of mankind. 
Consequently, British seapower in the 19th century had 
saved Europe and North America from despotisms like 
Napoleon's as well as wars. Because this power did not 
pose a direct threat to other states, it was largely 
accepted.37 At the same time, the British navy was the 
'driving force' in the fight against the slave trade.
32. Curtis, 'South Africa', p.255; Curtis, Open Road, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950, p.28.
33. Lionel Curtis, The Wav to Peace. Oxford and London: 
Oxford University Press and Humphrey Milford, 1944,
p.87.
34. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.428-39.
35. Ibid., pp.518-21.
36. Lionel Curtis, The Capital Question of China, Port 
Washington (NY) and London: Kennikat, (1932) 1970,
p.247.
37. Curtis, Decision, pp.15-17; Curtis, Commonwealth, 
pp.679, 695; Curtis, World War, pp.40-41.
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Furthermore, Britain kept the ports of her Empire open 
to all foreign ships while accepting limitations on 
her own shipping by the exclusionary measures of other 
powers. True, during WW I Britain had exerted a naval 
blockade that prevented neutrals from trading with 
Germany. But this was justifiable given Germany's own 
exclusionary policies with regard to the parts of 
Europe occupied by her.38
Foreshadowing an interpretation of hegemonic 
stability theory,39 Curtis portrays British actions in 
terms of self-sacrifice not appreciated by others. The 
American War of Independence broke out because the 
American colonists had been unwilling to take a share 
in paying for their defence.40 Britain also met the 
expenses for her later rival Germany's liberation from 
Napoleon.41 The granting of self-government to the 
Dominions was a 'sacrifice" and a sign of 'unselfish 
wisdom".42 Britain carried the burden of the Empire on 
her own43 and met the expenses of the Boer War alone, 
although it was fought for the interests of the 
Dominions as well.44
38 . Lionel Curtis, 'Windows of Freedom", in Round Table 
8 (1918), pp.1-47, p.7-10.
39. Isabelle Grunberg, 'Exploring the „Myth" of 
Hegemonic Stability", in International Organization 44 
(1990), 4, pp.431-77.
40. Lionel Curtis, World Revolution in the Cause of 
Peace, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949, pp.7-12.
41. Lionel Curtis, The Green Memorandum. London and 
Bungay: Richard Clay and Sons, 1910, p.23.
42. Ibid., pp.9-10.
43. Ibid., p. 17.
44. Ibid., pp.24-25.
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This ethical idea of England's mission also 
coloured his self-confident use of the term 
'imperialism" in The Green Memorandum. Imperialism is 
the belief in good government by the British Empire, 
which materializes itself in self-government for the 
white people and trusteeship for the coloured.45 In the 
later works, of course, 'imperialism" is dropped for 
the more innocent-sounding 'commonwealth".
Curtis further highlights the importance of the 
British Empire. He admits that the British Empire was 
born as a result of the struggle for existence and for 
wealth. However, its character is shaped by a concern 
for the mutual good.46 As he argues in The Commonwealth 
of Nations, because it is so vast and widely spread, 
its destruction will dislocate human society, indeed 
cause a 'cataclysm".47 The question whether Britain can 
in such a case of break-up maintain her 
responsibilities on her own is a question affecting 
the stability of the whole world.48 Fortunately, the 
Empire holds together because it is run not according 
to British, but universal principles.49
He repeats this motif in The Prevention of Wars 
The British Empire guarantees world peace because it 
brings together one quarter of mankind. However, it 
can only survive if turned into a commonwealth. 
Cosmopolitans dreaming of world government had better
45. Ibid., p. 126.
46. Ibid., pp.15-17.
47. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.2-3, 177.
48. Ibid., p.17.
49. Ibid., pp.686, 690-92.
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not condemn it, but to see it as a practical step in 
that direction.50
Curtis comes back to this as late as 1945. He 
once more asserts that the British have protected the 
Dominions, and indeed the freedom of the whole world, 
in the first half of the 20th century.51 At the same 
time, the Dominions have supplied the margin without 
which the World Wars would have been lost to the 
Allies.52 And, most grandiously, the question of 
whether peace will again be lost depends less upon a 
post-WWII peace conference, but upon the outcome of 
the first Imperial Conference after the war.53
In his 1949 book World Revolution in the Cause of 
Peace, Curtis's self-confident Greater Britishness 
remains as ebullient. The European people expect 
Britain's leadership because the British are already 
involved in the running of a commonwealth and, indeed, 
have carried the torch of freedom for nine centuries. 
Besides, the British experience in dealing 
with "backward peoples' is necessary in order to frame 
the federal constitution in a way that these can join 
later. It was also important that the Dominions could 
participate in the international commonwealth due to 
their own experience with federalism.54 He concludes in
50. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, pp.155-58. See also 
Lionel Curtis, "The End of War', in Round Table 5 
(1915), pp.772-96, here pp.787-88.
51. Curtis, World War, pp.47-59.
52. Ibid., p.85.
53. Curtis, World War, pp.91-95. See also Curtis, Wav, 
p.98.
54. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.131, 147-48, 158-59.
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a rather dramatic way that the abstenation of the 
United Kingdom and, particularly, the Dominions from 
the federation would be a disaster for the whole of 
mankind.55
The Heartlands Canada and South Africa
With the exception of Ireland (which, however, 
was a wayward case) Curtis wrote surprisingly little 
about the individual Dominions. This consists mainly 
of the passages on Canada in The Green Memorandum, 
where prime emphasis is given to the relations with 
the USA, and of a largely narrative article about 
"South Africa Since the Union". Despite this rather 
limited material some indications concerning their 
appropriate place in a world order according to Curtis 
can be got.
Observing the conditions of Canada in 1910,
Curtis mentions rapid economic growth and accompanying 
chances for social climbing. A drawback to this happy 
state of affairs is the fact that the country"s best 
brains go into business and not politics. As a result, 
there is a generally low quality of politics and 
public opinion, including widespread cases of 
corruption and a reckless increase of the public debt. 
Curtis holds that Canada can only afford these 
conditions because she is protected by Britain. An 
involvement in defence, foreign affairs and, 
particularly, in the white men's burden, would act as
55. Ibid., p.161.
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a corrective to these problems by forcing greater 
political maturity upon the Canadians.56
With these unflattering observations on Canadian 
politics Curtis does not mean that the Canadians are 
inferior to the British. After all, his comments on UK 
politics in the same book are much more scathing. 
Rather, as in the case of his remarks on Britain, 
these critical observations are made to bring home the 
point that imperial federation would improve domestic 
conditions.
According to Curtis, Canada owes her growth to 
the building of railroads, to US protective tariffs 
closing off the neighbouring market and thus 
involuntarily drawing the Canadian economy together, 
and to an effective banking system overseen by the 
federal government.57 There is, however, a 
contradiction between the country's agricultural West 
geared to free trade and a manufacturing East 
preferring protectionism. Despite his general free 
trade leanings, Curtis in this case recommends the 
establishment of tariff preferences for Canadian wheat 
in Britain. Furthermore, the fostering of industries 
in the West of Canada is to make it more amenable to 
protectionism.58 As usual with Curtis, economic issues 
are subordinated to political ones, in this case 
keeping Canada united and within the Empire.
56. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.50-59.
57. Ibid., pp.30-31.
58. Ibid., pp.39-40.
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In his overview of the first 17 years of the 
South African Union, Curtis celebrates the first two 
Prime Ministers - the Anglophile Botha and Smuts - as 
great statesmen.59 In contrast, their successor, the 
Boer nationalist Hertzog, is in polite words portrayed 
as a mediocrity. Luckily, he has retreated from his 
'fanaticism" and 'mischievous idea(s)" since he has 
been in office.60 Some twenty years later, Curtis goes 
as far as drawing a parallel between the Boer self- 
image as master race and Nazi ideology.61 However, we 
will see that he still stuck to the idea of South 
Africa as a white men's country.
Coming back to the situation in 1927, according 
to Curtis South Africa faces the problem of poor 
whites, who through their votes exert political power. 
Consequently, white workers have to be given public 
employment at rates much higher than if blacks would 
have been given the job. Furthermore, the question of 
employment for poor whites also leads to protectionism 
intended to shelter premature industrialization.
Curtis warns of the economic problems that might be in 
store for the country, resulting from a combination of 
rising public expenditures and a future decline of 
gold exports.62
59. Curtis, 'South Africa", pp.254-55.
60. Ibid., pp.260-61.
61. Lionel Curtis, War or Peace?, Oxford and London: 
Oxford University Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1946, 
pp.13-14.
62. Curtis, 'South Africa", pp.262-63.
In both the case of Canada and South Africa,
Curtis spells some ink on financial issues: the public 
debt and the banking system. He has good reason for 
that. After all, despite being able to shield their 
nascent industries with tariffs from foreign 
(including British) competition, the Dominions still 
remained economically tied to the mother country. 
Britain remained the most important market for their 
agricultural products and financed their economic 
development through the London banks.
The City tolerated Dominion industrialization 
because it contributed to the balance of payments and 
thus to the repayment of the national debts. At the 
same time, it forced financial orthodoxy upon them, 
including central banks modelled upon the Bank of 
England. Attempts by Dominion governments to pursue 
independent financial policies were seldom 
successful.63
If Curtis's plans for a federation between the UK 
and the Dominions had become reality it would have 
given the latter a say in the management of imperial 
defence and colonial affairs. But, together with this, 
there would also go an obligation to contribute 
financially to this management. At the same time, 
since Curtis's blueprints left economic matters to the 
component states, Britain (or, rather the City) would
63. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 
Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914. London and New 
York: Longman, 1993, pp.229-75; P.J. Cain and A.G. 
Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 
1914-1990. London and New York: Longman, 1993, pp.109-
45.
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still have remained de facto in charge of imperial
financial policy. Retaining fiscal paramountcy over
the Dominions while making them contribute to the
running of the Empire - such a deal would not at all
have been bad for Britain.
True, Curtis envisages already in 1910 that one
day the population size of Britain may be surpassed by
that of Canada, making the latter the most important
state of the federation.64 In 1946, within the context
of 'Canada's century' and locating the federal capital
at Quebec, he foresees a wave of immigration from
Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, 
(which) are overcrowded with men and women of the type 
that British Dominions need and desire.65
Furthermore,
(i)n the Dominions, population and industry will grow 
at the expense of the mother country. But that is 
exactly what we need.66
Yes, as long as Britain remains the financial centre!
It is also significant that even with the joining 
of Western European countries to the international 
federation Britain would remain the dominant power.
For example, the Scandinavian countries, which Curtis 
wants to include at an early stage, were in the 1930s 
anyway tied to the Sterling bloc.67 Only the French 
might have provided a counterweight to British 
influence.
Thus, Curtis here develops a scheme advancing 
British hegemony under the cloak of a federation 
between equals. In this, he simply glosses over the
Curtis, Green Memorandum, p.124.
65. Curtis, War, pp.54-55.
66. Ibid., p.59.
67. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialisms Crisis, p.80.
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possibilites to use 'economic power as an instrument 
of policy' so vividly uncovered by Carr.68
The Heartlands The United States
The different ways how Curtis approached the 
other great Anglo-Saxon 'commonwealth' illustrate the 
development of his thinking from imperial to world 
federation.
At the earlier stages of his writings and in line 
with the thinking of many social imperialists, Curtis 
still considers the USA as a potential antagonist to 
Britain. In The Green Memorandum, Curtis points out 
that the USA are an expanding empire rather than a 
state. Since their independence, they have 
contemplated the annexation of the whole of North 
America. In the 1890s, they erected tariff walls in an 
unsuccessful attempt to coerce Canada into the union. 
Now, the Americans pursue a possible annexation of 
their northern neighbour by more subtle means, for 
example, by the force of the economic pull and by the 
presence of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, who act as 
Washington's fifth column. Curtis particularly warns 
of the danger that the agricultural West of Canada 
might split off and join the United States. This would 
spark off a British-American war.69
This motif is repeated in The Commonwealth of 
Nations, wherein he reminds his readers that there was 
a danger of war with the USA over Canada in 1895,
68. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, pp.114-20.
Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.30-31, 33, 38-40, 44-
48.
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which might have been exploited by France and Russia.70 
At the same time, Curtis regrets the American 
independence of 1776. This has weakended the British 
Commonwealth and thus been a blow to the cause of 
freedom. As in the case of the Dominions, the 
Americans are not willing to assume responsibility for 
backward people.71
In 1918, he sees a chance to remedy that defect. 
Curtis appeals to the Americans to take over a number 
of tropical territories as League of Nation mandates 
and to take responsibility for their order and good 
government. On the list are Liberia (since it was 
founded by American ex-slaves), German East Africa, 
the Dardanelles, Armenia, Palestine (given the USA's 
large Jewish minority), Arabia and Persia.
Furthermore, the Americans should also assume the task 
of 'regenerating' Russia.
The reason for making the USA, rather than 
Britain, taking over the bulk of the Middle East is 
that the latter has neither the manpower nor the 
capital for such huge a task. Furthermore, their 
geographical distance from both Europe and India will 
ensure that control of the Middle East and 
its railway development by the United States will not 
be a geostrategical threat to Britain. France and 
Italy, which by treaty with the British have their own 
spheres of interest in the region, should somehow be 
/ eased out.72
70. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.324-26.
71. Ibid., pp.688-89, 692, 696-701.
72. Curtis, 'Windows', pp.30-36.
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In other words, given that Great Britain can 
neither take over the Middle Eastern mandates herself 
nor tolerate control by other European powers, an 
American presence there would be in her best interest. 
From a potential enemy, the USA have become Britain's 
partner in Curtis's mind.
In his later writings, Curtis envisages an 
international federation which will include the USA as 
well. This will bring the period of world wars to an 
end once and for all. The future world state will be 
shaped by joint Anglo-Saxon experience. The American 
contribution will be the lesson that there needs to be 
one government directly responsible to all citizens 
for defence. The British contribution will be the 
experience of having brought together different 
nations under one Commonwealth roof.73
Curtis claims that he would like the Americans to 
enter the federation from the onset but that he does 
not think they are willing to do so. It will take at 
least one generation. During that time, the Americans 
will see the successful working of the federation and 
give up their reservations about a merger of 
sovereignties. Echoing the analysis previously applied 
to Britain, Curtis diagnoses an overcongestion of 
issues to be dealt with at the level of the US 
government. In time, the US will see that transfer of 
foreign affairs and defence to the international union 
will allow concentration on domestic reform.74
73. Curtis, Decision, pp.62-69; Curtis, World War, 
pp.96-101.
74. Curtis, Action, pp.38-49; Curtis, World War, pp. 
154-62.
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Once the United States would become a member of 
the international federation they would, given their 
vast population combined with economic power, have 
taken over leadership from Britain. Curtis seems to 
have resigned himself into accepting Britain's long 
term fate of playing second fiddle to her former 
colony. At least, it meant submission to a member of 
the Anglo-Saxon family. In any case, the fact that 
Britain would effectively dominate the federation for 
at least one generation would give her opportunities 
to be later placed into the second rank under 
conditions as favourable to her as possible.
Curtis does not say these things directly. 
However, in World Revolution in the Cause of Peace he 
passingly mentions that the federal government will 
have its own currency. This currency will probably 
supplant national currencies over time.75 With America 
not participating in the initial federation it is not 
difficult to guess from where such an international 
currency would be managed. Once they would have 
joined, the USA would probably find it difficult to 
put the Dollar or gold into the dominant place. 
Probably only by coincidence, Curtis's idea reminds of 
an abortive attempt by Keynes at the Bretton Woods 
conference of 1942 to introduce a new currency 
replacing gold as global reserve.76
Thus, while Curtis accepts the political 
integration of the heartland under US hegemony he is 
still careful to ensure that Britain will not be
75. Curtis, World Revolution, p.143.
76. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism; Crisis, 
pp.271-72.
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completely displaced. In 1944, he dreams that the 
initial federation of the UK, the Dominions and 
Western Europe will be on equal terms with the United 
States and the Soviet Union.77 And as late as 1951 he 
responds to a critic who argues that any federal 
initiative has to come from the USAs 'He just abandons 
all idea of British leadership."78
The Contenders: Germany
Not surprisingly, given the political realities, 
Curtis puts specific emphasis on the threat posed by 
Germany. In The Green Memorandum, for instance, he 
argues that there is a geographically-determined 
historical contrast between the English spirit of 
liberty and the Continental autocratic one. The 
autocratic principle is now represented by Germany, 
which is unable to see that Britain is not like her an 
aggressive power.79
Like the social imperialists, Curtis sees in 
Germany a model as well as a threat for Britain. He 
refers to Germany's federal structure80 and to her 
population's discipline and self-sacrifice. These 
qualities, misused by the Germans for aggressive 
purposes, should be adopted by the British for the 
nobler aim of defending liberty.81 In other words, the 
heartland can also learn from the Hobbesian contenders.
77. Curtis, Wav, p.42.
78. Lionel Curtis, 'The 'Fifties as Seen Fifty Years 
Hence", in International Affairs 227 (1951), pp.273-84, 
here p.283.
79. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.5-8.
80. Ibid., pp.22-3.
81. Curtis, 'End', pp.794-95.
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Less admiringly, on another occasion the Germans are 
called "industrious imitators ... rather than 
originators".82
In The Commonwealth of Nations he repeats the 
motif of Germany as the contemporary hotbred of the 
autocratic principle. Although praising the Germans as 
"the most intelligent, educated and virile people in 
Europe",83 he is scathing of their political system. 
Public opinion, to the degree that it is not completely 
dicounted, is manipulated by the government. The 
Germans see might as the supreme right and project the 
imposition of cultural Germanization on the world. Thus 
indoctrinated by their rulers, the people of Germany 
are, for the time being, prevented from embracing the 
commonwealth principle.84 Such an autocratic system, 
resting on the military prestige of the dynasty, has 
made war inevitable.85
In contrast to the Milner group's demand for the 
total defeat of Germany followed by a harsh peace, 
Curtis during the earlier stage of WW I adopts a rather 
conciliatory stance. Once the Germans themselves have 
overcome the spirit of autocracy and aggression, they 
can join the other powers on equal terms.86
In another article written around the time of the 
armistice, this is still held out as a promise, but
82 . Lionel Curtis, "The Price of Liberty", in Round 
Table 10 (1919), pp.1-20, here p.6.
83. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.682.
84 • Ibid., pp.681-6.
85. L. Curtis, "Letters to the People of India on 
Responsible Government', in L. Curtis, Papers Relating 
to the Application of the Principle of Dyarchy to the 
Government of India, Oxfords Clarendon, 1920, pp. 357- 
466, here pp.390-91.
86. Curtis, "End', pp.789, 792-93.
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there are some significant additions.87 After first 
praising Germany's past achievements in culture and for 
the cause of liberty, Curtis castigated the present 
Germans for having 'reverted to the creeds of ...
Attila and Genghis".88 They are collectively guilty of 
supporting despotism.
Curtis quotes Milner that there should be no 
revenge against them. However, they will have to pay 
heavy reparations for the war damages. Curtis presents 
these reparations as a pedagogical device, teaching the 
Germans to change their ways: 'In weariness, poverty, 
hunger, cold, and remorse a whole people must learn 
that lesson.'89 Here we have revanchist demands put into 
Curtis's high-minded moralism. But then again, in 1920, 
he favours quick admission of Germany to the League and 
its Council.90
Twenty years later, Curtis takes the revanchist 
programme he at one stage himself propagated to task.
In Civitas Dei, Curtis holds that military defeat first 
made the Germans renounce their failed autocratic 
system and to adopt the principle of self-government, 
thereby bringing forward able politicians.
Unfortunately, the short-sighted policy of the 
victorious Allies - Curtis, however, blames France more 
than Britain - in enforcing reparations undermined the 
stability of the Weimar Republic. In the end, it
87. Curtis, 'Windows", pp.36-39.
88. Ibid., p.36.
89. Ibid., p.37.
90. Lionel Curtis, 'The World in Conference", in Round 
Table 10 (1920), pp.721-55, here pp.748, 752.
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contributed to the birth of an even more dangerous 
autocracy.91
On another occasion, Curtis blames the League of 
Nation's false promise of collective security and its 
clumsy decision-making mechanism for preventing Britain 
to see in time that the Weimar Republic needed to be 
strengthened.92
To put it into the terminology of van der Pijl, 
Curtis regrets a lost opportunity for integrating a 
contender country into the heartland. He, however, is 
unequivocal that this contender country first needs to 
be defeated. Grinding old social imperialist axes,93 he 
argues in Civitas Dei against the traditional 
Conservative luminary Lansdowne. His wartime plan for a 
compromise leaving Germany's military capabilities in 
place would have meant disaster.94
In his wartime publications, the projected 
international federation is, in the first place, 
directed against another German war of conquest.
Curtis, however, foresees that the strength of this 
federation will contribute to the Germans' renouncing 
their autocratic leanings. They will then be able to 
join, but only once the USA are already a member.95 He
Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.897-99.
92. Lionel Curtis, “World Order', in International 
Affairs 18 (1939), pp.301-20, here p.320.
Robert Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George 
Coalition: The Politics of Social Imperialism, 1900- 
1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, 
pp.16, 19.
94. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.943.
95. Curtis, Decision, pp.58-59; Curtis, Action, p.48; 
Curtis, World War, pp.87-88, 161, 231-32.
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rejects the idea of breaking up Germany into several 
states after victory.96
Some years later, slight variations on this issue 
are proposed. In a 1947 article written for a German 
readership, Curtis advocates membership for Germany 
once the federation embraces Britain, Western Europe 
and the Dominions. In other words, the Germans can join 
already before the US have. The different German 
provinces will become part of the federation as 
separate states, i.e. Germany will in effect be 
dismembered. Under this scheme Germans can learn the 
art of self-government.97
In the following year, Curtis elaborates upon 
this. He points to the danger of losing German goodwill 
by prolonging occupation. Since all armies and arms 
manufacturing will be under union control, Germany can 
no longer be a menace to peace. He now adds that 
Soviet-occupied Eastern Germany will at first have to 
remain outside. But seeing the luckier fate of their 
Western compatriots, the East Germans will probably be 
the first to break out of the Eastern Bloc.98
A similar solution for the German problem is 
sketched once more in The Open Road to Freedom of 1950. 
This time, because the Federal Republic of Germany has 
come into existence, the dismemberment idea is dropped 
again.99
96. Curtis, Action, p.32; Curtis, World Warf p.149.
97. Lionel Curtis, "Vereintes Europa", in Merkur 1 
(1947), 5, pp.641-49, here pp.647-48.
9*. Curtis, World Revolution, pp.151-53.
99. Curtis, Open Road, p.27.
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The Contenders: Japan and the Soviet Union
Of the other Hobbesian states, Japan's treatment 
by Curtis is quite variable. Already in 1907 he 
identified, together with the German one, a Japanese 
naval threat to the British Empire.100 In The Green 
Memorandum, he argues that the Anglo-Japanese defence 
treaty is unpopular in Canada and recommends not to 
renew it.101 In the same book, he also refers vaguely to 
a future 'Asiatic menace' which might necessitate to 
concentrate the Royal Navy at Vancouver and Hongkong.102
During the inter-war period, the tune remarkably 
changes. In the vein of the social imperialists, Curtis 
now admires the patriotism of the Japanese, which had 
enabled them to rise to great power status and which he 
recommends as a model. He further credits the Japanese 
Emperor (and the Italian king) with having overseen the 
transition from paternalist to popular government.103 On 
another occasion, he praises Japan's achievements for 
demonstrating how an Eastern nation can import Western 
knowledge without losing its own distinctive character. 
Japan is the proof that there is no base to Western 
assumptions of racial superiority.104 The integration of 
another contender state into the heartland seemed to be 
well under way.
100. Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International 
Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995, p.107.
101. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.37-38.
1°2. Ibid., p. 114.
103. L. Curtis, 'The Structure of Government Continued', 
in L. Curtis, Papers Relating to the Application of of 
the Principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India# 
pp.291-325, here p. 301; Curtis, 'Letters', pp.391,
397.
104. Curtis, Capital Question, pp.298-99.
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In the 1940s, when Japan had turned into an enemy 
of Britain, Curtis explains this as reaction to 
Dominion protectionism and immigration law aiming to 
keep the population white. He also points to Japan's 
commercial success in building up a merchant marine at 
the expense of British shipping. During the war, this 
merchant marine was of decisive help for Japan's 
conquests.105
A final reference from 1949 is rather dismissive. 
Japan is now counted, together with China and the 
African countries as one of these "backward nations'.106 
Defeated and occupied (and, in contrast to the equally 
defeated Germany, non-white) Japan no longer enjoys the 
respect of Curtis.
Before the 1940s, Curtis has little to say about 
Russia/the Soviet Union. While his commonwealth 
principle was directed against Marxism, he obviously 
did not yet see the Soviet Union as a major challenger. 
As we have seen, he at one stage wanted the Americans 
to step into the cauldron of the Russian civil war. In 
1920, he advocates the early admission of Russia to the 
League of Nations - as soon as she possesses "a 
government capable of admission'.107 And Communist- 
inspired troubles in China during the mid-1920s are the
105. Curtis, World War, pp.179-82; Curtis, World 
Revolution, pp.138-41.
106. Curtis, World Revolution, p.134. Curiously, in the 
German translation of this book, only China and Africa 
are mentioned in the list of the backward peoples. Did 
the German translators drop Japan out of consideration 
for a former wartime ally? See Durch Weltrevolution zum 
Frieden (transl. by Dr Juchhoff and J. Stocky), 
Cologne-Lindenthal: Liga, 1949, p.138.
107. Curtis, "World', pp.748, 752.
<118
result of the Soviet Union deliberately picking up a 
quarrel with Britain.108
During WWII, Curtis is in favour of continuing the 
alliance with Moscow for another generation.109 
Nevertheless, already in 1946 he warned of a policy of 
appeasement vis-a-vis the Soviets.110 However, in the 
following year he spoke out in support of Bevin's 
efforts to establish mutual confidence between the 
British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union and 
criticized the opposition of the Dominions to these 
efforts.111
With the Cold War unfolding, Curtis finally takes 
up a belligerent stance. The Soviet Union cannot be 
trusted to cooperate with the West for peace and 
prosperity.112 On the contrary, there is '(t)he Marxist 
obsession of the Russian Communists that war with 
capitalist States is inevitable."113
In World Revolution in the Cause of Peace he makes 
a - in view of the real events of 40 years later - 
quite remarkable prophesy. Once the Western federation 
is in place, the process of undermining the Eastern 
Bloc will start. Beginning with Eastern Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, the populations of the USSR's satellite 
states will overthrow the Communist yoke. Then the
108. Lionel Curtis, 'Shanghai', in Round Table 21 
(1931), pp.738-68, here pp.755-56.
109. Curtis, Wav, pp.21-22; Curtis, World War, p.225.
HO. May, Round Table, p.379.
H I .  Lavin, From Empire, p . 309.
H 2. Curtis, Open Road, p.20.
113. Curtis, World Revolution, p.156.
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regime will also break down in Russia, making her also 
ready to join the federation.114
The integration of the last major contender power 
into the heartland is thus only a matter of time. But, 
until then, vigilance is necessary.
The Prize Areas The Coloured Races
Curtis was not only concerned about the Dominions 
but also about Britain's tropical dependencies. In The 
Green Memorandum, he also deals with countries like 
India and Egypt. Foreshadowing Lord Lugard's Dual 
Mandate,115 Curtis sees the British rule over them, 
which has the purpose to prevent disorder, as a duty 
both to the indigenous people and to the world at 
large. Unfortunately, the rise of nationalist movements 
has turned these countries into 'vulcanoes '.116
Already two years later Curtis's ideas about white 
rule over coloured people had matured. He now proposed 
as an interim measure the presence of non-voting 
Indian, Malay and West African 'natives' in the 
imperial parliament, where they would act as advisers. 
He also accepted that it would be a contradiction if 
his planned commonwealth would govern communities which 
were not included in citizenship.117
During World War I, Curtis considers the 
integration of people like the Turks and the Chinese
114. Ibid., pp. 153-54.
115. F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical 
Africa, Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 
1922.
116. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.25-26. See also 
Curtis, 'Windows', p.28.
117. Lavin, From Empire, p. 116.
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into the future world state. They are not to be 
deprived of self-determination because they have 
already reached a higher stage than, for example, the 
Africans. But, at the same time, they are not civilized 
enough to join the world entity as equal members. His 
solution is to leave to these peoples control over 
their internal affairs but let the other members of the 
world state take over responsibility for their external 
relations.118 In other words, the already existing semi­
colonial status of countries like China and the Ottoman 
Empire is to be formalized and internationalized.
In The Commonwealth of Nations, Curtis dwells upon 
the dichotomy of the Orient and the Occident. Despite 
their lack of racial unity, all Asiatic peoples have 
similar characteristics, i.e. a strong religious 
conscience that stresses the duty to God but not to 
one's fellow men. In such societies, obedience to the 
limitless authority of the despotic state is likewise 
acknowledged as a religious duty, because the ruler is 
considered to be appointed by the gods. In contrast to 
Europe, Asia is stagnating because the Asians do not 
believe in free will and see customs and laws as divine 
and not subject to change. That Europeans were so 
different can be explained by the influence of 
Christianity, by climate, and by Europe's numerous 
coastlines.119
He argues that the project of the commonwealth, 
as far as the 'orientals" are concerned, involves 
bringing them to a higher order with representative
118. Curtis, 'End', pp.786-87.
Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.3-12.
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institutions. This is the noblest enterprise yet 
conceived in the course of history.120 In his writings 
on dyarchy, he clearly states that responsible 
government, although having first developed in the 
West, is a universal ideal.121
On the other hand, there is a flavour of a fear of 
race war in his agenda. Curtis claims that the age-old 
struggle between Europe and Asia continues in the 
contemporary day in the shape of Asian immigration to 
Africa and the Pacific.122 The uprisings of coloured 
people in Asia, Africa and the USA against white 
supremacy are 'bursting into flames'. In addition,
Islam turns out to be more succesful than Christianity 
in converting Central Africans. In order not to fuel 
these threats, the whites' claim for domination must be 
dropped.123 In The Prevention of War Curtis says that 
the ultimate world problem is the relationship between 
the European, Asiatic and African races. All of them 
need laws made by themselves as soon as they are able 
to exercise control over themselves.124
However, this is to be a long-term project. The 
inhabitants of Asia, Africa and the Pacific will for 
centuries remain incapable of self-government.125 In 
Civitas Dei, he once more explains why: People living 
in temperate zones have a more vigorous physique, a 
higher sense of the value of time, and more capacity 
for sustained and methodological action than those
12°. Ibid., pp. 176-7.
121. Curtis, 'Letters', p.431.
*22. Curtis, Commonwealth, pp.13-14, 125.
123. Curtis, 'Introduction', p.liii.
124. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, pp.80, 148.
125. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.700.
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living in a hot climate.126 He modifies, however, the 
picture of the eternal European-Asian conflict. It is 
continuing, but now in a blurred version. 'Asian" 
autocracy is also to be found in Europe, while the 
commonwealth idea is spreading in Asia.127
In 1939, again, he argued that the world order 
that he proposed included all human beings. People who 
made laws against the Jews or the Coloured people would 
find that there was no clear-cut line between one race 
and another.128 But, as we have seen in his later 
apologies for the racist immigration laws of the 
Dominions, Curtis remained himself quite willing to 
draw this line•
Let us now have a closer look at how Curtis's 
perception of Indians, Middle Easterners, Chinese and 
Africans developed over time.
The Prize Area: India
During his South African years, Curtis still 
thought that the Indians would be forever incapable of 
self-government.129 As we have seen, he radically 
changed that view some years later and spoke out in 
favour of ultimately including the Indians into the 
Commonwealth.
However, this would take time. In The Commonwealth 
of Nations, Curtis asserts that the immediate extension 
of sovereignty to the Indians would cause anarchy.130 He
126. Curtis, Civitas Dei, p.2.
127. Ibid., p.45.
128. Lavin, From Empire, p.286.
129. Ibid., p.60.
130. Curtis, Commonwealth, p. 155.
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repeats this motif in The Prevention of War, albeit in 
connection with a moderate criticism of the British 
rules The Indians are not ripe for the control of their 
external affairs, because they cannot yet govern 
themselves. This, however, is not their own fault. The 
British should have introduced measures of self- 
governmental responsibility much earlier.131
It is in his publications on dyarchy that Curtis's 
ideas of India's place in the future Commonwealth 
become more precise. He assures the Indians that they 
are on a different civilization plane than the Central 
Africans because there already exist small groups of 
people capable of formulating political questions among 
them.132
At the beginning, voting rights have to be 
restricted to these small groups. The qualifications 
for granting the franchise must be "sound". That this 
might mean a very small initial electorate is not a 
problem. Rather, it will stimulate efforts for social 
reforms ultimately leading to an expansion in the 
number of voters.133
As yet, Indian public opinion needs to improve 
both in terms of quality and quantity. Self-government, 
i.e. elected parliaments on both all-Indian and 
provincial levels with executives dependent upon a
131. Kerr and Curtis, Prevention, pp.148-50.
132. L. Curtis, "A Letter to the People of India", in L. 
Curtis, Papers Relating to the Application of the 
Principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India, pp.BB­
SS, here pp.53-54.
133. L. Curtis, "A Letter to the Hon. Babu Bhupendra 
Nath Basu (an experiment in the application of the 
principle of Dyarchy to the government of the United 
Provinces", in L. Curtis, Papers Relating to the 
Application of the Principle of Dyarchy to the 
Government of India, pp.96-200, here pp.112-13.
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majority in these parliaments, should be the ultimate 
aim of British policy in India. Furthermore, India will 
also have a share in the running of the British 
Commonwealth as a whole.134
Curtis makes it clear that a self-governing India 
could claim the right to restrict immigration, whether 
of European colonists or of Africans.135 The future all- 
Indian government will also have control over tariffs. 
Curtis also deems the existence of Indian nationalism 
necessary, if understood as ties of mutual esteem and 
affection between the people of the sub-continent. Out 
of this nationalism an additional adherence to the 
British Commonwealth will naturally develop.136
In sum, Curtis advocates the extension of self- 
government on the lines of the Dominions to India. This 
is to be done through a step-by-step approach of 
creating a responsible electorate.137 The example of 
India will spread the idea of freedom throughout Asia 
and Africa.138
This is all very well. But there was also a catch 
for Britain. When advocating Indian representation in 
the imperial parliament in 1917, Curtis mentioned that 
Britain's war debt had to be divided between all 
members of the British Commonwealth. As May dryly 
comments: 'India's representation was necessary, 
because her money was needed.'139
134. Curtis, 'A Letter to the People of India', pp.81- 
82.
135. Curtis, 'A Letter to the Hon. Babu Bhupendra Nath 
Basu', p.101.
136. Curtis, 'Letters', pp.396-97.
137. Curtis, 'Introduction', pp.xxii-xxiii.
138. ibid., p.lxi.
139. May, Round Table, p. 193.
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Furthermore, it would also take a long time until 
India would reach a position of equality with the white 
Dominions. In a 1923 memorandum, Curtis expects even 
partial self-government without responsibility for 
external affairs and defence to take at least three or 
four generations.140
As we have seen, Curtis in Civitas Dei foresees 
that an only partially self-governing India will join 
the federation quite early on. He cryptically 
recommends 'admission on terms which would not endanger 
the stability of the international commonwealth'.141 
What these terms would be becomes clearer in his 1940s 
writings on China, to which we will turn later.
The Prize Area: The Middle East
As shown above, in 1915 Curtis proposes a kind of
international protectorate for the Ottoman Empire. In a
1918 article, this idea is replaced by that of an
American mandate for the bulk of the region. In the
same article, he tells a tall tale about the effects of
British rule over Egypt. It will take a long time
before she is ready for self-government. But:
Less than forty years ago Egypt was one of the most 
miserable countries on earth. To-day she is one of the 
most prosperous.142
In the following year, he claims that, with the
exception of (ungrateful) Egyptian nationalists most
Middle Easterners want British or American tutelage.
Curtis dramatizes the situation in the whole region in
order to stress his point that the USA and the
140. Ibid., p.269. See also 193.
141. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.935-36.
142. Curtis, 'Windows', pp.23-24.
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Dominions must help Britain running it. Given its
position at the intersection of "two principal systems
of human society'143 (read freedom/Europe and despotism/
Asia), unsettled conditions in the Middle East provide
a threat to the whole world - the more so since
religious conflicts are involved. Thus:
Demoralized by ages of despotism, trampled by war, torn 
by internal conflicts over races, sects, and religions, 
they lack the primary condition in which alone free 
government can develop.144
Despite such alarmist assertions, for the 
following 30 years Curtis was no longer interested in 
the region. His only reference to it was the one in 
Civitas Dei about the special membership for Egypt in 
the international federation.
However, in his late work The Open Road to 
Freedom, the crucial importance of the Middle East is 
highlighted once again. This time, it is not so much 
its geographical position that raises Curtis's 
attention but its newly-achieved place as the centre of 
world oil exports. He warns that the Soviet Union wants 
to get hold over Middle Eastern oil and that only her 
failure to achieve this has so far prevented World War 
III. He presses the urgency for the West to pool its 
control over the Middle Eastern oil reserves.145
Finally, in one of his last statements on current 
affairs, Curtis in 1952 proposed the transfer of 
British troops from the Suez Canal Zone to Cyprus. This 
was to be a concession to Egyptian nationalism but, at 
the same time, involved keeping the British grip over
143. Curtis, "Price', p. 18,
144. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
145. Curtis, Open Road, pp. 155-57.
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the island, whose Greek nationalist movement ENOSIS he 
discounted.146
The Prize Area: China
As we have seen, the putting of her foreign 
affairs under international tutelage was also proposed 
for China by Curtis during WWI. After this first 
passing reference, Curtis developed an intense interest 
in that country in the years around 1930, leading to a 
book and an article about her affairs.
Given China's vast population, Curtis now 
considers the political chaos prevailing there as the 
most serious threat to world peace.147 British interests 
there are bound to the welfare of that country, of 
which the establishment of a stable government is most 
important. Rejecting the alternative possibilities of 
reaching this stability by colonial rule, by China's 
break-up into smaller states or by the coming to power 
of a new imperial dynasty, he settles for the 
establishment of self-government as the only 
solution.148
Once a stable government is in place, Britain 
should revise the unequal treaties between her and 
China - despite all the opposition of British residents 
in the treaty ports, who stick to an obsolete gunboat 
diplomacy. Putting his bets on the Kuomintang 
government under Chiang Kai-shek, Curtis also urges the 
transfer of the British Ministry from Peking to the new
146. Lavin, From Empire, p.320; May, Round Table, p.414.
147. Curtis, Capital Question. pp.v-vi, 235, 245.
148. Ibid., pp.287-92.
capital Nanking, This would demonstrate Britain's trust 
in the Kuomintang government.149
But, for all his awovals of a new policy vis-h-vis 
China, Curtis does not completely break with his 
previous acceptance of the country's inferior position 
on the international level. First, he diagnoses an 
unwillingness in the Chinese mind to adhere strictly to 
laws, business contracts and international agreements. 
Britain should thus courteously but firmly insist upon 
the exact fulfillment of treaties.150 In other words, 
the Chinese are not to be trusted completely and need 
to be handled kindly but firmly.
Second, the extraterritorial settlements, 
particularly the one in Shanghai, are "on the whole the 
most promising instance of international co-operation 
which the world has yet produced".151 Thanks to the 
provision of legal security under Western rule,
Shanghai has become the true economic centre upon which 
the rest of China depends.152 Suitably reformed by 
extending the political rights of the Chinese residents 
there,153 the International Settlements can have the 
function of teaching the Chinese the application of the 
rule of law and of self-government. Until China has 
achieved that stage herself, it is not in her interest 
that she regains sovereign control over these Western
149. Ibid., pp.247-52.
15°. Ibid., pp.264-72.
151. Curtis, 'Shanghai", p.750.
152. Ibid., pp.750-53.
153. Ibid., pp.758-61.
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enclaves.154 Extraterritoriality must remain in place 
for decades to come.155
Third, Curtis observes that the progressive 
members of the new government want foreign advisors 
while the reactionary wing opposes this. In his 
opinion, China is in particular need of political 
advice. The ministers of the great powers, namely of 
Great Britain, the USA and Japan, should have the 
function of giving sympathetic 'advice" to their hosts, 
with the aim of fostering a strong central government. 
Such a central government, by providing stability and 
thus stimulating trade, was also in the best interest 
of these foreign powers.156
For Curtis, China in effect is to remain a state 
under the tutelage of Britain and others. As he admits 
with unusual candour, stable conditions in China will 
benefit the British Empire enormously.157 In particular, 
vast sums of capital could be invested into the 
development of her industries.158
Curtis comes back to China in his writings from 
the second half of the 1940s. With decolonization in 
Asia under way, Curtis tackles the question of how the 
'backward" countries could join the federation without, 
however, controlling it with their large populations. 
His solution is elegantly simple. Representation in the 
federal parliament's Lower House will be in proportion 
not to population but to taxing capacity, i.e. national
154. Curtis, Capital Question, pp.262-63.
155. May, Round Table, p.340.
156. Curtis, Capital Question, pp.254-58, 293-98.
157. May, Round Table, p.340.
158. Curtis, Capital Question, p.300.
wealth. Under this arrangement, the poor but populous
states like India and China will be under-represented,
thus allaying the problem.159
In a revealing passage, Curtis writes:
While we may hope and expect that in course of time 
politically backward peoples like the Chinese will 
learn to keep order amongst themselves, it is most 
unlikely that they will ever achieve the same taxable 
capacity per head as the nations of Western Europe, the 
United States, or the British Dominions.160
In other words, for all the progress they may make, 
the Chinese and the other Asians will luckily never 
reach a position of equality with the West.
The Prize Area: Africa
Curtis's writings about the Africans show similar 
intellectual acrobatics. In 1900, Curtis said that the 
presence of black labour made the whites indolent. The 
trade unions' policy of excluding the blacks was 
acceptable, and it would in fact be the best if they 
would die out.161 In the following year, he was not 
hopeful for the future of South Africa if the present 
proportions between the whites and the blacks remained 
as they were. The blacks caused the whites to become 
incompetent.162
In 1906, he repeated that the South African 
federation had to be white.163 In the same year, in his 
draft of the Selbourne Memorandum, he warned of a 
"native' uprising. He added that the native franchise
159. Curtis, World War, p.114; Curtis, World Revolution, 
p.134-35; Curtis, Open Road, pp.44-46.
160. Curtis, World Revolution, p.135.
161. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes, pp.110-11.
162. Lavin, From Empire, pp.41-22.
163. Ibid., p.66.
AT 1
of the Cape was not to be forced upon the Transvaal.164 
On the other hand, Curtis did not exclude voting rights 
for the blacks completely. In 1908 he recommended for 
the South African Union an Upper House elected via a 
colour-blind franchise, but through a high level 
educational test. He argued that the British 
government and the Cape province would not accept 
complete lack of representation for coloured people and 
consequently supported equal rights for all civilized 
men.165
At the same time, he repeated his concern about 
the need for white entry into the ranks of unskilled 
labour and the stopping of coloured labour immigration. 
There had to be no job reservations (at the same time, 
however, also no exclusion) of black workers.166 He kept 
on stressing the importance of the building of a white 
labour force.167 In The Green Memorandum he dramatically 
claims that the native question in South Africa is a 
problem of life and death.168
Leaving the special case of South Africa aside, 
Curtis developed a paternalist concern for Africans. In 
the 1920s, he wanted Kenya to be run for the benefit of 
the Africans rather than for the white settlers. He 
recommended the appointment and a future election of 
"educated natives" as representatives for the colonial 
government. However, according to Lavin similar
164. Ibid., p.71.
165. Ibid., p.88.
166. Ibid., p. 100.
167. Ibid., pp. 100-01.
168. Curtis, Green Memorandum, pp.52-53.
safeguards have been ineffective in South Africa and 
Rhodesia.169
As in the case of his concern with the working 
classes in Britain, Curtis combined his sympathy with a 
high-handed attitude. In The Commonwealth of Nations he 
claims that there is a natural superiority of the 
Europeans over the Africans.170 The American blacks, 
according to Curtis, are the members of a backward 
civilization.171 Misrule in Liberia, then one of the two 
only independent African states, is used as an example 
for the inability of the Africans to govern 
themselves.172 And Central Africans are unable to form 
'any valid opinion" on how they should be governed.173 
(Only the Pacific islanders fared worse in Curtis's 
writings of that times slavers, head hunters and 
cannibals who, if left to themselves, are 'without hope 
of redemption ".)174
In Civitas Dei, the tune somewhat changes. The 
caste-like stratification based on colour in the US is 
now described as problematic.175 Furthermore, he now 
foresees that in a - perhaps remote future - there will 
be 'negro Dominions' in Africa.176 Indeed, the 'natives" 
of Africa, New Guinea and Java are to be taught self-
169. Lavin, From Empire, pp.230-34.
170. Curtis, Commonwealth, p.210.
171. Ibid., p.697.
172. Curtis, 'Windows", pp.30-32.
173. Curtis, 'A Letter to the People of India", p.53.
174. Curtis, 'Windows", p.29.
175. Curtis, Civitas Dei, pp.375-76.
176. Ibid., p.709.
government so that they can join the international 
commonwealth at some future time.177
In his writings of the late 1940s, Curtis further 
elaborates upon this theme. The federal union 
encompassing Britain, the Dominions and Western Europe 
will also control the bulk of tropical Africa, pooling 
Europe's colonies there. Under this system, an 
ultimately self-governing African Dominion should be 
sponsored.178
This scheme will also provide the solution for an 
old problem troubling Curtis. In contrast to South 
Africa, there will be no colour bar in the emerging 
'Negro Dominion' north of the Zambesi. Consequently, 
Curtis expects the South African blacks to move over 
time into that Dominion, finally leaving South Africa 
as a white men's country. With black labour gone, the 
poor whites will have to work themselves and stop being 
idle.175
It is striking to compare Curtis's proposal of 
1950 with what he wrote about the issue exactly half a 
century earlier. In both cases, the same problem was 
diagnosed (the availability of black labour making poor 
whites lazy) and in broad terms the same solution 
prescribed (the blacks must disappear from South 
Africa). The only difference was that in 1900 Curtis 
craved for their dying-out, while in 1950 he had found 
a much more benign way.
This specific case is symptomatic for the whole 
development of Curtis's thought from WWI onwards: He
177. Ibid., pp.937-38.
178. Curtis, World Revolution, p.149.
179. Curtis, Open Road, pp.28-31.
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skillfully managed to put old imperialist wine into new 
humanitarian and internationalist bottles.
Conclusion
The Rhodes-Milner group, of which Curtis was a 
member, was a policy planning body that aimed at 
providing hegemonic ideology that would keep the 
Lockean hertland together, help to offset challenges 
from the Hobbesian contenders and provide justification 
for keeping the inhabitants of the Prize area in their 
proper place.
These efforts at ideology-construction happened 
within the context of the decline of liberal 
internationalism and of the Pax Britannica. The state 
monopoly tendency was ascendant and the international 
system became more competitive. Although there was much 
disagreement within the Rhodes-Milner group on specific 
issues, for example imperial federation vs. the much 
looser concept of cooperation, the group remained 
unified in its goal of creating ideological cohesion. 
The parochial interests of Britain (or, rather, of its 
ruling class and its transnational extensions) were to 
be sold as universal principles benefitting the whole 
of mankind.
Curtis's specific contribution is fourfold. First, 
he advocates federal means for the coming-together of 
the heartland. While stressing Britain's past 
achievements for the cause of freedom, especially 
during her 19th century heyday, Curtis appeals to the 
Dominions and the USA to take over more 
'responsibility', using particularly shared control 
over the Prize area as a bait.
Second, Curtis wants Britain's position within the 
federally integrated heartland to remain strong. While 
formally based on the principle of equality, the 
initial imperial federation with its Western European 
adjunct would be dominated by Britain. Later on, 
leadership would pass to the USA, but only after 
Britain had shaped the federal structure. While Curtis 
spells much ink on constitutional questions, he 
conveniently ignores the financial power of the City of 
London over the Dominions and, to a lesser extent, over 
parts of Western Europe.
Third, military threats on the part of the 
Hobbesian contenders are to be resisted and the 
contending state, if possible by peaceful means, is to 
be integrated into the heartland by embracing the 
commonwealth principle. True to his assertion that 
economic issues are subordinate to political ones, 
Curtis does not see the challenge put by the contenders 
as part of a catching-up effort necessitating state 
dominance over civil society. Instead, he presents the 
contradiction between the British Commonwealth and the 
USA on the one hand and Germany, Japan and the Soviet 
Union on the other hand as expression of the age-old 
clash between freedom and autocracy.
Fourth, he holds out to the 'backward' peoples of 
the Prize area the promise to join, one day, the 
heartland in a position of equality. This assertion of 
racial equality is, however, heavily qualified.
Although the coloured races will eventually rise to the 
stage of self-government this is to take an undefinite 
time. In the meanwhile, the colonial empire will remain 
in existence in a internationalized shape. And even
after joining the international federation the formally 
colour-blind principle of parliamentary representation 
in accordance to national wealth will ensure continued 
de facto dominance by Europe and North America. From 
the perspective of hegemony, the catch of this argument 
is that it allows one to pose as critic of old-style 
colonialism while leaving the substance of it intact.
Curtis's specific federation proposals failed to 
convince many. But the implicit (and often explicit) 
assumptions behind them - that Britain was due to her 
moral superiority entitled to her disproportionate 
share of heartland leadership and Prize area control - 
fell on more open ears. It was not that Curtis and his 
Rhodes-Milner fellows invented this assumption but 
their contribution was to modernize and reproduce it. 
The convenient replacement of the ebullient, but also 
honest, term 'British Empire" by 'British Commonwealth' 
in public usage is a case in point.
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Conclusion
Using Curtis as an example, this thesis has argued 
that the common conceptualization of interwar IR 
thought as a debate between idealism and realism 
muddles rather than clarifies the issue. Instead of 
this, a neo-Gramscian framework is proposed as a better 
way to conceptualize the rich and variable thought of 
the period. While conceding the realm of ideas their 
own dynamics, this framework nevertheless grounds them 
firmly within the process of capital accumulation. In 
particular, works of that time can be usefully analysed 
with recourse to the conceptual apparatus of Van der 
Pijls his ideal-typical comprehensive concepts of 
control (liberal internationalism, the state monopoly 
tendency and their corporate-liberal synthesis) as well 
as his distinction between the Lockean heartland, 
Hobbesian contenders and the Prize area.
By referring to a number of secondary works, the 
mainstream version of the alleged 'First Debate" can be 
extraced. In that account, idealism and realism are 
presented as mutually incompatible schools of thought. 
Idealists believe in progress and universal ethics, 
assume the existence of a world community and hope to 
abolish war through international organization, 
collective security or a world state. Realists have a 
pessimistic image of human nature, embrace relativism, 
see competing states as the main units of the 
international system and discount the possibility of 
change for the better. Idealism was wishful thinking 
that owed its temporary strength to an emotional
reaction to WWI. It was then decisively defeated by 
level-headed realism, as represented by E.H. Carr.
Recently, this mainstream conceptualization has 
come in for a number of revisions or criticisms. First, 
there are those who want to give the terms idealism and 
realism an extended or completely different meaning or 
to drop them altogether. Such alternative 
conceptualizations remain, however, somewhat on the 
sidelines within the IR community. More in the 
limelight stands a second group, which wants to remove 
from the interwar idealists the stigma of being muddle- 
headed, points out to the diversity and originality of 
their thought and puts the whole image of a paradigm 
shift from idealism to realism into question. At the 
same time, this group tends to reproduce the image of 
an idealist-realist dichotomy, with Carr on the side of 
the latter position.
This image has been challenged by new approaches 
that adopt a revisionist reading of Carr. According to 
this interpretation, he did not use the terms 
utopianism and realism in a clear-cut way but as a 
rhetorical and dialectical device. Instead of being an 
idealist-baiting proponent of realpolitik, Carr in many 
respects laid the groundwork for a critical, non­
positivist kind of IR that has worked as an inspiration 
for neo-Gramscians like Robert Cox. Carr drafted 
schemes for a more equal world order based upon a 
combination of justice and force, for a decoupling of 
national identity from vast geographical security and 
economic communities, and for an integrated Western 
Europe under British leadership. He could thus be 
frankly utopian himself. However, what arose his ire
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was when projects for an improved world were used as 
smokescreen for particularist ruling group interests 
and taken out of their historical context.
Lionel Curtis clearly lays himself open to such a 
charge. He had a formidable career of more than half a 
century. He was social worker, colonial official, 
adviser to the India and Colonial Office and the 
driving force behind the foundation of Chatham House. 
His activities helped to shape the destinies of South 
Africa, India and Ireland. He was a founding member of 
the Round Table network, which gave him additional 
access to the corridors of power. Most importantly, he 
was a prolific writer propagating imperial, Atlantic, 
European and world federation.
Although the project of a world state is for the 
mainstream versions of the "First Debate' a typical 
symptom of idealism, Curtis's writings cannot be so 
easily labelled. If the mainstream understandings of 
what idealism and realism are supposed to mean are used 
a puzzling picture emerges: Curtis believes in the 
possibility of boundless progress but sees it 
circumscribed by systemic constraints which have to be 
overcome by charismatic leaders. He propagates the 
principle of the commonwealth and the accompanying 
values of freedom and altruism as the goal for the 
whole of humanity but also stresses the necessity for 
cultural diversity and racial separation. He points out 
that democratic states are inherently peaceful, thus 
indicating the existence of a world community, but that 
the existence of the anarchic state system undermines 
the spread of democratic values and thus prevents world 
peace. He rejects the logics of the balance of power
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but is even more scathing towards the idea of 
collective security. Indeed, he is so much of a 
'realist' stressing the inevitably conflictual nature 
of the international system that he sees the only way 
out in a radically idealist solution: the world state. 
What can we make out of this, except from observing 
that he was both an idealist and a realist?
Since the mainstream accounts have their limits, 
it is more helpful to conceptualize Curtis's work 
within the framework of the neo-Gramscian approaches 
within IR. According to Gramsci's concept of hegemony, 
a specific class manages to permeate civil society with 
its own values by presenting them as transcending class 
divisions. This concept can also be used at the 
international level. As Cox has shown, we can speak of 
a hegemonic order if one state uses its own powerful 
position in a way that appears to be in the interest of 
humanity at large. Van der Pijl has further developed 
these insights by relating specific forms of 
accumulation with certain comprehensive concepts of 
control which supplant each other in what he calls the 
Lockean heartland. This heartland consists of those 
state/society complexes with an autonomous civil 
society. It is faced with the challenges emanating from 
the Hobbesian contender countries, where the state has 
swallowed up civil society. This distinction, in this 
thesis applied to the case of Curtis, is of course also 
of relevance for other IR writers. For example, it 
could be used to show that classical (Anglo-Saxon) 
realism is not the same as Continental realpolitik. The 
work of the classical realists is rather a synthesis of 
the ideological assumptions of the liberal heartland
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with certain Hobbesian elements introduced from the 
contenders•
To come back to Curtis, in order to see how he 
relates to van der Pijl's framework we have, as a first 
step, to place him within the context of the political 
movements in Britain during the decades around the turn 
of the century. Three of them are of relevance here: 
First, empire federalism, which advocated a closer 
relationship between Britain and the white settlement 
colonies. Second, new liberalism, which rejected 
extreme individualism, stressed that one had to realize 
oneself within and through society and called for state 
actions to overcome poverty and inequality. Third, 
social imperialism, which wanted welfare measures to 
make the British fitter for the struggle for existence 
and which wanted to increase the efficiency of the 
political system through curbing parliamentary power. 
All these movements have to be seen within the context 
of the shift from extensive to intensive accumulation 
and from liberal internationalism to the state monopoly 
tendency, which particularly embraced state action and 
welfare. Since the state monopoly tendency was 
especially engrained within the Hobbesian contender 
state, this shift at the same time meant a heightened 
challenge to the heartland. Empire federalism responded 
to this challenge by trying to drum a section of the 
heartland together. New liberalism and social 
imperialism, in their different ways, attempted to 
adopt certain elements of the state monopoly tendency 
to the liberal state of Britain.
It was this agenda which also moved Curtis. He, 
too, vehemently rejected the extreme individualism and
AAl
laisser-faire connected with liberal internationalism 
and the money-capital perspective of the 19th century. 
He took over Empire federalism and transformed it into 
world federation. The concept of the commonwealth has 
many parallels with new liberal thinking, except for 
his reserved attitude towards mass democracy. In this 
respect, he followed social imperialist critique of 
parliamentary rule and called for a greater role of 
"trusted leaders" instead. In economic and social 
terms, Curtis remained tied to elements of the money- 
capital perspective by putting stress on sound 
finances, rejecting corporatism and sticking to free 
trade. At the same time, he embraced the productive- 
capital perspective's call for welfare measures and 
class harmony. Curtis thus sketched his own version of 
a synthesis between liberal internationalism and the 
state monopoly tendency.
The main stress of his writings is, however, on 
the defence of the heartland and its Anglo-Saxon 
leading states. This was the general aim of the Rhodes- 
Milner group. Against the challenge of the Hobbesian 
states, the heartland had to integrate itself by 
federal means. To make the transition from British to 
American leadership more bearable for the UK's 
historical bloc of City bankers and attached 
industrialists, Britain had to take the initial lead in 
forming the federation. The USA would only come in 
later. Once caved in by the pooled strength of the 
Lockean state/society complexes, the Hobbesian 
contenders would be ready for internal transformation 
and integration into the heartland. As for the Prize 
area, for the peoples of India, the Middle East, China
AA*
and Africa there was the prospect of ultimate 
integration, but only in the future and on subordinate 
terms. In all this, Curtis had the interests of Britain 
in mind but framed them with a rhetoric of supposedly 
universal appeal. This is what a hegemonic ideology is 
supposed to do.
A A A
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